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Abstract 
This dissertation revisits Brazil's experience with multiple exchange rates 
(MERs) between 1953 and 1961. Exchange controls such as MERs were 
common across the world during the early days of the Bretton Woods 
arrangement, despite the resistance from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), which assumed they caused instability and balance of payments crises. 
Latin America’s use of exchange controls was widespread, with different 
exchange rates also adopted as instruments to stimulate import substitution 
industrialization (ISI). Brazil’s MER system was, however, a unique 
experiment, with all the country’s imports included in a regime of auctions of 
foreign exchange, resulting in a controlled depreciation process with different 
sectoral exchange rates. The experience had two phases, the first of which 
diverged from other cases in the region in lasting much longer, maintaining 
stable macroeconomic conditions, and avoiding IMF interventions. The second 
phase resulted in a decline of the system's macroeconomic effectiveness and its 
eventual collapse in 1961. This research investigates the peak and decline of 
Brazil’s MER systems by analyzing a new quantitative dataset that is further 
complemented by qualitative sources. The main thesis is that Brazil’s MER 
regime was a ‘successful’ experience during its first phase, with a singular 
design that supported the stabilization of macroeconomic conditions. Officials 
were ‘guiding the invisible hand’ of the market to help balance macroeconomic 
variables. The dissertation also shows that the MER system was not a 
protectionist instrument to stimulate import substitution in advanced sectors 
and did not generate distortions to sectoral industrial growth. It was, however, 
transformed during its second phase into a mechanism to subsidize private 
sector imports and increase the government’s direct participation in the 
industrial effort, which was an industrial deepening process with costly 
macroeconomic consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
Fixed exchange rates have been at the core of global monetary systems for a 
large part of the last two centuries (Bordo, 1993, p.3). They appeal to 
governments and policymakers due to their predictability, which facilitates 
investment and trade decisions, and reduces the risk of exchange rate volatility 
for foreign investors (Marston, 1993, p. 515). Today, following 40 years of 
financial liberalization after the end of the dollar-gold peg in 1973 and the 
numerous currency crises that followed, it is common to see nostalgic calls 
from economists for the return of one of the previous fixed global exchange 
rate regimes.1 Bretton Woods, the last such regime to regulate international 
finance, which lasted from the original agreement in 1944 until 1973, is 
remembered as a period of great stability, integration and expansion of trade, 
and economic growth, based exactly on the support of the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement (Frieden et al, 2000, p. 5). 
The fast recovery of international trade and economic growth after the Second 
World War has been attributed to the stability of the Bretton Woods regime 
(Bordo, 1993, p. 4). Between 1948 and 1968, the volume of global trade grew by 
290%, an average of 14.5% per year (Terborgh, 2003, p. 3), while the global 
economy grew by 4.2% per year on average (Eichengreen, 1993, p. 1). At the 
same time, only 2.5% of the 145 countries in the Bretton-Woods system were 
without an official pegged exchange rate (Obstfeld et al, 2005, p. 425). Bordo 
                                                 
1 In 2008 and 2009, important global policymakers made calls for the return of a rules-
based monetary system like Bretton Woods. Former Federal Reserve Bank Chairman 
Paul Volcker and Former European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet were 
two of the voices raising this debate. This debate has been reported by the media and a 
summary can be found in Hoefle (2008). 
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(1993, p. 4) identifies this strong economic performance and the stability in 
financial markets of the Bretton Woods arrangement and asks: ‘Was Bretton 
Woods successful in producing economic stability because it operated during a 
period of economic stability, or did the existence of the adjustable peg regime 
produce economic stability?’. Although he seems to suggest there might be 
more than meets the eye to the correlation, the stability of fixed exchanges rates 
and economic growth explains why the Bretton Woods arrangement has been 
unattractive for economic historians, so that it remains relatively understudied 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2002, p. 2).  
This paradigm has recently been challenged by a few important contributions 
to the literature. Bordo (1993, p. 4) himself, although never answering the 
question, further asked if Bretton Woods’ ‘statistical stability [was] an illusion – 
belied by the presence of continual turmoil in the foreign exchange markets?’. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, p. 31) claim it was: they estimated that about half of 
exchange rate arrangements in the 1950s and 1960s had dual or parallel rates, 
even if official pegged rates kept being reported to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) by countries that were part of the arrangement. Monnet and Puy 
(2015, p. 30) argue that most countries had overvalued or undervalued 
exchange rates compared to their long-term economic fundamentals for most of 
that period, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Switzerland. In 
Latin America, although almost all countries were founders of the IMF, and 
consequentially adopted fixed official exchange rates, at least 14 countries used 
parallel or multiple exchange rates (MERs) during the 1950s (Konig, 1968, p. 
39). Different exchange rate regimes were also a pattern across Europe and Asia 
(Edwards, 1987). 
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Bretton Woods was indeed an extremely unstable arrangement in its early 
days. Full currency convertibility between Europe and the USA was only 
reached in 1958; there was an enormous shortage of global liquidity in the 
1940s and the first half of the 1950s due to the creation of the dollar-standard; 
and the IMF was still a weak and developing institution incapable of 
performing as a trusted lender of last resort for countries with balance of 
payment difficulties (Horsefield, 1969). Bretton Woods was theoretically 
designed to solve the ‘Impossible Trillema’, restricting capital flows to allow 
currencies to remain pegged and countries to have independent monetary 
policies (Garber, 1993, p. 483). But this was not reflected in reality, as at least 
half of the countries with official exchange rates were adopting some form of 
parallel exchange rate or MERs to remain with the framework of the system 
(Reinhart & Rogoff, 2002, p. 31). 
This role of exchange and capital controls was central to the instability of the 
Bretton Woods regime but has gained little attention in the literature. The study 
of these instruments is still largely concentrated on the last forty years, after the 
increase in financial flows following the end of the dollar-gold peg in 1973, the 
so-called ‘era of financial liberalization’. According to Schulze (2000, p. 1), 
during the 1990s, 144 countries adopted controls on direct investments and 128 
controlled transactions on capital market securities. And since restrictions to 
free capital flows are contrary to the current paradigm of liberalization, these 
instruments have been analyzed by scholars with skepticism and strongly 
negative assumptions about their desirability (Magud et al, 2011; Cardoso & 
Goldfajn, 1997). The same is not true for the Bretton Woods era. As capital 
controls were theoretically an essential part of the regime to maintain exchange 
rates pegged and permit independent monetary policies, they are simply 
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assumed to be an effective part of the system. For this reason, the effectiveness 
of controls has not been comprehensively tested by historians of the period (the 
best exceptions are Giovannini, 1988; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2002). There are many 
fewer studies of controls during Bretton Woods because they are seen as the 
norm rather than the exception for that arrangement (Marston, 1993, p. 515). 
This lack of studies is the result of a misleading view of the Bretton Woods 
regime that does not differentiate between the roles of capital and exchange 
controls (Frieden et al, 2000, p. 5). While capital controls were indeed a central 
instrument for the arrangement and were accepted by the IMF to maintain 
pegged currencies, exchange controls were not (Terborgh, 2003, p. 14). 
Exchange controls are interventions in current account flows that restrict trade 
via controls on foreign exchange transactions, while capital controls are only 
targeted at capital account transactions. The IMF considered exchange controls 
as instruments for competitive devaluation and a source of global financial 
instability (Horsefield, 1969). Interestingly, though, both instruments have 
technically the same macroeconomic effect. Dual exchange rates, quotas, or 
other quantitative restrictions to flows have the exact same effect as applying a 
tax on a category of international transaction of the balance of payments 
(Adams & Greenwood, 1985, p. 56).  
During the 1950s the IMF distinguished between these instruments. While it 
accepted capital account restrictions, it was strongly against interventions in 
trade flows and the current account (IMF, 1967). The Bretton Woods monetary 
arrangement was based on free markets of pegged exchange rates to stimulate 
the recovery of global growth and trade, and defending this stance was the 
main role of the IMF in its early days. Various forms of exchange controls were, 
however, common during that period. Most countries adopted different 
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exchange rates and the extent of their use depended on how difficult it was for 
them to keep official exchanges rates pegged within the structure of the system 
(Frenkel & Rapetti, 2010, p. 13). Giovannini (1998, p. 11) argues that there were 
large asymmetric responses among countries in their use of exchange controls, 
which was a direct consequence of an unstable Bretton Woods system. Not 
following the IMF policy guide was, in fact, also the norm rather than the 
exception, and this essentially meant using some degree of permanent 
exchange controls. Hence Bordo raised the correct question when he asked 
whether the statistical stability of Bretton Woods was a mirage, behind which 
hides significant turmoil in exchange rate markets without official recognition. 
Eichengreen (1993, p. 626) follows the same line and concludes that ‘there was 
nothing particularly admirable about financial market performance under 
Bretton Woods’, although he too does not investigate what was behind the 
statistical appearance of stability. 
While under Bretton Woods controls have been understudied and incorrectly 
assumed to simply function properly, a similar criticism can also be made of 
the literature’s negative assumptions about capital controls over the last forty 
years, as they are assumed to be ex-ante ineffective and always a source of 
economic distortions (Magud et al, 2011, p. 3). There is a theoretical and 
empirical agreement in the recent literature that individual experiences should 
be analyzed based on a methodological approach that requires controls to be 
proved effective, as they are assumed to be economically inefficient (Schultze, 
2000). During the last few decades a large number of papers with both cross-
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country and case studies have followed this methodological line,2 testing 
whether controls led to better economic conditions based on their stated 
objectives, but always assuming controls need to be proven effective, given the 
standard that free flows are always the best option. Most of them have reached 
the same policy prescription, being generally against the use of capital controls 
but agreeing that they might sometimes work for specific purposes without a 
‘one size fits all’ rule (Habermeier et al, 2011; Ostry et al, 2010).  
Recently, however, this negative assessment has been challenged, with scholars 
and the IMF gradually moving away from their previous assumptions about 
controls. After being against capital controls for many years after the end of the 
Bretton Woods regime, in the last decade IMF policy guidance papers have 
reassessed the institution’s policy advice on the subject. The IMF now accepts 
that controls can have an important role in smoothing capital volatility, mainly 
by reducing the pace or altering the composition of inflows to specific 
economies in moments of high global liquidity (Ostry et al, 2010, p. 5). But still 
the IMF is not entirely sure of where and when these controls should be 
adopted. In one of its most recent staff discussion notes, their conclusion was 
that ‘[f]or reasons that are not yet fully understood, capital controls and related 
prudential measures achieve their stated objectives in some cases but not in 
others, and it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions’ (Habermeier et al, 
2011, p. 4).  
                                                 
2 The most important cross-country studies are Habermeier et al (2011), Ostry et al 
(2010) and Magud et al (2011). There is also a long literature of case studies, which 
includes Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997), Capion and Neumann (2003), Carvalho and 
Garcia (2006), Fratzscher (2012), Goldfajn and Minella (2005), Kovanen (1994), and 
Marion (1994). 
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The IMF has thus shifted to a position of analyzing case-by-case situations, 
evaluating the role of controls depending on their design, objectives, and 
results in each specific circumstance. The same approach is also emerging in 
the recent academic literature. Magud et al (2011, p. 1) state that there are 
multiple definitions of what constitutes ‘success’ for the implementation of 
controls, as it depends on policymakers’ objectives. This means that it is hard to 
separate out whether controls were successful only for their intended purposes 
or more broadly for the economy. The instruments should therefore be tested 
with pragmatism to not impose pre-existing views about their expected 
effectiveness. Clearly, a final conclusion on the subject is far from being 
established and additional case studies can shed light on the historical role of 
controls.  
The history of Latin America is one of the most interesting for understanding 
the role of exchange controls under the Bretton Woods system. During the 
1950s, as primary goods exporters and importers of manufactured products, 
most Latin American countries faced constraints to increasing export receipts 
and raising dollar inflows. The opening of import markets after the Second 
World War resulted in significant pressures for more foreign exchange (Baer, 
1972, p. 97). With closed capital accounts, intervening in the trade balance to 
restrict imports became a pattern across the region. The use of exchange 
controls, particularly MER systems, rapidly grew as the most common 
instrument to restrict imports and try to adjust the balance of payments. But the 
instrument was adopted in very different forms. There were a variety of MER 
arrangements, with some countries only imposing very small margins between 
exchange rates, such as Cuba or Honduras, while others allowed large 
differences, such as Argentina and Brazil (Konig, 1968, p. 39), although most 
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regimes sought to privilege essential goods. Different systems were slowly 
developed from the breakdown of the gold standard in the 1930s to become 
very complex arrangements in the immediate post-war period (Frenkel & 
Rapetti, 2010, p. 15; Baer & Hervé, 1962, p. 176).  
The IMF also played a central role in Latin America’s MER systems, mostly by 
trying to force countries not to use these instruments. During its first years, the 
IMF adopted a moderate stance on MER regimes, essentially allowing them to 
remain in place and expecting that countries would migrate back to the dollar 
standard with the increase in liquidity and convertibility produced by the 
Bretton Woods system (Konig, 1968, p.41). The IMF considered it a transitional 
period for the global economy and allowed countries to adopt systems that 
were different from its official guidelines. During the 1950s, however, as it 
gained global importance and developed its internal structure, the IMF started 
to strongly oppose the use of MERs and by the mid-1950s had forced many 
Latin American countries out of these regimes by making it a condition for 
stabilization programs to provide balance of payments funding (Edwards, 
1989; IMF, 1954, p. 74). Chile and Bolivia in 1956, Paraguay in 1957, Argentina 
in 1958, and Uruguay in 1959 were all cases of the IMF forcing the removal of 
MER arrangements (Konig, 1968, p. 41). These were also all cases when MER 
experiments produced distortions and led to large balance of payments 
disequilibria, which provided the IMF with bargaining power to demand 
changes to exchange rate policies as conditions for its support. 
At the same time, the Latin American experience with exchange controls was 
strongly linked to the region’s industrialization process. The post-war period 
was a moment of structural change for the region, as most countries produced 
impressive industrial growth (Efrench & Palma, 1990). This post-war industrial 
 
 
25 
 
development is largely interpreted in the literature according to the import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) model that was first identified by Hirschman 
(1968). The ISI model was a set of ideas based on the concept that the 
‘appropriate strategy for development was to replace imports from the rich 
North with their own domestic production’ (Bruton, 1998, p. 907). To achieve 
this goal, the ISI model sought to promote the growth of the local industrial 
sector, with government given a key planning and execution role in the 
process.  
Although ISI could be achieved through many different measures, most of the 
literature has emphasized the use of protectionist instruments, such as tariffs or 
exchange rate controls, to develop local manufacturing sectors and correct for 
what was seen as a long-term dependency on primary commodity exports. The 
prescription of protectionist instruments to stimulate industrialization was 
already strongly present in the academic debate of the period, with Raul 
Prebisch, Celso Furtado, and more generally the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (CEPAL) providing the main source of theoretical justification 
for the strategy (Bielschowsky, 1996; Love, 1996). But ISI as a model to interpret 
the period was later developed by a large literature of American scholars on 
Latin America (Haber, 2006; Hirschman, 1968; Taylor, 1998, Fishlow, 1972; 
Coatsworth & Williamson, 2004). This framework sees the import substitution 
process as the result of a relationship between governments and industrialists, 
with policymakers favoring protectionist instruments that are not only targeted 
at the development of their countries but also benefit the government, both to 
gain political support and build rent-seeking schemes.  
There is, however, not enough evidence to support the assumption that 
protectionist instruments actually promoted industrialization. The use of 
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instruments for favoring local manufacturing sectors was widely established 
across Latin America, including high tariffs, import licenses, and exchange 
controls. MER systems are generally claimed to have been designed to 
stimulate industrialization, both in the region and in Brazil (Kaufman, 1990; 
Fishlow, 1972; Tavares, 1975; Weisskoff, 1980; Versani & Barros, 1977; Baer, 
1972). Different sectoral exchange rates provided weaker currencies for 
manufacturing sectors that were to be promoted, in order to substitute local 
production for imports. Yet the literature has not properly studied the effect of 
the instruments on industrialization, and has only looked at the industrial 
outcomes to justify the instruments, without testing the causal relationship.   
Given that MERs have been seen by scholars as an instrument to both stabilize 
the balance of payments and also to stimulate industrialization, this raises an 
important question about whether the Latin American experiences failed 
because they were indeed ineffective at balancing macroeconomic conditions, 
as claimed by the IMF at the time, or because the MER systems were in fact 
targeted at stimulating industrialization, leaving macroeconomic balance aside. 
This brings the political economy aspect of those experiments. There is a long 
literature on the political economy of capital controls in the post liberalization 
era that assesses whether they were used for their official purposes – usually 
correcting a form of market inefficiency – or were simply the result of rent-
seeking by policymakers (Alesina & Tabelini, 1989, p. 2; Alesina et al, 1993, p. 
12), such as favoring political supporters, maximizing taxation, or subsidizing 
parts of the local economy (Shultze, 2000, p. 35). Some authors have also 
argued that protectionist instruments were used to provide rents to 
governments and industrialists (Haber, 2006; Taylor, 1998; Baer, 1972). This 
reinforces the question of what were the true objectives behind the use of MERs 
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in Latin at that time, and whether the political economy aspect explains the 
failure of those instruments to resolve balance of payments crises or if it was 
due to their macroeconomic design.  
Brazil’s 1950s MER experience is an excellent case study to test and challenge 
many of these views on exchange controls and industrialization.  The post-war 
period in Brazil was a period of important economic development, with fast 
economic growth propelled by a significant industrialization process through 
the use of a complex MER system (Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 145, Baer, 2009, p. 57; 
Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 5). The period between 1945 and 1964 was a moment 
of rising democratic representation, with four different elected presidents in the 
middle of two long periods of autocratic regimes (1930-1945 and 1964-1985) 
(Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 143). Industrial growth averaged almost 10% per year in 
the 1950s, and GDP growth averaged 7.3% (IBGE, 1950-1960); the country 
expanded into the interior with the construction of its new capital Brasilia; it 
became more urbanized; and the manufacturing sector was transformed with 
the development of modern advanced industries, such as motor vehicles and 
capital goods (Aldrighi & Colistete, 2013, p. 6). Werner Baer describes the 
period: 
Brazil has undergone profound socioeconomic changes since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, especially since World War II. Its economy, 
which for centuries had been geared to the exportation of a small 
number of primary products, has become dominated by a large and 
diversified industrial sector in a relatively short period of time. At the 
same time, Brazilian society, which had been predominantly rural, has 
become increasingly urbanized. (Baer, 2009, p. 1) 
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The changes to the industrial sector in that period were impressive. Between 
1947 and 1955, during the Getulio Vargas administration (1951-1954), the 
industrial sector grew at an average of 7% per year, increasing its share of GDP 
from 17% to 22% (IBGE, 1951-1954). Industry’s internal structure changed 
significantly, moreover, with an increased participation of dynamic branches 
due to the greater production of durable consumer goods, intermediate goods, 
and capital goods (Versani and Barros, 1977, p. 239). The period 1956-1961, 
during the Juscelino Kubitschek presidency, saw a further acceleration of the 
industrialization process with industrial output growing at an annual 
cumulative rate of 9%, while GDP grew at 7% (IBGE, 1956-1961). This was the 
period of Kubitschek’s famous Target Plan (‘Plano de Metas’), an ambitious 
and comprehensive infrastructure and industrial investment program. The 
decade is seen as a period of diversification and integration of the industrial 
structure, in which advanced industries, including consumer durable goods 
but also capital goods, were developed in the country (Tavares, 1975, p. 95).  
It is unsurprising, then, that the two governments, particularly Kubitschek’s, 
are remembered with nostalgia by scholars and the Brazilian public (Klein & 
Luna, 2014, p. 146; Baer, 2009, p. 67). They were seen as pioneers of Brazil’s 
modernization and industrialization, with Kubitschek in particular capable of 
delivering massive economic growth, modernization, and the territorial 
expansion of the country in a very short period of time. Although they had 
quite different economic policies, as will be discussed below, the Brazilian 
literature sees the governments as the continuation of the same economic 
model: a national strategy of industrial development responding to the rise of a 
new urban and industrial society (Klein & Luna, 2014; Baer, 2009; Vianna, 1987; 
Sochazewski, 1980; Lago, 1982). 
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The ‘lost decades’ of the 1980s and 1990s, which saw average annual growth 
rates of 2.3% and 1.8% respectively (IBGE, 2017), make the 1950s look even 
more attractive from an historical perspective, but also explain the lack of 
attention of Brazilian scholars to that decade. With low economic growth, 
external debt default, and hyperinflation, the 1980s and 1990s have provided 
enough material to be the main focus of Brazilian economic historians over the 
last few decades. There is still a large literature from the 1970s and 1980s about 
Brazil’s industrialization process in the 1950s that is largely supportive of the 
industrial results of the period, ideologically linked to CEPAL and the ISI 
model (Tavares, 1975; Weisskoff, 1980; Versani & Barros, 1977; Baer, 1972; 
Bergsman, 1970). Thereafter there have been fewer studies that revise the 
industrialization of the post-war period from different perspectives (for 
example, Abreu et al, 1997; Colistete, 2006; Kaufman, 1990). But even these 
recent studies have not challenged the the role of tariffs and MERs, and the 
consensus persists.  
The literature on Brazil’s MER experiment fits this framework and has 
generally assumed the success of the MER experience and its support for 
industrialization without really testing it. Studies on the subject come from 
different periods but have reached similar conclusions: They generally consider 
the experience as a ‘successful’ case of exchange controls, which managed to 
stabilize the balance of payments at the same time while supported 
industrialization (Kafka, 1956; Huddle, 1964; Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; 
Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987; Sochazewski, 1980; Bergsman, 1970; Abreu, 1990; 
Caputo, 2007).  
The MER system in Brazil was indeed unique when compared to the rest of the 
region and in the context of the Bretton Woods arrangement. It was created by 
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the Superintendência de Moeda e Crédito (Sumoc), the Brazilian monetary 
authority during 1946-1964, which later became the Brazilian Central Bank, in 
response to a deterioration in the balance of payments in 1952, when the 
country ran out of international reserves and its balance of payments was in 
deficit by almost US$700 million (IBGE, 1952). This deficit was the result of a 
long period when the exchange rate was overvalued, kept fixed at the 1939 
level of Cr$ 18.7 cruzeiros per dollar between 1945 and 1952, without correcting 
for an average 20% annual inflation during the period (Vianna, 1987; Huddle, 
1964). Instead of only imposing widespread controls on outflows or allowing a 
massive devaluation of the currency – which was the case in most other Latin 
American countries (Konig, 1968, p. 40) – Sumoc established a regime of 
foreign exchange auctions to simultaneously control the level of imports, 
devalue the currency, and provide different exchange rates for different 
categories of imports. The system auctioned different quantities of foreign 
exchange for each category in order to reach distinct devalued exchange rates. 
And while it was a direct response to a balance of payments crisis, it also 
provided revenues to the government through the taxation of the auctions and 
a subsidy to exporters with the transfer of part of those revenues as bonuses 
(Vianna, 1987, p. 105; Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 127).  
The MER system lasted for eight years, beginning in 1953. Changes were made 
to its structure in 1957, and there followed a slow decline towards collapse 
during another balance of payments crisis in 1961 (Lago, 1982, p. 102). While 
the system had the same end as its neighbors', its singularity lies in its 
characteristics. The MER regime used a unique mechanism of auctions to 
distribute foreign exchange, resulted in a stable macroeconomic environment 
and survived for much longer than in the rest of the region. It only collapsed, 
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according to the existing literature, because of the decline in coffee prices at the 
end of the decade, which reduced the export receipts to be offered at the 
auctions (Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987). 
There are, however, many aspects of this experiment that remain unclear and 
could be used to challenge the established literature on Bretton Woods, Latin 
America, and Brazil’s industrialization. If the MER system indeed worked in 
Brazil but not in other Latin American countries, the reasons behind this 
‘success’ have not been explored. How were policymakers capable of 
centralizing foreign exchange and at the same time providing enough liquidity 
to all relevant sectors? How was the distribution of foreign exchange made, 
and why were officials getting macroeconomic results right? Why there was no 
emergence of a black-market for exchange rates? The answers to these 
questions provide interesting insights on the efficiency of exchange controls in 
the form of multiple exchange rates. They clarify how a country was capable of 
responding to the unstable conditions of the early Bretton Woods era using 
exchange controls despite the opposition of the IMF. 
It is also worth examining whether the centralized distribution of foreign 
exchange created inefficiencies for the rest of the economy. Was the system 
really efficient for the whole economy or did it only manage to stabilize the 
balance of payments by causing large distortions for different sectors? What 
would have happened if all sectors had had the same market exchange rate 
instead of going through the auction system?  
Finally, the case can contribute to an understanding of Brazil’s industrialization 
process and the political economy of that time. What were the political 
motivations for the use of MERs in Brazil?  Why did politicians opt for that 
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specific design? Was the system indeed an important instrument for 
industrialization policies in that period? If not, can the period’s 
industrialization still be interpreted through the ISI model? If it was so 
successful for both efficiency and industrialization, why did it eventually fail? 
What are the alternative interpretations of industrialization in that period that 
go beyond the ISI model? 
These questions have not been addressed by the literature, which concentrates 
on the historical narrative and assumes that the MER system was an effective 
way to keep the balance of payments stable as part of the ISI model (Kafka, 
1956; Huddle, 1964; Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 
1987; Sochazewski, 1980; Bergsman, 1970; Abreu, 1990; Caputo, 2007). It is 
interesting, however, to note that scholars have never made the connection 
between the different aspects of the experiment. If the MER system was indeed 
‘successful’, as claimed by many authors, then it challenges the assumption that 
exchange controls were a cause of instability, which is part of the standard 
understanding of Bretton Woods. But if it was not ‘successful’, then it 
challenges the positive view of the subject and its relation to industrialization. 
The final objective of this research is to assess whether the experiment was a 
‘successful’ case of MERs and qualify what this success means. 
The main conclusions of this research, which answer the above questions, are 
the following. By revisiting the peak and decline of the Brazilian MER system 
between 1953 and 1961, this thesis reveals that during its first phase (1953-1957) 
the MER system was able to stabilize the balance of payments and support 
macroeconomic conditions based on officials responding to fluctuations in 
market demand for foreign exchange and the use of minimum prices in foreign 
exchange auctions. This strategy, which combined the auctions mechanism 
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with a responsive behavior by authorities, resulted in an interesting system that 
helped to gradually make the exchange rates depreciate after a long period of 
overvaluation, while at the same time restricting the overall availability of 
foreign exchange to the economy to reduce import levels and stabilize the 
balance of payments. Authorities were ‘guiding the invisible hand’ of the 
market and this was the key factor behind the effectiveness of the first MER 
phase.   
This thesis also reveals that, during its second phase between 1957 and 1961, 
the decay and collapse of Brazil’s MER system was due to the increase in 
imports outside of the auction system, which was driven by the rise in direct 
government imports and exemptions given for private sector imports. The 
system did not collapse because of its original design or the fall of export 
receipts from coffee producers, as has been assumed in the literature, but 
because of its gradual disuse. This new interpretation of the peak and decline 
of the MER system shows that there were in fact two different systems, 
resulting in distinct macroeconomic outcomes during the two periods.  
To complement these conclusions, this research also performs a counterfactual 
exercise to assess whether sectoral industrial production would have been 
different if every industrial sector had received the same market exchange rate. 
By replacing the auction exchange rate with the free market exchange rate for a 
pool of industrial sectors, the test assesses whether the effective 
macroeconomic results observed during the first phase of the MER were not 
also generating important ‘distortions’ for the rest of the economy. This also 
tests the effectiveness of the MER system as an instrument of ISI for advanced 
sectors, since the existence of ‘distortions’ on sectoral industrial growth – that 
is, the better or worse performance of a sector with the MER system – would 
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suggest that it was an effective policy tool to stimulate industrialization and 
affect the performance of different sectors. The results reveal that during the 
whole period of the auctions, the overall level of ‘distortions’ was minimal, 
both for individual sectors as well as for the industrial sector as a whole.  
Finally, the last part of this thesis assesses why the original system was not 
kept in place after 1957 if it supported effective macroeconomic results in its 
original design and did not cause ‘distortions’. Based on quantitative and 
qualitative evidence, it concludes that during the second phase after 1957, the 
MER system was used as part of a national development strategy to generate 
the accelerated industrial growth of advanced sectors, transferring the import 
business directly to industrialists and the government and shifting the 
government’s main source of revenues from the MER system to tariffs to fund 
its increasing participation in industry. This redistribution created the 
incentives and channels for an industrial deepening process in Brazil, which 
was the main objective of the Kubitschek government, but neglected to 
maintain a macroeconomic balance.  
These conclusions are based on new primary sources from the period that have 
not been used by scholars before. Vianna (1989a, p. 105) states that ‘there is still 
an absence of a larger volume of primary material on this topic’. And while 
economic historians have used aggregate data of the balance of payments to 
assess the MER regime, studies have yet to research the quantitative data of the 
auction results, which is done in this dissertation by assembling a large set of 
new primary material. This includes exchange rates, quantities of foreign 
exchange offered and auctioned by authorities, and revenues and subsidies 
collected and provided by the government between 1953 and 1961. This 
information was gathered from the original documents from the institutions 
 
 
35 
 
that designed and managed the system in the 1950s: Sumoc and Banco do 
Brasil.  
Although the new dataset supports the new interpretation of the MER 
experience of this dissertation, the institutions of the time did not record all the 
potential information from the MER regime. Their documents did not report 
the quantitative data on the distribution of foreign exchange across the 20 
auctions houses of the country, the results of the sequential auction rounds 
which took place at each day at those locations, and also did not differentiate 
between the quantities of foreign exchange auctioned and offered to the 
different categories. As it will be shown throughout the dissertation, these 
details would have further supported the tests analysis performed in this 
research.  
Still, the new dataset is comprehensive and an important empirical 
contribution to Brazil’s economic history and to global international databases. 
The scholarship and the IMF have constructed statistical datasets which only 
use Brazil’s official fixed exchange rate3. The new dataset, by contrast, contains 
full series of multiple exchange rates, the free market exchange rate for services 
and the capital account, and the MERs for importers and exporters. This data 
changes the existing datasets of the period, allows a new interpretation of the 
MER experience and consequentially supports the future research of economic 
                                                 
3 The best-known datasets for Brazil’s macroeconomy include only the official 
exchange rate reported to the IMF in the 1950s. These include datasets of the Central 
Bank (https://www3.bcb.gov.br/sgspub/), the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica 
Aplicada (IPEA) (http://www.ipeadata.gov.br), and the IMF 
(http://www.imf.org/en/Data). 
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historians in this topic. This data is at the core of the dissertation and is 
presented in Appendix 3.  
To frame the quantitative data, this research has also obtained qualitative 
sources from the period, including the minutes of the 1175 meetings of Sumoc 
between 1945 and 1964, Sumoc’s 293 Instructions and 113 Decisions (called 
circulares), and the personal archives of Getulio Vargas and Juscelino 
Kubitschek to understand the political economy context of that time. Finally, 
information from newspapers of the period, as well as the IMF’s annual 
reports, complements the body of qualitative sources used.  
The dissertation is organized to address the above questions. It begins by 
situating the Brazilian case within its broader context, and then it focuses on 
the specifics of the MER system. Chapter 2 surveys the international context of 
the Bretton Woods period and the theoretical debates about exchange and 
capital controls. It also discusses methodological aspects of how to empirically 
assess capital and exchange controls and test their effectiveness. The chapter 
provides essential context on the debates on exchange rates, in order to situate 
the Brazilian MER experience.  
Chapter 3 presents the historical and historiographical context of 1950s Brazil, 
placing the Brazilian case within the general Latin American context of 
industrialization. The chapter introduces important debates related to the rise 
of industrialization in Brazil and Latin America, the historiographical 
interpretation of the ISI model, and reviews the political history of Brazil. 
Chapter 4 analytically reviews the chronological experience of exchange rate 
policies in Brazil from the immediate post-war period to the start of the MER 
system in 1953. It then examines the main characteristics of exchange rate 
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policies in Brazil prior to the MER regime, when the exchange rate was pegged 
to the dollar between 1946 and 1952. 
Chapter 5 continues the chronological review of exchange rate policies in post-
war Brazil by analyzing the rise and decay of the multiple exchange rate regime 
between 1953 and 1961 and discusses its collapse with the devaluation of the 
official exchange rate to Cr$ 215 cruzeiros per dollar.   
Chapter 6 assesses the effectiveness of the MER system by exploring the 
reasons why it was able to stabilize the balance of payments during its first 
phase between 1953 and 1957. It analyzes the allocation of foreign exchange in 
the auctions by searching for patterns of how officials were able to effectively 
stabilize the balance of payments using a centralized auctions mechanism.  
Chapter 7 examines whether the MER system of the 1950s in Brazil caused 
negative externalities to different industrial sectors. While the MER system 
supported good macroeconomic results, it imposed large exchange rate 
differentials on the various industrial sectors. The chapter performs a 
counterfactual exercise to measure the performance of industrial production 
under a single market exchange rate, rather than the MERs. The chapter is, at 
the same time, a check of the existing ISI consensus interpretation of the MER 
system.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the political economy of the system, especially the 
modification made to it in 1957, which led to its collapse in 1961. This is key to 
understand the MER experience, as it explains why the Kubitschek government 
did not keep the original MER regime if it was functioning to maintain 
macroeconomic stability. Given that there were no substantial observable 
changes in macroeconomic conditions that could have triggered a shift in 
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policy, the chapter explores whether the 1957 reforms were intended to benefit 
the government and industrialists. The chapter uses quantitative and 
qualitative materials to understand the political economy of welfare 
redistribution under the two systems, offering a new explanation of the decay 
and collapse of the MER experiment in Brazil 
Overall, the main contribution of this dissertation is a novel explanation of the 
peak and decline of the MER system in Brazil. The ‘success’ of the MER system 
during its first phase between 1953 and 1957 is explained by a responsive 
approach from authorities to changes in market demand and the use of 
minimum prices. This resulted in a controlled depreciation of the exchange 
rates, which did not produce ‘distortions’ for the economy and stabilized the 
balance of payments and other macroeconomic conditions. The decay and 
collapse of the MER system are explained by the rise in imports outside the 
auction system between 1957 and 1961. They were used to subsidize the private 
sector and finance the increased government role in the economy. The system 
after 1957 produced industrialization of advanced sectors, but at the expense of 
macroeconomic stability. This thesis presents two phases of the MER 
experience in Brazil, resulting in distinct macroeconomic consequences. In this 
way, the dissertation challenges the existing interpretation of Brazil’s economic 
history in the 1950s which has understated the role of the MER regime for 
macroeconomic stability and reveals its actual role for industrialization. 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
2. Bretton Woods, Multiple Exchange Rates and the Effectiveness of 
Exchange Controls 
This chapter revisits the international context of the Bretton Woods 
arrangement and the historiographical debate about exchange controls. It also 
discusses methodological aspects of how to empirically assess the effectiveness 
of exchange controls – a framework that will be used to test the Brazilian case 
in the chapters ahead. In this way, the chapter provides an overview of the 
essential international background and the debates required to situate the 
Brazilian MER experience. It argues that the Brazilian case presents a unique 
opportunity to contribute to the debates about Bretton Woods and exchange 
controls.  
2.1 Why Countries Adopt Controls: Beyond the Conventional View 
The traditional explanation for the adoption of any form of capital or exchange 
controls derives from the concept of controls as correction tools for cases of free 
market inefficiencies (Shultze, 2000, p. 9). Free trade and capital flows are 
conventionally accepted as bringing advantages to countries involved in a 
transaction. Trade and capital mobility in theory increase welfare on both sides 
of a transaction by providing a larger set of choices for agents, resulting in 
optimal investment allocation, efficiency of comparative advantages for trade, 
and faster economic growth. This is the conventional theoretical view, which 
favors free trade and capital movements (Kruger, 1983; Bhagwati, 1978; 
Edwards, 1989). Yet, while theory supports free flows, many countries have 
adopted different forms of capital and exchange controls, justifying their use by 
appealing to the market inefficiencies that exist in reality, which diverges from 
the theoretical efficiency of a free flows environment (Shultze, 2000, p. 10).   
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Thus, it has been argued that controls on flows are justified in cases of market 
inefficiencies, as free trade and capital flows do not always result in the optimal 
allocation of resources for countries (Kovanen, 1994, p. 2). This line of thought 
is not a new concept in the financial literature, with James Tobin’s (1978) 
seminal paper making a case for a global tax on foreign exchange transactions 
to reduce speculation and macroeconomic instability in the 1970s. According to 
this view, most market inefficiencies are related to some form of market 
irrationality, when markets’ reactions diverge from rational expectations, or 
policy-induced distortions, due to economic policies targeted towards different 
objectives having negative externalities for foreign inflows. These inefficiencies 
are claimed to be solved by the use of controls (Shultze, 2000, p.10).   
This view has become standard in the economic literature since the end of the 
1970s, with a series of important scholars such as Kruger (1983), Bhagwati 
(1978), and Edwards (1989) building a strong consensus against the use of any 
restrictions on flows, and having the support of the IMF on policy prescriptions 
(Kovanen, 1994, p. 1). According to this consensus, free flows are the efficiency 
benchmark for markets and most cases of capital and exchange controls cause a 
more inefficient allocation of resources, disrupt savings and consumption 
incentives, affect trade performance, and usually cause financial markets to not 
function properly (Cardoso & Goldfajn, 1997). Controls for this literature are 
only justified when authorities identify clear market inefficiencies and are 
designed to only correct these specific problems. The norm is free trade and 
capital flows, the exception is controls, and they should only be used when 
markets do not behave as they were expected to. 
Nevertheless, this theoretical approach does not hold when empirically 
confronted with the economic history of the last century. Countries used 
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different forms of controls throughout and most cases went beyond simply 
correcting a market inefficiency. The most frequent explanations from 
policymakers to justify their use of controls has been to limit the excess 
volatility of flows, protect against a fiscal default, or correct a divergence 
between the social and the private return of capital (Shultze, 2000, pp. 35-36). In 
a survey of more than 30 cases of controls being used, Magud et al (2011, pp. 3-
5) summarize the rationale behind their adoption as the ‘four fears’ of financial 
flows: the fear of appreciation, the fear of ‘hot money’, the fear of large inflows, 
and the fear of loss of monetary authority. These are the market distortions 
commonly claimed by authorities to justify adopting controls on flows.  
This conventional view is, however, too narrow to understand the historical 
uses of capital and exchange controls because it assumes that they are bad a 
priori. It inverts the historical question, which should be why countries opted 
for controls and how effective they were, rather than what was the market 
inefficiency that was claimed to be solved. If in most historical cases, markets 
do not perform as expected by theory, then the literature should be asking 
whether something might be actually wrong with the theory itself. Historical 
analysis of these cases therefore needs to go beyond the efficiency approach to 
controls. In the Brazilian case of the 1950s, the centralized auction system 
solved the inefficiency of a lack of foreign inflows to the economy, making it an 
efficient case from this perspective, but still the literature does not know why 
and how it worked, which would be required to know whether it truly was an 
effective system (Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987).  
The standard literature on controls takes this efficiency approach a step further 
by claiming that controls also need to prove they are not a source of new 
distortions. Shultze’s (2000, p. 15) guide to assessing controls states that ‘the 
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mere existence of such distortions, however, does not prove the case for capital 
controls – it must be shown that capital controls are the best available measure 
to deal with the respective distortions’. In other words, scholars should focus 
on the counterfactual. Just testing the direct results of controls based on the 
intentions of authorities misses the vital outcome of the overall impact on the 
economy. Although the existing consensus assumes controls are inefficient and 
only uses this further test for externalities as a way to complicate the 
justification for controls, it raises an important question that should be tested 
for historical cases. There are always cost-benefit trade offs in any economic 
policy choice, and they need to be clarified in the case of controls as well. Thus, 
even if historical tests of controls should not be locked into this search for 
market inefficiencies, and should focus on the real effectiveness of controls for 
the economy, counterfactual tests are necessary to check if controls did not 
cause negative externalities for the rest of the economy.  
This view of controls provides the theoretical background behind the empirical 
literature testing the success of historical experiences, for both capital and 
exchange controls (Magud et al, 2011; Habermeier et al, 2011; Ostry et al, 2010). 
Studies assume, based on the premise that free capital and trade flows are 
efficient, that controls are only effective when proved to be correct for an 
observed market inefficiency, although without also causing distortions to the 
rest of the economy. There does not seem to be any theoretical explanation to a 
priori argue in favor of the use of controls, only the empirical deduction that 
they might work because reality was different from theory.  
Although counterfactual exercises to confirm the use of any policy instrument 
are important, the negative stance is entrenched in the literature on both types 
of controls, particularly for the post-Bretton Woods period. If in some cases 
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reality is different from theory, and justifies the use of controls, this theoretical 
approach is incorrect, as there is nothing necessarily wrong with the use of 
these instruments. This is the approach adopted in this dissertation, which 
seeks to move beyond the efficiency approach towards the question of the 
effectiveness of historical cases of controls. The dissertation adopts a more 
impartial view, testing the results and counterfactual of a case of exchange 
controls without a preexisting conceptual stance. 
Another problem with the standard approach to both forms of controls is the 
time component, which assumes controls never work in the long run. For how 
long do controls need to work to be considered successful? There is no 
theoretical or empirical agreement on this either. The empirical literature tends 
to conclude that controls, when they work, do not have long-term effects on 
flows (Cardoso & Goldfajn, 1997; Carvalho & Garcia, 2006; Goldfajn & Minella, 
2005; Jinjarak et al, 2013). Controls could be considered useful tools for 
changing the composition of capital or altering other characteristics of trade 
flows for a short period of time, but are not able to fully change economic 
trends in a longer time horizon.  
The problem with this argument is that the definition of short- and long-term 
periods of success is again purely ad hoc, which makes it easy to say controls 
do not work in the longer run and are inefficient. That is why some recent 
studies have been calling cases of controls, such as Brazil’s, ‘successful’, even 
when the effects on the economy are short lived (Vieira & Holland, 2003; da 
Silva & Resende, 2010). Controls do not need to last forever, but can be effective 
at solving a short-run externality without creating further distortions to the 
economy. Chapter 7 will present an estimation of these distortions. This 
approach is less doctrinaire. If the Brazilian MER system, or any other 
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experience, is effective at providing positive contributions to the economy, 
without causing distortions or externalities, even if for a short period of time, it 
will thus be considered successful. 
It is important to stress that this approach can be applied to both capital and 
exchange controls. It will be shown below that most case studies set during the 
Bretton Woods period are related to both exchange and capital controls, as both 
instruments were widely used by policymakers, while in the post Bretton 
Woods period exchange controls became very rare and studies are mostly 
focused on capital controls. From a macroeconomic perspective, both are the 
same. According to Adams and Greenwood (1985, p. 56), any dual exchange 
rate system or other forms of current account restriction should be considered 
identical to a capital control because different exchange rates are equivalent to 
levying a tariff on a class of international transaction. Both instruments have 
the same objective of controlling or restricting a class of foreign exchange flow, 
and have the same macroeconomic effect on the balance of payments.  
However, from a policy perspective they are different becayse they are 
designed for different accounts of the balance of payments and create different 
options for governments. The choice of one or another depends on the political 
economy of the period, as well as the international context and market 
restrictions. This dissertation is focused on a case of exchange controls during 
the Bretton Woods period, but uses the general framework discussed above to 
consider whether it was successful or not, without pre-conceptions about 
whether it or a counterfactual would have been preferable.  
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2.2 The Political Economy of Controls 
The reasons for the use of any form of controls go beyond the efficiency 
arguments discussed above and also include the political economy dimension 
of these historical experiences. One of the main assumptions of authors who 
have performed empirical tests of the efficiency of controls is that they are 
endogenous to capital flows. This assumes governments only respond to 
changes in financial flows, without external – exogenous – reasons for the use 
of controls. This assumption is based on the premise that controls should only 
be adopted in the case of market inefficiencies, as it supposes that rational 
governments only impose capital controls in moments when they face 
restrictions in flows – otherwise they would just adopt markets with free flows. 
The obvious consequence of this assumption, which also appears in most of the 
literature of the last thirty years (Carvalho & Garcia, 2006; Goldfajn & Minella, 
2005; Magud et al, 2011; Cardoso & Goldfajn, 1997), is that controls are outliers 
to the system and could only be efficiently used in exceptional circumstances of 
foreign exchange shortages, rather than as a result of alternative political 
objectives. But these two reasons are not exclusive of each other in the historical 
experiences of controls. 
Over the last two decades, a growing literature has been questioning whether 
in reality the appeals to market inefficiencies are not only pretexts for the real 
reasons behind the use of controls by governments, which usually is to benefit 
themselves and their political constituencies (Alesina & Tabelini, 1989, p. 2). 
Most of this literature questions whether policymakers have actually targeted a 
different set of political objectives, instead of public welfare and 
macroeconomic balance (Grilli & Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Fratzscher, 2012). 
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Alesina and Tabelini (1989) introduce this argument to historical cases of 
controls, claiming that the real motivation behind these instruments is usually 
to pass a macroeconomic cost to certain groups in society. Based on a two 
agents model of workers (wage earners) and capitalists (owners of physical 
capital and profit earners), the authors argue that capital controls are a natural 
reaction of left wing governments (when workers are in power) to capital 
flight. This reaction happens frequently in emerging countries because of the 
rise in political risk when a change of government increases the chances of 
capital expropriation of right wing groups, leading to capital outflows. This 
case describes a typical confidence crisis that was commonly seen during the 
1970s and 1980s in Latin American countries like Argentina, Mexico, 
Venezuela, and Uruguay (Edwards, 1989). Right wing governments, on the 
other hand, tend to react to this crisis by imposing taxation on the left wing 
voter base (workers), while left wing groups are more likely to impose capital 
controls, which is a way of taxing the wealthier groups in society (capitalists) 
and the right-wing voter base. Although Alesina and Tabelini (1989) look 
specifically at capital controls, the use of exchange controls in countries in the 
post-war period fits well with this framework (Edwards, 1987). Overall, they 
suggest authorities decide to adopt controls not because they see them as the 
best possible measure to deal with a specific market inefficiency, in this case 
capital flight, but actually to pass on the cost of macroeconomic adjustment to a 
specific group in society and protect their voter base.  
The Brazilian political situation during the 1950s was very different from the 
polarization between left and right wing voters described by Alesina and 
Tabelini (1989), but their framework provides important insights to help 
understand Brazil’s experience. The political structure was more diffuse, with 
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Brazil having its first experience of democracy in the post-war period after 
years of dictatorship. It is difficult to separate exactly which would be the left 
and right wing groups in society (Skidmore, 1982, p. 111; Leopoldi, 2000). 
President Vargas’ voter base combined both labor unions and industrialists, 
and its use of exchange controls was not targeted at passing on the cost of 
macroeconomic adjustment to only one of these groups (Vianna, 1989; Lago, 
1982). Nonetheless, the development of the MER system in Brazil, and its 
changes in 1957, seem to respond to different political objectives, with 
Kubitschek’s government using the system to the pass the costs to exporters 
and importer companies, while benefiting industrialists and the government 
itself. This approach points to the key importance of searching for the political 
incentives behind these instruments, as will be done in Chapter 8. 
Many studies follow this framework to reach interesting conclusions (Alesina 
et al, 1993; Grilli & Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Fratzscher, 2012). Alesina et al (1993, p. 
12) argue that controls are more likely to be used by governments that are 
seeking to raise seigniorage revenues and keep interest rates artificially low, 
which is normally a feature of countries without a truly independent central 
bank and/or with pegged exchange rates  – both characteristics of Brazil in the 
1950s. Similar results were later obtained in an IMF study by Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995, p. 36), who argue that controls are more likely to be found in 
countries with low incomes, large governments, and where the central bank is 
not independent. They argue that in these circumstances governments tend to 
benefit the most from the imposition of capital controls. Similar results were 
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also later obtained in studies by the European Central Bank on historical cases 
of controls in Europe (Fratzscher, 2012).4  
Battilossi (2003) provides an interesting case study of the political economy of 
capital controls. The author examines the re-introduction of capital controls in 
Italy in the late 1960s and early 1970s during the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system. By examining the channels through which capital controls were used 
as implicit taxation to raise fiscal revenues, the author argues that the Italian 
government made use of this instrument to maintain a domestic tax base well 
beyond the end of the Bretton Woods system into the 1970s. The paper also 
attempts to estimate the size of this effect by calculating the level of seigniorage 
revenues obtained during that period. Although the author focuses on the 
Italian case, he argues that similar uses for capital controls can also be observed 
for a number of other European countries during that period. Overall, 
Battilossi’s (2003, p. 28) contribution is to show a case in which the use of 
capital controls clearly responded to political economy objectives with an 
intervention that lasted for a long period of time. 
Shultze (2000, p. 35-36) summarizes this literature by arguing that there are six 
main political economy reasons behind the adoption of controls, which benefit 
governments and politicians instead of social welfare. They all represent the 
intended reasons behind policymakers’ appeal to market externalities as 
justifications for the adoption of controls. They are (1) the power of tax, with 
controls used to increase revenues; (2) inflation and seigniorage, with controls 
used to considerably raise revenues through the inflation tax; (3) financial 
                                                 
4 Fratzscher (2012) also argues that capital controls are more likely to be imposed in 
countries with fixed exchange rates, non-independent monetary policy, and a shallow 
financial market. 
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repression and subsidizing government deficits, with controls producing 
artificially low rates to help finance the government; (4) trade protectionism, by 
controlling flows to erode or produce rents created through protection; (5) 
distribution of income, with controls targeted to redistribute welfare and 
privilege for specific groups in society; and finally (6) pure rent-seeking, with 
controls as channels to benefit groups or sectors via rent-seeking schemes.  
These objectives are not independent of each other and in many cases are parts 
of a highly endogenous process. In the case of Brazil in the 1950s, this 
dissertation argues that issues of taxation, trade protection, and redistribution 
of income were strongly behind the changes in the MER system after 1957, and 
explain the political economy of the second MER system. Overall, this literature 
suggests that if specific cases of capital controls are being examined, they 
should not only test its direct results and possible alternatives – that is, the 
effectiveness of the system – but also look for the political incentives behind the 
use of controls. 
2.3 Exchange Controls and the Bretton Woods System 
The literature examining the experiences of exchange controls, including MERs, 
is not large and can be divided in two main groups: (1) studies focused on the 
Bretton Woods system until 1973, which are actually few and have 
underestimated the role of exchange controls in the system; and (2) studies 
discussing controls in the post-Bretton Woods period, which is a larger and 
more recent literature mainly focused on capital controls. Still, both for the 
Bretton Woods system and also for the period after 1973, there is a group of 
authors who make an interesting critique of the consensus against these 
instruments, thus providing a rationale to justify the adoption of MERs in both 
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periods. This sub-section reviews the literature on the Bretton Woods period, 
starting with a discussion of the reasons for the different focus of research for 
the two periods, and then revising the main contributions for that period. 
The lack of attention to the role of exchange controls during the Bretton Woods 
arrangement seems to come from a biased interpretation of the efficiency of 
that system. Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, p. 1) argue that during Bretton Woods 
capital controls were widely established and policymakers did not see them as 
distortions – a position still present in the scholarship but has recently started 
to be challenged by a few authors (Eichengreen, 1993; Bordo, 1993). Frieden et 
al (2000, p. 5) summarize the consensus on the Bretton Woods system, stating 
that before its collapse in 1973, ‘an overwhelming majority of countries, 
including 90 percent of Latin American countries, had fixed exchange rate 
regimes. Since then, however, Latin American countries have had a wide 
variety of experiences with exchange rate regimes, and, more generally, their 
exchange rate policy’.  
There is a large debate among scholars on whether capital controls were indeed 
conceptually an essential instrument of the Bretton Woods system or only a 
tolerable externality to allow the system to reach its broader goal of restoring 
international trade and reduce convertibility problems. Ikenberry (1993, p. 157) 
defends the latter view. He argues that Bretton Woods was the result of long 
political negotiations between the Allies during the later part of the Second 
World War. While Americans had free trade and full currency convertibility as 
their primary policy objectives, the British were worried about guaranteeing 
full employment after the wartime destruction. The result was a system that 
ultimately had the American targets but tolerated a gradual convergence 
towards full convertibility in order to protect countries from the post-war 
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dollar shortage and economic disequilibrium. This resulted in controls being 
acceptable as a transitional instrument. Since full current account convertibility 
was only reached between the United States and European nations in 1958, the 
IMF accepted different types of controls during the transitional 1950s. 
Countries were encouraged to restrict capital account movements rather than 
the current account, using capital instead of exchange controls. But like the 
MER systems adopted throughout Latin America, restrictions on trade and 
current account flows were inevitable given the instability of the Bretton 
Woods system, despite the IMF’s opposition (Terborgh, 2003, p. 14).  
The Bretton Woods system tried to prevent countries from adopting exchange 
controls by using the adjustable pegs system in the later 1940s and early 1950s, 
which allowed countries to adjust their exchange rates in case of ‘fundamental 
disequilibrium‘, but this was not clearly defined and rarely used. Monnet and 
Puy (2015, p. 30) show, for example, that the United Kingdom had an 
overvalued exchange rate for almost 15 years between 1945 and 1960, while 
Germany and Switzerland maintained an undervalued currency and never 
adjusted for these fundamental disequilibria. Ultimately, IMF loans were also 
supposed to provide a buffer for balance of payments deficits, but were clearly 
not enough to prevent countries from adopting different forms of controls 
(Bordo, 1993). In the early part of the 1950s, even the IMF recognized that 
international reserves and the adjustable pegs system were insufficient to face 
the international depression without the use of controls, and had a tolerant 
attitude towards MERs until the mid-1950s (Horsefield, 1969). 
From a theoretical standpoint there was also a justification for capital controls 
to become an acceptable part of the Bretton Woods system. The ‘Impossible 
Trilema’, the theory on which the whole system was based, gave policymakers 
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this alternative. Obstfeld et al (2005, p. 423-424) argue that the trillema, which 
implies that it is only possible to have two of capital mobility, pegged exchange 
rates, and independent monetary policy at any one time, holds for most of 
history, particularly during Bretton Woods. The trade off created by the 
Trilema led most countries to opt for a wide range of controls to allow for both 
independent monetary policy and to keep exchange rates pegged, giving up on 
capital mobility. Only 2.5% of 145 countries in the Bretton Woods system were, 
on average, without official pegged exchange rates during the 1950s (Obstfeld 
et al, 2005, p. 425).  
But the fact that countries were opting for controls to solve the Trilema did not 
mean the system was actually stable and efficient, or that controls were used in 
similar forms by all countries to be part of the arrangement. Giovannini (1998, 
p. 11) examines whether there were asymmetries in the use of capital controls 
during the Bretton Woods period, arguing that a diverse response from 
policymakers in the use of these instruments would be evidence of an 
ineffective regime that was forcing countries to respond with an asymmetric 
use of controls. According to his argument, this was the natural outcome of an 
inherently asymmetric system, with countries managing flows at their own 
discretion to survive a dollar system that circled around a ‘center country’, the 
United States. Giovannini provides quantitative evidence that countries 
adopted a variety of different controls, and also had to change them extensively 
over time to deal with the volatile conditions in international flows. More than 
differences in the types of controls, what characterized this asymmetric 
response was the impressive variation in the use of these instruments. One 
important example was Germany, which throughout the Bretton Woods 
arrangement adopted a variety of capital controls, including higher reserve 
 
 
53 
 
requirements for foreign deposits in the banking system, a prohibition on 
paying interest rates to foreigners and selling money-market papers, always 
altering the extent of these instruments according to the size of flows at the 
time (Giovannini, 1998, p. 17). 
In the early years of the Bretton Woods period, the global economy was facing 
a foreign exchange (that is, US dollar) shortage (Machlup, 1964), and controls 
were the only solution to remain within the pegged exchange rate system 
created by Bretton Woods. While Giovannini (1998) does not necessarily focus 
on testing whether controls were effective, his argument supports the finding 
that controls were an inefficient response from countries to a system that was 
unstable by design. Garber (1993, p. 483) explains that some of these problems 
were already being discussed by contemporary scholars and policymakers, 
who, by the early 1960s, did not expect global convergence to full currency 
convertibility and stable exchange rates to happen under that regime. These 
problems are normally summarized in the form of the three main problems of 
the Bretton Woods system: liquidity, confidence in the dollar standard, and 
adjustment in case of balance of payments difficulties (Machlup, 1964; Bordo, 
1993). With no confidence in the dollar standard, a lack of global liquidity, 
particularly for emerging economies, and an inefficient system to adjust for 
balance of payments problems, different forms of controls were a natural 
outcome. 
Cross-country empirical evidence supports this interpretation. In line with 
Giovannini’s conclusion, an important study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
focuses specifically on exchange controls and evaluates the instability of the 
Bretton Woods system. Their starting point is exactly the fact that official 
exchange rates were mostly pegged, giving the initial impression of a system in 
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which controls helped to maintain stability. But by building a database of dual 
and parallel exchange rates, Reinhardt and Rogoff conclude that in reality less 
than 40% of the IMF member countries that were officially pegging rates were 
in practice doing so between 1946 and 1973. In most cases, what they call the 
‘natural exchange rate‘, which was estimated through market conditions, was 
more devalued than the official rate and in some cases ended up forcing 
countries to devalue their official rates at some point. Major devaluations 
occurred throughout the Bretton Woods period, including the French Franc in 
1957 and 1969, the British Pound in 1967 and the Deutsche Mark in 1961 and 
1969 (Terborgh, 2003, p. 19). The system was so unstable in the 1950s that the 
authors argue that ‘[f]rom 1946 until the arrival of the 1960s, Europe was de 
facto a floating regime under the guise of pegged official exchange rates. Each 
time the official rates were realigned, the story had already unfolded in the 
parallel market‘(Reinhardt & Rogoff, 2002, p. 25). And as will be seen below, 
Latin America was not very different. 
Marston (1993, p. 532) reinforces this conclusion and finds that exchange 
controls led to large covered interest rate differentials during the Bretton 
Woods system, distorting investments and borrowing costs. He tests for 
interest rate differentials in Britain, Germany, and the United States to 
determine if markets were correctly functioning under the Bretton Woods 
restrictions. His hypothesis is that if interest rate differentials did not exist, or 
were only pure risk premium, it would be a sign that the system was efficiently 
allocating resources even with the use of various forms of controls. He finds 
large asymmetries and argues that this was a direct consequence of the Bretton 
Woods system, which almost forced economies to impose controls as the only 
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way to maintain exchange rates pegged and keep the balance of payments 
stable. 
A reflection of this instability was the IMF position in the Bretton Woods 
system. The IMF was in favor of capital controls during the 1950s, justifying it 
as a consequence of the Impossible Trilema (Konig, 1968, p. 39). Since the IMF 
also had the broader objective of stimulating currency convertibility, however, 
it developed contradictory policy guidance, defending different uses for similar 
types of controls. Its policy advice evolved to accept restrictions on capital 
accounts, while being against MERs or other restrictions on current account 
flows (IMF, 1947-1960). For this reason, the relationship between countries, 
regulators, and controls was a difficult one, particularly in the face of a system 
that was inherently problematic but largely defended by the institution.  
Some contemporary scholars, including some of the institution’s own staff, 
highlighted the IMF’s contradictory position.and defended the role of exchange 
controls and MERs. The influential economist Robert Triffin, who was working 
for the IMF in 1947, wrote on how in the post-war period it should adapt its 
policy prescriptions to move beyond the framework of the Gold Standard 
years. Triffin (1947, p. 66) argued that, in moments of balance of payment 
disequilibrium, countries should be allowed to deploy their international 
reserves through a system of priorities to provide currency to the most 
important parts of the economy. Although he does not specifically discuss 
MERs, he is very clear that there is a significant negative consensus on 
exchange controls inside the Fund because of their misuse in the previous two 
decades (the 1930s and 1940s). He argues, nevertheless, that this does not mean 
that this instrument should not be considered for moments of balance of 
payments stress. ‘Unfortunately’, Triffin (1947, p. 66) writes, ‘the very mention 
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of ‘exchange control’ raises such emotional reactions with many people as to 
prevent any serious discussion of the subject’, but ‘the real purposes which 
nondiscriminatory controls can justifiably serve should not be summarily 
dismissed’. 
Schlesinger (1952), in a long theoretical and empirical evaluation of MERs, 
argued that the literature should move beyond the simple distrust of those 
mechanisms due to IMF opposition and understand them in their full 
complexity. The author claims that although there was some risk of causing 
negative externalities to the economy, particularly when they were too 
complex, MER systems were interesting tools to stabilize balance of payments. 
In his view, MERs were definitely preferable to trade quotas, which were the 
IMF’s preferred choice after capital controls, and could be particularly useful 
when preferred exchange rates were introduced to incentivize exports, such as 
in the Korean case, which will be discussed in the next sub-section. Overall, the 
author claims that ‘it would appear that there is a definite but limited rationale 
for the inclusion of multiple exchange rates in the economic programs of 
underdeveloped countries. Indeed, their use in economies of this kind is 
decidedly more justifiable than in highly developed countries. If the systems 
are kept relatively simple and are not overloaded with large number of 
conflicting objectives, they can satisfactorily accomplish some of the purposes 
for which they have been designed – provided, of course, that certain basic 
economic preconditions are simultaneously fulfilled’ (Schlesinger, 1952, p. 76).  
De Vries (1956) follows a similar line of argument, offering a list of reasons for 
countries to adopt MERs in the Bretton Woods period. De Vries also follows the 
rationale that, although many countries and MERs experiences in the 1950s 
came to an end due to the IMF’s opposition, it does not mean these experiments 
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did not produce effective results for individual countries. Her work reviews 
some of the experiments to test if it was in the self-interest of some countries to 
keep those systems in place despite the IMF’s disagreement. 
De Vries lists six reasons for countries to adopt MERs. The first is that an MER 
system is less arbitrary than quantitative restrictions, which had also been 
adopted in a number of countries in that period. MERs allow a transparent 
restriction to imports through a price mechanism rather than imposing a 
discretionary allocation of foreign exchange. As will be shown in this 
dissetation, this was clearly one of the benefits of MERs in Brazil, which had 
also previously adopted quantitative restrictions. The second reason is taxation, 
as the systems can provide a simple and effective way to tax imports and 
increase government revenues.5 The third is to isolate speculative transactions, 
since most MER systems have separated commercial from capital transactions, 
protecting trade from exchange rate fluctuations of capital activities. This is 
also one of the arguments used in the literature to defend the use of MERs after 
the Bretton Woods period, as will be discussed in Sub-section 2.6. The fourth is 
the alleviation of inflation, since the MER system can be used to smooth 
currency devaluations. Finally, and most importantly, the fifth and six reasons 
are the possibility of differentiating between particular exports and imports by 
creating different exchange rates for distinct sectors. This is the channel to 
adjust the balance of payments using exchange rates to prioritize essential 
imports and support export sectors. 
                                                 
5 Sherwood (1956) studies the revenues mechanism of different MER systems and 
reaches the same conclusion that MERs are effective to increase government revenues.  
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Although she lists reasons for countries to adopt MERs, and believes they had 
an important appeal for emerging countries in the Bretton Woods period, she 
concludes that MERs worked in some cases but not in others, and their success 
depended more on the implementation than on these theoretical benefits. Many 
MER designs have been distorted for political economy reasons and have 
resulted in balance of payments crises and inflation. Only in a few cases did the 
MERs’ design and implementation transform the above list of benefits into an 
effective system. This dissertation will show how Brazil’s 1950 experience, at 
least during its first phase, fits with this description of an effective design and 
implementation, although it was later transformed for political economy 
reasons into an ineffective system during its second phase. 
Clearly, these authors’ interpretations fit what was described above as the less 
doctrinaire view on exchange controls and MERs, as they do not assume there 
is anything a priori wrong with these instruments, and in fact provide an 
interesting set of arguments in favor of MERs. This discussion suggests that a 
more complex analysis is necessary to understand exchange rate policies in the 
Bretton Woods period, rather than only assume their ineffectiveness, as in the 
existing consensus. 
2.4 Exchange Controls and the IMF 
The IMF’s opposition to MERs was an important limit on the use of this 
instrument during the Bretton Woods period. The stance of the Fund 
developed, however, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, with the institution 
having a softer stance against MERs until the middle of the second decade, 
which gave countries the space to adopt MERs a (Konig, 1968, p. 41).  
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The IMF was largely in favor of closed capital accounts and capital controls to 
keep exchange rates pegged, which was the primary objective of the Bretton 
Woods system. One of the Fund’s main goals was to impede competitive 
devaluations and target full convertibility for its country members, as this was 
seen as a major source of international volatility during the inter-war period 
and a primary reason for the establishment of the Bretton Woods system in the 
first place. The IMF therefore fought against instruments that were seen as 
contrary to this goal (Krueger, 1983).  
While the IMF was against MERs, it took time for the institution to reach this 
stance and even more to force countries out of those systems, which only 
happened after the mid-1950s. During the first years after its creation in 1944, 
the rise of MERs in the region was tolerated. The IMF actually received 
numerous questions from countries on how to evolve from MERs towards the 
Bretton Woods pegged system (IMF, 1947-1950). And while the IMF’s 
regulations obliged countries to not impose exchange payment restrictions 
under Article VIII of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, it also 
allowed a period of transitional adjustment in which countries could slowly 
adapt to the new rules of Article IV of the Agreement (Horsefield, 1969). Most 
countries not only made use of this loophole, but increased their use of MER 
systems and level of controls during this supposedly transitional period, such 
as in the cases of Argentina and Brazil (Konig, 1968, p. 51). While most Latin 
American countries adopted some sort of MER in the early 1950s, a variety of 
countries from other regions also followed this route, including India, Israel, 
Korea, China, and even some West European countries, like France and 
Germany (Horsefield, 1969). 
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During this period, the IMF’s tolerant attitude towards country members was 
also a reflection of its limited faculties for enforcing changes to macroeconomic 
management. In the 1940s and the first half of the 1950s, it was unable to 
influence other forms of domestic policy, particularly monetary policy, until it 
started establishing its stabilization programs, which exchanged financial 
support for following domestic policies guidance. For this reason, enforcing 
policy changes was initially difficult in Latin America (Konig, 1968, p. 50). Even 
the IMF’s formal guidelines admitted these difficulties in restricting MERs. For 
example, its 1947 Annual Report claimed that some cases of MERs for 
stabilizing imports and balance of payments could be tolerated if they did not 
harm other trade partners (IMF, 1947, p. 26). The Fund also accepted that it 
would only be possible to eliminate this practice in the exchange rate market 
once domestic price levels were adjusted and this could take time (IMF, 1947, p. 
40). Another example of this tolerant attitude toward MERs can be seen in the 
IMF’s 1948 Annual Report, when it released a guideline stating how it expected 
countries adopting such systems to behave and to communicate further 
changes to the Fund. Although it accepted those systems temporarily, it always 
made clear that changes would be expected as soon as the country was stable 
enough (IMF, 1948, p. 22). 
All Latin American countries became members of the IMF on its foundation in 
1944, except for Argentina and Haiti, which joined in 1955 and 1953 
respectively. Consequently, all countries had to report an official rate and any 
changes to their MER systems, which also meant they had to deal with the 
formal opposition from the IMF to the use of MERs, although without real 
enforcement to change their frameworks (Frenkel & Rapetti, 2010, p. 13). A case 
that exemplifies this situation was Ecuador, which the 1947 Annual Report 
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shows had consulted the IMF to make some changes to its already existing 
MER system, which the IMF agreed to (IMF, 1947, p. 23). During the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, its annual reports show the most the IMF was able to do was 
to advise countries to use alternative systems, such as mixed free and 
controlled exchange rates or to simplify arrangements, then transition towards 
tariffs as the preferred option for protection. This was effective in some cases 
but not in others, such as Brazil, which developed a complex auction-based 
MER system (Konig, 1968). 
The IMF’s attitude started to change in the mid-1950s, when the stabilization 
programs took shape, while most countries’ MER systems led to large 
macroeconomic imbalances (IMF, 1954, p. 74). Horsefield (1969) states that very 
few systems worked because they had to be simple, in order to be flexible 
enough to adjust for changes in macroeconomic conditions, and needed to be 
combined with stability in fiscal and monetary policy. In most cases, the system 
itself was the cause of distortions and inflation, or problems arising from 
irresponsible monetary policies resulted in further balance of payments 
difficulties, leading the MER systems to collapse. Black markets,6 high inflation, 
and in most cases a balance of payments crisis were the natural consequences 
of those regimes. Argentina was probably the best example of a system that led 
to a complete collapse of the country’s macroeconomic condition, resulting in 
an IMF stabilization program in 1958. Brazil was instead a notable case of an 
                                                 
6 Black markets were a common consequence of macroeconomic imbalances and the 
MER systems in Latin America, and common across the region. Grosse (1994) provides 
a comprehensive discussion of how black markets for exchange rates emerged in Latin 
America. 
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effective system, as will be shown here, even though it also ended in an IMF 
program in 1961 (Konig, 1958). 
The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions was exactly the moment when 
the IMF was able to step in and force many of these countries out of their MER 
systems through the conditions attached to its stabilization programs, which 
required a large set of changes in domestic policies. These included the removal 
of restrictions on foreign payments combined with control over monetary and 
fiscal expansionary policies. And in order to provide some temporary 
protection for trade, the IMF also usually accepted a transitional period of high 
tariffs to compensate for the end of the MER (Horsefield, 1969). Chile and 
Bolivia in 1956, Paraguay in 1957, Argentina in 1958, and Uruguay in 1959 
where all cases of the IMF forcing the removal of their MERs through these 
conditional agreements for funding (Konig, 1968, p. 41). 
But the IMF was not the only reason for Latin American countries to abandon 
their MER regimes. As the history of the relationship between the IMF and 
member countries has shown, the institution has been used several times as an 
external constraint on local interests by governments that have had difficulty in 
implementing macroeconomic reforms. There is a large literature on the 
political economy of IMF programs, particularly for the 1990s, which has 
highlighted the role of the institution for local political interests (Breen, 2008). 
In the 1950s this was no different, with countries having to request IMF funds 
to solve their balance of payments problems and also sometimes using the 
Fund as a channel to implement difficult reforms (Horsefield, 1969). 
By the end of the 1950s, the IMF had completely changed its position regarding 
MER practices. In its 1957 Annual Report, the tone was already much harsher, 
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as it was claimed that MER systems not only caused harm to the country’s 
economy and its trade partners but were also too complex to manage and 
needed constant changes and other distortions to work (IMF, 1957, p. 146). 
Given this assessment, it was decided that rapid changes in order to simplify 
such systems were necessary, and the IMF would do everything possible to 
force countries to agree. The new position was that countries still on such 
systems would be allowed to maintain them only if they were showing 
significant progress in eliminating payment restrictions and would be 
‘reluctant to approve changes in multiple exchange rates system which make 
them more complex’ (IMF, 1957, p. 147). The IMF would also provide technical 
assistance and other collaboration for members to simplify their exchange 
systems and converge to a single pegged exchange rate as quickly as possible. 
It is very important to notice the IMF’s view on tariffs in this context, which is 
presented as a secondary matter but had an important consequence for the 
region. While the IMF fought against MER regimes in an effort to maintain 
pegged exchanged rates, tariffs were allowed as the alternative instrument for 
countries when they eliminated the MER system. Although the IMF claimed to 
be against exchange controls because it sought to promote free trade, it was in 
fact only concerned about liberalizing exchange rates to reach currency 
convertibility. It claimed that it would authorize tariffs just for a transitional 
period, but in fact preferred countries to adopt high tariffs as a permanent 
instrument to control trade flows if this was the channel to replace exchange 
controls. As a result, most countries in Latin America, when ending their MER 
systems though the IMF programs, migrated to tariffs as an instrument to 
intervene in trade flows (Horsefield, 1969). From a pure balance of payments 
perspective, tariffs are much more ineffective than direct exchange controls 
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because the size of foreign exchange transactions cannot be controlled, as was 
case in Brazil’s MER system. But more importantly, this emergence of tariffs as 
a substitute for MERs contrasts with the dominant view in the literature that 
the rise of tariffs in Latin America was purely an instrument of the ISI model 
(Haber, 2006; Fishlow, 1972; Weisskoff, 1980; Hirschman, 1966). As will be 
further discussed in Chapter 3, tariffs should also be seen as a consequence of 
the IMF policy towards exchange controls, and Brazil is an important case that 
shows that the longer duration of the MER system delayed the re-introduction 
of ad-valorem tariffs, which only happened in 1957.  
2.5 Multiple Exchange Rates in Latin America and Elsewhere 
MERs were the most popular form of exchange control in Latin America during 
the Bretton Wood period. The relationship of the region with this instrument is 
quite distinctive, and its use dates back to Argentina in the 1930s. After leaving 
the Gold Standard in 1931, Argentina created the Exchange Control 
Commission as an effort to stop the currency devaluation and adopt rules to 
distribute foreign exchange, prioritizing government spending and crucial 
import sectors (Abreu, 2000, p. 66). Other Latin American countries had also 
used different forms of multiple exchange rates since the 1930s, such as Bolivia, 
Chile, and Paraguay, all in response to the breakdown of the gold standard 
during the Great Depression (Horsefield, 1969).  
The Argentine case was an important inspiration for the post-war experiences. 
Della Paolera and Taylor (2001) argue that the 1930s regime allowed a rapid 
recovery from the 1929 financial crisis in comparison with other countries from 
the so-called ‘periphery‘. The authors back their position by examining two 
counterfactual scenarios. The first examined what would have happened 
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without the action of the Conversion Office and the expansion of domestic 
credit, when gold would have been solely used for servicing external debt and 
the currency board would not have sterilized gold outflows. The second 
counterfactual tested a less extreme case, allowing for the break in the gold 
standard parity but not allowing for other forms of monetary expansion. The 
authors observe that the change of regime returned better results when 
compared to both alternative scenarios, with output recovering to the 1929 
levels already by 1934-35.  
This type of policy instrument became the norm in the region after the war, as 
14 Latin American countries adopted different types of MER systems with the 
same purpose: to stabilize their balance of payments in the context of a global 
shortage of dollars, although in many cases scholars have also interpreted it as 
part of an attempt to promote import substituting industrialization, given the 
sectoral differentiation of exchange rates (Konig, 1968; Baer & Hervé, 1962). 
There were a variety of MER arrangements, with some countries only imposing 
very small margins between different exchange rates, such as in Cuba or 
Honduras, although the most common pattern was of large differences, as seen 
in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay (Konig, 1968, p. 39). The 
rationale for these systems was quite simple: with closed capital accounts, 
difficulties in increasing exports, and the lack of foreign exchange liquidity in 
the first years of Bretton Woods, MERs were a tool to provide stability in the 
balance of payments by reducing imports while trying to keep inflation under 
control.  
Dornbusch (1986, p.146) provides an interesting framework to assess the 
different designs of MER systems, which can be used to compare the different 
Latin American systems. He defines four types of MER systems determined by 
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two types of characteristics: i) whether they have fixed or flexible exchange rate 
price determination, and ii) whether the foreign exchange was rationed by the 
government or determined by the market. Table 2.1 shows that the 
combination of these two characteristics resulted in four types of MERs. System 
I was applied when officials adopted different fixed exchange rates for different 
types of goods, but also discretionarily set the amount of foreign exchange 
allocated to each category. This was usually determined by historical precedent 
or purely on the discretion of the authorities. The system tended to result in 
black markets, given that authorities normally allocated foreign exchange 
discretionarily, benefiting certain groups in society, rather than for 
macroeconomic purposes. System II was applied when authorities 
discretionarily determined the amount for each exchange rate category, but 
allowed a flexible auction mechanism to determine the exchange rate price in 
which all participants could bid in the market. In this system the quantities of 
foreign exchange for each market are fixed, but the exchange rate price was 
endogenous. System III was when authorities fixed the different exchange rates 
prices, but allowed the market to determine the amounts being transacted at 
each exchange rate without quantitative restrictions. Prices were fixed but 
quantities were free to float. And System IV was when the government created 
different exchange rates, but allowed prices to be set in the market and 
participants to determine the quantities. In System IV the restriction was only 
for the types of goods and services allowed in each exchange rate market.  
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Table 2.1 – Types of Multiple Exchange Rate Regimes 
Type of Foreign 
Exchange Sypply Fixed Flexible
Rationed I II
Market Determined III IV
Type of Exchange Rate
 
Source: Dornbusch (1986, p. 146)  
Almost all Latin American countries system adopted System I, with authorities 
fixing different categories of exchange rates, in some cases only legalizing the 
existence of a black market, but maintaining a discretionary distribution of 
foreign exchange to the different categories. There were usually different 
exchange rates for imports and exports, with the government centralizing 
foreign exchange from exporters and then allocating discretionarily to 
importers. Systems III and IV were basically not adopted during the Bretton 
Woods period because they required allowing the market to determine the 
quantities being transacted at each exchange rate, which was difficult due to 
the shortage of foreign exchange. Finally, System II, with an auction system to 
determine the exchange rate but with the government determining the 
quantities to the exchange rate market, was also not common across Latin 
America as it removed from government the discretionary power to distribute 
foreign exchange. Nonetheless, this system was adopted in Brazil for most of 
the 1950s, which made it distinct from other experiences in Latin America.  
The IMF was an important limit to the use of MERs in the region, pressuring 
countries to end their System I MERs. The goal of the IMF was to move 
countries to a form of System III, where exchange rates were limited to a 
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number of fixed exchange rates but without exchange restrictions, meaning no 
quantitative restrictions on each of these exchange rate markets.  The two most 
notable cases of successful IMF involvement in Latin America were Argentina 
and Bolivia. In the first case, after a turbulent decade from the late 1940s to the 
mid-1950s, the country lacked foreign reserves even to import the most 
essential goods. Two successful IMF missions in 1958 reached an agreement to 
lend the country US$329 million, conditional upon major changes in the 
exchange rate policies and a stabilization program. In the latter case, the 
stabilization program was announced in 1956 after a year of negotiation with 
the country, also following enormous balance of payments difficulties (Konig, 
1968, p. 41). 
The cases of Colombia, Paraguay, and Chile reveal how the IMF gradually 
participated in the removal of countries from MER systems. Colombia appears 
quite often in the Fund’s annual reports, mainly because it was an example of a 
clear path towards the simplification of the exchange system, which was 
exactly the IMF goal. According to the 1949 report, the country’s request to 
keep its MER system was rejected because there was no path toward reducing 
the level of payment restrictions. In the 1951 report the country agreed with a 
reform to the system, which allowed a depreciation of both the selling and 
buying exchange rates, both of which had previously been fixed and with 
quantities determined discretionarily by authorities. From 1953 onwards, 
Colombia showed signs of better economic management and this was reflected 
in its exchange system, as the spread between the coffee export rate and other 
rates was narrowed, the restriction list adopted in 1951 was eliminated, and its 
exchange system further simplified (IMF, 1951, p. 50).  
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According to the 1950 Annual Report, Paraguay had a very complex MER 
system with several rates for buying and selling foreign exchange, all pre-
determined by the government with a discretionary system to distribute 
foreign exchange. In the 1951 report, the country made its first step towards 
simplification, with the old system being replaced by a new one featuring only 
two fixed rates, one for most exports and some imports and the other for most 
imports and some exports. In addition, a free market was established for some 
limited transactions, which is a feature of System III, although it remained 
highly limited. In the 1953 report, the IMF found that the country had to 
sacrifice some of the simplification due to the weaker price of its exports and 
inflationary pressures, returning to the original MER system. Again in the 1956 
report, Paraguay aimed at a simplification of its system supported by the IMF: 
it depreciated its currency and replaced a system in which the exchange rate 
ranged from 21 to 75 guraranies to a dollar with a new one in which the 
effective rate would be fixed (IMF, 1956, p. 83).  
Chile began to simplify it exchange system in 1949, according to the 1950 
report, although part of the unification of exchange rates required negotiations 
with foreign mining companies that operated in the country (IMF, 1950). In 
1954 the country backed by the IMF devalued its currency and consolidated 
some preferential selling rates with a free market rate of a System IV type. In 
addition, the free market rate was extended to export transactions and special 
exchange rates for exports were eliminated (IMF, 1954, p. 82). The main part of 
the reform took place in 1955 with the abolition of the import licensing system, 
which imposed quotas on groups of imports, and the introduction of two 
fluctuating free market exchange rates, one for imports and exports and some 
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government related transactions and the other for capital transactions (IMF, 
1956, p. 57).  
The path of these countries was very similar. First they authorized some 
devaluation and reduced the number of exchange rates, reducing the discretion 
of their System I form of MERs; later they removed payment restrictions to 
create a fixed exchange rate for trade and a free market rate for capital 
transactions, moving closer to System III for current account transactions. In its 
1967 report, the IMF looked back at its experience with MER regimes and how 
its stance had changed over time. The IMF recognized that it took time to reach 
the conclusion that those systems were ineffective, and there were situations in 
which it had supported them in the beginning, even providing resources. Still, 
the IMF believed this had always been done based on the assumption that such 
regimes were temporary and would end soon. It also stated the various 
disadvantages of MERs and concluded from the experience of countries using 
them to correct for balance of payments difficulties had the following 
problems: (1) lack of trust in the country; (2) increased complexity to maintain 
different rates; (3) distortions in the efficient allocation of resources; and (4) 
currency appreciation, generating even greater disincentives for economic 
growth. This is why from the mid-1950s onwards the IMF fully advocated a 
single exchange rate, and argued that its successful track record in dealing with 
developing countries strengthened this stance (IMF, 1967). 
There does not seem to be any consensus on what was the optimal design for 
MER systems for Latin America, mostly because a large number of experiences 
failed to support a sustainable macroeconomic environment. But based on the 
experiences of individual countries, clearly most attempts did not work 
because a System I MER generated a discretionary distribution of foreign 
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exchange by governments, which usually resulted in an ineffective distribution 
of foreign exchange to markets and the rise of black market exchange rates.  
MERs were present not only in Latin America during this period, as 
developing nations from other regions were also forced into complex systems 
of exchange rate allocation due to the same problems of liquidity in the Bretton 
Woods system. Probably the most interesting case outside Latin America was 
the South Korean experience between 1953 and 1960, the same years as Brazil. 
The South Korean case highlights how MER systems were designed and used 
for very different purposes. In contrast to Latin American countries, where 
multiple or parallel rates were introduced to reduce imports and stabilize 
balance of payments via a reduction of foreign exchange outflows, in South 
Korea the MER system was mostly designed to benefit exporters, in order to 
increase export receipts. The extremely different economic conditions of the 
country, which was recovering from the Korean War and did not have Latin 
America’s dependence on primary commodity exports, played a role in the 
system’s design (Frank Jr et al, 1975, p. 25). 
Similarly to Brazil, the South Korean system also emerged after a long post-war 
period of extreme foreign exchange shortage. Between 1945 and 1953 the 
distribution of foreign exchange was managed through quantitative controls 
and the discretionary power of the central authorities. During this period, 
almost all imports were financed by foreign aid or currency redemptions from 
the United Nations. With the country badly affected by the war, the 
government itself was the major importer. The result was a multiplicity of 
exchange rates applied to a variety of transactions, including a large black 
market for dollars. By the end of the war, the official exchange rate was 
seriously overvalued and applied to less than one-quarter of transactions. 
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(Frank Jr et al, 1975, p. 26). Although the source of foreign exchange limitations 
was very different from Brazil’s, the result of the system for foreign exchange 
distribution – a strongly over-valued exchange rate – was similar to the 
Brazilian case between 1947 and 1953 (Lago, 1982). 
A different system emerged in South Korea between 1953 and 1960. Unlike in 
Latin America, where imports were restricted with the export sectors being the 
ultimate payer of the costs of the system, in South Korea it was the opposite. 
Between 1953 and 1960 the new system in South Korea created extremely 
favorable export exchange rates via a variety of mechanisms. These included a 
deposit system in the Bank of Korea to avoid exchange risk, an export-import 
link system that authorized exporters to import inputs at cheaper prices, direct 
export subsidies, preferential loans, and tariffs exemptions. The import 
exchange rate system remained extremely complex, as different exchange rates 
were applied for different types of goods, while quotas and tariffs were added 
into the mix during the mid-1950s. The result was the opposite of the Brazilian 
case, as it provided a strong incentive for increased foreign exchange inflows 
via implicit subsidies for exporters (Frank Jr et al, 1975, p. 41).    
The MER experience in South Korea differed from Brazil, although it also 
achieved effective macroeconomic results. The literature on the South Korean 
case analyzes its MER system as part of a more complex governmental and 
private sector effort to industrialize the country and produce economic growth 
by deliberately ‘setting the relative prices wrong’ (Amsten, 1992). The system 
was designed to simultaneously balance macroeconomic conditions and 
stimulate export-led growth with preferential exchange rates for exporters. It 
was part of a broader industrial deepening effort to industrialize the country 
(Kuroiwa, 2015).  
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Compared to the South Korean case and particularly to other Latin American 
countries, Brazil’s MER experience is unique in many respects. Its main 
characteristics were a distinct endogenous exchange rate system based on 
auctions, a System II MER according to Dornbusch’s classification, whose 
details will be discussed in the chapters below. It lasted for much longer 
compared to the rest of the region and involved a different relationship with 
the IMF: whereas the MER regimes were gradually removed or ended with an 
IMF agreement by the mid-1950s, Brazil maintained its MER system for the 
whole period 1953-1961, with two different phases. The regime underwent 
changes until 1957, despite the IMF’s opposition. Moreover, just before making 
a deal to receive IMF funds and end the MER regime in 1959, Brazil’s president 
Juscelino Kubistchek decided to not accept the IMF conditions after all and 
maintained the structure of the MER system (Almeida, 2015). For this reason, 
IMF reports from the second half of the 1950s have few references to Brazil. In 
fact, the IMF only reports on the beginning of Brazil’s MER system in 1953, but 
since there were no changes to the system and no discussions with the 
institution, Brazil is a clear outsider compared to all of the other Latin 
American countries. Brazil’s experience with MERs only ended in 1961, when a 
balance of payments crisis led the government of Joao Goulart to appeal to the 
IMF, which resulted in a deal that ended the system in exchange for financing.  
The process of eliminating Latin America MERs contributed to the IMF’s 
prestige, and is normally seen as a victory for its policy stance, although it did 
not manage to solve the inherent problems of the Bretton Woods system 
(Bordo, 1993). But Latin America’s relationship with different currency systems 
did not end with the MERs of the 1950s. In fact, until the end of the Bretton 
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Woods system in 1973, Latin American countries moved through different 
exchange rate regimes, while always dealing with the same problem: shortage 
of inflows and no willingness to allow massive exchange rate depreciations 
because of the high inflation they brought. After the period of MERs in the 
1950s, most counties moved to passive crawling peg systems, which had the 
same objectives through a different instrument. Instead of fixed MERs, these 
systems were designed to allow a slow depreciation of the fixed official rate 
(Frenkel & Rapetti, 2010, p. 15). Yet, there were still many devaluations and the 
subsequent system also did not work as expected. For this reason, there was 
some return to dual exchange rates during the 1970s and 1980s (Marion, 1994). 
Edwards (1987) studied the evolution of these exchange rate regimes in Latin 
America and argued that in most cases they did not manage to bring 
macroeconomic equilibrium to the countries of the region, forcing many of 
them to undergo massive currency depreciations. But interestingly, he also 
concludes that in most cases devaluations were also ineffective at reestablishing 
macroeconomic stability. According to Edwards, only in cases in which there 
was much more stable monetary and fiscal regimes did countries manage to 
reach macroeconomic equilibrium. 
The Brazilian case will be further discussed below, where many of the unique 
aspects that differentiate it from the region’s other countries will be shown. The 
Bralizian MER system’s long duration and isolation from the IMF reflects the 
way in which it produced at least five years of a stable balance of payments, 
kept inflation under control, and helped increase international reserves – an 
outstanding result considering the Latin America pattern. Most importantly, 
Brazil’s MER system was the only one to fully centralize all trade flows and 
distribute available foreign exchange through the same auction system.  
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2.6 Exchange Controls in the Post Bretton Woods Period 
The opposition to controls for the post-Bretton Woods period is even stronger, 
although the literature is mostly concentrated on capital controls. For exchange 
controls, the consensus is also against interventions in the current account, as in 
the Bretton Woods period, although here is also an interesting literature against 
that provides a rationale to also justify the adoption of MERs for some specific 
conditions. 
Most of the cross-country analyses on capital controls focused on the post-
Bretton Woods period tend to conclude that there is no one-size-fits-all rule for 
the use of controls and argue in favor of analyzing case-by-case conditions. 
Magud et al (2011) is the most important contribution to this literature. The 
authors develop two general indexes for the use of capital controls for the post-
1970s period based on 30 country cases. The authors distinguish between 
controls on inflows and outflows as a way to separate between the different 
objectives declared by policymakers. On the one hand, they conclude that 
controls on inflows tend to make monetary policy more independent, alter the 
composition of capital flows from speculative to foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and help to reduce the pressure on real exchange rates to appreciate. In 
moments of sudden inflows controls seem to be generally effective and a 
justified policy tool.  However, controls on inflows do not seem to be effective 
at reducing the volume of net inflows and the current account deficit. On the 
other hand, for controls on outflows, there is only one specific case in which 
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controls resulted in a reduction of outflows and made room for a more 
independent monetary policy: Malaysia in 1998.7 
Other cross-country studies have reached similar conclusions, such as the most 
recent IMF paper by Habermeier et al (2011, p.19), which argues that controls 
seem to have little effect on overall inflows and in impeding currency 
appreciation but are successful in shifting the composition of inflows.8 
Furthermore, the authors argue that emerging market economies had different 
outcomes in managing inflows with capital controls due to their different 
financial conditions. In the case of Brazil, they argue that the large financial 
sector and well-developed derivatives market reduced the efficiency of controls 
during the 2000s. 
For Latin America, the importance of the different types of flows has also been 
highlighted by Campion and Neumann (2003, p. 177). They argue that with the 
growing globalization of economies and new availability of data, it is now 
possible to distinguish between the different types of financial flows and their 
relationship to capital controls. The authors collected high frequency data of 
flows between 1990 and 2000 for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru, and Venezuela, separating between debt flows and equity flows. The 
study concludes that authorities have been able to shift capital between these 
groups by using taxation and discouraging short-term disruptive inflows. 
Similar to the other studies, they suggest a positive contribution to rebalancing 
capital inflows from speculative to long-term investments.  
                                                 
7 Johnson et al (2007) also conclude in favor of outflow controls in the Malaysian 
experience. 
8 A previous IMF staff paper also reaches the same conclusions (Ostry et al, 2010). 
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For exchange controls after the Bretton Woods period, Dornbusch (1986) 
provides a comprehensive defense of the use of MERs in certain conditions. His 
starting question is whether they represent a ‘perfectly sensible quest for extra 
policy instruments, or [are] ill-considered distortions with little payoff in terms 
of effectiveness but major allocation costs’ (p. 144), as claimed by the consensus 
view. He argues that this is a particularly important question because 
international supervisory agencies, particularly the IMF, were in charge of 
restricting the use of multiple exchange rates practices since the Bretton Woods 
period. Dornbusch (1986) presents a counter set of ideas that can also be found 
in the works of a few other authors who also saw MERs as an important policy 
alternative. 
Dornbusch argues that MERs have three uses that make them an effective 
policy tool. The first is as an adjustment instrument during periods of balance 
of payments problems, similar to their use during Bretton Woods. He claims 
that MERs can provide a mechanism to adjust balance of payments deficits 
when financing is not available and without causing a large devaluation to the 
exchange rate and a negative aggregate demand shock. By creating different 
exchange rates for distinct groups of imports and exports, the MER system can 
help to improve current account deficits by containing non-essential imports 
and stimulate groups of exports. As it will be shown in Chapters 5 and 6, this 
adjustment mechanism fits perfectly with the reasons for the effectiveness of 
MERs in Brazil in the 1950s, with the MER system being primarily used to 
correct for the balance of payments deficits. 
The second use of an MER system is as a macroeconomic shock absorber in 
case of a temporary improvement in terms of trade which causes a real 
exchange rate appreciation. In this case the different sectoral MERs can help to 
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prevent a large capital inflow shock from having a negative impact on real 
sectors of the economy, which could otherwise suffer from an over-appreciated 
exchange rate. This problem became an issue from the 1970s onwards with the 
rise of oil and other commodity prices.  
The third use is as a developmental policy to produce an implicit taxation 
structure to both generate revenues for the government and subsidize the 
different sectors of the economy. According to Dornbusch, this use can be 
measured both as the total net income the MER system generates for the 
government, as well as its redistributive effects to subsidized sectors. Chapter 8 
will focus entirely on this structure of Brazil’s MER system, showing that the 
second MER system after 1957 generated higher revenues to the government as 
well as subsidizing advanced industrial sectors.  
Dornbusch concludes that MERs can be used for these three different 
objectives, with it being a particularly efficient way to deal with balance of 
payments problems. Still, he warns that MER systems do cause changes in 
relative prices in the economy, which the consensus sees as distortions, and 
which can be easily abused by governments or policymakers. He suggests that 
the important issue is not whether an MER system is a priori effective or not, 
but whether governments implement them to reach macroeconomic policy 
objectives. His warning is strongly related to the risk of governments using 
MERs for political economy reasons, as already discussed in Section 2.2, and 
which resulted in extremely discretionary systems in Latin America, as shown 
in Section 2.5. 
Kiguel (1995, p. 28), in a World Bank study, offers a similar argument about the 
effectiveness of MERs to support balance of payment adjustments. He argues 
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that many countries adopted MERs to prevent a devaluation and as a 
transitional effort to limit the inflationary effect of a large devaluation or to 
adjust the current account deficit. He claims this approach usually includes 
separating exchange rates for current and capital account transactions. The 
rationale behind this, he argues, is to allow a free floating exchange rate for 
capital transactions and a more controlled depreciation process for the current 
account, helping to adjust the current account deficit and limit the inflationary 
impact. A similar argument is made by Lanyi (1975, p. 714), who also sees a 
rationale for the separation between capital and current account transactions, 
although he does not discuss the possibility of different exchange rates for 
types of current account transactions. He argues that ‘a fluctuating exchange 
rate for capital transactions would remove pressure from official reserves 
caused by large shifts in capital flows, while at the same time insulating foreign 
trade from exchange rate fluctuations and eliminating the need for inefficient 
discretionary restrictions on capital transactions’ (p. 714). 
Overall, this literature suggests that there is also room for exchange controls in 
the post-Bretton Woods period in order to manage large capital inflows and 
help stabilize balance of payments deficits and inflationary effects from 
devaluations, which diverges from the consensus against the use of these 
instruments. Interestingly, the use of MERs to support balance of payments 
adjustments follows exactly the same rationale for their use in the Bretton 
Woods period. 
2.7 The Literature on Controls in Brazil 
Despite the widespread use of MER systems in Latin America, there is little 
analysis of the effectiveness of individual experiences. In the Brazilian case, the 
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literature offers only a limited take on the MER regime, with just a few authors 
superficially analyzing the effectiveness of the 1950s regime. The lack of studies 
of the period in Brazil is also the result of the same problems discussed more 
generally for the Bretton Woods arrangement, with controls seen as the norm 
rather than the exception and not attracting attention from scholars. In the case 
of Brazil, there is an additional problem. The literature has analyzed the MER 
system as part of the ISI model, largely ignoring its wider macroeconomic 
implications (for example, Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; 
Vianna, 1987; Sochazewski, 1980; Bergsman, 1980; Abreu, 1990; Caputo, 2007). 
These authors have tended to assume that MERs were an effective tool for 
balancing macroeconomic conditions in Brazil during the 1950s, but without 
showing the reasons for those results. Most of the literature on controls in 
Brazil is concentrated on the last thirty years, looking at controls because they 
are seen as anomalies to the current pattern of free flows. This sub-section 
revises this literature on controls in Brazil after the Bretton Woods period, as 
well as the few contemporary authors from the 1950s and 1960s who analyzed 
the effectiveness of the MER regime in Brazil. The larger literature that 
interprets the MER as part of the industrialization effort is explored in Chapter 
3. 
Probably the most important contribution of the literature on controls after 
Bretton Woods in Brazil is the IMF study by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997). They 
argue that controls can alter the composition of capital flows in moments of 
high global liquidity, but have not had sustainable long-run effects on capital 
flows in Brazil. The authors review the use of controls in Brazil during the 
1980s and 1990s and test their efficiency with vector autoregression (VAR) 
estimations to assess the effect of controls on capital inflows. It is interesting to 
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note that Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) follow exactly the same approach as the 
broader literature on controls in the post-Bretton Woods period discussed 
above. They assume controls to be endogenous to flows, which means that 
authorities would only respond with controls in case of an observed market 
inefficiency. They assume controls to be an inefficient tool a priori, and this is 
why they conclude that controls can only have minor short-term effects altering 
the composition of flows, solving the market inefficiency of a sudden rise in 
inflows. The authors do not test for the actual macroeconomic effectiveness of 
controls, only their efficiency based on a pre-determined theoretical approach. 
Similar conclusions were reached by other authors who have adopted a similar 
approach. Carvalho and Garcia (2006), Goldfajn and Minella (2005), and 
Jinjarak et al (2013) all conclude that controls in Brazil had short-term impacts 
on financial flows, normally up to six months, but no long-run effects. 
Interestingly, in arguing against the efficiency of controls in Brazil, Jinjarak et al 
(2013, p. 14) conclude that the rebound of inflows when capital controls were 
abolished in the 2000s was actually larger than their fall by the time of the 
initial adoption, suggesting that, while some temporary relief was achieved, the 
ultimate result was even stronger net inflows than initially desired. 
On the other hand, there are other authors who suggest a more important role 
for controls in balancing flows in Brazil. Vieira and Holland (2003, pp. 24-25 
argue that controls had a more significant long-term effect to alter the 
composition of capital flows towards less short-term disruptive forms of capital 
in Brazil), directly challenging Cardoso and Goldfajn’s (1997) results. They 
argue that Brazil faced a much more complex period of capital volatility in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s and controls were an important tool to reduce the 
negative externalities of inflows. Vieira and Holland (2003) use similar VAR 
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estimations, but extend the time series to 2002, whereas Cardoso and Goldfjan 
(1997) only have data up to 1995. Vieira and Holland argue that the 
stabilization of macroeconomic conditions and the fall of inflation after 1994 
made a significant difference to the capacity of controls to effectively alter 
inflows. Similar results were obtained by Silva and Resende (2010, p. 644), who 
also tested the efficiency of controls during the 1990s using VAR estimations. 
They conclude that in moments of large capital volatility, only the adoption of 
quantitative controls were able to contain the massive capital flight, such as 
during the 1999 crisis.  
While there are many studies testing the efficiency of controls in Brazil over the 
past few decades, the same is not true for the Bretton Woods period. The best 
known studies on the MER regime of the 1950s focus on the historical narrative 
and the contribution of controls to the industrialization process, and just 
assume it dealt with macroeconomic conditions without really testing its 
effectiveness (Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987; 
Sochazewski, 1980; Bergsman, 1970; Abreu, 1990; Caputo, 2007). A gap in the 
literature thus exists in the Brazilian case, as for other countries during the 
Bretton Woods period.   
2.8 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has revisited the international context of the Bretton Woods 
system and the literature on exchange controls. It has also discussed 
methodological aspects of how to analyze these historical cases. There are four 
main conclusions to be drawn. 
First, this chapter has demonstrated the need for more empirical case studies 
on controls that can tackle both the effectiveness of the systems, including 
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counterfactual exercises, but also their political economy, which has been a 
central reason for the adoptions of these instruments in history. Second, it has 
shown the limited literature on exchange controls for the Bretton Woods period 
and the negative consensus against MERs.  Third, it has shown that, despite 
this negative consensus, there is a group of authors who provide the rationale 
for the adoption of MERs for the Bretton Woods period and also for the period 
after financial liberalization. This literature particularly emphasizes the 
effectiveness of MERs for solving balance of payment problems. Finally, the 
chapter has discussed the unique contribution that Brazil’s case could make to 
this literature. Brazil’s MER system was unique in terms of its design, duration 
and the relationship with the IMF, differing from other cases in the region. 
This is the international background to the case study of Brazil in Chapters 4-8. 
The next chapter will provide the background from Brazil’s perspective, 
placing the MER system within the context of debates about the ISI model, its 
instruments, and its effectiveness for stimulating industrial development. 
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3. Industrialization and its Interpretations in 1950s Brazil  
Chapter 2 presented the context of the Bretton Woods arrangement and the 
debates about the role of exchange controls. This chapter introduces the context 
of the Brazilian experience, placing the case in wider historical and 
historiographical perspectives. The chapter thus discusses the political context 
of Brazil in the 1950s, as well as the existing historiographical interpretation of 
industrialization in Brazil and the Latin American region. Particular attention is 
given to debates about the rise of ‘developmentalism‘ in Brazil and Latin 
America in the post-war period, together with the standard ISI model that is 
used to interpret industrialization. An important contribution of this 
dissertation will be to show the ineffectiveness of traditional instruments, such 
as tariffs and the MER system, for promoting industrialization, thus 
challenging important aspects of the consensus about the ISI model.  
3.1 The Emergence of Industrialization in Brazil 
Before discussing the different interpretations of the causes of industrialization 
in Brazil in the 1950s, it is necessary to place that unique period in a long-term 
perspective, in order to show how extraordinary it was. 
The beginning of a local manufacturing sector in Brazil dates back to the late 
part of the nineteenth century. There are four main views to explain the 
emergence of industrialization in Brazil: the ‘adverse shocks‘ theory; the 
positive relationship between primary export-led expansion and industrial 
growth; the ‘late capitalism‘ theory; and finally the influence of government 
policies (Suzigan, 2000, p. 30). 
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The theory of ‘adverse shocks’ states that industrialization was a response to 
the three principal shocks of the first half of the twentieth century: the two 
World Wars and the Great Depression. These shocks caused a decrease in the 
supply of industrial products in foreign countries and consequently changed 
the relative prices between manufacturing and agricultural commodities. For 
example, between 1932 and 1939, Brazil’s terms of trade declined by about 25% 
due to the rise in prices of imported manufactured goods and the decline in 
prices of exported coffee (Abreu, 1990, p. 410). In this context, the local 
industrial sector was able to occupy the place left by imports and profit from 
the relative increase in the price of their products. The adverse shocks theory is 
linked to the traditional ideas of CEPAL and ‘developmentalist‘ economists of 
the post-war period, which will be explored below. Its main supporters in 
Brazil were Simonsen (1973), Tavares (1975), and Furtado (1959), who generally 
argued that the industrial sector is essential for overcoming the long-term 
dependence on primary commodities, reducing the vulnerability to periods of 
cyclical deterioration in the terms of trade. These authors argued that there 
should be a progressive detachment from the primary export sector to allow 
the industrial sector to grow. This opened space for policymakers to use 
protectionist policies, especially tariffs, to protect the position of the emerging 
local manufacturing sectors, even in moments of improving terms of trade.  
The second theory defends the existence of a positive relationship between the 
industrial sector and the export sector. It claims that there is a positive linear 
relationship between the performance of Brazilian exports (mostly coffee) and 
the emergence of industrial production. Dean (1971) and Nicol (1974) were the 
main authors of this theory. They argue that when exports increase, domestic 
industries grow, and, similarly, when the value of exports decrease, the 
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industrial sector faces periods of decline or slower growth. This dependence on 
the coffee sector’s performance contrasts diametrically with the theory of 
adverse shocks. Dean (1971, p. 94), for example, opposes the view that Brazilian 
industrialization was caused by external shocks and that the decline in coffee 
provided the initial trigger for industrial development by forcing a devaluation 
of the Brazilian currency, leading to greater support for industrial growth. He 
argues that during the fall in the coffee trade, the demand for industrialized 
products also felt. And industrial inputs, which were mostly imported, became 
more expensive, thereby reducing the industrial sector’s growth potential. 
The third theory is the ‘late capitalism‘ model, proposed by Mello (1994). It 
states that in periods of export expansion, there is a natural surplus of capital 
that shifts from exports to the industrial sector. At the beginning of 
industrialization, declining coffee prices negatively affect the industrial sector 
because of the lack of capital to be invested in the local manufacturing sector, 
much as in the theory of Dean and Nicol, but the relationship is inverted over 
time and is not linear. In time, declines in coffee prices start benefiting the local 
manufacturing sector. The reduction of export receipts restricts the import of 
manufactured goods, which turns into a natural protection that encourages 
consumption to shift to the domestic market. This substitution of imports 
increases the absorption of the local demand for manufactured products and 
results in further industrialization (Suzigan, 2000, p. 33). 
The last theory is industrialization based on government policies. Both Suzigan 
(2000b, p. 14) and Versiani and Barros (1977, p. 313) argue that policies such as 
the exchange rate and tariff protection were already important for the 
emergence of industrialization in Brazil long before the peak of post-war 
policies, even if in many cases they were not directly targeted towards import 
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substitution. The need to raise revenues was the main reason for a rise in 
tariffs, while exchange rate depreciation, usually caused by balance of 
payments stress, created an unintended protection for the local manufacturing 
sector during the end of the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth 
century in Brazil and was positive for industrialization. They encouraged the 
diversification of industrial production before the 1920s and created a more 
developed industrial sector before the shocks of the interwar period. 
Fishlow (1972) made an important contribution to this debate, although his 
views do not support only one of the above theories. While his views mostly 
support the theory of adverse shocks, they also contain various aspects of the 
other thesis, such as the effect of unintended policy instruments on 
industrialization and the positive effect of capital accumulated in the coffee 
sector. Fishlow (1972) claims that the first impulse to industrial production in 
Brazil was the result of the inflation and exchange rate volatility brought about 
by the debt crisis in the late 19th century (the so-called encilhamento). The weaker 
exchange rate provided the initial support for import substitution of some final 
manufactured goods at the turn of the century. Fishlow then underlines the 
positive effect of the First World War on the demand for domestically 
produced goods. He stresses that the interruption of imports of intermediate 
goods and capital limited Brazil’s industrialization, but also argues that the war 
allowed the capital accumulated in the coffee sector to be invested in the local 
manufacturing sector. Finally, Fishlow argues that during the Second World 
War, the overvaluation of the exchange rate, which resulted from improving 
terms of trade, supported the import of capital goods and promoted 
industrialization. Fishlow thus provides a narrative that places a strong 
emphasis on the positive effects of the shocks since the end of the nineteenth 
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century, while also using elements from the other theories to explain how these 
shocks promoted industrialization in Brazil.  
Figure 3.1 – Real Industrial Production Index, 1900-1958 (1900=100)  
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Source: For 1900-1947, Haddad (1978, pp. 7-8); for 1947-1959, Fundacao Getulio Vargas (FGV)’s Revista Conjuntura 
Economica. The two indexes were chained and adjusted to the same base of 1900=100. 
Figure 3.1 shows that the start of industrial growth in Brazil happened well 
before the interwar period, which is the process these different theories have 
tried to explain. Table 3.1 shows the averages of industrial production growth 
by decade between 1900 and 1990. In the first half of the century industrial 
production averages ranged between 4% and 7%. These averages then 
increased from the 1940s onwards, rising to between 7% and 9% from the 1940s 
to the 1980s. 
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Table 3.1 – Average Industrial Growth- 1900-1990 
Decade Average Annual Real Industrial Production Growth (%)
1900-1910 5.65%
1910-1920 6.40%
1920-1930 4.17%
1930-1940 7.02%
1940-1950 9.46%
1950-1960 9.20%
1960-1970 7.10%
1970-1980 9.00%
1980-1990 0.04%  
Source: For 1900-1947, Haddad (1978, pp. 7-8); for 1947-1959, FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica; and for 1960-1990, 
IBGE (2017). Averages of industrial growth were calculated based on annual data. 
There is no agreement among the different theories on the causes of 
industrialization in the first half of the twentieth century, and although the 
authors have used empirical evidence to support their theories, it is very 
difficult to prove the causation between coffee exports or unintended 
protectionist instruments and industrialization.9 Nevertheless, there is one 
generalized aspect that brings them together. Pre-war industrial development 
is seen as the result either of international shocks, unintended consequences of 
government policies, or a natural accumulation of capital from the coffee 
sector, which was then invested in the manufacturing sector. It was not, they 
agree, the direct consequence of economic policy targeted at industrialization. 
This is the main difference with the interpretation of the rapid industrial 
growth from the 1950s onwards, which has largely been explained as a result of 
intentional government policies. This interpretation is the topic of the Sub-
                                                 
9 Suzigan (2000) spends most of his book trying to test the causation between coffee 
exports and industrialization. 
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section 3.3, where it will be shown that MERs and tariffs, not only in Brazil but 
also in the rest of Latin America, are described as the main instruments for this 
policy-led industrial effort in the post-war period.  
3.2 The 1950s Industrial Growth  
The following sections will discuss the different interpretations of Brazil’s 
industrial growth in the 1950s. This section will first present the most 
important characteristics of that growth. 
The 1950s were a moment of great transformation in the composition Brazil’s 
industry. Until the end of the 1940s, Brazil’s industry was focused on 
producing final goods, resulting from the process of early industrialization that 
was described in Section 3.1. During the 1950s the industrial sector grew in 
importance, as well as shifting from traditional industries normally seen in the 
first wave of industrialization, such as textiles and food, to more advanced 
industries, such as mechanical engineering, metallurgy, electrics, chemicals, 
and intermediate and capital goods. In this way, it became more like the type of 
industrial structure that is normally seen in more advanced or dynamic 
industrial societies (Malan et al, 1977).  
During first wave of industrialization in the 1930s, industrial production grew 
by 60%, although traditional industries, such as textiles and food, still 
represented about 50% of the total value of production at the end of the war 
(Versani and Barros, 1977, p. 239). As discussed in Section 3.1, the interwar 
shocks played an important role in stimulating the import substitution of 
traditional industries in Brazil. During the Second World War, the restrictions 
to global trade and the reduction in the overall availability of manufactured 
goods resulted in a natural protection against imports and supported the rise of 
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industry. By the end of the 1940s the substitution of traditional industries was 
almost fully completed, as Table 3.2 shows. 
Table 3.2 – Import Composition and Import Ratio, 1949 
% Imports Import Ratio
Steel 13.5% 29%
Machinery 17.5% 176%
Electrical Material 7.0% 81%
Transportation Material 18.6% 130%
Pharmaceutical 22.0% 41%
Minerals (Non-metals) 3.1% 11%
Paper 1.3% 11%
Rubber 0.1% 1%
Wood 0.2% 1%
Textiles 7.6% 7%
Food 7.8% 4%
Beverages 0.5% 2%
Publishing 0.4% 2%
Leather 0.3% 3%
1949
 
Source: Tavares (1975, pp. 92-93). Original data from IBGE (1949). Import ratio is the ratio of imports to domestic 
production and calculated based on production values.  
Table 3.2 shows that by 1949 most consumer sectors, such as textiles, food, 
beverages, leather, and paper, already represented a very small share of overall 
imports. The import substitution of these sectors was fully completed, as 
shown by the import ratios (that is, the ratio between imports and domestic 
production). Most of the traditional industries had import ratios around only 2-
3%, which means imports from those industries were equivalent to only 2-3% 
of domestic production. Advanced industries, such as steel, machinery, and 
electrical and transportation material, on the other hand, were still mostly 
imported, with import ratios ranging from 30% to 176%. 
This picture began to change after the war, with industrial production growing 
faster and exports losing importance in GDP. The share of the industrial sector 
in GDP rose from 19% in 1949 to 30% in 1959 (IBGE, 1949, 1959). The 
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performance of the economy was exceptional from the end of the war up to end 
of the 1970s. During this golden age, the annual average GDP growth rate was 
7.3% and of industrial production was 8.8% (IBGE, 2017). For the 1950s 
specifically, average GDP growth was 7.4% per year and industrial production 
was the main driver of that process, with average growth around 10% per year 
(Aldrighi & Colistete, 2013, p. 6). At the same time, the share of agriculture in 
GDP declined from 27.7% in 1947 to 21.4% in 1961 (Schmitter, 1971, p. 27). 
The 1950s can be divided into two separate periods to analyze the evolution of 
industrial development, separating the decade into two parts. Although the 
literature tends to have a very similar interpretation of the whole decade, as 
will be discussed in Section 3.3, this separation is important because the 
instruments and policies differ significantly for the two periods. Between 1947 
and 1955, including the Vargas administration (1951-1954), the share of the 
industrial sector in GDP increased from 17% to 22% (IBGE, 1951-1954), and 
more importantly its internal structure changed significantly with the increased 
participation of dynamic branches and the production of durable consumer 
goods, as well as intermediate and capital goods (Versani & Barros, 1977). By 
1955, almost all sub-sectors of manufactured goods were being produced 
domestically, whereas in 1949 industrial production had been concentrated on 
non-durable consumer goods (Bergsman, 1970, p. 54). 
The period 1956-1961 was characterized by an even further acceleration of the 
industrialization process, with industrial output growing at an annual 
cumulative rate of 11%, while GDP grew at 7%. Industry’s share of GDP 
increased from 22% to almost 30% by 1961 (IBGE, 1956-1961). This was the 
period of Kubitschek’s famous Target Plan (‘Plano de Metas’), an ambitious 
and comprehensive infrastructure and industrial investment program (Tavares, 
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1975). After 1955, the industrial sector became more diversified and vertically 
integrated, with the rise of advanced industries, both consumer durable goods 
but also capital goods, such as metallurgy and vehicles. Although some of these 
advanced sectors, such as vehicles, emerged in the first half of the decade, they 
had their most significant development in the second half. Bergsman (1970, p. 
55) argues that in this later period it is possible to see a progressive vertical 
integration of the industrial sector in Brazil, with ‘investments causing the 
simultaneous creation of both demand and supply for a wide variety of 
industrial products’. The best example is probably the rise of the steel sector. 
Although it was expanding since the war, had the steel sector’s fastest growth 
came in the second half of the 1950s, providing the inputs for the development 
of the motor vehicles sector (Caputo, 2007, p. 41). Shapiro (1994) shows that the 
rise of the vehicles industry was mostly concentrated in the second half of the 
decade, with the Kubitschek’s administration using the sector as the quickest 
and most effective way to further industrialize Brazil. She argues that, until 
that period, Brazil's auto industry consisted of foreign subsidiaries or licensed 
domestic firms that assembled vehicles locally from fully imported or semi-
knocked down kits. From the mid-1950s onwards transnational 
corporations moved to the country, resulting in 95% of Brazil’s supply of 
automobiles being made domestically by the end of the decade. 
During the whole decade, the most important aspect of Brazil’s 
industrialization was the shift in industrial structure. The share of food and 
textile industries (‘traditional industries’) in the value of total industrial 
production decreased from 18% to 12%, with an increase in the relative weight 
of mechanical engineering, steel, durable goods, electrics, and chemicals – 
advanced industries that together rose from 23% to 34% (IBGE, 1949, 1959). 
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Aldrighi and Colistete (2013) state that in this initial post-war period of import 
substitution a core group of traditional and modern industries managed to 
adapt foreign technology, helping to substantially increase productivity and 
maintain growth for a reasonable period of time. Labor productivity growth for 
industry was about 40% between 1951 and 1961 (Colistete, 2007, p. 98). 
Figure 3.2 – Real Sectorial Industrial Production, 1947-1958 (1949=100)  
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Source: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica, (1947-1958).  
Figure 3.2 illustrates this sectoral divergence, which transformed the 
composition of the industrial sector during the 1950s. Industries such as 
textiles, leather, and food, while still growing, lagged behind compared to non-
metallic mineral products and metallurgy, which were more advanced 
industries. The average annual growth rate of the textiles sector was 4.7% 
during the decade, while steel grew at 12.2% (FGV, 1950-1960). By the end of 
the period, industrial production was more diversified and vertically 
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integrated, with both capital and consumer goods being an important part of 
the structure (Baer, 1972, p. 98). The industrial expansion thus brought a shift 
from traditional industries to an advanced and integrated industrial sector. 
A similar process can also be seen in the employment structure, not only with a 
significant increase in the overall labor force, but also its internal composition. 
During the 1950s the share of economically active population in the tertiary 
sector increased from 20.1% to 28.8%, while the share in the primary sector 
decreased from 71.0% to 58.5% (IBGE, 1949, 1959). This represented an increase 
of 33% in the overall labor force of the manufacturing sector during that 
decade, an impressive average of 3.3% per year (Baer, 1972, p. 100).  
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the changes in the composition of labor within the 
industrial sector during the 1950s. Traditional industries such as food and 
textile lost share of total employment. Textile, for example, lost 3% of its labor 
during the decade, while food, beverages or tobacco saw their level of 
employment stagnated during the decade. This contrasts with the significant 
increase in the labor share of advanced industries such as steel. Labor in the 
steel sector, for example, increased by almost 70% during the 1950s. There was 
a clear stagnation of employment in traditional industries versus an important 
increase in labor in advanced industries. 
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Figure 3.3 – Labor Composition in Industry, 1949  
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Source: IBGE (1949). Shares were calculated as a percentage of the total labor force in industrial sector 
 
Figure 3.4 – Labor Composition in Industry - 1959 
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Source: IBGE (1959). Shares were calculated as a percentage of the total labor force in the industrial sector 
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3.3 Beyond Import Substitution: Interpreting Industrialization in 1950s 
Brazil 
Brazilian economic historiography of the 1950s tends to interpret the 
transformation of the structure of the industrial sector from traditional to 
advanced industries according to the Latin American development school 
(‘desenvolvimentistas‘) and the ISI model. The literature characterizes the 1950s 
as a period when the goal of rapid economic growth and industrialization 
enjoyed a nationwide consensus (Kuperman, 2012, p. 74), bringing together the 
government, elites, and organized urban labor. This alignment of interests 
resulted in governments that produced highly populist expansionary policies 
that made use of import substitution instruments to support the rise of modern 
and advanced industrial sectors (Bielschowsky, 1996, p. 7).   
Politically, the 1950s were an interesting period in Brazil due an incipient 
experience of democracy. After the end of Vargas’s dictatorship (the Estado 
Novo) in 1945, Brazil went through a period of ‘open politics’ that lasted until 
the military coup of 1964. ‘Open‘ is one of the terms commonly used to 
characterize the period because there was no full control of the political power 
by a single person or group, and there was a reduced form of democracy with 
elections taking place.  Only a small part of the population could be part of the 
political system (about 15% of the population voted in the 1950 election, or 8 
million people, according to the Electoral Court), with restrictions on 
participation based on income, literacy, and other characteristics (Bethel, 2008, 
p. 87). Klein and Luna (2014, p. 143) called this period ‘formative democracy’: a 
return to democracy between two dictatorships that nonetheless still had a 
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restricted access to political power. During this period, a relatively small part of 
Brazil’s population, about 15%, disputed the main political positions and was 
allowed to participate in the electoral game, mostly representing the interests of 
the wealthy social groups. This represented an important rise in representation 
when compared to the previous democratic period, as up to the 1930s only 
about 5% of the population participated in the electoral process (Nicola, 2002, 
p. 40). The two presidents of the 1950s, Vargas and Kubitschek, had to play this 
political game, managing to bring together the diverse interests of the most 
important social classes: an old agrarian and military elite versus a new 
emerging urban industrial sector (Leopoldi, 2000; Lyne, 2015). It will be shown 
that Vargas had problems balancing the political influence of these groups, 
which resulted in a mixed economic policy framework, while Kubitschek 
managed to please both groups with a more populist economic approach. 
The division in Brazilian society is key to understanding how the two 
governments operated, and is emphasized by most of the political economy 
literature on that period (French, 1991; Hilton, 1975; Bueno & Faro, 2004; Baer, 
1995; Bielschowsky, 1996; Schmitter, 1971). Skidmore (1982, p. 111) provides 
one of the most interesting classifications of the division of classes in the post-
war period. For him, Brazil had seven social classes in the 1950s. Three were 
new classes that were growing in importance and favored industrialization and 
economic policies oriented towards protecting the labor market and shifting 
away from agricultural (that is, coffee) driven policies. These were the urban 
industrial elite, urban workers, and an urban middle class, characterized by 
liberal professionals and private sector business executives. They were born 
from the growth of industrialization at the beginning of the century, gaining 
more relevance with the industrial growth during the interwar period. 
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The next classes were declining in political importance and included the coffee 
exporters and the importers of manufactured goods. Both were directly linked 
to the old primary commodity export model of the nineteenth century and had 
political demands that were complementary, defending open markets for trade 
and subsidies for coffee exports. The remaining two classes had stable political 
positions. These were the local agricultural producers and the military. The 
first were non-politicized, since only a few commodities had to be imported, 
such as wheat, which meant they never really faced foreign competition and 
did not need government protection.  The military had always been an 
influential group in Brazil and kept that role during the 1950s. They were 
generally in favor of the existing agrarian status quo, but the low ranked 
military were also influenced by the growing middle and working classes, so 
that they were generally not against the industrialization process (Skidmore, 
1982, p. 114). 
The main dispute over political influence was between these rising and 
declining groups of classes, with the agrarian elite being in favor of subsidies 
and protectionism for their coffee exports, while the urban industrial groups 
demanded policies oriented towards industrialization (Bielschowsky, 1996). 
The transformation that Brazilian society was going through with 
industrialization and urbanization inevitably meant that the three new 
emerging urban classes were gaining importance and political influence, coffee 
exporters and manufactured goods importers were losing influence, and local 
agricultural producers and the military maintained their relative positions 
(Skidmore, 1982, p. 116). Schmitter (1971) similarly argues that the new 
manufacturing and middle-class urban groups emerged exactly from the 
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success of the exporting sector, and finally gained political influence in the 
1950s.  
Lyne (2015, p. 78) provides an interesting framework for understanding the 
relationship between politicians and these social groups. For Lyne, the 
influence of these groups in Brazilian politics was not directly through voting, 
but was rather based on a clientelist framework. Politicians directly exchanged 
political support for policy benefits with each one of these groups, adjusting 
general policies to maintain groups under their control and influence. In this 
framework, general policies were full of exemptions created exactly to allow all 
groups to benefit from the government in some form. Lyne (2015, p. 86) calls 
this framework ‘direct exchange linkages’, as politicians are not only providing 
benefits to a specific social groups in exchange for their future votes (an 
indirect linkage), but were rather diversifying policies to provide direct benefits 
to various groups. 
One of Lyne’s (2015, p. 86) examples is the exchange rate policy for exporters 
during the Vargas period, in which the government provided a bonus to the 
exchange rate to subsidize exporters, although Chapter 5 will show that this 
system actually penalized exporters. Other forms of subsidies through the MER 
system, benefiting industrialists and the government, also resulted from the 
policy framework implemented in the 1950s. Another example of this approach 
was the use of stated-owned companies (SOEs) to extract quasi-rents and 
benefits for micro social groups. Musacchio and Lazzarini (2015, 2016) show 
that although the rise of SOEs in Brazil was more of a feature of the 1970s and 
the industrial deepening pursued by the military dictatorship, there were 
already signs of growing state participation in the economy during the 1950s, 
with the creation of important companies, such as oil company Petrobras, and 
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of the state-owned Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico (BNDE), 
which in different moments were used to generate policies to benefit specific 
social groups. The authors thus reinforce Lyne’s framework by suggesting that 
the clientelist model can be applied to the 1950s, when policies were also 
adjusted to multiple politico-economic goals.  
This analysis of Brazil’s politics in the 1950s reflects the populist trend in Latin 
America during the post-war period. Macroeconomic responsibility was 
generally left to one side in order to benefit urban industrial groups. The 
fundamental tenet of populism in Latin America was a rhetoric centered on the 
interests of ‘the people’ by a leader whose attractiveness to the masses is 
secured via their strong and charismatic personality. Knight (1998, p. 223) 
describes populism as a political style that rallies the poor behind a charismatic 
leader. The coalition of support commanded by populist leaders normally 
includes not just the working classes, but the middle classes and industrialists 
as well. Government-led industrialization features strongly in this populist 
agenda (Ioris & Ioris, 2013; Conniff, 1982). But in practice, as Lyne (2015) points 
out, although there is a general nationwide agreement in favor of 
industrialization, policies have to be adjusted to maintain control over the 
different interest groups; otherwise, their coalitions would fall due to the 
disputes between the rising and declining classes.  
In terms of economic policy, the most common feature of populist governments 
is the use of rapid expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to support 
industrial expansion, with the government at the center of this growth. 
Charismatic populist leaders, such as Vargas and Kubitschek, often promised 
fast economic growth for the huge numbers of poor via a redistribution of 
income. However, as Sachs (1989, p. 5) points out, these governments often 
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resorted to policies that merely resulted in high inflation and severe balance of 
payments crises. Dornbusch and Edwards (1990, p. 8) define economic 
populism along the same lines, arguing that it is an ‘approach to economics 
that emphasizes growth and income redistribution and deemphasizes the risks 
of inflation and deficit finance, external constraints, and the reaction of 
economic agents to aggressive nonmarket policies’.   
Yet, as will be shown in this dissertation, the Vargas administration still 
managed to impose some control over budgetary and monetary policies and 
was more macroeconomically responsible. This reflected its inability to build a 
unified consensus around populist policies, as it responded to the strong 
opposition of the old elite. The Kubitschek administration, on the other hand, is 
a clear example of expansionary populism because it created subsidy channels 
to benefit different social groups, with predictable macroeconomic 
consequences. 
The persistence of populism has been, according to Weylang (2003, p. 1096), a 
central part of Latin American politics for about a century. It can be explained 
by a number of key factors, such as the high inequality and weak political 
systems. The appeal for a rapid redistribution of wealth was far more attractive 
for leaders and the population at large than long-term policies of gradual 
growth. Sachs (1989) cites pressures for increased living standards from the 
poor, the short tenure of governments, and the inability to tax elites as primary 
reasons for populism’s continuing persistence. Dornbusch and Edwards (1990, 
p. 8) explain the persistence of populism as a result of the initial 
macroeconomic conditions that makes it attractive to the population, which is 
usually poor economic performance with very moderate growth or stagnation, 
resulting in lower standards of living. 
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In this clientelist system in which politicians had to keep different social groups 
under control, Bielschowsky (1996) provides a good description of the different 
economic schools of thought behind these political groups. He defines two 
main groups in Brazilian economic thinking in the post-war period. A group 
from the Brazilian liberal tradition, which included economists such as Eugênio 
Gudin and Otávio Gouvêia de Bulhões, was also influenced by new ideas 
arriving from Bretton Woods and the IMF; and a group of ‘developmentalists‘, 
who, despite having internal sub-divisions, was mainly linked to Roberto 
Campos, Celso Furtado, and Roberto Simonsen, defenders of pro-
industrialization strategies and highly influenced by the ideas emerging from 
CEPAL. 
These two lines of economic ideology were at the core of the dispute over 
policymaking at that time, and reflected the social classes described above. The 
'developmentalists' represented the rising industrial sector, while the liberals, 
although they did not represent any particular organized group, were 
guardians of the tradition of exporters and defenders of free trade. It will be 
shown that although industrial ideas were rising and becoming dominant in 
policymaking in that decade, the liberal tradition still had influence over 
exchange rate and monetary policies, particularly during the Vargas 
presidency. 
Most of the literature uses the ISI model to interpret the industrial growth and 
the rise of advanced industries in that period. Bruton (1998, p. 907) provides a 
clear definition of the ISI model, describing it a set of ideas adopted by 
policymakers and governments who believed that ‘the appropriate strategy for 
development was to replace imports from the rich North with their own 
domestic production. Large scale comprehensive planning, rather than 
 
 
104 
 
markets, was assumed to be the appropriate instrument’. Essentially, ISI was 
an economic model that advocated the rise of the local industrial sector by 
substituting imports and giving the government a key planning and execution 
role in the process.  
ISI had its intellectual foundations in Latin America during the 1950s, when the 
Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch (1949), together with Brazilian economist 
Celso Furtado (1959), developed the basis for why countries should protect 
their local industrial sectors to overcome dependence on primary commodity 
exports in a context of deteriorating terms of trade. According to them, 
developing countries needed to create local vertical linkages and they could 
only succeed by creating industries that used the primary products already 
being produced domestically. The core theoretical concept behind the Brazilian 
developmentalist school was to design policies that provided sufficient 
protectionism to allow domestic infant industries to prosper (Furtado, 1959). 
A key aspect of the ISI model was its application by policymakers with the use 
of a series of instruments to provide protection to the local industrial sector and 
stimulate the substitution of imports. As Bruton (1998, p. 911) says, ‘[t]he 
import substitution idea, by its very nature, involved protection, and from the 
beginning of the 1950s virtually all developing countries began to put in place a 
variety of instruments to protect their economies from a large number of 
imports’. Both the traditional literature of the 1970s and 1980s (Tavares, 1975; 
Weisskoff, 1980; Versani & Barros, 1977; Baer, 1972; Fishlow, 1972), as well as 
more recent revisions by economic historians (Abreu et al, 1997; Colistete, 2006; 
Kaufman, 1990; Lewis, 2005), emphasized the importance of import 
substitution instruments such as tariffs, exchange controls, price 
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administration, subsidies, and direct government participation as central for 
the industrial strategy of the ISI model in Latin America.  
Most Brazilian authors from the 1960s to the 1980s interpreted the industrial 
take off of the post-war period with this framework, giving a large role for 
protectionist instruments such as tariffs and exchange rates to explain the 
impressive industrial growth. Protection was given to the local manufacturing 
sector by changing relative prices, thereby forcing a shift in consumer demand 
from imported to locally produced goods. This was usually achieved with the 
introducing of ad valorem tariffs, managing exchange rates or introducing 
mechanisms to alter the domestic prices of goods. The combined effect of these 
traditional instruments is summarized as the effective rate of protection (ERP). 
The simple formula is ERP = (1 + t)*R*Pm/Pd, where t is the ad valorem tariffs 
for a specific sector, R is the nominal exchange rate, Pm is the import price of 
that sector, and Pd is the domestic price of that same sector (Brandão e 
Carvalho, 1991, p. 62). Policymakers could increase the protection given to a 
sector by interfering in any of these variables, with the most common being the 
application of ad valorem tariffs. As it will be shown below, the MER system of 
the 1950s in Brazil was targeted to create differentiation between sectors and 
provide protection to the local manufacturing sector. In practice, however, 
Chapter 7 will show that this had only a minimal impact on industrial growth. 
Most authors claim that Brazil’s industrial growth was the result of these 
instruments. According to Tavares (1975, p. 95), during the 1950s the import 
coefficient declined in traditional industries as well as in advanced industries, 
reflecting the progress of import substitution. She claims that ‘there was a 
considerable effort of import substitution performed by almost all 
manufacturing industries’(Tavares, 1975, p. 96).  Abreu et al (1997, p. 3) state 
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that ‘high tariffs, or non-tariff barriers after 1930, have been a crucial feature of 
import-substitution in Brazil’. Weisskoff (1980, p. 665) argues that ‘Brazilian 
economic growth was spurred by deliberate and accelerated promotion of 
modern industry’. And Versani and Barros (1977) argue that the currency 
structure had a direct impact in this transformation by bringing advantages to 
dynamic sectors and stimulating imports of capital goods.  
Hirschman’s (1968) claimed these instruments of protection were the main 
feature of the ISI model to stimulate industrial growth in Latin America. They 
are one of the four impulses that supported industrialization in the region in 
the 1950s and 1960s. For the author, import substitution policies were easily 
welcomed into the existing social and political environment of that period, as in 
the case of Vargas and his coalition of urban classes and industrialists, 
facilitating their growth during the second half of the twentieth century. He 
argues that there were ‘four impulses’ for the adoption of the ISI model in that 
political environment: most importantly, balance of payments difficulties and 
government policies, such as subsidies and tariffs, but also the world wars and 
the gradual growth of income. 
The ISI consensus remained at the core of the historiographical interpretation 
of industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s, without suffering much criticism. 
Few authors of the time have written against the ISI consensus. Leff (1967) was 
one of them and had a critical view of the ISI consensus. He claims that the 
post-war period was characterized by a singularly positive view of ISI on the 
part of policymakers and public opinion, supported by various economic 
schools of thought. His criticism is concentrated on the lack of policies 
designed to stimulate exports, which he argues were completely ignored by 
scholars and policymakers as the alternative channel to overcome the 
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dependency on primary commodities and balance of payments problems. 
Another author who also criticized the ISI consensus at that time was Macario 
(1964, p. 77). He agrees with Leff that there was an indiscriminate support for 
import substitution, which, instead of providing protection to the most efficient 
industries to prepare them for international competition, only maintained the 
status quo of an inefficient local manufacturing sector. 
The ISI consensus has been revised by important authors in recent years. Yet, 
although in some cases they have criticized the outcomes of the ISI model, they 
have not challenged the consensus that industrialization was mostly the result 
of protectionist instruments. Haber (2006) has a strongly critical view of the 
process. He claims that the peak of the ISI policies of the post-war period 
resulted in inefficient protected industries that were not capable of competing 
in international markets when protection was finally removed in the 1990s. 
Colistete (2006, 2010) is the Brazilian author who also provides an interesting 
revision of Brazil’s experience of industrialization, arriving at a more positive 
assessment than Haber. Colistete (2006) discusses the importance of CEPAL 
ideas for Brazilian industrialists in the 1950s and how they shaped 
policymaking during that decade and the following one. He states that the 
defense of industrialization was their main goal and that tariffs were a central 
policy tool to reach this objective. Colistete (2010) provides a longer revision of 
industrialization in Brazil from 1945 to 1979, and finds evidence of important 
labor productivity growth in the post-war period and of the manufacturing 
sector becoming more technologically sophisticated, despite the criticisms of 
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Haber.10 He also finds evidence that this productivity growth lagged behind 
other industrializing and developed countries from the mid-1970s onwards, 
suggesting a more heterogeneous structure to Latin American import 
substitution than the widespread view of inefficient industries across the 
board. 
Both the 1960s and 1970s literature that developed the ISI consensus 
(Hirschman, 1966; Tavares, 1975), as well as important recent revisions (Taylor, 
1998; Haber, 2006; Coatsworth & Williamson, 2004; Efrench & Palma, 1990), 
have reached a consensus that two general concepts are applied to most cases 
in the region: (1) Latin American was passing through a strong phase of import 
substitution in the post-war period based on the relationship between 
governments and industrialists; and (2) this resulted from strong protectionist 
policies for the local manufacturing sectors via tariffs and other trade controls. 
These concepts and the influence of the ISI consensus are clearly present in the 
Brazilian literature on the MER system in Brazil (Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 
2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987; Sochazewski, 1980; Bergsman, 1970; Abreu, 
1990; Caputo, 2007), which essentially explains the changes to the system in 
1957 as an effort to increase protection while differentiating between sectors, in 
order to promote import substitution industrialization in more advanced 
industries.  
One of the problems of the ISI consensus is this strong emphasis on 
protectionist instruments such as tariffs and exchange controls as the sources of 
                                                 
10 In two other papers, Colistete (2007, 2009) shows that this labor productivity growth 
was strongly related to the concentration of profits in the hands of industrialists, rather 
than wages for workers. This caused a strong increase in Brazilian inequality during 
this golden age of industrialization. 
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industrialization. There is a strong consensus that these instruments were 
adopted in the post-war period in Latin America and Brazil, and explain a 
significant portion of the increase in industrial growth. Some authors have, 
however, placed an interesting emphasis on a larger set of government policies 
rather than just protectionist instruments. Although they are all conceptually 
part of the ISI model, this distinction is important for this dissertation because 
Chapters 7 and 8 will exactly show that the traditional protectionist 
instruments (tariffs and exchange rates) do not explain most of Brazil’s 
industrial growth, which is actually mostly explained by other government 
policies.   
Baer (1972, p. 97) argued that after the Second World War most ‘of the larger 
countries of Latin America implicitly or explicitly accepted the Cepal analysis 
of the hopelessness of gearing their economies towards the traditional world 
division of labor’. But he also argued that states used a large collection of 
instruments to do so, including tariffs and exchange controls, but also subsidies 
for capital goods imports, cheap loans by government development banks, and 
the direct participation of government in certain industries. Bergsman (1969) 
also puts a lot of emphasis on the government role in that process. He argues 
that ‘throughout the period of postwar growth, protection, public investment 
and investment subsidies generally complemented each other‘ (1969, p. 32). 
There was, then, a broader government effort to promote industrialization that 
went beyond the use of protectionist instruments. 
Fishlow (1972) made an interesting contribution to this debate by arguing that 
although we cannot read the minds of policymakers, it seems likely that many 
of the impulses for import substitution came from the unintended effects of 
other policies rather than direct protectionist policymaking, which is a similar 
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argument to the literature on the early rise of industrialization in Brazil that 
was discussed in the last sub-section (Suzigan, 2000). He argues, for example, 
that the overvaluation of the exchange rate during the war did more to 
stimulate and subsidize the import of capital goods to promote 
industrialization than explicit tariffs or other forms of direct trade control. 
Below it will be shown how the MER indeed was a channel to subsidize 
imports in the later part of the 1950s. Similar views on the role of the state are 
also presented by Kaufman (1990), who claims that the Brazilian case is 
characterized by an inward-looking strategy in which the state participated in 
all forms of industrial development, not only in providing protection but also 
in financing and directly participating in production. Lewis (2005) also 
emphasizes the many forms of state participation, including direct investment 
and price administration. Colistete (2007), who in other articles places strong 
importance on ISI ideas, also characterizes the period as ‘the heyday of 
‘developmentalism’, an economic ideology aimed at state-led, accelerated 
industrialization, with foreign and domestic private capital as active partners‘ 
(p. 93). Mussachio and Lazzarini (2015) see the 1950s as the first period of the 
rise of state capitalism in Brazil with the creation of the country’s first stated-
owned companies. 
One of the interesting aspects of the authors who have emphasized the broader 
role of the state rather than traditional protectionist instruments is their clear 
connection to a scholarly debate that emerged in the 1970s on the causes of 
industrial growth under military rule. The 1960s and 1970s were characterized 
by the rise of military dictatorships across the region, and in Brazil was also 
another period of important industrial expansion. Many authors characterized 
the 1960s and 1970s as a period of ‘state-led’ industrialization or ‘industrial 
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deepening’ (O’Donnell, 1973), in which the government took center stage in the 
industrial development process by not only providing protection but also by 
financing, expanding, and directly participating in the economy.  
The emphasis on the active role of the state in promoting industrial deepening 
mirrors the literature on East Asia’s post-war ‘economic miracle’. Kuroiwa 
(2015, p. 1) defines industrial deepening as policies targeted towards the 
‘formation of local linkages and the creation of a robust local supplier base’. He 
argues that governments in many East Asian countries, such as Korea and 
Taiwan, focused on a group of policies targeted at encouraging vertical 
integration in the industrial sector, where a strong base of local suppliers 
directly linked to final goods manufacturers were the key to building 
competitiveness. These policies included trade protection, local content 
requirement rules, funding for training and information, financial assistance 
with subsidized state credit, direct state participation, fiscal incentives, 
subsidies to imported inputs, and infrastructure investment (Kuroiwa, 2015; 
Toshiyuki, 2005). There are numerous studies about the post-war industrial 
deepening process in East Asia,11 and the various policies and instruments used 
by different countries. As discussed in Chapter 2, this was the policy 
framework described by Amsden (1992) as ‘setting the prices wrong’: a large-
scale government effort to interfere in relative prices to produce vertical 
industrialization. The important aspect for Brazil is the industrial deepening 
concept, which seems to be an interesting framework for analyzing the 1950s 
beyond the ISI model.  
                                                 
11 Toshiyuki (2005), Fumitake and Fujikawa (1998), and Tham and Wai (2011) are good 
case studies. 
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Industrial deepening was first applied to Latin America by O’Donnell (1973), 
who claimed deepening industrialization was an essential part of ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarianism’ – his term for the region’s military regimes. His argument is 
that the elites saw in the military a means to advance industrial capitalism in 
the region. Serra (1979) provides an interesting contribution to the ‘industrial 
deepening‘ discussion for Brazil. Against O’Donnell, he argues that deepening 
did not appear necessary for the survival of capitalism in Brazil in the 1960s 
and 1970s. More importantly for this dissertation, Serra claimed industrial 
deepening was already happening in Brazil in the later part of the 1950s, 
during a democratic period, so it did not need an authoritarian regime. Serra 
was the only author that has framed Brazil’s industrialization in the 1950s as 
industrial deepening: 
The deepening process advanced considerably during the 1950’s – 
especially in the second half of the decade – and at the beginning of the 
1960’s. It was actively promoted by the administrations of the pre-BA 
regimes, which would clearly be considered democratic. (Serra, 1979, p. 
117) 
Serra’s arguments are not intended to revise the interpretation of 
industrialization in the 1950s and reflect the consensus view of the ISI model, 
but they do provide a description of industrialization that seems to be a more 
accurate characterization of Brazil’s industrial growth in the later part of the 
decade. Empirical evidence to support the importance of the government’s 
direct role in industrialization will be a key contribution of this dissertation to 
the historiography of that period, while it also demonstrates the minor role of 
tariffs and exchange controls. The next section will revise the long-term history 
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of tariffs in Brazil, which demonstrates exactly that this instrument was not 
used during most of the 1950s.  
3.4 Tariffs and the Long-Term History of Protectionism in Brazil  
The case of Brazil challenges some of the above literature on the use of 
protectionist instruments in the post-war period. Although protection, as 
discussed, resulted from a much larger group of policies, there is a considerable 
emphasis on tariffs as the main instrument of protectionism in post-war Brazil. 
This sub-section explores the history of tariffs in Brazil in the long run and 
shows that this instrument was not present for most of the 1950s, exactly when 
the traditional interpretation suggests that they were central to 
industrialization. The challenge to exchange rates as the other main instrument 
of protection will come in Chapter 7, when their effect on industrial growth is 
tested. 
The use of tariffs in Brazil had started long before the 1950s, but there was a 
long period with only a minor use of tariffs between 1934 and 1957, exactly 
during the main period of industrial take off and the shift towards advanced 
industries. Tariffs were kept fixed and provided just a minimal level of 
protection, only returning to the spotlight toward the end of the 1950s, when ad 
valorem tariffs were reintroduced. Chapter 8 will show than even this 
reintroduction was not targeted at import substitution and was mostly used to 
subsidize industrialization as part of the process of industrial deepening.  
One of most interesting recent contributions is the evidence that tariffs were 
high in Latin America much earlier than has previously been supposed, 
resulting in some form of early import substitution, although the tariffs were 
mostly targeted at increasing tax revenues (Haber, 2006, p. 540; Coatsworth & 
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Williamson, 2004, p. 206). Versiani and Barros (1977) previously made the same 
claim for Brazil, arguing that the early days of protectionism were mostly a 
result of externalities from tariffs designed for other purposes. The evidence 
shown in Section 3.2 confirms that early substitution did happen in Brazil, as 
by the end of the 1940s most traditional industries had their substitution fully 
completed before the 1950s and 1960s period, when the ISI model is normally 
applied.  
This argument also holds well when the economic history of tariffs in Brazil is 
reviewed. They were first introduced in the country during the end of the 
colonial period, when in 1808 the King of Portugal moved the crown to Brazil 
to escape from the Napoleonic Wars. With Brazilian ports becoming an 
important part of Portugal’s expanding trade, the first import tariffs were 
introduced in the following years. This process continued after independence. 
During the Empire, from 1822 to 1889, the country established trade 
relationships with Britain and signed its first important commercial agreements 
(Silva, 2008, p. 1). Tariffs were not primarily used to stimulate import 
substitution or the development of the local manufacturing sector. Foreign 
trade agreements between Brazil and other countries (mainly Britain) 
essentially exchanged imports of foreign manufactured goods for exports of 
local primary commodities (Conde, 2002, p. 163).  
There were a few moments, however, when tariffs were raised for shorter 
periods of time, such as in 1844, with the Alves Branco Tariffs, or during the 
Paraguay War between 1865 and 1870 (Silva, 2008, p. 3). Yet, as in other weak 
post-independence Latin American states, import tariffs were conceived as an 
instrument for taxation, and these temporary increases merely resulted from 
moments of financial stress, such as wars or large debt payments (Conde, 2002, 
 
 
115 
 
p. 164). Yet, as Luz (1978, p. 60) notes, these episodes resulted in large tariffs 
increase, such as the Alves Branco Tariffs, which increased import tariffs by 
between 20% and 60%, but only for a limited number of goods. It is important 
to note that during this long period from the nineteenth century up to the Great 
Depression, the export-led growth model dominated economic thinking in 
Brazil and most of Latin America (Bielschowsky, 1996). From a political 
economy perspective, this approach protected the interests of the country’s 
elites: agricultural producers who were primarily coffee exporters (Cortés 
Conde, 2002). This social group remained a significant part of the Brazilian 
class structure even after the war, when industrialists and the other urban 
classes emerged as the most important social groups. 
Luz (1978, p. 51) shows that during most of the nineteenth century nationalistic 
economic thinking, which became the norm in the middle of the twentieth 
century, had very little influence over the Brazilian society and policymakers. 
Nonetheless, the fiscal needs of the country resulted in a moderate 
protectionism that supported the early rise of some industrial production, as 
discussed in Section 3.1. During the period of export-led growth, voices 
defending tariffs and protectionism were found coming from a few statesmen, 
such as Alves Branco and Rodrigues Torres, who reflected the pressure from 
some isolated industrialists. It was only after the creation of the Industrial 
Association in 1881 when the industrial sector started to slowly grow in 
importance and organization. Pressure for protection increased under the 
leadership of Malvino Reis and Antonio Felicio dos Santos, though it remained 
incipient (Silva, 2008, p. 4). 
Broader protectionist policies in Brazil began after the proclamation of the 
Republic in 1889. There is a long discussion among scholars about whether the 
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surge in industrialization in the pre-1914 period was ‘export-driven’ – that is, 
the result of credit expansion and capital accumulated from export-led growth 
(Suzigan, 2000) – or actually resulted from deliberate government policies, 
including tariffs and exchange rate protection (Versiani & Barros, 1977), which 
was discussed in Section 3.1. According to Versiani and Barros, pre-1914  
industrialization in Brazil cannot have been based solely on a direct 
relationship between agricultural exports and industrial investment. Instead, 
there were the main factors driving the process: the rise in tariff protection in 
the late part of the nineteenth century and the exchange rate instability of the 
country during the first republican period. The world wars and the Great 
Depression later reinforced protectionist policies due to the strong restriction 
imposed on imports, but they were not the initial triggers for industrialization. 
Higher import tariffs were the result of an increased pressure on revenues for 
the new republic and volatility in exchange rates (Versiani & Barros, 1977, p. 
313).  
During the first republic between 1889 and 1930, the fight between the 
agricultural elites who favored free market policies and the growing 
importance of the industrial sector resulted in changes to the tariffs structure, 
and the overall trend started slowly moving toward protectionism. Cumulative 
changes to tariff laws led to more products being transferred from specific 
nominal tariffs, which were the standard during the Empire, to ad-valorem 
tariffs, which maintained the level of protection over time. The number of 
products with ad-valorem tariffs grew from 46 under the Alves Branco Tariff of 
1844 to 114 in the 1910 tariffs revision. The maximum tariff rose from 60% to 
100% and by the early 1920s the average import tariff was already around 30-
35%. Although these were still far from the levels reached after the 1957 reform, 
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which led to tariffs that averaged more than 60% in the 1960s, and while they 
were not deliberately targeted towards import substitution, there was a 
gradually increasing process of protectionism (Silva, 2008, p. 7) 
The growing importance of the industrial elites in policymaking was also a 
major part of the 1930s political shift in Brazil, when Vargas first ascended to 
power based on the support of the new classes, gradually reducing the 
attention paid by the government to the old agricultural elites. In that context, 
the expectation would have been an even faster increase in the use of tariffs for 
more deliberate import substitution policies. Nonetheless, the use of tariffs 
paradoxically declined as a policy instrument for protection until the 1957 
reform.  
Despite the greater prominence of the industrial classes, tariffs continued to be 
used for fiscal purposes in the 1930s. During the term of Oswaldo Aranha as 
Finance Minister, the 1934 tariff legislation reduced to just seven the number of 
products under ad-valorem taxes and fixed specific tariffs for all others goods, 
which did not undergo modifications until 1957. Aranha’s plan had no link to 
import substitution or industrialization because, as in previous periods of 
Brazilian economic history, it was purely based on fiscal needs (Silva, 2008, p. 
8). With the impact of the Great Depression and the increase in social spending 
proposed by Vargas, ad valorem revenues were falling with the deflation of 
prices in global markets, which was particularly acute for Brazil because tariffs 
on imported goods represented 40% of government revenues (Silva, 2008, p. 9). 
By fixing specific nominal tariffs, Aranha tried to preserve the revenues from 
the main source of taxation. This is shown in Figures 3.6, which present the 
long decline in import prices during the 1920s and early 1930s. 
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Figure 3.5 - Import Prices, 1910-1961 (1910=100) 
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Source: Own construction from Abreu (1990, p. 410). Original data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica.   
Figure 3.5 shows that from 1920 to 1934, import prices fell drastically by 55%. 
As a consequence, there was a deterioration in Brazil’s public finances: between 
1928 and 1934, fiscal revenues from tariffs declined by 8.2 percentage points of 
total revenues, from a share of 42.4% to only 33.8% (IBGE, 2017). By fixing 
specific tariffs, the 1934 reform therefore sought to hedge against this process. 
But with an average inflation of 8.9% between 1934 and the end of the war 
(IBGE, 2017), specific nominal tariffs rapidly fell behind the nominal price of 
imports, reducing the effective rate of protection. Until the war, this decline in 
tariff protection was increasingly compensated for by the rise of other non-
tariffs forms of protection, mostly quotas or quantitative restrictions. But these 
were also quickly reversed during the war as the fear of a shortage of imports 
led officials to maintain very low restrictions on trade. Although the value of 
‘free on board’ (FOB) imports grew by 47% between 1939 and 1945, from 
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US$218 million to US$323 million, rise in transportation costs meant that the 
quantum of imports declined by 11.4%, given the strong restrictions to global 
trade (IBGE, 2017).  
Figure 3.6 - Coffee Export Prices, 1901-1961 (1995=100) 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
19
01
19
04
19
07
19
10
19
13
19
16
19
19
19
22
19
25
19
28
19
31
19
34
19
37
19
40
19
43
19
46
19
49
19
52
19
55
19
58
19
61
 
Source: Compiled by IBGE (2017). Original data comes from the Instituto Brasileiro de Café and the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). 
On the other hand, exports receipts increased substantially in the same period. 
Figure 3.6 shows an important recovery of coffee prices during the Second 
World War. Export prices of coffee increased by 102% between 1939 and 1945. 
Abreu (2004) shows that Brazil, as a commodity producer, benefited 
significantly from the Second World War, managing to increase foreign receipts 
due to the demand for agricultural products. Most Latin American countries 
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were in a similar situation and ended the war with high foreign exchange 
reserves (Abreu, 2004, p. 15).  
Figure 3.7 - Terms of Trade, 1930-1961 (1930=100) 
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Source: Data compiled by Abreu (1990, p. 410). Original data from FGV, Revista Conjuntura Economica.   
This improvement can also be observed in the terms of trade, shown in Figure 
3.7. Following the rise of coffee export prices, the terms of trade increased by 
44% between 1939 and 1946. The positive balance of payments position that 
resulted prevented changes to the import tariffs system in the immediate post-
war period, further reducing the effective rate of protection of the nominal 
tariffs. Malan et all (1977, p. 165) show, however, that while the restrictions on 
imports and the improvement in terms of trade supported Brazil´s balance of 
payments during the war, preventing authorities from changing the tariff 
structure, most of the foreign exchange reserves accumulated during this 
period were actually in inconvertible currencies. Of the US$700 million that 
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Brazil recorded as international reserves in the immediate post-war period only 
about US$92 million were truly convertible. This became a severe restriction on 
the balance of payments between 1947 and 1949 because the boom in imports 
and the lack of import restrictions resulted in a significant balance of payments 
deficit, and there were not enough reserves to cover the gap. 
The overall result of the 1934 tariffs law was that the average tariff rate, which 
was around 35% ad valorem by the late 1920s, fell to less than 30% by 1939, and 
around 10% between 1943 and 1950 (Silva, 2008, p. 7). During both the Dutra 
administration (1947-1951) and Vargas’ second mandate (1951-1954), the 
effective tariff rate remained below 10%, with most revenues collected from 
small ad valorem taxes limited to the 5% charged by state ports as entrance 
fees. These were originally designed to be an additional source of revenue only 
for states, but ended up becoming the sole source of tariff protection with 
almost all goods paying specific tariffs that had become low in real terms 
(Lago, 1982). Table 3.2 shows the ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs for 
some specific products between 1933 and 1945. 
Table 3.3 - Ad Valorem Equivalent of Specific Tariffs on Selected Products, 
1933-1945 (%) 
1933 1939 1945
Cement 77.8 54 19.9
Iron 39.1 26 17.8
Rails 29.7 13.5 9.7
Tires 71.6 61.1 -
Motor Cars 48.3 41.9 -
Coal 24.7 15.3 6.9
Wheat 16.2 22.4 7.3
Wines 67.5 20.3 19.7
Cotton Yarn 50.6 24.2 8.6
Weighted Total 36.1 29.2 10.4  
Source: Reproduced from Abreu (2004, p. 32). 
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Table 3.3 shows the major decline of protection with fixed specific tariffs losing 
traction to inflation during the period 1933 to 1945. This can be seen in a variety 
of sectors, making the weighted total protection close to 10% by 1945, which 
then fell to below 5% by the mid-1950s, providing little protection at all (Silva, 
2008, p. 11). It is important to highlight, however, that during the war the low 
rate of protection from tariffs and the rise in export prices did not prevent 
industrialization from continuing. As shown in Section 3.2, by the end of the 
1940s the substitution of almost all consumer industrial goods was completed 
in Brazil despite the lack of protectionism. The restrictions to global trade and 
the shortage of global manufacturing production to be imported by Brazil, as 
shown by the decline in import volumes, became a natural form of protection, 
stimulating the substitution of imports of non-durable goods (Versiani and 
Barros, 1977, p. 313) 
By the end of the war, the administration of Eurico Gaspar Dutra opted for a 
liberal approach that did not change this situation of low tariffs. The decision 
reflected the belief that Brazil would be a major recipient of FDI after the war 
and also that the country had accumulated enough reserves to cover a 
transitory balance of payments deficit (Malan et al, 1977). Both views proved to 
be wrong and the country faced large balance of payments problems until 1953, 
when the MER was adopted. The discussion of the return to tariffs started 
exactly during this period, during the second mandate of Getulio Vargas 
between 1951 and 1954. The debate about a new tariffs system grew and 
industrialists based in Sao Paulo demanded a shift toward more differentiation 
and ad valorem tariff protection, in an effort to both protect the wartime 
industrial growth, but mostly to stimulate import substitution in advanced 
industries (Colistete, 2006, p. 6). This did not, however, result in policy action 
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until 1957, and even this return to tariffs as a source of protectionism will be 
questioned. Although it was claimed by the Kubitschek administration as 
another step toward the import substitution of modern industries, this 
dissertation presents new evidence that suggests it was mostly targeted at 
generating revenues and slowly dismantling the MER regime that had been in 
place between 1953 and 1957. This will be the main theme of Chapter 8. 
3.5 Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter has discussed the economic history of Brazil’s impressive 
industrial performance in the 1950s, the historiographical interpretation of that 
period based on the ISI consensus, and debates about the broader role of the 
government in the process of industrialization and the long-term history of 
tariffs in Brazil. The chapter has two important findings that place Brazil’s MER 
experience in perspective. 
First, the impressive industrial growth and the shift from traditional to 
advanced industries in the 1950s. This was the main transformation that took 
place in the Brazilian economy during this period.  
Second, the explanation of this process is largely based on the ISI model, which 
sees the industrial process as the result of a set of ideas and policies designed to 
replace imports by local manufacturing. This consensus sees government 
planning and execution as central in this process, and gives an important 
emphasis to protectionist instruments such as tariffs and exchange rates to 
achieve the industrial goals.  
The importance of these traditional instruments is analyzed in this dissertation. 
The history of tariffs presented in this chapter shows that they had only a 
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minor use during the post-war period, while the role of exchange rates will be 
tested in Chapter 7. Overall, it will be argued that other government policies 
were much more important for industrial growth than these protectionist 
instruments.  
The industrial history of the 1950s as well as its interpretations provided in this 
chapter is also the necessary context to understand the evolution of Sumoc, the 
monetary authority responsible for macroeconomic policy at that time, and the 
sequence of macroeconomic policies that it applied. These are the topics of the 
next chapters. 
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4. Politics, Institutions and Exchange Rate Management Pre-MER 
Chapters 2 and 3 placed the MER experiment within the larger context of 
exchange controls and Bretton Woods, as well as Brazil’s industrialization in 
the 1950s. They provided the historiographical and historical context to 
understand this dissertation‘s contributions to the literature. This chapter 
provides a review of the political history of post-war Brazil, the history of the 
institutions and actors responsible for exchange rate management in the post-
war period, and the chronological historical experience of exchange rate 
policies from immediately after the Second World War until just before the 
adoption of the MER in 1952, including the earlier attempts to solve the balance 
of payments problems. The chapter will show that Sumoc, the institution 
responsible for economic policy, was an ‘arena’ for debates about 
macroeconomic policy between two different schools of economic thought and 
served the interests of the leader in power at each time. It will also show the 
ineffectiveness of the import licensing regime and the free market for the 
exchange rate, predecessors of the MER system, to adjust the balance of 
payments problems of the country.  
4.1 The Politics of Vargas and Kubistcheck 
This section presents a short chronological revision of the political history of 
Brazil in the 1950s, which is the background context for the analysis of 
macroeconomic policymaking provided in the rest of the dissertation. 
The division of social classes discussed in Section 3.3 provides the background 
for understanding the politics of 1950s Brazil. There were essentially two 
important political groups in Brazil’s incipient democracy: one that represented 
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the interests of the traditional elite, mostly agricultural exporters but also 
importers of manufactured goods and part of the military; and the other 
representing the emerging urban industrial and labor classes in society. The 
traditional elite was represented by the political party UDN (União 
Democrática Nacional), which had been created in 1945 after the end of the 
Vargas dictatorship, with a strong conservative stance in opposition to Vargas’ 
pro-industry and labor positions. The industrial and urban classes were 
represented by the PTB (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro), which was created by 
Vargas himself in an effort to gain the support of the urban classes (Figueiredo, 
2012, p. 167). Alongside the PTB was the PSD (Partido Social Democrático), also 
a pro-urban and labor party, but with a more centrist approach than the PTB. 
The PSD’s main leader was Juscelino Kubitschek, and the party was not created 
by Vargas; rather, it was encouraged by him as another vehicle for increasing 
the influence of his industrial and urban ideas (Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 28). 
There were also a variety of other smaller parties that were generally aligned 
with the UDN or the PTB/PSD, with the most important being the PSP (Partido 
Social Progressista), the PR (Partido Republicano), and the PDC (Partido 
Democrata Cristão) (Lyne, 2015, p. 77). 
Vargas won the 1950 election with 48.7% of the votes, against 29.7% for 
Eduardo Gomes, a general from the UDN, and 21.5% for Cristiano Machado, 
the PSD candidate (Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 29). Vargas’ campaign was based 
on winning the urban and industrial electorate, defending pro-industrialization 
policies, and implementing labor protection laws. Even though Vargas had 
sympathy from parts of the traditional elite that had supported him during his 
dictatorship between 1937 and 1945, the UDN maintained a strong opposition 
to his mandate. The PSD supported Vargas and was part of his coalition, giving 
 
 
127 
 
him a majority in congress (57% of seats), although this was not a very large 
coalition and his own party, the PTB, had only 15.6% of congressional seats 
(Figueiredo, 2012, p. 165).  
Vargas tried to attract the support of the UDN, so at first chose a very 
conservative cabinet, but he was not successful and most of the party remained 
strongly opposed to his government. This resulted in a weak coalition during 
his mandate and a highly polarized political arena (Hilton, 1975; Leopoldi, 
2000). Vargas’ effort to conquer the UDN while having won with support from 
PTB and PSD fits Lyne (2015)’s framework of a model of political bargaining in 
which the limited representation of the electorate (only 15% of the population 
voted) meant politicians were more inclined to look for support from the main 
political groups in society, rather than following a policy direction that purely 
reflected their voting base.  
Vargas was not particularly successful in bringing the UDN to his side and 
spent most of his mandate trying to balance these forces but without being able 
to build a consensus regarding the direction of economic policy. His economic 
policies, as the rest of the chapter will show, fluctuated between the ‘old’ 
conservative liberal policies, which Skidmore (1982, p. 125) calls ‘orthodox’, 
and the ‘new’ industry and labor-oriented policies. The president’s mandate 
was quite unstable. For the old classes, who feared losing their status and 
incomes, economic nationalism was a bad strategy. On the other hand, ‘the 
middle class had an instinctive attraction to the economic nationalism 
doctrines’ (Skidmore, 1982, p. 143), given that they would benefit from the 
increase in the country’s economic autonomy due to the creation of jobs and 
social protection. This division was also reflected in the military, which was 
split over supporting Vargas. The lower ranks adopted an anti-Vargas stance, 
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close to the UDN party, but the most prominent figures in the military class, 
such as Góes Monteiro, still supported Vargas’ mandate (Baer, 1995, p. 72). 
Sumoc, the institution responsible for macroeconomic management, was the 
arena where this battle between liberal and developmentalist ideas took place. 
There are many examples of how this difficult political environment resulted in 
hard policy choices during the Vargas years. One example was the creation of 
Petrobras, the country’s oil producing company in 1954. At first, Vargas 
planned Petrobras as a project of mixed capital – the government being the 
majority shareholder – with the monopoly of oil extraction and refining. 
However, throughout the process the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) 
adopted a strong stand of national radicalism, focusing their propaganda 
against international oil companies and the subjugation of the Brazilian 
economy. In order to keep their support in the coalition, the administration 
changed the project to a more nationalistic option, but this resulted in losing 
part of the UDN’s support for the new company (Skidmore, 1982, p. 131).  
Vargas’s administration remained turbulent throughout his mandate, with the 
UDN opposition getting more aggressive over time, while Vargas’ nationalistic 
rhetoric also intensified. After numerous fights with the UDN about a number 
of issues, mostly relating to economic policy choices like the creation of 
Petrobras, the crisis reached its peak in 1954. Social tensions were high and 
Vargas’ rhetoric, particularly his sympathy with the unions, made the UDN 
consider alternatives to remove him from office (Skidmore, 1982, p. 146). In 
March 1954, Aliomar Baleeiro, one of the most extreme members of the UDN 
called for a military coup to remove Vargas from office (Vianna & Villela, 2005, 
p. 38). In August, an attack on conservative journalist Carlos Lacerda led to the 
final act of his government. Vargas and his supporters were accused of the 
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attack and before being removed from office by the military, Vargas shot 
himself.  
While his rhetoric and the contents of his suicide note could give the 
impression that it was the radicalization of his developmentalist rhetoric that 
resulted in the end of his government, it was actually his ‘middle way’ between 
orthodoxy and the new politics that was unable to balance the different 
political forces in the country, leading to radicalization on both sides 
(Skidmore, 1982, p.180). Vargas ended up being an isolated politician who 
could not find a way to balance the diverse political forces of his time, which 
ended up costing him dearly (Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 39). 
The transition to Kubitschek’s government reflects how he was able to build a 
much more stable and pro-development policy framework. The period under 
João Café Filho (1954-1955), who was Vargas’ vice president and became 
interim president until the next elections, was marked by ideological conflict. 
After the 1955 elections, a crisis emerged between the voters who supported the 
result of the new elections, which was won by Kubitschek, and the 
conservatives from the UDN, which again lost the elections and were against 
Kubitschek taking office because of the presence of João Goulart, Kubitschek’s 
communist vice president, who was seen a threat to the conservative UDN. 
Kubitschek’s campaign and election, including the presence of Goulart, was 
mainly targeted at the expanding urban classes, with a strong national 
developmentalist rhetoric that was becoming central to Brazilian society, but 
was exactly what the UDN was trying to block. (Skidmore, 1982, p. 188; Bueno 
& Faro, 2004, p. 141) 
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Carlos Lacerda, the conservative journalist, was the main advocate in favor of a 
coup against the newly elected president, claiming Kubitschek was only 
supported by communists and was elected without reaching an absolute 
majority of votes: Kubitschek was elected with 36% of the votes, while Juarez 
Távora was the runner up with 30% (Figueiredo, 2012, p. 165). In support of the 
election result and against the coup was General Lott. As a nonpartisan public 
figure, he stood by the constitution to guarantee the military would endorse 
any candidate’s victory. Lacerda, by contrast, began to engineer a coup in order 
to prevent Kubitschek and Goulart from assuming their offices. General Lott 
therefore called a ‘preemptive coup’ against the anti-Vargas followers to ensure 
that Kubitschek became president (Skidmore, 1982, p. 194).  
Once in office, Kubitschek managed to build a much more stable political 
environment. Although his own party, the PSD, held only 35% of congressional 
seats, a coalition with the PTB and other smaller parties controlled 68%. Hence, 
while his personal result in the presidential race was not that large, his control 
over congress allowed him to deliver legislation. As will be shown, this 
included changes to the MER system, such as the new tariff law of 1957, which 
was strongly supported by his coalition and his political base of industrialists 
and urban classes (Figueiredo, 2012, p. 167). 
This relative stability was also the result of the political balance that 
Kubitschek’s administration was able to build, even after taking office in an 
extremely divided society and through the pre-emptive coup. Kubitschek 
managed to avoid direct conflicts with the UDN and found ways to meet 
everyone’s needs, particularly through substantial changes in economic policy. 
His political and economic strategies gained him the support of industrialists, 
while he managed to keep the unions on side using Goulart as his intermediary 
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(Leopoldi, 2000). More importantly, he also managed to keep control over the 
traditional elite. The openness of trade to imports and the authorization of 
foreign investments was one of the features that helped to build support from 
these traditional groups. While he favored industrial policy, using the state to 
support a strong national development process, he was at the same time 
attracting foreign companies (Bueno & Faro, 2004). Politically, Kubitschek 
adopted a very moderate stance with regard to the UDN, backing off from 
confrontation, giving amnesty to the generals who had planned the coup 
against him, taking an anti-communist stance, and building a good relationship 
with the United States, the main source of foreign investment (Skidmore, 1982, 
p. 206). This was reflected in a very different set of policies compared to 
Vargas. 
4.2 Sumoc: The ‘Arena’ of Macroeconomic Policy  
This section focuses on the changes in the personnel and economic thinking of 
the two institutions behind policymaking during the post-war period: Sumoc 
and Banco do Brasil. Until 1946, Brazil did not have a Central Bank or an 
institution solely responsible for monetary and exchange rate policies. Banco 
do Brasil, which dates back to colonial times, when Portugal‘s King Dom Joao 
VI moved the crown to Brazil in 1808, was still responsible for managing 
money supply and exchange rate policies in the first half of the twentieth 
century. However, Banco do Brasil was primarily a commercial bank, with 
branches spread throughout the country and allowed to lend money and 
collect savings like any other bank. Banco do Brasil was not the banker of the 
other banks. It did not have instruments to properly function as a lender of last 
resort and lacked the capacity to control money supply, with an internal 
 
 
132 
 
endogenous process of printing money to generate liquidity for its own 
demand for lending (Lago, 1982, p. 13).  
After the Bretton-Woods conference in 1944, an influential Brazilian economist 
called Otávio Gouvêia de Bulhões, head of economic studies in the Ministry of 
Finance since 1939 and one of the country‘s representatives in the conference 
and with close relations to the IMF in its early years, came back to Brazil 
convinced that the country needed to follow the best practices of international 
financial institutions, such as the IMF and the Federal Reserve system, which 
included the creation of an independent Central Bank to control monetary and 
exchange rate policies (de Pinho Barreiros, 2009, p. 516). Bulhões, as well as 
Eugênio Gudin, another important economist of that time, were influential 
academics of the liberal school of economic thought (Kuperman, 2012, p. 240). 
The group also included Alexandre Kafka, an Austrian trained economist who 
migrated to Brazil before the war and was one of Gudin’s main advisors. 
According to Bulhões (1990, p. 47), the idea of creating an independent 
monetary institution dates to before the Bretton Woods conference and was 
already being discussed internally in the Ministry of Finance while he was the 
head of the economics studies department between 1939 and 1945. But the 
conference, and the changes expected to international capital flows that would 
emerge from it, made it essential (Bulhões, 1990, p. 46). Gudin and Bulhões 
were part of the liberal tradition of economic thinking in Brasil, which was 
connected to the traditional elites of Brazilian society. They saw control over 
monetary and exchange rate policies as key to guaranteeing a macroeconomic 
balance with low inflation and balance of payments stability (Kuperman, 2012, 
p. 155; Bielshowsky, 1996). 
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Before Vargas’ return to power in 1951, which forced him to find a balance 
between the rising industrial and urban classes and the declining traditional 
elite, he had been strongly supported by the traditional elite and liberal 
economic thinkers during his previous period in power between 1930 and 1945. 
Indeed, it was exactly during the last part of his first presidency, as well as 
during the presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra from 1946 to 1951, that the 
liberal group around Bulhões and Gudin was most influential in setting 
macroeconomic policymaking and building Sumoc (Baer, 2009, p. 73). In fact, 
throughout the post-war period the executive bureaucracy of the different 
administrations always had a central role in determining economic policies, 
with the role of the legislature in setting macroeconomic policies almost 
inexistence (Schmitter, 1971). It was, however, the influence of the different 
economic schools over the distinct administrations that explains the shifts in 
policy (Leopoldi, 2000). 
In 1945, at the end of Vargas’ first presidency, the liberal group convinced 
Minister of Finance Sousa Costa and President Vargas to create the new 
institution Sumoc, which was the first step, while still incomplete, toward a 
future Central Bank (Lago, 1982, p. 14), but which became central to 
determining macroeconomic policies during the end of the 1940s and the 1950s. 
Sumoc had the normative power to determine exchange rate and monetary 
policies, as in a modern Central Bank, with its council responsible for 
establishing policy changes from 1946 to 1964. However, Sumoc was not yet a 
Central Bank because Banco do Brasil retained its role in implementing 
macroeconomic policies. The direct control over monetary and exchange rate 
policies was only transferred to Sumoc with the creation of the Central Bank in 
1964, during the military dictatorship. Banco do Brasil, particularly its 
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exchange rate department, remained throughout the end of the 1940s and 1950s 
as the single operator of exchange rate policies, including the MER system 
created in 1953 (Lago, 1982, p. 16; Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 50).  
The reason for this dual system, with one institution being the normative 
policymaker and the other with direct operational responsibility, resulted from 
the conflict to create Sumoc. Banco do Brasil was a powerful institution at that 
time, whose directors had, in practice, been responsible for economic policy 
since the bank was created. And while the President of Banco do Brasil and its 
directors were appointed by the Minister of Finance, the institution had a long 
history of forming its own staff and was extremely independent regarding 
policy decisions. More importantly, its mixed structure of being a commercial 
bank and a monetary authority made it difficult for it to control the money 
supply, even if the leadership of the bank sought to do so (Malan, 1974, p. 2). 
Gudin, Bulhões main academic advisor, suggested an intermediate option 
between creating a new Central Bank and giving Sumoc just the normative 
control over policies. Gudin believed the only technical staff in Brazil who 
could support the creation of a Central Bank were inside Banco do Brasil, and 
Sumoc needed that expertise to become viable. In his view, the future Central 
Bank would be a natural evolution from the bank (Bulhões, 1990, p. 54). At the 
same time, the mixed structure was also designed to keep Banco do Brasil’s 
important staff involved in policymaking decisions, both because of the need 
for their expertise and due to their historical importance (Lago, 1982, p. 16; 
Malan, 1974, p. 5). This intermediate solution gave Banco do Brasil an 
important role but transferred the authority over the main decisions to Sumoc, 
which would gradually develop into an independent Central Bank. The 
negotiation was conducted by Bulhões himself, who was at that time an 
 
 
135 
 
important policymaker as Secretary of Economic Research in the Ministry of 
Finance, working together with Vargas, the Finance Minister, and some of 
Banco do Brasil officials, particularly Jose Vieira Machado, who was the 
director of exchange rate policies at the bank (Lago, 1982, p. 17). 
Sumoc‘s council, the most important committee of the new institution, was the 
apex of this mixed structure, with a large influence of Banco do Brasil officials. 
The council was composed of five people, all of them appointed by the 
government: the Minister of Finance; the President of Banco of Brasil; Sumoc‘s 
Executive Director, a new position created for the institution; and Banco do 
Brasil’s directors of Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy. Of the five members, 
three were Banco do Brasil officials. Together they had the power to continue 
dictating policymaking inside the new institution, demonstrating the 
continuity of the old structure within the new arrangement (Figueiredo Filho, 
2005, 51).  
The first Sumoc Executive Director was José Vieira Machado, a liberal 
economist who was Banco do Brasil’s head of the exchange rate department. It 
is important to stress that there was no homogenous economic thought 
representing the entire institution of Banco do Brasil. The bank’s staff were 
influenced both by the liberal ideas of Bretton Woods, as they had been 
policymakers for a long time, but also by the emerging developmentalist 
thought. These different currents of economic thought shared, and fought, for 
the control of Sumoc during the whole decade. As will be shown below, which 
dominated changed according to the political preferences of the leader of the 
country. While Sumoc was designed to remove Banco do Brasil from the 
normative direction of macroeconomic policymaking, which was seen by the 
liberal group as a way to form an independent liberal institution, it did not 
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operate autonomously from the federal administration and the President 
appointed its members and determined its policy direction (Figueiredo Filho, 
2005, p. 55). 
Vieira Machado remained as Sumoc‘s executive director not only in its first 
years during the end of Vargas’ Estado Novo but also through Dutra’s 
presidency between 1946 and 1950. He ran Sumoc for six years in total and was 
responsible for building the institution’s structure and moving it to the center 
stage of policymaking at that time. He was responsible, together with the three 
different Finance Ministers during Dutra‘s administration,12 for the failed 
liberal experience of the first post-war administration, which will be discussed 
in detail below (Klein and Luna, 2014, p. 146). President Dutra, a general 
elected based on a liberal policy framework strongly supported by the 
traditional elites, focused his mandate on re-opening the economy and the 
exchange rate markets after the war (Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 60). 
When Vargas returned to power in 1951, however, he was elected on a 
platform of promoting industrialization, and Sumoc changed somewhat to 
reflect this position (Bastos, 2011, p. 76), although its policies remained a 
reflection of Vargas’ dual stance, as was discussed in Chapter 3. Vieira 
Machado left and the three Sumoc Executive Directors in charge during 
Vargas’ new mandate, as well as the two Finance Ministers – Horacio Lafer and 
Osvaldo E. Souza Aranha – were ideologically very different from the liberal 
ideas of the initial leadership of Sumoc. They were all important 
developmentalist economists linked to CEPAL (Lago, 1982, p. 75). Lafer, 
                                                 
12 Gastao Vidical (1946), Pedro Luiz Correa e Castro (1946-1949), and Manuel 
Guilherme da Silveira (1949-1951). 
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Vargas’ first Finance Minister, for example, as well as his team composed of 
Roberto Campos, Romulo de Almeida, Glaycon Paiva, and others, were all 
exponents of nationalist developmentalism (Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 59). 
Sumoc‘s policymaking gradually changed due to this new political 
environment. The decision to introduce the MER system in 1953 was not only a 
reaction to the worsening of the balance of payments in 1952, but also 
ideologically designed to support industrialization (Lago, 1982, p. 95). What is 
clear, however, is that the Sumoc leadership during this period followed a 
responsible policy framework on exchange rates and monetary policy. This 
resulted from the mixed approach that Vargas took to balance the influence of 
the traditional elite, which demanded control over inflation and balance of 
payments deficits, with the interests of his pro-industry base. This is what 
Skidmore (1982, p. 117) called the ‘pragmatic adoption of economic liberalism’. 
At the same time, the framing of policies that could simultaneously target 
macroeconomic stabilization and support industrial take off was always part of 
the policymaking process, as is shown below by the design of the MER system 
(Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 182). 
Between 1954 and 1955, after Vargas’ suicide, which, as shown in the last 
section, resulted from the enormous pressures the President felt from the 
traditional elite, his Vice-President, Café Filho, took office for a short period of 
time and adopted a conservative stance to stabilize the country. He appointed 
Gudin as Finance Minister and Bulhões as Sumoc Executive Director, and this 
resulted in a short period when Sumoc was again ruled by the liberal 
policymakers who had created the institution back in 1945. Some of the other 
civil ministers were public figures with a conservative view and some of the 
military ministers had an anti-Vargas position (for example Eduardo Gomes as 
 
 
138 
 
Aviation Minister and Amorim Vale as Navy Minister) (Ioris & Ioris, 2013; 
Skidmore, 1982, p. 181).  
But this did not last long, as the Kubitschek presidency once again turned 
Sumoc back to developmentalism. As shown in the last section, Kubitschek 
managed to produce a much more cohesive national development strategy, 
which was also reflected in his macroeconomic policies. From 1956 to 1961, 
Sumoc became a much less influential body for policymaking and the 
discussions and formulation of macroeconomic policies started to come straight 
from the top, directly from the Finance Ministry and the cabinet (Malan, 1974, 
p. 5). Sumoc was ruled by seven different executive directors, compared to just 
three under Vargas. All were developmentalist economists linked to the 
Minister of Finance or coming straight from Banco do Brasil. None of them 
seem to have had any relevant outside career and almost no influence over 
policy decisions. The three Finance Ministers from that administration – Jose 
Maria Alkmin, Lucas Lopes, and Sebastião Paes de Almeida – were the central 
decision makers under Kubitschek. During this period Sumoc just reflected 
broader choices made by the president and his cabinet, as will be shown in 
Chapter 8. The influence of the orthodox and more macroeconomically 
responsible group was basically inexistent during this time. 
This reduction of Sumoc’s relative importance in economic policy also explains 
why, as Lago (1982, p. 140) suggests, the project for gradually transforming the 
institution into a proper Central Bank took so long to materialize. Gudin‘s 
initial plan back in 1945 was to create a mixed institution that would gradually 
gain power to finally be able to control monetary policy, not only from a 
normative stance, but also operationally. During the Vargas period, and under 
Vieira Machado’s leadership, Sumoc grew with new departments and a 
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structure that was becoming ready for the next step of becoming a Central 
Bank, although it was not independent from the politics of Vargas, as already 
discussed. The period under Café Filho was very short and politically unstable, 
so Gudin could not bring back the debate about upgrading the institution to a 
proper Central Bank. And finally the shift to Kubitschek further limited any 
progress on this front. The administration had no interest in an independent 
Central Bank, concentrated policymaking around the president and the 
Ministry of Finance, and made Sumoc a less significant participant. The plan 
for a Central Bank only returned to centre stage in 1964, during the military 
dictatorship, which had a conservative stance on economic policy and brought 
the group of liberal economists back to power (Skidmore, 1982, p. 355). 
Many economic historians have tried to separate and categorize these two 
different groups of policymakers who influenced Sumoc and economic 
thinking more broadly. Lago (1982, p. 5) argued that it is possible to call the 
original founders of Sumoc around Bulhões the ‘Sumoquean’ group, compared 
to the ‘desenvolvimentistas’ linked to CEPAL and industrialization. Kuperman 
(2012) and Bielshowsky (1996) suggest that this ongoing dispute over economic 
policy was also a representation of the broader economic debate in Brazilian 
society during that time,. The developmentalist group was a strong source of 
economic policy advice during the 1950s and 1960s, with major influence from 
Raul Prebish, Celso Furtado and CEPAL in general.13 On the other hand, 
Bulhões and Gudin were from a group much more linked to ideas associated 
                                                 
13 See Bielschowsky (1996) for more on the ideological debates of the 1950s. Colistete 
(2001) also provides a comprehensive review of the Cepal ideas. 
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with Bretton Woods and the IMF. They were economists with foreign training 
who opposed most of the policy prescriptions of the ‘developmentalists’. 
Leopoldi (2000) provides evidence of how Sumoc was in the middle of a 
broader dispute in Brazilian society between the ‘old’ elites and the ‘new’ 
industrial groups. She argues that the industrial sector was growing in terms of 
organization and political voice during this period, particularly through the 
Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (FIESP), the federation of 
industries of the state of São Paulo (see Colistete, 2004). This group played an 
important role in analyzing and suggesting policies to Sumoc, particularly 
during the periods when the institution was ruled by economists of the 
‘developmentalist’ group, such as during the Kubitschek administration. 
This history of Sumoc suggests that while the institution was created following 
liberal ideas, it became an ‘arena’ for macroeconomic policy between two 
different schools of economic thought and served the interests of the leader in 
power at each time: from Vargas’ balanced approach to the full orthodoxy of 
Café Filho to Kubitschek’s preference for the developmentalist school. This 
back and forth process happened a few times during the twenty years of 
Sumoc’s existence and reflected the broader conflict in Brazil’s political 
economy. The next sub-section will detail the exchange rates policies that 
resulted from this volatile history.  
4.3 1947-1953: From Fixed Exchange Rates to Balance of Payments Crisis  
During the presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1950) the experiment of 
opening the economy and exchange rate markets resulted in a severe balance of 
payments crisis in the early 1950s (Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 153; Baer, 2009, p. 75), 
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which forced the Vargas government to opt for alternative policy solutions, 
such as the MER system, which will be presented in the next chapter. 
During President’s Dutra term, Sumoc can be characterized, as discussed in the 
last sub-section, as an institution with liberal ideas closely influenced by the 
IMF and the Bretton Woods policy guidelines. Its main policymakers were 
from the Sumoquean group, such as Bulhões and Vieira Machado, who 
thought a new era for Brazil was starting and the country needed to open its 
economy to benefit from the recovery in international trade and capital flows 
(Lago, 1982, pp. 6-7). An ex-military general, Dutra was a conservative 
politician who represented a conservative political base and the liberal ideas of 
the ‘old’ elites in Brazil (Bielschowsky, 1996).  
In this context, Sumoc developed a framework of policies targeted at inserting 
Brazil into the ‘new global era’, and its first two decisions at the beginning of 
Dutra‘s mandate were the opening of the foreign exchange market to the 
private sector and fixing the exchange rate at Cr$18.7 per dollar, the same 
nominal parity as in 1939. This decision ended the wartime centralization of 
foreign exchange transactions in Banco do Brasil, allowing private banks to 
freely transact foreign exchange using the fixed exchange rate (Lago, 1982, p. 
57).  
The decision to fix the currency at the same pre-war level was controversial 
internally at Sumoc, since the board knew it was fixing the exchange rate at an 
overvalued level, given that inflation was running above 20% annually 
(Kuperman, 2012, p. 145). The decision is mostly explained by the fear of an 
even faster inflationary rise in case of a weaker exchange rate. According to 
Bulhões, who participated in this debate inside Sumoc and was in favor of 
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fixing the exchange rate at the Cr$18.7 rate, this was their best option even 
though it was overvalued both because of high inflation, which was the result 
of various wartime supply restrictions, but also because the country needed to 
quickly report an official rate to the IMF (Bulhões, 1990, p. 50). Bergsman (1970, 
p. 28) adds that the pressure to make imports more flexible, as they had been 
restricted during the war, also strongly counted in favor of a stronger exchange 
rate. Sumoc feared that the combination of greatly increased imports at higher 
prices could result in higher inflation. Although the minutes of Sumoc’s 
meeting describe this technical debate (Sumoc Minutes 66, 16/12/1946), the 
conservative nature of Dutra’s government, which had traditional importers as 
a core group of supporters, also reinforced Sumoc’s decisions (Bergsman, 1970, 
p. 28). This combination of a strong currency and an open market for the 
exchange rate was a very liberal mix of policies, which reflected Sumoc’s first 
leadership’s belief that this would attract foreign investments (Lago, 1982, p. 
58). 
But the overvaluation of the exchange rate would soon bring balance of 
payments problems. During the period of 1939 to 1945, prices had risen by 
about 100%, yet in 1947 the currency was fixed at the same nominal level as 
1939. In 1953, when the currency finally devalued with the introduction of the 
MER system, the accumulated inflation was above 150% (IBGE, 1945). Figure 
4.1 shows the evolution of the real exchange rate during this period. It was 
calculated with a reference year of 1939 and using the weighted average of the 
quantities auctioned at the various categories of MER regime and the 
exchanges rates of each category between 1953 and 1960. It is clearly possible to 
see how, between 1939 and 1952, just before the MER regime started, the 
official rate was five times stronger in real terms than its initial level and this 
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resulted in a strong deterioration of the balance of payments, as will be shown 
below. 
Figure 4.1 – Real Exchange Rate, 1939-1960 (Cr$ per US$, 1939=100) 
-
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Source: Own construction with primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil, inflation from IBGE (2017). See 
Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
Although officials acknowledged the overvaluation (Sumoc Minutes 77, 
3/6/1947), they did not fear a balance of payments crisis because they believed 
that Brazil was poised to be an important recipient of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 23). This would allow the balance of payments 
to remain under control, while at the same time increasing the overall level of 
foreign exchange inflows and making imports more flexible. This strategy was 
exactly the IMF policy guidance at the time, with the opening of the exchange 
rate market combined with a fixed exchange rate seen as the textbook way to 
stimulate trade (IMF, 1947, pp. 39-40).  
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At the same time, Brazilian authorities thought that they had quite a 
comfortable level of international reserves, with about US$700 million dollars 
accumulated during the war, or about 3.5% of GDP, and a positive surplus in 
the balance of payments of about US$61 million in 1945 (IBGE, 1945). 
International reserves were accumulated during the war due to the rise in 
commodity prices (coffee export prices increased by about 102% between 1939 
and 1944), an increase in manufacturing exports of traditional industries to 
allies, and the restrictions imposed on imports (Abreu, 2004, p. 405). This buffer 
was seen as a protection in case short-run balance of payments deficits resulted 
from the strategy of re-opening the economy and allowing imports to rise in 
the first few years after the war (Vianna & Villela, 2005, p. 23). 
It is important to stress that the capital account was almost fully closed during 
the war and only slightly opened during Dutra’s administration, as in most 
economies during the Bretton Woods era. FDI inflows were welcomed, but 
other types of financial and portfolio flows were almost inexistent at that time 
and highly restricted by capital controls. As discussed in Chapter 2, controlling 
capital flows was an essential part of the Bretton Woods regime because the 
Impossible Trillema made it the only way to keep exchange rates pegged, as 
required by the IMF, while also maintaining an independent monetary policy. 
This meant that FDI was the only relevant international flow for the capital 
account, and in case it was insufficient to finance the deficits of the current 
account, it forced a reduction in the current account deficit or a sale of 
international reserves.  
Due to the opening of the economy and the highly overvalued exchange rate, 
imports rose rapidly. But the level of FDI did not follow this movement and 
there were almost no inflows on the capital account during the first post-war 
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years, with Brazil not being a major destination of international flows. FDI 
averaged only US$13 million between 1947 and 1951, while imports rose on 
average by US$120 million during the same years (IBGE, 1945-1951). Banco do 
Brasil was quickly forced to sell its international reserves, which declined by 
US$100 million between 1947 and 1951, to cover the rising deficit in foreign 
accounts (IBGE, 1945-1951). To make things worse, international reserves were 
in practice much smaller than the US$700 million that Sumoc had reported in 
its books in 1947. From those, only about US$92 million were in truly 
convertible currencies by the end of 1946 and US$33 million by the end of 1947, 
as Table 4.1 below shows. Until the late 1950s, the Bretton Woods arrangement 
did not build a fully convertible currency system and countries needed to have 
bilateral payment agreements (Magud et al, 2011).  
This phenomenon later became known in the Brazilian literature as the ‘illusion 
of foreign exchange’, since Sumoc authorities thought they had a good level of 
international reserves but in reality most of those funds could not be used to 
pay for the rising current account deficit (Baer, 2009, p. 75). Table 4.1 shows the 
net foreign exchange position in convertible currencies and Figure 4.2 shows 
the evolution of the current account, FDI, the balance of payments, and the 
changes in international reserves for the whole period from 1946 to 1961.  
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Table 4.1 - Net Foreign Exchange Position in Convertible Currencies, 1946-
1952 (US$ Million) 
1946 92
1947 33
1948 62
1949 121
1950 128
1951 -30
1952 -24  
Source: Reproduced from Malan et al (1977, p. 165). 
Figure 4.2 – Balance of Payments, 1946-1961 (US$ million)  
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Source: Own construction from IBGE’s Anuários Estatísticos (1946-1961) 
In 1947, the second year of Dutra‘s mandate, increased imports of goods and 
services of US$800 million in 1946 and 1947 (IBGE, 1946-1947) resulted in a 
current account deficit of US$200 million, pushing the country towards a 
balance of payments crisis. In 1947, inflows in the capital account ammounted 
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to only $ 12 million, which was far from enough to compensate for the large 
current account deficit (IBGE, 1947). The root of the problem was not the lack of 
convertible reserves, even though they were much smaller than the official 
overall level of international reserves and critical for a quick collapse in 1947, 
but the structural increase in balance of payments deficits. Even if Brazil could 
use all of its official reserves, over time they would not have been enough to 
contain the rising balance of payments deficit, which was already US$200 
million. The trade and services balance deteriorated from a surplus of US$255 
million in 1945 to a deficit of US$127 million in 1947, with exports rising by 
US$500 million while imports increased by US$885 million (IBGE, 1945-1947). 
International coffee prices rose during this period by 74% (Figure 3.1), 
increasing export receipts, but the rise in imports was significantly faster. The 
problem was that Brazil was incapable of stabilizing its balance of payments 
with the strong pre-war exchange rate, the high demand for imports in the 
post-war period, the openness of the foreign exchange market, and no FDI 
inflows. The positive export performance was not enough to stabilize the 
growing current account deficit.   
Dutra and Sumoc were forced to react. The solution was to introduce 
quantitative restrictions on imports through the concession of licenses by Banco 
do Brasil (Baer, 2004, p. 75). At the same time, Sumoc re-centralized foreign 
exchange operations, forcing all transactions to go through Banco do Brasil 
first, and only then allowing other commercial private banks to operate in the 
market in case there was any surplus of foreign exchange (Sumoc Instruction 
25, 3/6/1947). By the end of 1947 Banco do Brasil quickly returned to being the 
major currency operator, accounting for around 70-80% of all foreign exchange 
transactions (Klein & Luna, 2015, p. 154) 
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The choice of an import licensing system rather than a devaluation of the 
official exchange rate was based on the theory that a devaluation of the 
exchange rate would not boost exports because coffee production was inelastic 
to relative price changes (Lago, 1982, p. 49). At the same time, there was also 
the fear that high inflation would return. One of the few achievements of those 
first years of Dutra’s government was to bring inflation down from 16.5% in 
1945 to 7% in 1946 (IBGE 1945-1946), thanks to the combination of the strong 
currency and the openness of markets. By restricting imports, officials were 
essentially assuming that there was no other way to improve inflows – both 
from exports or capital account flows – and the only option was to reduce 
outflows by containing imports.  
The import licensing regime was authorized by Sumoc and administered by 
Banco do Brasil. One of the bank‘s departments was responsible for analyzing 
all requests and deciding whether to give import licenses, depending on the 
priority and importance of each product and sector. There was no clear 
methodology for this process. The decisions were discretionary and based on 
the ‘rule of tradition’, according to which the historical level of imports was 
used to determine whether a company or sector could import. In theory, this 
system was supposed to provide a ceiling to the overall level of imports, with 
the ‘rule of tradition’ allowing companies and sectors to maintain their status 
quo of imports, while restricting the increase of new imports much beyond 
existing levels.  
Huddle (1964, 1967) provides an interesting theoretical analysis of this system, 
which preceded the MER auction system. He is one of only two authors who 
have analyzed the MER experience of the 1950s from an effectiveness 
perspective, the other being Alexander Kafka. They both offer a more 
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theoretical rather than empirical evaluation of the MER system and were 
written during or just after the experience of the 1950s. They offer the 
contemporary scholarly view of the MER experience.  
Huddle explains that in the 1950s the contemporary view of the MER system 
was that the adjustment of the balance of payments would have to take place 
by selecting imports and not by depreciating the exchange rate because of the 
inelasticity of coffee exports to international prices, which he claims was a 
general belief among Brazilian policymakers and meant that they believed a 
devaluation of the exchange rate would not result in rising exports. In fact, they 
believed it would only result in higher inflation from the weaker currency. As a 
result, they tended to initially favor controls to adjust the balance of payments 
through the level of imports rather than depreciating exchange rates. Huddle 
also argues that policymakers defended the selective import licensing system 
as a way to stimulate imports of capital goods and induce industrialization, 
following the classic ISI model. Huddle links this policy advice to Celso 
Furtado, a prominent Brazilian economist in that period who was closely 
linked to CEPAL school of economics. 14  
Nevertheless, by analyzing descriptive data on the composition of imports and 
exports for that short period between 1947 and 1951, Huddle concludes that the 
protection of capital goods claimed by policymakers did not actually happen, 
and also did not result in more investment for the economy. Quantum and 
price indexes for selected exports prove that there was a more competitive 
international market for coffee exports than officials thought, and a depreciated 
exchange rate would probably have helped to increase coffee exports. His 
                                                 
14 For more on his theoretical work and policy advice, see Furtado (1959). 
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explanation for why the selective import system did not work to stimulate 
capital imports and did not promote industrialization was the existence of a 
huge black market for foreign exchange during 1947-1952, and the ‘rule of 
tradition’, which regulated the import licensing system. This rule determined 
that the amount of imports that policymakers authorized to each sector 
depended on its ‘tradition’, meaning the past level of imports and the 
importance of the sector to the economy. This system basically allowed existing 
sectors to import without any changes to the overall import composition.  
In a second study for the same pre-MER period, Huddle (1968) estimated the 
black market exchange rate that resulted from the import licensing system. He 
calls it only a ‘guestimate’ and uses price distortions to adjust the nominal 
exchange rate and calculate the black market rate. His estimate looks quite 
impressive at around Cr$ 36 cruzeiros per dollar, which was double the official 
rate, while he suggests that bribes for officials to sell foreign exchange 
represented about 30-40% of the black market rate (Huddle, 1968, p. 116). 
Essentially, Huddle believed that the black market was composed of the bribe 
component, since authorities were in practice selling foreign exchange at a 
more expensive price, and a liquidity component, which was the mismatch of 
supply and demand in the market. Huddle claims the import licensing system 
was inefficient, with loopholes allowing imports to flow through the black 
market. This resulted in a major balance of payments crisis in 1952, which 
forced the government to move to the more restrictive MER system (Lago, 
1982). 
Overall, the two studies combined provide a critique of the system. Huddle 
essentially argues that most sectors managed to continue importing without 
major restrictions and there were no relevant changes in the composition of 
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imports. He also claims this system created a significant incentive for 
corruption, as the controls were in the hands of a few officials, leading to the 
appearance of an important black market for foreign exchange.  
His criticism is confirmed by the data. Under the import licensing regime the 
current account deficit was gradually reduced, even reaching a surplus of 
US$140 million by the end of Dutra’s mandate in 1950 (IBGE, 1950). This was, 
however, the result of a favorable international context, with coffee prices 
continuing to rise and terms of trade improving, rather than being due to the 
import licensing regime restricting imports. Figure 4.3 shows how both exports 
and imports rose to similar levels between 1947 and 1950. The balance of 
payments situation did not get much worse only because export prices were 
able to compensate for the failure of the import licensing system. Imports of 
goods and services soared by US$888 million between 1947 and 1951 (IBGE, 
1947-1951). This not only supports Huddle’s interpretation that the import 
licensing system and its ‘rule of tradition’ had actually maintained the previous 
status quo, but also shows that the system was not enough to contain a further 
rise in imports. The discretionary system not only allowed sectors to maintain 
their previous level of imports, but also permitted a significant rise of new 
imports. The import licensing system was clearly very ineffective. The real 
problem, the overvalued exchange rate and rising imports, remained hidden by 
the favorable international environment but would soon return. Gudin, the 
influential economist in the liberal group at Sumoc, estimated in 1950, based on 
the accumulated inflation since 1939, that the equilibrium exchange rate that 
would stabilize the balance of payments was between Cr$25 and Cr$28 per 
US$, at least 35% weaker than the overvalued official exchange rate of Cr$ 18.7. 
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He also suggested accepting that depreciation was necessary to overcome the 
structural balance of payments deficit (Gudin & Kingston, 1950, pp. 120-121).   
Figure 4.3 – Balance of Trade and Services, 1946-61 (US$ million)  
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Source: Own Construction from IBGE’s Anuários Estatísticos (1946-1961). 
But the relief did not last long. Dutra left power and Vargas returned to the 
presidency in 1951. As discussed in Section 4.1, Vargas represented the 
emergence of the new urban and industrial social classes, while still being 
influenced by the ‘old’ elite that had supported his dictatorship between 1937 
and 1945. The influence of the developmentalist school and CEPAL’s economic 
thinking was growing, but at the same time the liberal group behind Sumoc’s 
policies in its early post-war period remained present in Sumoc, as reflected by 
the influence of the conservative elite on Vargas’ administration (Lago, 1982, p. 
75).  
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In the early stages of Vargas’ mandate, the new administration made 
significant changes to the economic team, moving toward the developmentalist 
group. Vargas appointed Horacio Lafer, an important industrialist from São 
Paulo, as Finance Minister. Walter Moreira Sales, a traditional banker from the 
state of Minas Gerais, was appointed as Executive Director of Sumoc. The new 
economic team quickly decided to start relaxing the import licensing regime 
following the improvement in the trade balance due to the growth in exports in 
the later part of Dutra’s period (Vianna, 1987, p. 43).  
Sumoc‘s council promoted this flexibilization as a way to contain inflation, as 
the import licensing system imposed at the end of Dutra’s mandate reversed 
the decline in prices achieved in the first part of his term, when exchange rate 
controls were relaxed. Even though the exchange rate remained overvalued, 
the import restrictions put pressure on prices (Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 124). 
At the same time, the fear of another escalation in global conflict with the 
Korean War also contributed to the decision to relax the import licensing 
system due to the fear of another shortage of goods, similar to the Second 
World War (Vianna, 1987, p. 43). These initial decisions by Sumoc were 
intended to stabilize inflation, in order to open the space for policies to 
stimulate industrialization in the later part of the mandate (Vianna, 1987, p 32). 
Figure 4.4 shows the increase in inflation from about 5% to above 20% between 
1950 and 1952.  
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Figure 4.4 – Annual Inflation in the Consumer Price Index, 1946-1962 (%)   
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Source: Own construction from IBGE’s Anuários Estatísticos (1946-1962). 
However, this easing of import restrictions led to a rapid increase in imports, 
although this time it was not followed by an increase in export receipts. A 
reversal in coffee prices in 1951-1952, shown in Figure 3.1, resulted in a 
reduction of foreign exchange inflows and a rapid deterioration in the current 
account deficit once again, as seen in Figure 4.2. The terms of trade felt about 
9% in 1951 and another 8.1% in 1952 (Abreu, 2004, p. 405). With a still fragile 
position in international reserves after the use of almost all convertible reserves 
in 1947 during the ‘illusion’ of foreign exchange, the situation quickly started to 
become unsustainable and a balance of payments crisis was the looming (Baer, 
2009, p. 74).  
Clearly, throughout the period from Dutra to the first years of Vargas 
policymakers believed that there was a conflict between inflation and the 
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balance of payments deficits, as discussed above by Huddle (1964) and 
described in the minutes of Sumoc meetings between 1947 and 1952. 
Expanding consumption in a growing economy was not fully supplied locally, 
generating great pressure for imports. In this context, Sumoc policymakers kept 
trying to balance the pressure from rising imports, which helped to contain 
inflation, with imposing restrictions on imports to stabilize the balance of 
payments, which resulted in inflation. In moments when rising export prices 
helped, such as in the end of Dutra‘s mandate in 1949 and 1950, it was possible 
to relax import restrictions while at the same time obtaining enough foreign 
currency for the balance of payments. But when export prices were less 
favorable, such as in 1951 and 1952, the balance of payments deteriorated again 
and the trade off between inflation and the balance of payments became 
clearer. And Sumoc was right in this assessment. As will be shown in Chapter 
5, when policymakers finally allowed exchange rate depreciation via the MER 
system, the new system was much more effective at stabilizing the balance of 
payments, but it generated some inflationary pressures. 
As an attempt to solve the growing balance of payments crisis, Sumoc made a 
first move toward allowing some currency depreciation in 1951. As described 
by the minutes of the Sumoc meeting 263 (25/06/1951), its board members 
discussed the creation of a free market for foreign exchange only for services 
and the capital account. In that meeting, Fernando Cadaval, Exchange Rate 
Director for Banco do Brasil, reported that the bank was receiving significant 
pressure from society to allow a liberalization of the exchange rate market for 
transactions such as travel, tourism, and health treatments, and when Banco do 
Brasil refused to provide foreign exchange at a cheaper rate, they saw evidence 
of the emergence of a black market exchange rate. He argued that Sumoc 
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needed to create a free exchange rate for transactions outside of the trade 
balance to solve this problem, and that in practice informally this market was 
already functioning outside Sumoc’s control. 
The board discussed this idea and agreed it was reasonable to allow 
transactions outside of the trade balance to take place via a free market in 
which supply and demand for foreign exchange could freely operate. The 
discussion in the board was, again, around the theme of inflation and whether 
the expected depreciation of the new free market exchange rate was going to 
bring additional pressure on inflation compared to the expected benefits. There 
were also doubts over whether this partial depreciation could really help the 
balance of payments, since services and capital account transactions were a 
smaller part of the balance of payments: in 1951, capital account flows were 
US$48 million and services US$257 million, whereas trade flows were US$2.1 
billion. Services and capital represented only 12% of overall foreign exchange 
flows (calculated based on IBGE, 1951).  
The process of discussing the creation of the free market was long and resulted 
in debates in the following Sumoc meetings between July and October of 1951. 
Different versions of the law were discussed with the Ministry of Finance. At 
the end of the debate, exactly because these two accounts represented a 
relatively small part of the balance of payments, Sumoc’s board decided to 
move forward with the project and the free market was approved by the board 
with the draft of the law being sent to congress in October 1951, after the 
Sumoc’s meeting 265 . 
The project was not approved in its original form by the congress, which 
debated it for almost one and half year. Eventually the debate resulted in Law 
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1807 in January 1953, which officially created the free market rate but also a 
first experiment at multiple exchange rates, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter (Lago, 1983, p. 93). Nonetheless, as the law was sent in the form of a 
decree, it meant it was valid from the moment of its publication, requiring only 
later approval by congress. The free market rate had therefore become 
operational at the end of 1951.  
It is important to stress that this decision, and the discussion within the board, 
was the first time since 1947 that the board seriously considered the alternative 
of depreciating the currency to solve the balance of payments deficit. The 
informal rise of the free market in 1951 was very important in shifting the 
board’s view. Either the fear of inflation or the lack of belief that currency 
depreciation would support exports, were the two reasons why this had not 
previously been considered. But the awareness that the currency was 
overvalued had been present since 1947 (Sumoc Minutes 77, 3/6/1947). 
It is also important to highlight that there was no direct link between the free 
market and the official exchange rate. In this period Banco do Brasil continued 
to have centralized control of both imports and exports, while the availability 
of foreign exchange for the free market was separate and came exclusively from 
inflows outside the trade balance, that is, from services or capital. Given the 
small size of inflows for capital and the structural deficit in the services 
balance, the free market exchange rate quickly depreciated to Cr$40 per dollar 
(against Cr$18.7 at the official rate) and kept depreciating throughout the 
decade.  
Yet, since the size of transactions outside the trade balance was small, this 
depreciation did not have any significant impact on the balance of payments. 
 
 
158 
 
The real problem, which was the impact of the strong currency on the current 
account, remained without a solution. In 1952 the current account deficit 
peaked at almost US$600 million, which was about 2.6% of GDP (IBGE, 1952), 
forcing Sumoc to cash out all of it international reserves (Vianna, 1987, p. 49).  
4.4 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the political history of post-war Brazil, the history of 
the institutions and actors behind macroeconomic policy, and presented a 
chronological review of economic policies from the end of the war until 1952.  
The first part of the chapter reviewed Brazil’s political and institutional history 
and concluded that while Sumoc was created according to liberal ideas, it 
became an ‘arena’ for macroeconomic policy between two different schools of 
economic thought and served the interests of the leader in power at each time: 
from Vargas’ balanced approach to the full orthodoxy of Café Filho to 
Kubitschek’s preference for the developmentalist school.  
The second part of the chapter discussed the macroeconomic policies of the 
immediate post-War period, during the presidencies of Dutra and the early 
years of Vargas. It showed that the import licensing regime adopted at the end 
of Dutra’s administration was not effective at stabilizing the balance of 
payments, and also that the creation of the free market rate was only a minor 
step in the process of allowing exchange rate depreciation.  
The next chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the MER system between 
1953 and 1961, and how it first solved the balance of payments problem, but 
then declined and collapsed following the changes made by the Kubitschek 
administration. 
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5. Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate Management under the MER regime 
Chapter 4 provided a review of the political history of post-war Brazil, the 
history of the institutions and actors responsible for exchange rate management 
during that period, and a chronological overview of exchange rate policies 
from the end of the Second World War until 1952, including the earlier 
attempts to solve the structural balance of payments deficits before the 
adoption of the MER regime. The chapter argued that the import licensing 
regime and the introduction of the free market rate were not enough to 
stabilize the balance of payments, and did not solve the structural overvalued 
exchange rate problem. By the start of 1953, Brazil was close to another balance 
of payments crisis.  
This chapter continues the chronological review of exchange rate policies in 
post-war Brazil, now focusing on the period of the MER regime between 1953 
and 1957. It begins by discussing the first phase of the MER between 1953 and 
1957, which was effective at stabilizing the balance of payments and improving 
macroeconomic conditions. It then reviews the changes in the MER system 
after 1957, which led to the decline and eventual collapse of the MER 
experiment in Brazil.  
5.1 1953-1957: Instruction 70 and Multiple Exchange Rates 
During the 1952 balance of payments crisis Sumoc continued discussing other 
ways to reduce the foreign exchange shortage and improve the balance of 
payments deficit. The free market rate had been functioning since the end of 
1951 but its official law remained without approval in congress until the start of 
1953. Sumoc minutes describe a long process of negotiation between Sumoc, 
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the Ministry of Finance, and members of the private sector and politicians in 
congress who sought to agree on the law. Since the free market was proving 
enough to stabilize the balance of payments given its limited impact on flows, 
the pressure for a devaluation of the exchange rate for some trade transactions 
was rising (Sumoc Minutes 300 to 350, 1952). 
This debate inside Sumoc resulted in another attempt to allow some further 
currency depreciation, now in the form of also allowing some depreciation for 
a group of exports in an effort to stimulate them. Officials’ belief that most 
exports, particularly coffee, were inelastic to currency depreciation meant, 
however, that Sumoc proposed the depreciation only for a limited number of 
sectors. Thus, sectors that did not represent more than 4% of total exports 
(considering the previous three month average) were allowed to transact at the 
free market rate. It is important to notice that all imports and most exports still 
remained authorized to only use the official rate, but with this change the free 
market rate, at least for a short period of time until the MER was adopted, was 
now used for a mix of services, capital, and some merchandise exports. This 
decision was incorporated in the final version of Law 1807, which officially 
created the free market rate. The new exemption also gave Sumoc the 
prerogative to determine which sectors would be included or removed from 
the free market rate. Law 1807 was approved in congress on 7th January 1953, 
and the Sumoc meeting 360 on 10th February of 1953 decided that Sumoc 
would determine which sectors would be included or removed from the 
exemption. Although the MER system was only created for imports later in 
1953, in practical terms Law 1807 produced a small first experiment MERs, as a 
small group of exports were allowed to transact at the free market rate. 
 
 
161 
 
During the first half of 1953 various minutes of Sumoc meetings describe long 
discussions about the situation of the balance of payments, which was not 
improving even with the free market rate applied to a small group of exports. 
The minutes also describe the difficulty Sumoc officials had in determining 
which sectors would receive or not the exemption to operate at the free market 
rate. At every meeting Sumoc discussed a demand from a new export sector 
that sought to be allowed to export at the free market exchange rate (Sumoc 
Minutes 375 to 392, 1953). 
Around the middle of the year Vargas changed his economic leadership, 
appointing  Oswaldo Aranha, a Brazilian politician and diplomat, as Minister 
of Finance and José Soares Maciel Filho, an economic journalist, as Sumoc‘s 
Executive Director. According to Bulhoes’ memoirs (1990, p. 100), Maciel Filho 
was not well regarded by the original Sumoquean group and was considered 
an economic populist. Nevertheless, the new leadership seems to have 
followed the same pragmatism as the previous Sumoc board and was forced to 
search for solutions to the balance of payments crisis. Many minutes of Sumoc 
board meetings during 1953 describe long discussions about the conditions of 
the balance of payments but without reaching practical solutions (Sumoc 
Minutes 375 to 392, 1953). 
In October 1953, the new economic leadership came up with a solution to try to 
permanently resolve the balance of payments situation while at the same time 
avoiding a large currency depreciation. On 9th October Oswaldo Aranha 
opened a board meeting by saying ‘I have called the board for a special reason 
to present a suggestion for a topic of the highest importance for the economy 
and the finances of the country’, and then started to discuss the draft of 
Instruction 70 (Sumoc Minutes 408, 1953), which was then approved and 
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launched a few days later. Aranha acknowledged Marcos de Sousa Dantas’ 
contribution to Instruction 70, as he had brought the original idea to the table. 
Dantas was the President of Banco do Brasil and also an economist linked to 
Vargas (Sumoc Minutes 408, 9/10/1953).  
Instruction 70 proposed that the import licensing regime should be replaced by 
a system of foreign exchange auctions. The regime gave Banco do Brasil the 
monopoly of all trade foreign exchange transactions, leaving only services and 
the capital account to the free market. On the import side, goods were divided 
into five categories. Category 1, which had the most favorable exchange rate, 
included the most essential goods, such as some foodstuffs, chemicals, 
agricultural equipment, and medicines. Category 2 included some production 
inputs (rubber, for example), electrical material, and medical equipment. 
Category 3 included all industrial equipment, capital goods, and some 
consumer durables, such as vehicles. Category 4 included all non-essential 
equipment and some production inputs like steel. Category 5 included all other 
sectors, which were basically all the remaining consumption goods. In the 
minutes of Sumoc’s relevant board meetings, there is no explanation of why 
officials opted for five categories, only a reference to them spending a long time 
debating which sectors to include in each of them (Sumoc Minutes 408, 
9/10/1953).  
According to Kafka, who was an advisor to the board during this time, the 
main objective of the system was achieve balance of payments stability, 
although the choice of five categories and the distribution of sectors among 
them was part of a plan to stimulate industrialization in advanced sectors 
(Kafka, 1956). Given the restrictions on the availability of foreign exchange, the 
structure of the auction system prioritized sectors without local substitutes 
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while strongly restricting foreign exchange for goods that could be produced 
locally. Most advanced industrial goods, such as steel and capital goods, which 
were supposed to undergo import substitution at that time, were included in 
Categories 3 to 5, while essential foodstuffs and some products that had no 
local substitute were included in Categories 1 and 2. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, at first this structure was targeted at providing protection to these 
industrial sectors in line with developmentalist economic thought, but in 
practice the allocation of foreign exchange to different sectors did not provide a 
stimulus for their faster substitution. The depreciation of the various exchange 
rates was in fact only adjusting for the cruzeiro’s long period of overvaluation 
(see Figure 4.1). Chapter 8 will also provide primary evidence from Vargas’ 
personal archives that while protectionism and stimulating import substitution 
were part of the plan behind the MER system, balance of payments stability 
was the primary reason for the auction system.  
To keep the balance of payments stable and regulate the outflows of foreign 
currency, Banco do Brasil defined the quantities of foreign exchange to be 
auctioned for each category on a weekly basis, which were then auctioned in 
public exchange houses across the country. In practice, Banco do Brasil was not 
auctioning the actual dollars but rather a license to import products in that 
category for the exact amount purchased in the auctions (Gudin, 1956, p. 502). 
As Banco do Brasil was the only one authorized to execute the foreign 
exchange operations, it was able to guarantee that the licenses were only used 
to import products in the correct category. These new licenses were called 
promises to sell foreign exchange (promessas de venda de cambio, PVC) (Vianna, 
1987, p. 103).  
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The auctions were held in different exchange houses throughout the country, 
with the distribution of foreign exchange between the cities also arbitrarily 
allocated by Banco do Brasil. During the whole period of auctions, São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s biggest cities, each received at least 30% of all 
foreign exchange, with the remaining 40% distributed to the rest of the country. 
Initially only 12 auction houses were established, but the number increased to 
20 over time (Huddle, 1964, p. 95). Although most of the trade in Brazil was 
concentrated in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, officials believed the system 
would be more efficient if there were a large number of exchange houses, 
allowing foreign exchange to reach different parts of the country, even if in 
small quantities (Lago, 1982, p. 95). 
Kafka (1956) thought that having various auction houses across the country 
allowed foreign exchange to reach demand across different regions, helping to 
contain the emergence of a black market, but it could also result in regional 
exchange rate differences, as there was no price mechanism to match the 
exchange rates resulting from the auctions held at different places. To correct 
for this, minimum prices for the exchange rates for the different categories were 
introduced for all auction houses based on the auction results of the previous 
week. At the end of each week, the information from the auctions was 
centralized at Banco do Brasil, which then decided the quantities and minimum 
prices for each category and each location for the following week (Gudin, 1956, 
p. 503). This process helped to guarantee price homogeneity in the auction 
results.  
The auctions were made for the price of the foreign exchange, which means the 
bids were for the highest price importers were willing to pay for the foreign 
currency to be used for one of the categories. The exchange rate for each 
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category was also called custo de câmbio and was the sum of the official 
exchange rate plus a sobretaxa, which was the price resulting from the auctions. 
Most of the auctions were for US dollars, but there were also some smaller 
auctions for other currencies from countries with which Brazil had direct trade 
relationships and payment agreements, such as France and the United 
Kingdom (Vianna, 1987, p. 100). Even if full currency convertibility was only 
reached between the United States and Europe later in the decade, most 
countries were already using the US dollar as the reserve currency during those 
early days of the Bretton Woods period, so most of Brazil’s trade transactions 
were conducted in US dollars. Sumoc’s records of the quantities of foreign 
exchange show that on average less than 5% of all currency offered in the 
system was not US dollars, mainly consisting of small amounts of French francs 
and British pounds (Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports, 1953-1961). The 
higher the category, meaning the less essential the sectors and goods included, 
the smaller was the amount of foreign exchange offered by Banco do Brasil. 
This pushed the price of foreign exchange up and depreciated the exchange 
rate for that category. Auctions took place once per week in each of the 
auctions houses, and only registered import companies could participate. 
Individuals were not allowed because all services and capital transactions were 
already taking place at the free market exchange rate, which was on average 
about 10% of overall amounts transacted in the foreign exchange market. The 
auctions followed a traditional English auction system, in which open 
ascending bids were made. The minimum PVC was US$1,000 and the process 
was repeated as many times as was needed to sell all of the available foreign 
exchange at each location (Gudin, 1956, p. 503). Figure 5.1 shows the average 
monthly exchange rates per US dollar for each category in the period of the 
MER regime. 
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Figure 5.1 – Multiple Exchange Rates, 1951-1960 (Cr$ per US$) 
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Source: Own construction from data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
The devaluations obtained in almost all categories are impressive, even for 
Category 1, in which the essential products were included. In some cases, the 
exchange rate reached almost Cr$400 per dollar in a couple of years (about a 
2,100% depreciation), such as in Category 5, with the official Cr$18.5 remaining 
as the parity rate reported to the IMF during the whole period. It is remarkable 
how well controlled the depreciations of the multiple exchange rates were. 
Given that the price was endogenous and resulted from the auctions 
mechanism, a lot of variation in the resulting exchange rates could be expected, 
as well as possibility of the different categories crossing each other over time. 
There was no a priori technical reason for Category 1 to remain lower than 
Category 2 and so on during the whole period between 1953 and 1957, and yet 
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this was achieved under the MER regime. This suggests the authorities were 
able to distribute foreign exchange across the five categories, so that the 
depreciations were controlled and exchange rates followed the ranking of 
priorities. It suggests the key aspect of the system lay in controlling the 
quantities of foreign exchange being auctioned. Chapter 6 expands on this 
analysis, looking at the data on quantities auctioned to understand how this 
distribution took place.  
Most of the foreign exchange collected from exports by Banco do Brasil was 
offered at the auctions, but the government kept its essential external purchases 
outside of the auction system, retaining about 30% of foreign exchange for its 
own use (Vianna, 1987, p. 105). Sections 5.2 and 5.3 will discuss this aspect in 
more detail, where it will be shown that the increase in imports outside the 
auctions, from the government but also from exemptions given to the private 
sector, was a major reason behind the decay of the system in the later years of 
the 1950s.  
On top of paying a higher price for foreign exchange because of the agio, which 
was the difference between the official exchange rate and the auctioned 
exchange rate, the importer also had to pay an 8% tax on the amount of dollars 
being purchased.  Everything combined, importers were paying the official rate 
plus an 8% tax on the amount being bought plus the agio (Lago, 1982, p. 100; 
Rio & Gomes, 1955, p. 356). As previously indicated, there were basically no 
import tariffs added to this price because the 1934 tariffs law was still in place 
and tariffs were specific rather than ad valorem. Tariffs overall did not 
represent more than 5% ad valorem and were not a major source of 
protectionism since the exchange rate devaluations were significantly larger 
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(Sochczewski, 1980, p. 99). Tariffs only became an important part of the 
structure when the system was reformed in 1957, as will be discussed below. 
It is important to clarify who exactly were the importers who participated in 
the auctions to fully comprehend how the system worked. The above system 
would only work if importers alone could participate, functioning as 
intermediaries between the foreign exchange market and the rest of the 
economy. If importers were part of the local industrial sector, in a vertically 
integrated system in which they imported inputs for local production, then the 
whole system would do nothing more than only provide foreign exchange to 
the larger industrialists in society, similarly to the pre-MER licensing system, 
which allowed industrialists to keep their existing levels of imports even with 
the restrictions of the licensing system. This does not seem to be the case for the 
new MER system, however, as it appears to have been designed so that 
importers were a distinct group. Only registered import companies were 
allowed to participate in the auctions, and there were two important 
institutional restrictions to entry: (1) scale mattered because the minimum 
license value was set at the high level of $1,000 and importers were allowed to 
bid on any of the auctions houses across the country but only if they had 
formally opened branches in each location; and (2) more importantly, 
importers were forced to pay for the currency and the agio upfront, while 
having up to 120 days to confirm the imports with Banco do Brasil and only 
then sell the goods locally. The latter restriction meant that importers needed a 
cash flow in the form of credit from Banco do Brasil, which was only provided 
to registered import companies. This was an official policy and had the 
objective of helping importers to participate in the MER system, while also 
excluding non-import companies from it (Kafka, 1956). 
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The system was entirely different for exporters. Instead of an auction system, 
exporters were not anymore allowed to transact in the free market and were 
obligated to sell all their foreign exchange to Banco do Brasil, which paid them 
a fixed exchange rate. The government created two fixed exchange rates to pay 
the exporters: the official rate plus a bonus of Cr$5.0 per dollar for coffee 
exports and the official rate plus a bonus of Cr$10.0 for all other product 
categories (Rio & Gomes, 1955, p. 357).  
These bonuses, on top of the fixed exchange rate for exports, were intended to 
compensate for the depreciation of the import MERs. Exporters, particularly 
coffee producers, were the main source of foreign exchange and still had a 
relatively important position in Brazilian society in the early 1950s, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (Skidmore, 1982, p. 114). There was a clear concern on 
the part of policymakers in the Vargas period to compensate exporters, which 
was reflected in the design of the first MER system. While the regime was 
initially designed to stabilize the balance of payments and protect local 
production through devalued exchange rates, it was in theory simultaneously 
able to use some funds coming from importers to subsidy the export sector. 
The government was obviously trying to at least officially compensate 
exporters for not having the same depreciated exchange rates as importers, and 
was willing to use part of its revenues to do so, even though a large part still 
remained for the government use (Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 91).  
Chapter 8 will present qualitative evidence that explicitly highlights 
authorities’ concern about supporting exporters. And this was not only the case 
for coffee producers. By the early 1950s, policymakers knew coffee production 
was facing an important structural decline, and they sought to stimulate other 
export sectors, including manufacturing, although they were starting from a 
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low base. This debate was present in the discussion of the design of the system 
in the minutes of the Sumoc meetings at the end of 1953 (Sumoc Minutes 408, 
9/10/1953). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, then, the bonus for the exporters contrasts with 
Leff’s (1967) claim that exporters never had any stimulus during this period. He 
argued that exports were seen only as a form of ‘leftover’ from production that 
was not internally consumed, and policymakers were only concerned with 
import substitution. Tyler (1983, p. 98) makes a similar argument and claims 
policymakers in Brazil had a strong ‘anti-export’ bias to favor import 
substitution policies in the post-war period until the end of the 1970s, although 
he believed bias was smaller in the 1950s than in the subsequent period. The 
bonus for exporters suggests a real concern for trying to stimulate 
manufactured exports and compensate for the gradual decline of the coffee 
sector. 
This was also the reason why the bonus for categories other than coffee was 
double: Cr$10.0 per dollar versus Cr$5.0 per dollar. And given that the official 
exchange rate was Cr$ 18.7, this was a substantial subsidy being transferred to 
exporters. The bonus for coffee exports was, however, smaller because it was 
the major export good and its bonus was consequentially more costly than the 
other sectors. During the early 1950s, coffee exports still represented 60-70% of 
total exports, with only 30-40% coming from all other sectors, including just 3% 
from manufactured goods (Bergsman, 1970 p. 100; Vianna, 1987, p. 54). In 
practice, exporters were receiving the official rate plus this subsidy from the 
government. These bonuses for exporters were paid using the money from the 
agios charged to importers, and were the so-called bonificações (Lago, 1982, p. 
101).  
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These export bonuses were not the same during the whole existence of the 
system, and were gradually increased (such as in Sumoc Instruction 99, 
17/08/1954) to compensate for inflation and also to catch up with the 
adjustment to import exchange rates, which were rising rapidly in the auctions, 
as seen in Figure 4.1. Since the exporters’ rate was fixed and the importers rate 
resulted from the auctions, Sumoc was always running to catch up with the 
pace of depreciation of the exporters’ exchange rate, to prevent the gap 
between importers’ and exporters’ rates from not widening too quickly.  
But in practice this never happened, and exporters kept seeing a widening gap 
with the import exchange rate. So while theoretically the system was designed 
to also support exporters, contrary to the argument of the anti-export bias, in 
practice it was not doing so. The bonuses were never enough to compensate for 
the widening gap between the average import and export exchange rates, 
which meant that in fact exporters were transferring a large implicit subsidy to 
importers. This can be seen below in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 – Import versus Export Average Exchange Rates, 1953-1960 (Cr$ per 
US$) 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the gap between the average import exchange rate grew 
when compared to the export exchange rate after 1957. The policy of increasing 
the bonus to exporters happened during the whole period and accelerated after 
1957, but was never enough to provide any real stimulus to the export sector. 
Exporters kept receiving a much smaller rate in comparison to the rate charged 
to importers at the auctions, disincentivizing their business. This explains why 
the adjustment in the balance of payments that resulted from the MER system 
was essentially made via a reduction in imports. Exports receipts of coffee were 
in a slow decline during the decade, and there was essentially no rise in exports 
of manufactured goods (IBGE, 1950-1960).  
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The money received by the government, both from the transfer tax and the agio 
paid in the auctions, had two destinations: revenues to the government and the 
subsidies to exporters just discussed. Banco do Brasil had a booking account to 
register this flow of taxes and subsidies, with the remaining money sent to the 
government, which rapidly became an important source of revenue (Vianna, 
1987, p. 104; Rio & Gomes, 1955, p. 358). Table 5.1 shows agios and bonificações 
during the period 1954-1957. 
Table 5.1 – Agios and Bonificações, 1953-1960 (Cr$ Millions) 
Agios (Taxes) Bonificações (Subsidies)
Net Revenues 
from MER 
System
1953 $5,111,965.34 $4,261,950.00 $850,015.34
1954 $45,058,894.56 $20,148,510.42 $24,910,384.14
1955 $66,796,524.79 $26,108,713.13 $40,687,811.66
1956 $81,860,754.64 $32,048,247.92 $49,812,506.72
1957 $76,320,652.41 $38,931,920.00 $37,388,732.41
1958 $70,780,550.18 $47,810,548.33 $22,970,001.85
1959 $96,652,195.28 $77,480,875.00 $19,171,320.28
1960 $117,755,731.73 $76,261,912.50 $41,493,819.23  
Source: Own construction based on primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the 
Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Table 5.1 not only shows the significant increase of agios during the first four 
years of the system, but also that the subsidies were significant and net 
revenues were very large for the government. In 1954, Cr$24 million 
represented 20% of the total government budget – a figure that reached 25% in 
1957 (calculated from Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 127). Nominal revenues from the 
system continued to rise after 1957, but, as will be shown below, their share of 
government revenues declined, as they were substituted for by revenues from 
the introduction of ad valorem tariffs. A more detailed analysis of the welfare 
effects of this system, in which importers, exporters, and the government 
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received part of the benefits, is the topic of Chapter 8. It will be seen that 
despite this rebate for exporters via the bonificações, the system was not as 
capable of protecting exporters as it initially appears. Particularly after the 
changes in 1957, which will be discussed below, the exporters were actually the 
main group subsidizing a system that benefited mostly industrialists and the 
government.  
This complex MER system, with its redistributive implications, was originally 
conceived of by the group of developmentalist economists linked to Vargas, 
although their plan still clearly shows the desire to stabilize the balance of 
payments and depreciate the currency, rather than simply promote 
industrialization. Chapter 8 will discuss the political economy of the system 
and provide further primary evidence that the main objective was balance of 
payments stability, although promoting industrialization was also a secondary 
objective of the system’s design. Bulhões and the original Sumoquean group 
were kept out of policymaking during the Vargas mandate. In a late interview, 
Bulhões (1990, p. 101) said he was against the introduction of the MER system 
and would have preferred a unilateral depreciation of the exchange rate and 
opening all transactions to the free market, as this would have been a better 
way to adjust the balance of payments. He also argued that the protectionism 
implicit in the auction system was supposed to be done by tariffs and not 
exchange rate differentiation. At the same time, however, he agreed that the 
system was a much better option compared to the previous licensing system, 
which kept the exchange rate overvalued and was a major source of corruption 
in Banco do Brasil.  
Huddle’s (1967), who as discussed in Chapter 4 was one of the few authors 
who studied the evolution of the MER at that time, also provides a theoretical 
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evaluation of the first phase of the MER system between 1953 and 1957, which 
he claimed to be a much more effective system than the previous import 
licensing regime. According to him, the main benefits of the MER in its first 
phase were: (1) the balance of payments discipline it created, allowing a major 
correction of the current account deficit by effectively controlling the level of 
imports; (2) the distribution of imports to priority sectors; and (3) the ability to 
transfer profits from importers to the government in the form of taxes on the 
auctions. 
Huddle’s assessment of the system was mostly correct. The import licensing 
system was, as he suggests, incapable of providing balance of payments 
stability and imports did not fall at all, which is why the 1947-1952 system 
resulted in a balance of payments crisis, as shown in Chapter 4. Moreover, the 
MER system imposed in 1953 was indeed a much more effective regime for 
stabilizing the balance of payments and providing macroeconomic stability, 
which will be shown in the rest of the chapter below. He was also right to 
argue that the increased production of capital and final consumer goods was 
not a direct consequence of the MER instruments, as Chapter 7 will show that 
the MER did not produce industrialization as a protectionist instrument, and 
Chapter 8 will show that the government’s industrial policy was the main 
driver of industrialization. Overall, without much empirical evidence, Huddle 
was right in his general assessment of the reasons for the failure of the import 
licensing system and for the effectiveness of the MER. 
The other contemporary author who also provides a theoretical analysis of the 
MER system was Kafta (1956). Kafta wrote as the system was being introduced 
and was not able to analyze its final results. His analysis is nonetheless 
important when the context of his work is discussed. Kafka was part of the 
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group of policymakers who created the system in the first place. He worked as 
an advisor to Sumoc, the normative monetary authority during that period, 
and then as advisor to the Ministry of Finance between 1951 and 1955, when 
the system was introduced and implemented. In this context, it is not 
surprising that he also claims, like Huddle, that the MER system was a much 
better option compared to the previous import licensing regime. But Kafka also 
discusses some of the operational difficulties involved in implementing the 
MERs, which is an interesting primary source to show how policymakers dealt 
with the challenges facing the transition to the MER system in the 1950s. He did 
not write about the system again because he left to work at the United Nations 
in 1956. His only later academic work is a theoretical discussion about 
protectionism, without a specific focus on the Brazilian case (Kafka, 1962), 
which means there is no later analysis from him to revise his own remarks 
written at the time. 
Kafka’s overall take on the MER system is positive and similar to Huddle’s. He 
stated that ‘the new exchange auction system undoubtedly represents a vast 
improvement over its predecessor, mainly because it limits substantially the 
administrative discretion and because it recognizes the depreciation of the 
currency‘(Kafta, 1956, p. 321). He also claims that it was an ‘imperfect cure’ to 
the various problems of the previous import licensing system, which mostly 
aligns with Huddle’s view from the 1960s.  
Kafka also makes some interesting comments about the operational part of the 
MER auction system. Although he believed it was an advance on the previous 
system, there were some operational difficulties. He states that the auctions 
were only made in large denominations (US$1,000 or the equivalent in other 
currencies), and only for registered import companies. This excluded smaller 
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companies and individuals from the system, reducing competition. At the same 
time, however, he argues that this was the only way in which the system could 
have worked and it rationalized import demand compared to the previous 
system, in which anyone could fight politically for their share of foreign 
exchange (Kafta, 1956, p. 311).  
Another interesting point is that there was a lot of variation in the exchange 
rates between the various auctions houses across the country. The introduction 
of minimum price bids was chosen as a way to equalize them, although it led to 
not all foreign exchange offered being purchased. Kafka (1956, p. 312) states 
that this was more common for countries with inconvertible currencies or for 
which there was little demand, and not for the US dollar, which received most 
of the funds. He does not think this resulted in any special problem, as this 
non-purchased foreign exchange was usually sold in the following auction. 
Kafka (1956, p. 312) also argues that the authorities were able to distribute 
foreign exchange according across regions and according to the sectoral 
demand for each category, which is the topic of Section 5.5 below, as it will test 
the mechanics of how the system was able to produce balance of payments 
stability.  
Indeed, the system was quite effective at stabilizing the balance of payments 
via a reduction in imports: imports fell by US$600 million between 1952 and 
1955 (IBGE, 1952-1955) and the trade balance and the balance of payments 
stabilized quite rapidly, achieving a surplus of US$17 million in 1955, against a 
deficit of US$203 in 1953 (IBGE, 1953-1955). In contrast with the previous 
import licensing system, there was no black market for foreign exchange 
between 1953 and 1957 (Huddle, 1964).  
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5.2 1955: Instruction 113 and the Surge in FDI  
The MER system stabilized the balance of payments for several years, but after 
Vargas’ suicide in 1954, Café-Filho assumed the presidency for a brief period 
before the next elections in 1955. Under Café Filho, the original Sumoquean 
group returned to run economic policy. Gudin was appointed Minister of 
Finance and Bulhões himself was appointed Sumoc’s Executive Director, with 
Kafka and Campos as Gudin’s senior advisors. As they did during the Dutra 
administration, the immediate objective of the liberal group was to reduce 
inflation, which was increasing after the devaluation of the exchange rates 
under the new MER system. Although it remained stable around 20% during 
the years of the first MER, it had climbed from 9.4% in 1951 (IBGE, 1951), at the 
end of the Dutra administration, which was a major concern for the liberal 
group. The acceleration of inflation following the devaluation of exchange rates 
between 1952 and 1954 confirmed Sumoc’s officials view that the trade off 
between stabilizing the balance of payments and inflation was indeed present. 
Without the downward inflationary pressures from rising imports at the 
overvalued official exchange rate of the previous period, the combination of 
restricted imports at weaker exchange rates generated fear of inflationary 
pressures. Nonetheless, the liberal group still saw the MER system as working 
well, as it gave a structural solution to the balance of payments by having a 
controlled devaluation of the currency (Lago, 1982, p. 166). Gudin thought that 
the MER system was an intermediary between ‘total chaos’ and ‘normality’, but 
should be allowed to continue in place, given the government’s other priorities 
(Malan, 1974, p. 4). 
On top of the inflationary pressures rising from the depreciation, Gudin and 
Bulhões were also worried about the monetary expansion over the previous 
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few years (Bulhões, 1990, p. 104; Vianna, 1987, p. 117). The previous economic 
team was led by developmentalists, both at Sumoc and the Ministry of Finance, 
who both designed a system for balance of payments stability but also allowed 
an expansionist monetary policy to provide funds to Banco do Brazil and help 
industrialists. As mentioned, Sumoc was not yet a fully effective monetary 
authority, as Banco do Brasil could print money to fund itself and give credit to 
markets. Sumoc therefore tried to enforce monetary control by issuing 
instructions to Banco do Brasil with monetary expansion quotas, but they were 
not always followed and during Vargas’ years Sumoc adopted quite a relaxed 
stance on the issue. Figure 5.3 shows how the expansion of the monetary base 
rose from around 15% annualized growth to close to 25% between 1951 and 
1954. While this was not yet enough to force the country into a complete 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, it was enough when combined with the 
depreciation of the various exchange rates to bring inflation back up from 
around 5% in 1951 to almost 20% in 1954 (see Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 5.3 – Monetary Base, 1940-1961 (Annual % Growth) 
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Source: Own construction from Abreu (1990, p. 402). Original data from IBGE. 
The liberal group leading Sumoc only stayed until the following year, but that 
was enough time to implement some tightening of the money supply, although 
this was difficult to implement given the endogenous money printing process 
at Banco do Brasil (Gudin, 1956, p. 508). As seen in Figure 4.6, the monetary 
base growth rate fell by about five percentage points between 1954 and 1955. 
The main instrument of this tightening was the instructions issued to Banco do 
Brasil, which were supposed to determine the levels of monetary expansion 
(Sumoc Instructions 83 to 125, 1954 and 1955). 
Notably, the liberal group recognized one of the disadvantages of the MER 
system that they nevertheless kept in place: the negative impact on investments 
and FDI inflows (Caputo, 2009, p. 42). With most imports restricted to the 
auctions, a lot of uncertainty was brought to the imports of capital goods and 
consequentially to investment. Brazil already received minimal foreign 
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investment in the post-war period, but the uncertainty regarding the 
availability of capital goods made this condition even worse. 
Between 1953 and 1955, after the MER regime was installed, gross fixed capital 
formation fell from 15.1% to 13.5% of GDP, having been at a similar level of 
around 15% in both 1952 and 1951, and the capital account fell from a net 
inflow of US$59 million to only US$3 million (IBGE, 1951-1955). So while the 
system was working well to stabilize the balance of payments from a current 
account perspective, which was the primary objective, it was also indirectly 
having a negative impact on the capital account. Solving this externality would 
help the system as whole, as the more capital inflows there were, the more 
foreign exchange would be available for the auction system, reducing the 
pressure imposed on importers. It is important to stress that while the capital 
account was almost closed at the time, with other sources of financial flows 
being largely inexistent, FDI was legal and made through the free exchange 
rate market. Only imports of goods were made through the auction system. 
Transactions of services and FDI could be exchanged outside the system at the 
free market rate (Sochczewski, 1980, p. 90). 
The response to this problem came with an important adjustment to the auction 
system in 1955: Sumoc’s Instruction 113. This new policy followed some of the 
original ideas that had led to the formation of Sumoc in the mid-1940s and was 
targeted at re-opening the economy, but in a more gradual way than under 
Dutra‘s administration, exactly because of the balance of payments problems 
that had resulted from that experience (Lago, 1982, p. 117). Instead of re-
opening the market as a whole, Sumoc decided to do it only for capital goods in 
a direct attempt to solve the problem of lack of FDI flows. The new legislation 
allowed importers of capital goods to classify them as FDI, making them 
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eligible for the official exchange rate, without having to go through the 
auctions. Foreign investors could now directly buy capital goods outside the 
country with their own funds, and then import them at their face value as FDI, 
without including them as imports in the balance of payments. In this way, 
imports of capital goods where removed from the auction system and instead 
of having a negative value in the current account, they were recorded as 
positive values in the capital account. This modification reduced significantly 
the cost of FDI inflows, as foreign investors could be sure that they would be 
allowed to import capital goods at the much cheaper (that is, overvalued) 
official exchange rate (Sumoc Minutes 507, 17/01/1955). This structure 
combined with a boom of investments from multinational companies in Brazil 
and in Latin America as a whole during the late 1950s, which will be discussed 
below, explains the significant rise of FDI flows. 
The implicit aim of Instruction 113 was to start stimulating new sectors for 
industrialization, particularly the automotive industry (Bulhoes, 1990, p. 110; 
Malan, 1974, p. 5), which demonstrates that the liberal group, while it had a 
much more orthodox policy approach, was also still supportive of 
industrialization. As shown in Chapter 3, this was one of the various policy 
moves targeted to stimulate industrial development, which were not part of the 
common tariff-dominated description of the ISI model. This policy, as well as 
the other tools used for industrialization in the second half of the decade and 
the political economy behind this policy move will be analyzed in Chapter 8, 
where they will be analyzed as part of an industrial deepening process. 
Caputo (2007, p. 40) argues that the discussion inside Sumoc to find ways to 
stimulate the capital goods imports started even before Gudin and Bulhoes’ 
term in the institution. Previous instructions during 1953 and 1954 authorized 
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Banco do Brasil to allow imports of some capital goods outside the auction 
system, suggesting officials were already concerned with this externality a few 
years previously. In fact, Law 1807 and Instruction 70 in its Article XVI, which 
can be found in Appendix 2, included the discretionary possibility for Sumoc to 
authorize imports outside the system if it wanted to (Sumoc Minutes 408, 
9/10/1953). This was, however, almost not used by Sumoc before Instruction 
113 was introduced in 1955. 
When the developmentalist group came back to policymaking in mid-1955, 
after Kubitschek was elected, the new legislation from Instruction 113 remained 
in place, as it brought clear benefits to industrialization and FDI inflows. 
Between 1956 and 1961 Kubitschek delivered his famous investment program, 
the Target Plan, and Instruction 113 became a major channel to allow foreign 
investment to enter the country (Baer, 2014, p. 80). As Figure 4.2 shows, FDI to 
import capital goods surged from about less than US$50 million per year 
during 1950-1955 to more than US$200 million by 1957. Industrialization levels 
also surged as discussed in Chapter 4, with industrial growth increasing on 
average by 2 percentage points from 7% to about 9% (IBGE, 1950-1960). In a 
way, the increase in foreign investment that Dutra had expected in 1946 only 
happened a decade later and after this change in the legislation. 
This significant rise in FDI was not only the result of the subsidy from 
Instruction 113 but also a consequence of an important change in the global 
context in the second half of the 1950s (Lago, 1982, p. 172). In contrast to the 
late 1940s and early 1950s, this was a period of expansion of international trade 
and investments in emerging markets. This period saw, moreover, the 
emergence of a new form of foreign investment with the rise of multinational 
corporations. Investments not only came as portfolio capital or infrastructure 
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projects for commodity exports, which had been the case in the first half of the 
century, but directly toward the production of knowledge-based products in 
developing countries (Buckley and Casson, 1976, p. 36). Furthermore, 
important changes in the organization of international businesses were taking 
place, in particular the development of horizontal multinational corporations 
(Hymer, 1976, p. 270). This new context strongly benefited Brazil, which offered 
a growing industrial economy combined with a subsidy scheme designed to 
attract foreign corporations. 
Shapiro (1994) stresses that this new international environment was the result 
of the end of the ten years of recovery that followed the end of the war. The 
profitability of domestic operations fell in both the United States and Europe, 
pushing firms to place greater emphasis on overseas expansion. International 
competition intensified as a result, and aggressive European firms began to 
challenge the US firms in their traditional export markets, including Latin 
America. In this context, when the first firms decided to invest in Brazil, others 
followed to defend their market shares. Shapiro (1994) also shows that in the 
specific case of the auto sector, this shake-up in global competition between US 
and European companies gave the Brazilian government greater leverage over 
the auto transnationals. By issuing a credible threat that the Brazilian market 
would be closed to imports, which was indeed delivered with the new tariffs 
Law in 1957, and by creating subsidies such as Instruction 113 to attract them, 
the government was able to pressure and attract transnationals to engage in 
full-scale local production.  
The structure created by Instruction 113 allowed industrialists to classify their 
imports of capital goods as FDI at the official exchange rate (Sumoc Minutes 
507, 17/01/1955). In practical terms, foreign investors had to request an 
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authorization to Sumoc to import via Instruction 113. With this authorization 
they could then purchase the capital goods abroad and bring them to any 
Brazilian port to be registered as FDI (Sochawesky, 1980, p. 90). Between 1955 
and 1960, there were 1,545 authorizations issued under Instruction 113, 
representing US$497 million, which was about half of all FDI during the period 
(Caputo, 2007, p. 5; IBGE, 1955-1960).  
The strategy is largely seen by the literature as an important stimulus to the 
import of capital goods and the promotion of advanced industries in the 
second half of the 1950s (Figueiredo Filho, 2005, p. 163; Caputo, 2007, p. 105). In 
fact, the implicit idea of Instruction 113 was exactly to stimulate new sectors for 
industrialization, particularly the automotive industry (Bulhoes, 1990, p. 110; 
Malan, 1974, p. 5). Hence, 38% of the total FDI during the years 1955-1963 went 
to the automotive sector, although other important industries such as chemicals 
(13%) and machinery (16%) also received an important share of the inflows 
(Caputo 2007, p. 46). Under the Target Plan, the Kubitschek administration 
created the Automotive Industry Executive Group (Grupo Executivo da 
Industria Automobilística, GEIA), which was composed of government officials 
and private sector executives, to plan, study, and approve benefits to develop 
the automotive sector (Kertenetzky, 2016, p. 5). Chapter 8 will focus on the 
analysis of Instruction 113 from the political economy perspective and as a 
channel to subsidize industrialization. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, however, Instruction 113 contributed to 
the decline of the auction system as a mechanism to stabilize the balance of 
payments. By classifying imports – even if only capital goods – as positive FDI 
inflows in the balance of payments, the government was ‘cheating’ about the 
amount of foreign exchange that was available. In the restricted capital account 
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system, large sums of FDI could have been the solution to allow imports to rise 
in the MER system without misbalancing foreign accounts. But since a major 
part of this ‘FDI’ was imports via Instruction 113, they were in reality illiquid, 
and could not be used as foreign exchange to be distributed through the MER 
system.  
Figure 5.4 – FDI and Instruction 113, 1954-1961 (US$ Million) 
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Source: FDI data compiled by IBGE (2017), with the original data from Sumoc; Instruction 113 data from Caputo (2007, 
p. 54). 
Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of both FDI and Instruction 113 flows after 1955. 
It shows how both surged after 1955. FDI was practically zero in the first half of 
the 1950s, which was a disappointment for Sumoc officials in the Dutra 
administration, so they started adjusting the balance of payments through 
restrictions on imports. With the major incentives from Instruction 113, FDI 
picked up from 1955 onwards, however, peaking at US$250 million dollars in 
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1957. FDI flows, on average, represented 20% of the level of imports, which 
averaged US$1.2 billion dollars. In theory, the inflows of FDI could thus have 
financed one fifth of imports, reducing the foreign exchange constraint and 
reinforcing the MER system.  
Figure 5.5 - Liquid and ‘Illiquid’ FDI, 1955-1961 (US$ Million) 
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Source: Own construction. FDI data compiled by IBGE (2017), with the original data from Sumoc. Instruction 113 data 
from Caputo (2007, p. 54). See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
But Figure 5.5 shows this was a mirage by presenting the distribution of liquid 
versus ‘illiquid’ Instruction 113 FDI between 1955 and 1961. On average, 
Instruction 113 FDI accounted for 49.6% of the FDI flows. These imports did 
not compete with the rest of the economy for the use of the limited supply of 
foreign exchange, as foreign companies used external funding to buy capital 
goods and then import them, which was a useful financing procedure for a 
country that did not have access to foreign debt markets in that period (Caputo, 
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2007, p. 12). Nonetheless, it meant that only half of the FDI in the period was 
available to support the financing of other imports via the MER system.  
As FDI was on average US$150 million per year, only US$75 million could be 
used to fund additional imports. When these figures are compared to the level 
of imports, it becomes clear that FDI was not enough to finance the surge of 
imports outside the MER system. Imports rose by almost US$300 million per 
year between 1955 and 1961, so the additional US$75 million of liquid FDI was 
not enough to pay for that (IBGE, 1955-1961). If the US$75 million of illiquid 
FDI is counted as imports, the surge in imports reached almost US$400 million 
per year, against an annual decline of only US$80 million of export receipts 
over the same period (IBGE, 1955-1961). There is no balance of payments that 
can remain stable under these conditions. Moreover, it is worth remembering 
the increase in amortizations that resulted from these FDI flows in the later part 
of the 1950s. They represented on average US$280 million between 1956 and 
1960 (IBGE, 1956-1960). This means that Instruction 113 produced a system in 
which foreign companies brought imports instead of foreign exchange, and 
then took away foreign exchange to repay debts and profit. The illiquid FDI 
were not only an opportunity cost on the foreign exchange that could have 
been used to finance the MER system, but eventually had a significant balance 
of payments cost via the outflows.  
5.3 1956-1958: Reform and Decay of the Auction System  
The Kubitschek administration made other important changes to the MER 
system. As already noticed, his choices for the economic team were clearly a 
return to developmentalist ideas, but without the restrictions placed on Vargas 
by the traditional elite. The new government’s developmentalist policies 
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sought to make a stronger effort to accelerate industrialization, but resulted in a 
much less responsible macroeconomic framework than during the first half of 
the 1950s.  Kubitschek won the election against Juarez Tavora, a conservative 
candidate from UDN who defended macroeconomic equilibrium and the 
continuation of the liberal policies adopted under Café Filho. Interestingly, 
some authors attribute Kubitschek’s easy victory to exactly the tightening of the 
money supply under Café Filho, which brought inflation down and the 
economy back to a slower growth rate in 1955 (Bulhoes, 1990, p. 114; Skidmore, 
1982, p. 203). But as discussed before in Chapter 3, Brazilian society was 
changing and the new urban and industrial groups were keen on a more 
developmentalist and pro-growth strategy, so Kubitschek’s victory was not a 
surprise. Kubitschek had many difficulties before assuming power due to 
Brazil’s extreme social divisions. A strong ideological conflict emerged between 
those who supported the result of the elections and those who opposed it 
because of the presence of João Goulart, Kubitschek’s Vice President, who was 
known for his relationship to the Communist Party, even though he was from 
the PTB party (Bueno & Faro, 2004). Kubitschek was only able to take office 
after General Lott, a nonpartisan public figure from a divided military, stood 
by the constitution and endorsed his victory (Skidmore, 1982, p. 194).  
After winning this initial battle, the new president was inclined to defend his 
broader political base of industrialists and urban classes. The new Minister of 
Finance was Jose Maria Whitaker, a banker from São Paulo closely linked to the 
industrialist class, who Bulhoes (1990, p. 114) describes as someone ready to 
‘throw money to the air as much as possible’. His tone shows how the liberal 
group was worried about the possible shift of policies during the Kubistheck 
years. 
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Indeed, the return of the developmentalist group is an important part of the 
explanation of why the auction system started to slowly lose its capacity to 
stabilize the balance of payments and to then finally collapse in 1961. This is 
particularly true after 1957, when the government decided to make an 
important reform to the system. As previously discussed, the first system 
seems to have worked well until 1957, stabilizing the balance of payments. 
With Instruction 113 and the rapid increase in FDI inflows after 1955, 
moreover, the MER system had an increasing availability of foreign exchange 
to be distributed through the auction system. On top of this, the decline seen in 
coffee prices in 1953-1957 stabilized between 1957 and 1961 (Figure 3.1). These 
conditions suggested that the MER regime could continue being effective at 
keeping the balance of payments stable. 
But the new administration wanted to further develop the industrial sector and 
had plans for exceptionally high growth rates during a small period of time. 
Kubitschek slogan was ‘fifty years in five’, and his Target Plan was designed to 
produce exceptional growth rates with a combination of investments in basic 
industries, infrastructure, and advanced durable goods. The new 
administration was mostly concerned with providing a new level of industrial 
development in Brazil, building both infrastructure and capital goods 
industries in order to fully vertically integrate the industrial chain, as was seen 
in Chapter 3. Figure 5.6 shows the rising GDP growth rate in the later part of 
the decade after a significant decline following Café Filho’s monetary 
tightening in 1955-1956. 
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Figure 5.6 - GDP (Annual % Growth) 
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Source: Own construction from original data from IBGE’s Anuários Estatísticos IBGE (1951-1961). 
To attain this level of growth, an important change took place to the MER 
system in 1957. In theory, it had two basic premises. Firstly, it was believed that 
the MER system did not need to be as restrictive because foreign exchange 
inflows had increased significantly with the surge in FDI after Instruction 113  
(Sochczewski, 1980, p. 92). Officials seemed comfortable with the idea that the 
new cycle of foreign investment in Brazil would last for a long time, so there 
was no need to further restrict imports. The second premise was to create 
further differentiation between sectors, as the auction system only provided the 
exact same protection for a large group of products included in each of the five 
categories and there were no ad valorem tariffs (Sochczewski, 1980, p. 93) 
In fact, a reform of the protectionist system, with the reintroduction of ad 
valorem tariffs, had been discussed since the end of Vargas’ administration in 
1954 (Silva, 2008, p. 12). Osvaldo Aranha, the same finance minister who had 
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removed the ad valorem taxes to increase revenues with specific tariffs in 1934, 
was the main name behind the new change to the system during the Vargas 
administration. After Vargas’ suicide and the shift towards more orthodox 
policies under Café Filho, however, this discussion was put aside and only 
returned to the spotlight when Kubitschek came to power. Colistete (2006) 
shows that the pressure for ad valorem tariffs from the organized industrialists 
in São Paulo was extremely high, as it had long been one of their main 
demands. From the industrialists’ perspective, ad valorem tariffs were a 
superior form of protection compared to the MER because they could restrict 
imports of final goods, but would not force them to join the auctions to import 
inputs. 
The reform of the auction system essentially had two main points. Firstly, the 
reduction from five categories to three (four if the free market is also counted): 
(1) a preferential exchange rate, which was basically for government imports at 
the official rates; followed by (2) a special and (3) a general category, which 
were the combination of the previous five categories into two larger ones. This 
simplified the system and reduced the differentiation among sectors, although 
it did not necessarily mean a reduction in the restriction of imports, which still 
had to go through the auctions (Sochczewski, 1980, p. 91). In Sumoc’s minutes 
there is no explanation for the reduction from five to three categories. In fact, 
there is no description of debates between Sumoc officials about these changes 
in the system, only a reference that, following the new 1957 Tariffs Law, Sumoc 
decided to adjust the exchange rate system to the new framework (Sumoc 
Minutes 661, 09/08/1957). This reflects the smaller role of Sumoc in 
policymaking during the Kubitschek years, which was discussed in Chapter 4. 
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The second change was the reintroduction of ad valorem tariffs for each group 
of products, ranging from 0% to 150% and aimed at substituting for the implicit 
protection previously given by the MER system. A new body called the 
Customs Policy Council (Conselho de Política Anfandegária, CPA) was made 
responsible for determining the level of ad valorem tariffs for each product and 
collecting the revenues, which rapidly became the new main source of revenue 
for the government, replacing the auctions tax (Sochczewski, 1980, p. 102; 
Malan, 1974, p. 5). Overall, the main idea behind the reform was to simplify the 
auction system and further stimulate import substitution through additional 
differentiation. Specifically, it was intended to accelerate the substitution of 
capital goods and reduce the previous emphasis on the substitution of 
consumer goods (Sochaczewski, 1980, p. 103).   
On top of the new ad valorem taxes, a complex system of exemptions from the 
MER system was also gradually implemented. These were determined ad hoc 
by the CPA, which granted benefits to some sectors depending on their 
requests. The enforcement of these exemptions was very flexible and varied 
according to the political influence of the particular sector (Bergsman, 1970, p. 
33). They were mainly granted to companies that demonstrated they were 
importing essential inputs that did not have internal substitutes. Originally, 
tariffs were introduced to replicate the protection previously given by the MER 
system, and most sectors received the same amount of protection they had 
been getting from the exchange rates, but these were soon changed in order to 
achieve the new objective of creating more differentiation (Sochaczewski, 1980, 
p. 104).  
While the new system simplified and created further differentiation among 
sectors, in theory it did not change the major goal of the first MER system, 
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which was to allow the auctions mechanism to adjust the exchange rates to 
maintain stability in the balance of payments. This is why the literature on 
these changes generally sees them as a continuation of Vargas’ policies, with 
the addition of further import substitution and the greater openness to foreign 
investments via Instruction 113. For most authors, the second phase of the MER 
system was just a step further in import substitution for modern and advanced 
sectors (Bergsman, 1970; Baer, 1995; Sochaczweski, 1980; Vianna, 1987; 
Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Malan, 1974).  
But in light of the new primary data, this interpretation can be challenged, as 
the new system essentially dismantled the original MER framework by 
removing imports from the auction system. The first evidence of this is simply 
the commitment from authorities to using the MER auctions in the second 
phase. As shown, there were two different ways in which the private sector 
and the government could import outside the auction system. The first and 
most simple was the government prerogative to use part of the available 
foreign exchange for its own imports, at the official exchange rate and without 
going through the auctions. The second was the exemptions authorized to the 
private sector (Sochzewsky, 1980, p. 91). These exemptions started to appear in 
Sumoc’s minutes between 1953 and 1954, and were created by Article XVI of 
Instruction 70 (see Appendix 2), which gave Sumoc the privilege to authorize 
imports outside of the auctions for capital or essential goods at its own 
discretion. The new evidence presented below shows that these exemptions 
were very small in 1953 and 1954: on average only 5% of foreign exchange, as 
60-65% was allocated to the auctions and 30% to the government (Figure 5.2). 
Caputo (2007, p. 40) argues, however, that these exemptions were in practice an 
anticipation of Instruction 113, which from 1955 made the imports of capital 
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goods outside the system a more formal procedure, allowing them to also be 
classified as FDI, rather than imports. After 1957, the level of exemptions then 
increased significantly, not only because of Instruction 113, but mostly as a 
consequence of the 1957 tariffs reform, which opened the door for discretionary 
exemptions authorized by the CPA (Sochzewsky, 1980, p. 92).  
While these exemptions already existed in theory in 1953, they were in practice 
largely only used after 1957 and once the formal procedure to authorize 
exemptions by the CPA was established. Before 1955, Sumoc was committed to 
forcing most of the private imports to go through the auctions, allowing the 
exchange rates to adjust correctly for each category. The centralization of 
foreign exchange distribution allowed officials to have a strict control of the 
level of imports, in order to guarantee balance of payments stability. After 1956, 
however, this was completely changed with the rise in imports outside the 
auctions.  
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Figure 5.7 - Auctioned Foreign Exchange, 1953-1960 (US$ million) 
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Source: Own construction from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly 
Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
Figure 5.7 shows the amount of foreign exchange auctioned through the MER 
system between 1953 and 1961. The amount of auctioned currency declined 
over time, with its highest level in the first phase of the auction system. At first, 
this could seem paradoxical, since it was in the first phase after the 1952 
balance of payments crisis that the government was more under pressure to 
contain imports. This was the period when Sumoc worked to rebuild the 
country’s international reserves under major foreign exchange constraints. 
After 1956, the government’s foreign accounts improved significantly with the 
large amount of FDI coming via Instruction 113: on average, about US$150 
million per year between 1955 and 1960 (IBGE, 1955-1960). So the simple 
explanation of why the government reduced the amount of currency being 
offered in the MER system does not have to do with the availability of foreign 
exchange, but with the willingness to use the system as the means to achieve 
equilibrium in the balance of payments. 
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Figure 5.8 – Imports Outside the Auction System, 1953-1961  
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Source: Own construction from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly 
Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Import data from IBGE’s Anuários Estatísticos (1953-
1961).  See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of imports that were made outside the auction 
system, including both government imports and the exemptions conceded to 
the private sector. Unfortunately, the data for each component separately is 
unavailable, but the overall level of imports outside the auctions was calculated 
by simply subtracting the amount of foreign exchange auctioned in the MER 
system from total imports. 
Figure 5.8 shows that, until 1956, around 30-40% of imports remained outside 
the system, which Sochazweski (1980, p. 91) describes as the standard level for 
the government’s own imports. But after 1956 the situation changed 
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completely, with a significant increase in imports outside the auctions to 60-
70%. The MER system gradually started to receive less foreign exchange and by 
the end of the 1960s the auctions were almost non-operational. When the 
system was finally shut down in 1961, 90% of foreign exchange was being 
allocated outside the auctions. 
By comparing the auctioned foreign exchange with the evolution of exports 
and imports, it can be seen that the decline of the auction system was really due 
to an unwillingness to use it. There was a decline in export receipts of about 
US$150 million per year on average between 1955 and 1961 (IBGE, 1955-1961), 
largely due to the fall of coffee prices. The auctioned foreign exchange declined 
even more rapidly, however, by US$264 million per year on average, even 
though there was a major rise in imports of US$300 million per year (IBGE, 
1955-1961). Sumoc was thus removing more foreign exchange from the system 
than the reduction in exports receipts, while at the same time allowing imports 
to rise. The result was a deterioration in the trade balance and the balance of 
payments.  
While it is not possible to know what would have happened with the balance 
of payments if the same commitment to the MER system had been maintained 
during the second phase, the simple math of flows suggest that the system 
could have been maintained. If imports of goods had remained at the same 
level of US$1.1 million as during the system’s first phase, the average export 
receipts of US$1.25 million would still have provided enough foreign exchange 
to pay for the imports during the second phase (IBGE, 1953-1960). This would 
have been enough to stabilize the trade balance and the balance of payments. 
This counterfactual is somewhat extreme and probably unrealistic as it is 
difficult to imagine imports remaining stable in a period of very strong 
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industrial growth, such as the second half of the 1950s. Yet, the US$1.25 million 
average export receipts would also have been enough to allow a rise of 13.6% 
of average imports levels from their average of US$1.1 million during the first 
period. This means that there was space for a rise in imports following the 
acceleration in economic growth even with the declining levels of export 
receipts. The MER system stopped working, then, because authorities reduced 
their use of it. By removing foreign exchange from the auctions, they permitted 
a massive surge in imports above what foreign exchange inflows allowed. This 
evidence from the allocation of foreign exchange to the MER system suggests 
that during its later phase it differed little in practice from the previous import 
licensing system that had been in place between 1947 and 1953, in which the 
discretionary power of Banco do Brasil to authorize imports resulted in no real 
control over the process.  
5.4 1958-1961: Breaking with the IMF and Collapse  
The decay of the system was also a consequence of the Kubitschek 
administration’s expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, as it sought to 
deliver its ambitious investment plan, including the construction of the 
country’s new capital. The increased demand for additional imports, both from 
the government and the private sector, drove up imports outside the auctions. 
Kubitschek’s expansionist policies saw a dramatic increase in the money 
supply. As shown in Figure 4.6, the money supply, although increasing, had 
remained under control during Vargas’ administration, growing at a peak of 
around 18% in 1952, although on average it grew at 16%, which was a similar 
level as the 15.9% average rate of inflation (IBGE, 1951-1954). Under the Dutra 
and Café Filho administrations, when the liberal leadership of Sumoc adopted 
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a restrictive monetary stance, the money supply was even more tightly 
controlled. During the second half of the decade, by contrast, the annual 
growth rate of the monetary supply increased to the enormous rate of 60% in 
1958 (IBGE, 1958). 
This monetary financing was essentially used to cover the growing budget 
gaps created by rising fiscal expenditures. Although FDI increased significantly 
between 1956 and 1961, about half of the funds were illiquid and in the form of 
direct capital goods imports under Instruction 113. Out of the US$871 million 
of FDI that arrived in Brazil during those years, US$418 million were imports 
(calculated from Caputo, 2007, p. 54), which while classified as capital flows in 
the balance of payments, could not be used as foreign exchange in the MER 
system to fund other imports. Most of the financing for the administration’s 
direct infrastructure projects under the Target Plan, as well as for the 
construction of the new capital of the country, Brasilia, came from printing 
money to cover these rising expenditures and the negative budget balances 
(Klein and Luna, 2014, p. 160). Figure 5.9 shows the rise in the budget deficits 
as a percentage of GDP during the MER system.  
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Figure 5.9 – Budget Balance, 1952-1961 (% of GDP) 
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Source: Own construction from data compiled by Sochaczwesky (1980, p. 127). Original data from the Balanços Geral 
da União, various years. 
Between 1956 and 1961, government expenditure increased by four points of 
GDP, from 14% to 18%, which explains the increase in the budget balance from 
an average of -1.6% of GDP between 1952 and 1955, to -5.9% between 1956 and 
1960. Two percentage points of this rise were due to the increases in direct 
government investments. It is no surprise, then, that money printing increased 
significantly to finance this deficit during the second part of the decade. As a 
result, inflation increased, increasing pressure for depreciation during the 
second MER system. 
This deterioration of the basic macroeconomic position resulted in strong 
pressures on both imports and inflation. Inflation rose quickly to about 40% in 
1961, as Figure 4.4 shows. At the same time, the lighter restrictions of the new 
MER system led to a major rise in imports. Imports of goods and services grew 
by US$345 million between 1955 and 1960, which represented a 25% increase 
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(IBGE, 1955-1960). The result of this process was the rapid deterioration of the 
balance of payments, despite the large amounts of FDI inflows and greater 
currency availability of that period. The balance of payments deteriorated to a 
deficit of almost US$500 million dollars by 1960, forcing Sumoc to cash out all 
the available reserves, which had been built up during the good years of 1953-
1957 (Klein & Luna, 2015, p. 87). Thanks to the policy changes, especially the 
rise of imports outside the auctions and the lack of control over monetary 
policy, Brazil returned to the same condition as the pre-auction system.  
Between 1956 and 1959, the current account deteriorated from being balanced 
to a deficit of US$100 million, while the overall balance of payments deficit 
increased to US$200 million (IBGE, 1956-1959). The period of 1957-1959 is the 
only time when the balance of payments deficit increased faster than the 
current account deficit, which is explained by the deterioration of the capital 
account, as it posted deficits of US$100-150 million in those years, despite the 
large FDI inflows from Instruction 113, which averaged US$150 million (IBGE, 
1957-1960; Caputo, 2007, p. 54). The deficit in the capital account is explained 
by a massive increase in the account of amortizations, which averaged almost 
US$280 million between 1957 and 1960 (IBGE, 1957-1960). These amortizations 
were essentially profit remittances from the multinational companies that 
invested via Instruction 113 to pay for their original financing. In the balance of 
payments, inflows were counted as FDI, while the profits from the investments 
were accounted as amortizations. This highlights two important problems in 
the Kubitschek years. First, companies were sending money back quickly, 
either because they saw the deterioration of macroeconomic fundamentals or 
did not plan to reinvest the funds. The flows from Instruction 113 were shorted 
lived and quickly resulted in negative deficits in the capital account. Second, 
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these outflows contributed to the overall collapse of the balance of payments at 
the end of the period. Even a more stable current account would have not been 
able to stabilize the balance of payments, given the increase in these 
amortizations.  
To make the situation worse, there was also another fall in international coffee 
prices after a peak in 1953, declining further after 1956 (Figure 3.1), even if the 
terms of trade did not deteriorate significantly and remained at relatively high 
levels until the end of the decade. Coffee prices fell by 29% between 1957 and 
1959, while the terms of trade declined 8% over the same period (Abreu, 2009, 
p. 405). This decline meant an average decline of US$150 million in export 
revenues between 1956 and 1960 (equivalent to about 10% of exports), which 
accelerated the deterioration of the current account (IBGE, 1957-1959). The 
decline in coffee prices was the result of a significant global overproduction of 
the product at the end of the 1950s. For most of the 1940s and early 1950s, 
Brazil’s coffee production was around 20 million bags of coffee, but the 
increase in global commodity prices during the Korean War until 1953 
stimulated the local market to expand production in the second half of the 
decade. By 1959, local production of coffee reached 44 million bags of coffee, 
which was above global demand of 42 million and with a total global 
production of 79 million bags. Brazil by itself could thus fulfil all of the global 
demand for coffee (Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 174). In an effort to contain the 
falling prices and the loss of export receipts in the context of rising inflation 
and imports, the Kubitschek administration organized the stockpiling of coffee 
from the private sector to try to maintain prices. In 1958 and 1959, about one 
third of local production was stored across the country, accounting for 69 
million bags by the end of the decade, though this had almost no effect on 
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global coffee prices (Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 175). The Kubitschek 
administration’s attempt to organize and prevent the decline in coffee prices is 
notable because the traditional landowning elite was undergoing an important 
decline in its political influence, as discussed in Chapter 3. Yet, coffee still 
represented 60% of exports, making it a major source of foreign exchange, 
which explains the pragmatism of the government’s attempt to maintain prices, 
even if it was unsuccessful.  
The decline in coffee prices was not, however, the main cause of the 
deterioration in the balance of payments, despite most of the traditional 
literature blaming the decline for the balance of payments crisis and bringing 
about the end of the MER regime (Bergsman, 1970; Baer, 1995; Sochaczweski, 
1980; Vianna, 1987; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Malan, 1974). The trade 
data show that the decline in export receipts of US$150 million per year was too 
small to destabilize the balance of payments. The problem was the strong 
increase in imports of almost US$300 million dollars annually between 1956 
and 1960, produced by the increase in imports outside the auctions (IBGE, 
1956-1960). These numbers do not include the imports in the form of FDI via 
Instruction 113, which would increase this figure on average to US$400 million 
(Caputo, 2007, p. 54). If imports remained at the same levels as when the MER 
system was effectively stabilizing current account flows during 1953 to 1956 
(about US$1.1 billion per year on average), the exports receipts that averaged 
US$1.25 billion during the second half of the decade would have been more 
than enough to stabilize the current account and the balance of payments. In 
fact, even in the context of declining coffee prices, the export receipts would 
have been enough to continuously allow a small current account surplus or an 
increase in imports. The US$150 million annual decline in coffee exports was 
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not enough to produce a collapse in the first MER system. The reduction of 
import restrictions, which created a surge of imports of more than 25% in the 
second half of the decade, was thus the main cause of the deterioration in the 
balance of payments. 
Despite largely being a result of its policies, the government was not unaware 
of the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions. Worried about both rising 
inflation and particularly the widening balance of payments deficit, Kubitschek 
tried to stabilize the economy. In 1958 he appointed Lucas Lopes as Finance 
Minister. Together with the President of the National Bank for Economic 
Development (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico, BNDE), 
Roberto Campos, Lopes elaborated a stabilization program y and started to 
negotiate with the IMF for a rescue package to provide the country with foreign 
exchange liquidity.  
In 1958, the administration announced the Program of Monetary Stabilization 
(Programa de Estabilizacao Monetaria, PEM), which proposed a strong control 
over the fiscal budget and money supply to both prevent new money from 
being used to finance the budget and credit expansion from Banco do Brasil. In 
the same year, Lopes met with an IMF delegation and agreed a stand-by rescue 
package. The IMF straight away gave US$37.5 million for immediate use, 
which was just a sign of its commitment, given the small size of the funds. 
Attached to the loan was a list of conditions that needed to be accepted in order 
for the rest of the US$300 million requested to be gradually released in the 
following years (Almeida, 2015, p. 480). As discussed in Chapter 3, access to 
IMF funding with conditionalities was an important reason for Latin American 
countries to abandon their MER regimes. Whereas the IMF had originally 
showed a tolerant attitude towards these MER regimes, by 1958 it was already 
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highly opposed to them, having pressured for their removal in many other 
countries from the region (Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Argentina, and Uruguay). 
Brazil was the only one left (Konig, 1968). The conditions included a significant 
cut in government spending (Cr$135 billion to be removed from the Target 
Plan), for the money supply to not increase by more than 5% per year, and the 
end of the MER regime to allow the convergence of the special rates with the 
free market exchange rate (Almeida, 2015, p. 490).   
Although initially accepted by the government, the administration tried to 
negotiate the terms with the IMF slowly, in order to give it time to search for 
other sources of foreign exchange. Nevertheless, there were no alternatives and 
the IMF remained highly intransigent on its conditions. At the same time, 
Kubitschek was under more pressure from industrialists and his political base 
to not accept the terms and stop the monetary stabilization program (Skidmore, 
1982, p. 225). Figure 5.9 shows that, at least initially, the program was being 
fully implemented, with growth of the monetary supply falling from 35% in 
1957 to 15% in 1958. The same happened with inflation, which declined from 
21% in 1957 to 16.1% in 1958 and 14.8% in 1959 (see Figure 4.4). 
In June 1959, one year after the program started and from Lopes having signed 
the stand-by agreement with the IMF, Kubitschek could no longer accept it, 
however, the lack of political support for those measures from his political base 
of industrialists and the PTB and PSD, which were pressuring him to return to 
the policies of the first years of his mandate (Skidmore, 1982, p. 226). He 
therefore broke the negotiations with the IMF and decided to reverse the 
tightening of monetary and fiscal policies (Lima, 2008). This decision can be 
seen as his ultimate political choice for developmentalism and was the death 
sentence for the second phase of the MER system (Malan, 1974, p. 6). Between 
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1959 and 1961, the annual money supply growth rate increased from 15% to 
60%, inflation accelerated from 15% to 40%, and the balance of payments deficit 
widened from US$300 to US$500 million (IBGE, 1959-1960).  Kubitschek left 
power at the end of 1960 with the country’s macroeconomic conditions on the 
verge of collapse.  
Kubitschek left power at the end of his mandate and Janio Quadros assumed 
power after winning the elections by promising to restore macroeconomic 
equilibrium and fight inflation, with the support of the liberal group, including 
Bulhões. Quadros did not hesitate to publically condemn the terrible financial 
situation that he inherited from the previous administration and announced 
that painful remedies would be necessary (Malan, 1974, p. 7). With inflation 
around 40% by 1960, his conservative view had a stronger influence in the 
electorate this time than in the early part of the 1950s. Quadros appointed 
Clemente Mariani, the President of Banco do Brasil during the presidency of 
Café Filho, as Minister of Finance, and Bulhões was once again made the 
Executive Director of Sumoc. The new economic strategy was very similar to 
what had been done during the short mandate of Café Filho: contain monetary 
and fiscal expansion (Lago, 1982, p. 168). 
This time the economic leadership decided to end the MER regime, which had 
in practice been unused, with almost 90% of imports taking place outside of the 
auctions in 1960. The MER system was already over by the time the decision to 
finish it was taken (Lago, 1982, 178). According to Bulhões (1990, p. 131), who 
was behind the decision, there was no other option than letting the currency 
depreciate, then fighting its inflationary impacts with monetary control. A 
gradual depreciation was not an option or the economy would naturally 
migrate towards another balance of payments crisis. The MER system was 
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therefore abolished in 1961 under Instruction 204 of Sumoc, ending nine years 
of MER experience and allowing a 100% depreciation of the official rate. At the 
same time, the new administration went to the IMF to re-open negotiations and 
ask for funds to ease the balance of payments difficulties (Lago, 1982, p. 179). 
By mid-1961, a new deal of US$650 million was reached, with the country 
obliged to fulfill all of the conditions proposed in 1958.  
After managing to control foreign exchange difficulties between 1953 and 1956 
with a well-balanced economy, the 1957 reform and the relaxation of import 
controls combined with the increasingly incoherent macroeconomic policies of 
the Kubitschek administration forced Brazil to return to its starting point in 
1952, bringing about the end of the MER system. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has analyzed the rise and decay of the MER system. The evidence 
shows that the first MER system of 1953-1957 successfully adjusted the balance 
of payments, while at the same time supporting macroeconomic conditions. 
The system’s auction mechanism allowed the exchange rate to endogenously 
depreciate, correcting for a long period of overvaluation. The decay and 
eventual collapse followed many changes introduced in 1957, particularly the 
exemptions to the system, which allowed foreign exchange to be distributed 
outside of the auctions. Combined with rising pressures from expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy, this undermined the balance of payments toward 
the end of the decade, resulting in the collapse of the MER system, which 
forced a one-off devaluation of the official exchange rate and recourse to the 
IMF. Chapter 6 further explores the reasons behind the success of the first 
 
 
209 
 
phase, and how officials managed to reach macroeconomic equilibrium 
through the auction system.  
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6. Guiding the Invisible Hand: Market Equilibrium and Multiple Exchange 
Rates15 
Chapter 5 analyzed the evolution of the two phases of MER system. It showed 
that between 1953 and 1957 the first MER system stabilized the balance of 
payments through an effective system of auctions of foreign exchange, which 
combined with more responsible fiscal and monetary policies to support a 
stable macroeconomic environment. The system decayed after 1956 when the 
Kubitschek administration made considerable changes to its structure, 
expanding imports outside of the auctions, which combined with a major 
expansion of monetary and fiscal policy to put pressure on both imports and 
inflation, leading to the system’s collapse. 
This interpretation of the rise and decline of the MER system differs 
considerably from the exiting literature on the MER experiment. It not only 
identifies the two phases and their distinct designs, but also explains the 
decline and collapse as not being primarily related to the fall of coffee prices in 
the second half of the decade, but due to the dismantling of the system because 
of the rise in imports outside the auctions and unsustainable macroeconomic 
policies, which negatively impacted the balance of payments.  
While the last chapter elaborates further on this interpretation of the peak and 
decline of the MER system, it remains to explain the effectiveness of the system 
during its first phase. As shown, the system only worked when officials 
concentrated foreign exchange in the auctions. When imports outside the 
                                                 
15 The title echoes Love and Nils (1988). 
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auctions increased, the system gradually declined in effectiveness. But while 
allocating foreign exchange to the system was a necessary condition for it to 
perform well, it is not sufficient to explain how policymakers were able to 
reach market equilibrium under a centralized system of exchange rate auctions.  
This chapter explains the macroeconomic effectiveness of the first phase of the 
MER system. The new evidence presented will demonstrate the mechanics 
behind the MER system during 1953-1957 and provide a new explanation for 
its success.  The chapter is based on the collection of a new database of the MER 
system that includes the monthly quantities of foreign exchange allocated to 
the MER categories and the prices of the various exchange rates of that period. 
This information was collected from the annual reports of Banco do Brasil, the 
operator of the system, and the monthly bulletins of Sumoc, the regulatory 
body responsible for the MER experiment. 
6.1 The Effectiveness of MER Auctions 
The hypothesis is that the primary reason for the effectiveness of the first MER 
system is the combination of authorities using minimum prices to restrict 
foreign exchange in the auctions, combined with a responsive approach to 
market demand from the different categories across auctions houses. The first 
system’s most impressive feature was how the allocation to the different 
categories across the exchange houses resulted in a stable balance of payments, 
impeding the emergence of a black market for foreign exchange, while at the 
same time being able to limit the availibility of foreign exchange sufficiently to 
stabilize the balance of payments and allow exchange rates to gradually 
depreciate. This was only possible if the distribution of foreign exchange to the 
different categories was done so as to guarantee that a minimum level of 
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foreign exchange was available to all sectors, so that importers of those sectors 
would not go to the black market, while at the same time restricting foreign 
exchange to the economy as a whole to stabilize the balance of payments. And 
the way to do this was by using the two instruments officials had at their hands 
to control the auctions process: the minimum prices and the supply of foreign 
exchange to the different auctions houses and categories. The description of 
contemporary sources about the design of the first system suggests these two 
instruments were key to the MER auctions.During the building of the system, 
officials believed it would be more efficient if there were a large number of 
exchange houses, allowing foreign exchange to reach different parts of the 
country even if in small quantities, since São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro received 
around 80% of the total foreign exchange. Initially, 12 auction houses were 
opened, but they were increased to 20 in time to allow minor quantities of 
foreign exchange to reach different parts of the country (Huddle, 1964, p. 95; 
Lago, 1982, p. 95). 
This created the benefit of allowing foreign exchange to reach demand across 
regions, helping to contain the emergence of a black market. But it also resulted 
in disequilibrium, since different exchange rates could emerge in the same 
categories across different exchange houses. There was no formal link between 
auctions at different places and no mechanism to guarantee the same price 
equilibrium. Minimum prices based on the auction results of the previous week 
were introduced to correct for this problem in all auction houses. With this 
system, the minimum prices guaranteed that auctions in different parts of the 
country would result in similar exchange rates for each category across the 
country. While this mechanism could force homogeneity, it also meant that not 
all the foreign exchange allocated to a specific auction house was sold, as some 
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buyers would not purchase at those minimum price levels. These amounts 
were brought back to the central office of Banco do Brasil to be supplied in the 
next round of auctions at new locations or categories in the following week 
(Vianna, 1987, p. 104; Kafka, 1956) 
This design suggests a system in which authorities were imposing minimum 
prices to guarantee homogenous exchange rates and also to force some buyers 
out of the system, restricting the scarce foreign exchange to achieve the goal of 
reducing imports. Yet at the same time they made sure that there was sufficient 
liquidity across sectors and locations, so that the buyers forced out by the 
minimum prices did not search for currency in the black market and knew that 
they would find liquidity in the next auction round. This suggests that 
authorities had to be realistic about the sectoral distribution of foreign 
exchange and be able to follow the fluctuations in demand for each category to 
provide some liquidity for each market, even if they had the primary objective 
of restricting foreign exchange. The hypothesis to explain the effectiveness of 
the first phase is therefore that authorities were responding to market demand 
in the process of distributing foreign exchange to guarantee some supply for 
every sector, while also using minimum prices to restrict foreign exchange as a 
whole. 
In his assessment of the MER system, Kafta (1956) suggests that this framework 
was a key part of the system’s design, while authorities discussed a way of 
both restricting foreign exchange to stabilize the balance of payments without 
creating new distortions in the exchange rate market. Sumoc minutes during 
the first phase period do not report discussions on the design, but at different 
time officials do debate whether the system was effective in accomplishing both 
goals (Sumoc Minutes 450 to 500, 1954 and 1955). This suggests that there was a 
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responsive approach from authorities to sectoral demand for foreign exchange, 
which sought to guarantee supply to contain the emergence of a black market, 
but also restrict overall supply. This hypothesis seems a plausible explanation 
for the system’s effectiveness at stabilizing the balance of payments. 
Testing this hypothesis is not easy. Unfortunately, qualitative sources (both 
primary and secondary) do not record how authorities were distributing 
foreign exchange across the five categories and how the minimum prices were 
decided. As shown earlier in the last chapter, the minutes of the Sumoc meeting 
that launched Instruction 70 do not have a proper explanation of the allocation 
of different sectors to the five categories (Sumoc Minutes 408, 9/10/1953). Banco 
do Brasil does not hold records explaining the distribution of foreign exchange 
on a monthly basis, only the records of the amount of foreign exchange 
distributed. This new quantitative data can, however, shed light on the 
behavior of the distribution across sectors and auction houses.  
To test the hypothesis, the next sub-sections analyze the pattern of three 
different parts of the new dataset: (1) the difference between the amounts of 
foreign exchange supplied to and auctioned through the MER system; (2) the 
distribution of foreign exchange to the five categories during the first MER 
period; and finally (3) the comparison between the auctions’ weighted 
exchange rate and the free market exchange rate. The analysis of this data with 
some simple econometrics can help test the above hypothesis. 
6.2 No Systematic Mistakes 
Given that there is no available information on the process of distributing 
foreign exchange to the different auction houses and categories, the test of the 
hypothesis of a responsive approach to market demand that also sought to 
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force some buyers out has to be made from the available data on the outcomes 
of the auctions process. One of the interesting features of the new data is the 
separation between the quantities of foreign exchange offered at the auctions, 
basically the supply of foreign exchange to the MER system, and the amounts 
effectively purchased by importers, which is the equilibrium level of foreign 
exchange sold at the auctions.  
The difference between the foreign exchange supplied and auctioned is a good 
indicator of the size of the mismatch between supply and demand for each 
category at a certain period of time, since it represents how much currency was 
not purchased at the auctions given the minimum prices. With scarce foreign 
exchange, this gap only existed because of the imposition of the minimum 
prices. A large gap means that there was not enough demand to purchase the 
foreign exchange at the imposed minimum price of that auctions category, 
since some buyers were being forced out of the auctions. On the other hand, a 
very small gap signals that demand was much stronger than the supply and 
additional foreign exchange was probably needed in that specific category or 
location, as buyers were purchasing at any given minimum price.  
If officials were being responsive to demand but also trying to force some 
buyers out of the auctions, they would be looking at the auction results at a 
specific moment to determine how much to supply in each market in the 
following period, in order to not allow the gap between supplied and 
auctioned foreign exchange to grow very large. At the same time, by setting 
minimum prices they were also always maintaining a gap, as this was the 
mechanism used to force some buyers out of the system and restrict the overall 
level of foreign exchange to adjust the balance of payments. In this framework 
officials had to, at the same time, gradually minimize the gap but keep its 
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existence to make the auctions effective. If these patterns can be seen in the 
data, it would suggest this decision making process was taking place at the 
central level. Figure 6.1 provides a simple microeconomic chart of this MER 
auctions process. 
Figure 6.1 – Microeconomic Interpretation of Brazil’s MER System 
 
Source: Own construction. 
The charts show a simple supply and demand dynamic of the MER system for 
a single category and location at a specific moment in time. The horizontal axis 
shows the quantity (Q) of foreign exchange (US$) available to the system, while 
the vertical axis shows the exchange rate in cruzeiros per dollars (Cr$/US$). 
The vertical black line is the supply of foreign exchange to the auction system. 
This supply is fixed by authorities for each category and location at a given 
auction. The negatively inverted black curve is the demand for foreign 
exchange, which follows a typical demand function. Demand for foreign 
exchange declines if the exchange rate rises. If there were no minimum prices, 
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the equilibrium of the auction system would take place where these two lines 
cross. All foreign exchange would be sold at the price of the auctions, which 
results from the supply defined by authorities. However, the existence of the 
minimum prices alters this equilibrium. By fixing a higher minimum price than 
the market clearing price, authorities force some buyers out of the system and 
reduce demand for foreign exchange though the demand curve. This results in 
a new equilibrium where the minimum price crosses the demand curve, 
resulting in a smaller auctioned foreign exchange quantity. The difference 
between the supply and the auctioned foreign exchange is the gap created by 
authorities by setting the minimum prices. 
The hypothesis to explain the effectiveness of the system follows the 
microeconomic logic of the chart. Minimum prices were designed exactly to 
create to create a gap and force buyers out, while Sumoc officials also had to be 
cognizant of the demand curve in order to provide enough supply and choose 
a minimum price that would not cause this gap to grow too much, so that 
importers did not turn to the black market. Authorities had to minimize the 
gap over time to make sure that the auction system remained the only place 
importers would buy foreign exchange. To test this hypothesis, one has to look 
at whether the gap existed in the data and if it indeed declined over time. 
One interesting possibility that could go against this hypothesis is that bidders, 
in this case importers, could be colluding to keep the prices of exchange rates 
from depreciating too much. Tenorio (1997, p. 207) shows that in multiple 
auctions bidders have a strategic incentive to bid for less than they require to 
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keep prices from rising too much.16 If all bidders act in the same way, even if 
not explicitly colluding, they could be tacitly colluding to prevent exchange 
rates from depreciating significantly. Although this is impossible to test for the 
Brazilian case, a few reasons suggest that it was unlikely to happen in the MER 
auctions. First, in contrast with other auctions where bidders can strategically 
determine how much to bid, in this case there was a clear and known lack of 
supply for foreign exchange. And with the variation in the supply of foreign 
exchange for categories and exchange houses over time, importers had no 
control over whether they could buy the foreign exchange at a future date, as 
they did not determine whether foreign exchange would be auctioned again for 
that category and location. This was a mechanism that made authorities 
unpredictable and helped to contain this strategic behavior. Second, auctions 
were held for similar categories at different locations at the same time. It would 
be hard for importers to coordinate, or act strategically, in many locations at the 
same time. Finally, minimum prices were the mechanism that helped 
authorities prevent importers from bidding too little. And as these prices were 
set according to previous auctions, importers were not able to purchase foreign 
exchange at lower prices in a future auction, which also likely prevented them 
from colluding.  
To evaluate whether the gap followed the above hypothesis, the ideal would be 
to track whether the gap existed and declined overtime for each category or at 
each auction house. This level of detail would allow a very comprehensive 
understanding of how officials were supplying foreign exchange. 
                                                 
16 There is a large literature that deal with strategic bidding in auctions which also 
includes Goldberg and Tenori (1997), Feldman and Mehra (2003), and Ausubel and 
Romeu (2005) 
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Unfortunately, there is no data available on auctioned and supplied foreign 
exchange at the category level, only at the aggregated level for the whole MER 
system. There are, moreover, no data on the distribution across the auction 
houses. The collected data include only the quantities auctioned at the category 
level, which will be presented in the next sub-section. Sumoc’s monthly 
bulletins, as well as Banco do Brasil’s statistical books, only provide general 
data for the system, aggregated from the different auction houses.  
Despite this limitation, tracking the aggregate level can be revealing about the 
officials’ approach to foreign currency distribution. If the gap existed and 
declined over time, it means that officials were, from a centralized perspective, 
looking at the full market results at a specific moment to determine how much 
to supply in the next auctions and how high to set the new minimum prices, 
thus maintaining the gap but trying to reduce it over time. Figures 6.2 and 6.3 
present the data. 
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Figure 6.2 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange and the Gap, 1953-1961 (US$ 
million) 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 6.2 shows the evolution of the auctioned foreign exchange and the gap 
between it and the foreign exchange supplied. It suggests changes in the 
pattern of the auctioned foreign exchange and the gap. In the beginning of the 
series, until 1956, the gap was much bigger than the amounts effectively 
auctioned. This was during the good years of the MER regime under Vargas 
and Café-Filho. It suggests officials were indeed creating the gap by using 
minimum prices and forcing buyers out of the auctions. At the same time, there 
also seems to be a declining trend in the gap, suggesting a reduction in this 
mismatch and a learning process from authorities to not force too many buyers 
out of the system, and thus not create demand for a black market. It is worth 
remembering that the large gap at the start of the period does not mean that 
there was a surplus of foreign exchange for the system. The gap was simply the 
result of the mismatch created by the minimum prices in the auction system.  
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In 1956 there is a clear structural break in the series, which reflects the change 
in government. The gap falls significantly and during a large part of the series 
it runs very close to zero. This likely reflects the change in the approach to the 
system discussed in the first part of the chapter. With most foreign exchange 
being gradually allocated outside of the auctions after 1956, Sumoc had much 
less foreign exchange to offer to the auctions, which can be seen in the decline 
of the amount of offered foreign exchange shown in the Chart 5.12 below. This 
by itself resulted in weaker exchange rate equilibrium levels, as seen in Chart 
5.1 earlier in the chapter. But at the same time, given the reduced interest from 
authorities in using the auction system and with foreign exchange being 
provided much more easily, Sumoc was probably not setting minimum prices 
at much higher levels than what the auctions clearing price would have been 
during the second phase, so buyers would no longer have been forced out of 
the system. Although there is no data on Sumoc’s minimum prices, the 
outcome of the auctions shows a much smaller gap in the context of a reduced 
supply of foreign exchange and faster exchange rate depreciation, and the only 
way for this to have happened was without a significant use of minimum 
prices above the auctions’ equilibrium levels. This explanation is consistent 
with the historical description of the system, with authorities gradually 
marginalizing the use of the system during the second phase.  
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Figure 6.3 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange and Offered Foreign Exchange, 
1953-1961 (US$ million) 
$-
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
$350,000
Oc
t-5
3
Ap
r-
54
Oc
t-5
4
Ap
r-
55
Oc
t-5
5
Ap
r-
56
Oc
t-5
6
Ap
r-
57
Oc
t-5
7
Ap
r-
58
Oc
t-5
8
Ap
r-
59
Oc
t-5
9
Ap
r-
60
Oc
t-6
0
Auctioned Currency Offered Currency
Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books  (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 6.3 shows the evolution of the quantities of foreign exchange supplied 
and auctioned, reinforcing the narrative seen in the previous graph. It shows a 
much larger amount of foreign exchange offered in the first versus the second 
phase, and as expected, also that the amounts auctioned were much smaller 
than the supply in the first period versus the second, which explains the decline 
in the gap seen in the previous chart.  
A simple econometric test applied to the gap series can help to validate the 
hypothesis of a declining gap. Although the data shows the existence of the 
gap, validating the hypothesis that authorities were indeed using minimum 
prices to force some buyers out of the system, an econometric test can 
determine whether authorities were indeed trying to prevent the gap from 
becoming too large and minimize it over time. This would support the second 
part of the hypothesis: that officials could also not allow the gap to grow too 
large. This is done by performing a stationarity test in the gap series.  
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A stationary series has the property that its mean, variance, and autocorrelation 
structure do not change over time. And a non-stationary series is one whose 
statistical properties change over time (Greene, 2008, p. 550). For the purpose of 
this test, a stationary gap would mean authorities were not making systematic 
mistakes in the supply of foreign exchange to the system, so that the mean, 
variance, and autocorrelation of the gap are constant over time. It means every 
time the gap grows too large because officials made mistakes in the supply of 
foreign exchange or in setting the minimum prices, they would learn from this 
mistake and correct it in the following period. This would result in a 
fluctuating gap around a constant mean. On the other hand, if this is not found 
and the gap is non-stationary, it means officials were not learning from their 
prior mistakes and setting prices too high, forcing more and more buyers out of 
the system.  
On top of this, a stationarity test can also reveal if the series has an upward or 
declining trend under a stationary series. If the test reveals a declining trend, it 
would suggest not only that officials were not making systematic mistakes, but 
also that they had indeed worked to gradually minimize the size of the gap in 
time, making the system more efficient. Thus, if a stationarity test reveals a 
stationary and declining gap, it would suggest officials were responding to the 
previous auction results to both contain mistakes but also to minimize the gap 
– evidence of a learning process on the part of the authorities.   
The simple test for stationarity is the ADF (Augmented Dickey–Fuller), in 
which the null hypothesis is that a unit root is present in a time series, which 
characterizes non-stationary data. But in the case of the gap, the problem of 
directly applying an ADF in the series is the structural break of 1956, which 
changes the behavior from authorities regarding the auction system. In order to 
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test the gap under a structural break, I have followed the procedure introduced 
by Johansen et al (2000), which presents a sequence to account for a structural 
break in a stationarity test. For robustness, I have also tested the stationarity of 
the series only for the period of 1953-1956 during the first system, which 
although has less available data, allows us to analyze the stationarity and trend 
only for the first period. 
Johansen et al’s (2000) procedure to test for stationarity with a structural break 
is the following: first perform the unit root ADF and the KPPS (Kwiatkowski–
Phillips–Schmidt–Shin, another test for stationarity) on the original gap series. 
This shows whether the series, without accounting for the structural break, is 
stationary. If the test confirms stationarity, then the gap series is regressed by 
OLS on an intercept, a linear trend, and a dummy that accounts for the 
structural break (0 until 1956 and 1 afterwards). Then the residuals of this test, 
which is the series minus its trend and the structural break, are tested with 
ADF for unit root again. If the ADF of the residuals is also stationary, it means 
the original series accounting for the structural break is stationary. The first 
original test should be performed including trend in intercept in the ADF 
equation. The second test, on the residuals, should be performed without trend 
and intercept, since those are already included in the OLS regression to obtain 
the residuals. Table 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 presents the results of the stationarity tests. 
Table 6.1 present the results of the original ADF and KPPS test. Table 6.2 
presents the OLS regression that accounts for the structural break and the ADF 
of the residuals of the regression.  
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Table 6.1 – Stationarity of GAP 
ADF
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic P-value Outcome
GAP -3.9 0.0157** I (0)
ADF Test Equation
GAP (-1) -0.22 -3.3 0.0011***
C 2.65 3.4 0.001***
Trend -0.007 -2.87 0.0028***
KPPS
Variable LM Stat Outcome
GAP 0.06 I (0)  
Source: Own construction. Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. Number of 
observations: 89. Test performed with variable in log, with trend and intercept 
Table 6.1 shows the results of the ADF and KPPS for the original gap series, 
and also the ADF equation, which tests for intercept and trend in the data. The 
results show that, without accounting for the structural break yet, both the 
ADF and KPPS test suggest the series is integrated with order 0, which means it 
is stationary and has no unit root. The ADF equation shows that the gap has a 
statistically significant intercept and a declining trend. 
Table 6.2 – Stationarity of GAP Residuals 
ADF
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic P-value Outcome
GAP Residuals -8.12 0*** I (0)
OLS Equation
C -0.88 -8.12 0***
Break 0.008 2.84 0.004***
Trend -0.0001 -6.64 0***  
Source: Own construction.  Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. Number of 
observations: 89. Test performed with variable in log, without trend and intercept which have been filtered in the OLS 
regression 
Table 6.2 shows the results of the regression that cleans the structural break out 
of the series, and also the ADF test for the residuals of this equation. It is 
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important to highlight that, in this case, the ADF is performed on the residuals 
without a trend and intercept since those have already been accounted for in 
the OLS regression. Similar to the original series, the results show that the 
residuals of the GAP are also integrated with order 0, so they are stationary, 
and also show a small declining trend in the GAP. 
Analyzed together, the exercises suggest that the GAP series, accounting for its 
structural break in 1956, is stationary, so officials were indeed not committing 
systematic mistakes in the supply of foreign exchange and the decision to set 
minimum prices. They were learning from their mistakes so that the gap 
fluctuated around a constant mean. The results also show a small declining 
trend for the gap, which suggest officials were also gradually trying to 
minimize the gap over time. 
 
The above results are made for the full gap series, which runs between 1953 
and 1961 and has 86 observations. This is the ideal series to perform the test 
because it has enough observations to fully test for stationarity in the data. 
However, although to test for stationary the full series is good, to test for the 
declining trend in the series it is less appropriate. After 1956, as discussed, the 
gap falls significantly with the change in approach of authorities to the MER 
system The gap therefore falls not because authorities were minimizing it, but 
because of the restricted supply to the system. One way to test for the declining 
trend of the series is to also perform the test only for the first period of the 
system. This will show whether, during the period when authorities were in 
fact following the pattern of imposing high minimum prices to force buyers 
out, they were indeed trying to minimize the gap. This test will also serve as a 
robustness check for the test of the full series, since the gap until 1956 has no 
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structural break problem, so the stationarity test can be performed without any 
restrictions. The result of this test is presented below in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 – Stationarity of GAP 1953-1956 
ADF
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic P-value Outcome
GAP 1953-1956 -5.8 0.0007*** I (0)
ADF Test Equation
GAP 1953-1956 (-1) -2.5 -5.8 0***
C 28.59 5.8 0***
Trend -0.0026 -2.79 0.004***  
Source: Own construction.  Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. Number of 
observations: 26. Test performed with variable in log, with trend and intercept 
Table 6.3 shows the result of the ADF and the ADF equation for the gap only in 
the period 1953-1956. The result of the ADF confirms that the series is 
stationary also only for the period 1953-1956. More interestingly, it shows a 
slightly stronger declining trend in the series when compared to the full test 
until 1961. This shows that, only for the period 1953-1956 during the peak years 
of the system, Sumoc not only did not make systematic mistakes but also tried 
to very gradually minimize the gap. This is further confirmation of Sumoc 
officials’ learning process.  
6.3 Fluctuating Auctions Results 
The above sub-section has presented and analyzed the data on the gap between 
the foreign exchange supplied to and effectively auctioned through the MER 
system. Unfortunately, that same data is not available at a more granular level 
divided by categories or auction houses, which would have allowed the same 
exercise to be applied to each individual category. But while Sumoc documents 
do not report the supply of foreign exchange at the category level, they do 
contain the effectively auctioned foreign exchange for each category. As 
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discussed, this is the equilibrium level of auctioned currency that resulted from 
the supply allocated by Sumoc to each category at each auction, the minimum 
prices for each category, and the market demand at each auction. The analysis 
of the pattern of this data can help to shed some more light on the results 
obtained in the previous section. Figure 6.4 presents the data. 
Figure 6.4 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange Per Category, 1953-1957 (US$ 
million) 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 6.4 shows the amount of foreign exchange auctioned in each category 
between 1953 and 1957, during the first phase of the system. A few interesting 
things can be observed from this data. First, it reveals a certain pattern in 
auctioned currency between categories. Categories 1-3 accounted for the larger 
share of the foreign exchange auctioned while Categories 4-5 had much less 
foreign exchange being auctioned. Although this is the effectively auctioned 
currency and not the supply, it suggests that either Sumoc was supplying much 
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less currency for Categories 4-5 or it was setting minimum prices much higher 
than the market clearing price so that less foreign exchange was auctioned. 
Either way, this approach follows the logic behind the five categories of the 
system, with priority being given to imports of the most essential goods in 
Categories 1-3. To recap from Chapter 4, Category 1 included the most essential 
sectors such as food, chemicals, agricultural equipment, and medicine; 
Category 2 included some production inputs such as rubber, electrical 
materials, and medical equipment; Category 3 included all industrial 
equipment, capital goods, and some consumption goods, such as vehicles; 
Category 4 included all non-essential equipment and some production inputs 
like steel; Category 5 included all other sectors, which basically meant all the 
remaining consumption goods (Sumoc Minutes 408, 9/10/1953). It is possible to 
notice that Category 5, which included consumption goods, had only limited 
amounts of foreign exchange throughout. But between Categories 1-3 there was 
a lot of fluctuations which reflected either the changes in supply or minimum 
prices. It is clear that the supply and minimum prices were not fixed and 
fluctuated in time depending on how much officials wanted to privilege each 
category at each time. This data complements the analysis of the previous 
sections as it shows, even without looking specifically at the supply and the 
gap for each category, the large fluctuation of auctioned currency between 
categories is an indication that officials were managing supply and minimum 
prices in order to alter significantly the amounts auctioned in each category. 
This reinforces the impression that officials were not committing systematic 
mistakes and were managing the system effectively.   
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Figure 6.5 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange, 1953-1957 (% of Total) 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 6.5 shows the percentages distributed to each category and 
complements the analysis of Figure 6.4. Clearly, a pattern seems to exist 
throughout the first phase. Categories 1-3 had the largest share of foreign 
exchange auctioned, representing the bulk of essential imports and accounting 
for almost 90% of the total, while Categories 4-5 represent only around 10%. 
Yet, as discussed following Figure 5.13 there was a lot of variation within 
Categories 1-3, with percentages ranging between 15% and 30% for each of 
them during the whole period. One possible explanation for this variation is 
that essential products that were not produced in Brazil, such as medicine or 
food, had peaks of demand that forced officials to increase the supply of 
foreign exchange to Category 1. In other moments, these funds could be 
supplied to equipment and capital goods in Categories 2 and 3. Clearly, the 
variation between them shows the existence of a trade off over the supply of 
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funds to the different sectors and the choice of minimum prices at each given 
time. 
6.4 The Free Market Benchmark 
A final econometric exercise on another part of the dataset can shed further 
light on the hypothesis discussed above. Instead of looking at the quantities of 
the two last sub-sections, an interesting exercise can be made using the 
exchange rates. Based on the quantities allocated to each MER category and the 
exchange rates, it is possible to construct the weighted average auction 
exchange rate. While all trade operations went through the auction system, 
there was a floating free market exchange rate for services and capital 
operations, which represented about 10% of the foreign exchange market 
(calculated from IBGE, 1951-1961). This exchange rate was created in 1952 
before the auctions and it was in practice a separate market for these 
transactions (Sumoc Minutes 266, 10/07/1951). The free market was Sumoc’s 
first experiment with allowing some exchange rate depreciation, but since it 
was concentrated on only a small part of the market, it did not have any 
meaningful impact on stabilizing the balance of payments (Figure 4.2).  
As already discussed, officials imposed minimum prices for the exchange rates 
in the auctions for each category. These prices were increased over time 
according to the results of the previous round of auctions and were used to 
homogenize the system and remove some buyers from the auctions, forcing the 
auctions to have similar exchange rates in the same categories across the 
country and depreciate over time. These minimum prices were set 
discretionarily and did not follow any specific rules. The question that emerges 
is if this increase in the minimum prices to depreciate the auction exchange 
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rates had any connection to the free market exchange rate, which could have 
been used by authorities as a benchmark for the expected size of the 
depreciation and help them set new minimum prices. If the weighted auction 
exchange rate is predicted by the lagged market exchange rate, this is an 
indication that officials were looking at the free market as a benchmark to 
determine the minimum prices for the auctions. They were forcing the auctions 
to converge to the free market over time by using the minimum prices 
mechanism and the quantities supplied to each category. 
There was no overlap between the free market and the auctions. Exporters 
were forced to sell all their foreign exchange inflows to Banco do Brasil and this 
was the only source of foreign exchange for the auctions. The transactions of 
the free market rate had their own supply of foreign exchange from inflows for 
wages, capital, or services. The free market, although smaller in size (about 10% 
of the foreign exchange market), functioned during the whole auctions period 
and can be tested as a benchmark for the auction exchanges rates. The 
weighted auction exchange rate was constructed with the data of the quantities 
of foreign exchange auctioned to each sector between 1953 and 1957 (Figure 
5.7) and the exchange rates of each category (Figure 5.1). Figure 6.6 presents the 
two series. 
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Figure 6.6 – Free Market Rate and Weighted Auctions Rate, 1953-1957 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
A first look at the two series seems to suggest they do correlate in parts of the 
period. The two series run very close to each other at the start of the MER 
period until about 1955, and then again from 1957 onwards. In 1955 and 1956 
there is a significant divergence between the two series with the average 
auction exchange rates depreciating faster than the free market rate, but this 
divergence is corrected from mid-1956 when the auction exchange rate 
converges lower to the free market. It is worth nothing that while the free 
market exchange rate depreciates at a stable pace, the auctions rate follows a 
more volatile path. This is probably the result of the volatility of the quantities 
supplied for the different categories and the minimum prices.  
Overall, although the two series diverge during a period of time, the correction 
after 1956 and the long-term correlation between the two series suggest there 
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might be a causal relationship between them. A first look does not, however, 
indicate which series could be following the other in a causal relationship. 
Based on the discussions above, the expectation would be that the market rate 
predicts the auctions rate, confirming that authorities were responding to 
markets and using the free market as a benchmark to set minimum prices and 
depreciate the auction exchange rates. The opposite result, with the free market 
being predicted by the auctions, would be counter-intuitive.  
Table 6.4 – Stationarity of Market and Auction Exchange Rates 
ADF T-Statistic P-value Outcome
Level
Market -1.366 0.8615 I (1)
Auctions -1.76 0.7121 I (1)
1st Difference
Market -6.45 0*** I (0)
Auctions -7.86 0*** I (0)
KPPS LM-Stat Outcome
Level
Market 0.15 I (1)
Auctions 0.16 I (1)
1st Difference
Market 0.11 I (0)
Auctions 0.12 I (0)  
 Source: Own construction. Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. 
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Table 6.5 – Stationarity of Market and Auction Exchange Rates Residuals 
OLS Equation
Auctions
C 3.87 43.3 0***
Trend 0.026 6.1 0***
Break -0.36 -2.2 0.03***
Market
C 3.87 102.3 0***
Trend 0.021 11.56 0***
Break -0.34 -4.9 0***
ADF Residuals T-Statistic P-value Outcome
Level
Market Residuals -1.36 0.86 I (1)
Auctions Residuals -1.99 0.59 I (1)
1st Difference
Market Residuals -6.25 0*** I (0)
Auctions Residuals -7.66 0*** I (0)  
 Source: Own construction. Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. 
 
For this exercise, a different econometric methodology is required compared to 
the previous exercises. Following the same methodology adopted in Section 6.2 
from Johansen et al (2000), Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present the results of stationarity 
tests for the two series. Since the series also have the problem of having a 
structural break in 1956, similar to the GAP series tested before and because of 
the regime change, the stationarity tests have to follow the same procedure of 
testing the residuals of an OLS regression that cleans the structural break from 
the original series.  
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that, both in the original test but also in the test of the 
residuals, the two series (market and auction) are not stationary in level, which 
impedes performing an econometric exercise that requires stationary data, such 
as a VAR or a Granger Causality test, which would otherwise both be options 
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to check the causal relationship between the two series. Since the variables are 
stationary in first difference, however, a cointegration test combined with a 
Vector Error Correction (VEC) – in case they do cointegrate – is the correct 
approach to test whether the market exchange rate predicts the auction 
exchange rate. 
The cointegration test checks whether the two variables have a long-run 
relationship, and in case they do, the VEC shows which variable predicts the 
other in the short-term (Greene, 2008, p. 756). For the purpose of this exercise, a 
cointegration test is appropriate because the objective is to find a long-term 
relationship between the two series. Only if the two series are cointegrated and 
with a long-term relationship and if the VEC model shows that the auctions 
rate is predicted by the market rate, would the test confirm the short-term 
adjustment dynamic. Given the structural break in 1956, Johansen et al (2000) 
also present a procedure for testing for cointegration and VEC accounting for 
the structural break. This is done by also including in the VAR equation of the 
cointegration test the structural break dummy as an exogenous variable that 
was also used to perform the stationarity test. Table 6.6 presents the results of 
the cointegration test, based on the VAR equation with intercept, trend, and 
including the structural break dummy.  
Table 6.6 – Cointegration Test 
Trace Max-Eigen
None 0.18 0.24
At Most 1 0.055* 0.036**
Johansen Cointegration Test
Market and Auctions
 
Source: Own construction; Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. 
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Table 6.6 shows one cointegrating equation between the two variables in the 
long term (according to both the trace and max-Eigen indicators of the 
Johansen Test). This means that the two series have a long-term statistical 
relationship, and allows the performance of the VEC model to test the short-
term responsiveness of one variable to the other. The VEC results are presented 
in Table 6.7, which also includes the structural break dummy.   
Table 6.7 – Cointegration and VEC Results 
Market Auctions
Coint Equation 0.053 0.229 Coef
0.05** 0.0045*** P-value
Market (-1) 0.165 0.698 Coef
0.015** 0.023** P-value
Market (-2) -0.145 -0.070 Coef
0.150 0.480 P-value
Auctions (-1) 0.033 -0.150 Coef
0.300 0.280 P-value
Auctions (-2) -0.020 -0.080 Coef
0.460 0.640 P-value
Break 1956 0.003 -0.057 Coef
0.170 0.04** P-value
C 0.016 0.031 Coef
0.04** 0.048** P-value
N=62
Vector Error Correction Model
 
Source: Own construction.  Statistical significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. 
  
The VEC results show that the market exchange rate explains the auction 
exchange rate at 5% statistical significance, while the opposite effect does not 
exist. This means that the market rate statistically predicts the auction exchange 
rate. The test also shows that this short-term response happens only with a one-
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month lag, which suggests that officials were chasing the immediately previous 
market exchange rate. The results of the VEC suggest the existence of a 
relationship between the two completely separate markets, which could only 
be linked by the MER mechanism of setting minimum prices and supplying 
foreign exchange in the auctions in an effort to depreciate exchange rates 
following the free market. It suggests the free market exchange rate was a 
benchmark for the auction system and Sumoc.  
6.5 – Chapter Conclusions  
This chapter has shown, based on the new dataset of the MER auction system, 
that the effective results obtained in the first phase were not only the result of 
the centralization of foreign exchange in the system but mostly due to officials 
using the auctions to effectively force buyers out of the auctions and depreciate 
exchange rates, as well as their responsive approach to changes in market 
demand, which prevented the the gap between the supplied and auctioned 
foreign exchange from increasing too much.  
This was done both by controlling the supply of foreign exchange to the 
auctions and also by setting minimum prices for each category at each moment 
in time. The econometric exercises suggest officials were not committing 
systematic mistakes with the supply of foreign exchange and were looking at 
the free market exchange rate to determine how much to provide to each 
category and to set minimum prices in the following month. This mechanism 
worked as an intermediary system that helped to gradually depreciate the 
exchange rate after a long period of overvaluation, with Sumoc ‘guiding the 
invisible hand’ of the market for an effective outcome between 1953 and 1957.  
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7. The Neutrality of Multiple Exchange Rates:  The Lack of Industrial 
Distortions in 1950s Brazil 
Chapters 5 and 6 have investigated the reasons behind the rise and fall of the 
MER system in Brazil and the mechanics for the effective macroeconomic 
results during its first phase between 1953 and 1957. The main conclusions 
were that during the period when Brazilian authorities were using the MER 
system, distributing most of the country’s foreign exchange via the auctions, 
the responsiveness to market demand combined with the use of minimum 
prices explained the positive results for the balance of payments. The decline of 
the system resulted from the dismantling of the original design due to the 
major increase in imports outside the system, combined with the expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies after 1957. 
While Chapter 6 explains the mechanics of the system, it does not provide 
enough evidence to fully assess whether the regime was indeed a ‘successful’ 
case of exchange controls, according to the current literature on controls.  As 
shown in Chapter 2, the literature sees any attempts to modify free markets as 
distortive unless proven otherwise (Kovanen, 1994, p. 2). Researchers are 
required to provide counterfactual tests to show that a specific use of controls 
was not causing ‘distortions’ to the rest of the economy (Shultze, 2000, p. 9). 
Although Chapter 5 has shown that the MER system in its first phase stabilized 
the balance of payments and supported macroeconomic conditions, it did not 
test for its second order effects. When fully functional the MER system was an 
effective mechanism to keep macroeconomic conditions in equilibrium, but it 
could have potentially caused important distortions for different sectors of the 
economy. Different exchange rates for different groups of imports could have 
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stimulated some industrial sectors to perform better or worse than they would 
have done if all had had the same market exchange rate. While the system was 
helping markets to function better, it was still not an equal system for all 
sectors, which were affected differently by the auctions. As shown in Chapter 5, 
this differentiation was in fact an objective of the MER system, which was 
initially designed to stabilize the balance of payments, but with the implicit 
objective of stimulating industrialization, especially the import substitution of 
advanced industries (Kafka, 1956).  
This creates a conflict between the existing literature on controls, which claims 
this differentiation should be considered a ‘distortion’ to a free market system, 
versus the literature on ISI, which, as shown in Chapter 3, sees tariffs and 
exchange controls as essential policy tools exactly targeted at producing 
‘distortions’ to accelerate the industrial growth of specific sectors. In fact, this 
conflict also exists within the literature on Brazilian industrialization. Many 
authors have a positive assessment of the results of the ISI model, arguing that 
protectionism stimulated industrialization in advanced sectors (Baer, 1972; 
Tavares, 1975; Weisskoff, 1980; Colistete, 2006; Bergsman, 1970). At the same 
time, there is a strong critical literature on the outcomes of the application of 
the ISI model in Latin America, as it resulted in distortions to trade flows and 
resulted in inefficient industries at the end of the process (Taylor, 1998; Haber, 
2006; Fishlow, 1972; Leff, 1967).  
Irrespective of whether these should be classified as distortions or simply the 
results of policy interventions, very little empirical work has been done to 
actually show how different sectors have been affected by the MER system. In 
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the existing literature it is assumed that the MER system produced import 
substitution in the advanced industrial sectors.17 This is the main issue this 
chapter investigates. The method is to perform a counterfactual exercise 
exploring what would have happened to industrial growth if all sectors had 
had the same free market exchange rate rather than the MER system. The 
comparison between the trajectory of each industrial sector with the auction 
exchange rate versus the market exchange rate shows whether the MER system 
favored the growth of particular sectors. If so, this will prove the existence of 
distortions, challenging the conclusion that the system was effective for the 
economy as a whole. It would, at the same, prove that the MER system was 
indeed an instrument for stimulating import substitution in advanced sectors 
during the 1950s. If, by contrast, the results show a similar performance with 
and without the MERs, it demonstrates that the system was not producing 
distortions for the rest of the economy but also that it was not an instrument 
that supported industrialization, challenging the consensus in the literature on 
ISI.  
7.1 Defining MER ‘Distortions’ 
There are different ways to assess distortions when examining experiences of 
controls and multiple exchange rates. From the conventional point of view of 
the literature on controls, discussed in Chapter 2, distortions are simply 
deviations from the economic results that would have otherwise been obtained 
if capital or exchange controls were not used (Schulze, 2000, p. 10). According 
                                                 
17 This literature was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 and includes Baer (2009), 
Figueiredo Filho (2005), Lago (1982), Vianna (1987), Sochazewski (1980), Bergsman 
(1980), Abreu (1990), and Caputo (2007). 
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to this view, free market flows are always the most efficient option and all 
alternatives cause distortions to this equilibrium.   
This definition is problematic and unrealistic from a historical perspective, as 
shown in Chapter 2. Most of the recent empirical literature on controls after 
Bretton Woods has moved beyond simply assuming that any deviation is a 
distortion. Instead, it tests whether the use of controls was able to reach 
superior economic results compared to before the adoption of the instrument 
(Cardoso & Goldfajn, 1997; Carvalho & Garcia, 2006; Goldfajn & Minella, 2005; 
Jinjarak et al, 2013). This was exactly the test performed on the Brazilian MER 
system of the 1950s in Chapter 6. It showed that the effective mechanics behind 
the MER system supported better macroeconomic conditions when compared 
to the period without the instrument. The deviation from the original results – 
a distortion in the simplest definition – was actually positive for the Brazilian 
economy.  
Yet the literature still takes a strongly skeptical stance on exchange controls and 
assumes that even if controls have resulted in superior economic results after 
their adoption, they probably have also resulted in distortions somewhere else 
in the economy. For this reason, the literature requires these instruments to be 
tested for whether they have resulted in negative externalities for other parts of 
the economy that were not necessarily intended by the initial use of controls. 
Counterfactual exercises are needed to prove that a specific use of controls can 
really be considered successful (Schulze, 2000, p. 9). Chapter 2 has already 
discussed this stance, and while it argued that this requirement for a 
counterfactual test comes from the literature’s negative assumptions about 
controls, it also made the relevant point that most of the historical experiences 
could have passed the test of improving the economic results under a partial 
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equilibrium exercise, but only a few would pass the broader test of looking at 
the externalities for the rest of the economy. This is how distortions are 
assessed in this chapter. Although the term carries a mistaken pre-conception 
that controls are theoretically always inefficient, it is fair to test whether the 
instrument caused negative externalities for other parts of the economy. For the 
Brazilian case, the aggregate macroeconomic results were good, so now the 
question is whether this was achieved at the expense of some industrial sectors. 
It is worthwhile exploring what happened to the different industrial sectors 
that were part of the auction system. There is a long literature about the many 
inefficiencies that have resulted from protectionist instruments (Haber, 2006; 
Taylor, 1998; Baer, 1972; Hirschman, 1966), although with very different 
focuses. Haber (2006, p. 578), for example, argues that ISI resulted in highly 
inefficient industries, with the cost of subsidies and protectionism falling on 
consumers. For Haber, the mature part of the industrialization process saw 
incentives created to develop sectors that would not have survived without the 
protection offered by the government. Taylor (1998, p. 23) says that the 
microeconomic cost was the region’s inability to increase productivity and keep 
growing once import substitution was over a few decades later. 
Colistete (2007; 2009) explores the social inequalities generated by the industrial 
development process in Brazil in the post-war period. Focusing on the 
relationship between unions and workers, the author shows the two groups 
always maintained an antagonistic association, with industrialists 
concentrating a much larger share of the benefits from the country’s industrial 
growth. The result of this process was that real wages lagged behind 
productivity growth, and over time this was a source of high social inequality 
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and contributed to preventing the emergence of a strong consumption-based 
middle class economy. 
Baer (1972) provides a long discussion of the costs of the import substitution 
process in Latin America.  He is against the simplistic criticism in the literature 
that puts excessive focus on the ‘inefficient allocation of resources’ (p. 101), and 
the static comparative advantages that could be gained from pure market 
liberalism. At the same time, he underlines the relevance of this criticism, 
affirming that by the 1970s the ISI model was already reaching its limits.  Not 
only the size of Latin American domestic markets constrained the opportunities 
for further industrialization, but also the accumulation of distortions associated 
with the high level of government interventions, which imposed increasing 
problems on the growth prospects of these economies. Since irresponsible 
monetary and fiscal policies often became the macroeconomic companions of 
industrialization, as governments tried to stimulate economies amid increasing 
signs that the growth dividend of the easy phase was gone, these actions paved 
the way for the external debt crises experienced by Latin American countries in 
the 1980s. Overall, he is clear that the accumulation of imbalances in the 
economies that protected inefficient industrial sectors became unsustainable 
over time.  
Designing a counterfactual exercise focused on the divergence of the final 
performance of the different industrial sectors is a way of accounting for all of 
the possible distortions highlighted in the above literature. The ISI model could 
lead to the over or under performance of a specific sector through various 
channels, such as reduced foreign competition, increased prices of imported 
goods, or a higher profit margin for the local manufacturer. Independently 
from how the distortion was transmitted to each industrial sector, a 
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counterfactual exercise that compares the final industrial production 
performance must account for the overall net effect of these channels. This 
means it would, at the same time, test for the distortions featured in the 
literature on controls and the effect of the ISI model.  
7.2 Designing the Counterfactual Test  
The next issue is how to correctly design a counterfactual exercise to estimate 
the size of distortions in industrial performance. The shadow exchange rate 
(SER) is a useful concept to methodologically formulate the counterfactual test. 
The idea is that in any macroeconomic regime in which policymakers have 
imposed any sort of restrictions on the free movement of capital or trade, the 
resulting nominal exchange rate decouples from the underlying exchange rate 
that would correctly reflect the fundamentals of that economy. The SER is then 
the underlying exchange rate if controls where not applied and the exchange 
rate fluctuated purely based on macroeconomic fundamentals, such as trade 
flows, credit, money supply and demand, productivity, and other institutional 
aspects (Bertrand, 1974, p. 185). 
In this framework the distortion is not simply the policy intervention but the 
economic outcome that results from the difference between the nominal 
exchange rate and the SER, with the latter capturing the economy’s long-term 
fundamentals. This concept provides a definition of distortion that does not 
only claim that the policy intervention is a distortion per se but looks at its 
outcomes. Moreover, it also helps to improve econometric estimations by 
resolving endogeneity problems, as will be shown below. 
Many studies in the literature have used the SER from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. Bertrand (1974, p. 186), for example, argues that the 
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nominal exchange rate does not reflect the correct value of any currency under 
significant trade restrictions and derives a formula to calculate the SER from a 
consumption optimization problem. He concludes that the SER differs from the 
nominal exchange rate ‘by a percentage amount equal to a weighted sum of 
price disparities, where the weights are changes in trade flows or consumption 
and gross output changes brought about by the marginal change in foreign 
exchange availability’ (1974, p. 187). Bertrand estimates the SER by adjusting 
the nominal exchange rate by the difference of prices internally and externally. 
From a different perspective, Builter (1987, p. 222) estimates the SER by 
calculating the present value of future expected fundamentals, such as money 
or credit stock, price levels, and the foreign interest rate. Edwards and Rigobon 
(2009, p. 259), while studying the effectiveness of controls on capital flows 
applied in Chile during the 1990s, estimated the SER by incorporating all the 
fundamentals of the economy in a regression. Goldberg (1991, p. 414) uses the 
SER to predict the ‘ex ante probabilities of currency crises and the sizes of 
expected devaluations’ in the Mexican peso between 1980 and 1986. The author 
defines the SER as the exchange rate that would equilibrate money markets one 
period ahead, given a speculative attack on the domestic currency that would 
result in a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime. Oliveira (1986) presents 
an interesting experiment that uses the SER to test the size of agricultural 
taxation in Brazil between 1950 and 1974, partially covering the same period of 
this dissertation. Although he does not look in detail at the sources of the 
difference between the nominal exchange rate and the SER, and in fact does not 
even discuss the MER system, he estimates the SER based on the price 
differences between Brazil and abroad, following Bertrand’s (1974) approach. 
He concludes that the difference between the nominal exchange rate received 
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by exporters and the SER is an implicit taxation on Brazilian exporters of about 
25-30%, and this represents the size of the distortion of the exchange rate 
market in the whole period.  
Chapter 8 will explore in further detail the taxation on exporters and present 
another way of estimating this appropriation. There is, however, an important 
difference between Oliveira’s (1986) use of the SER and that adopted here, 
following the conclusions from the theoretical discussion of capital and 
exchange controls made in Chapter 2 and above. Oliveira claims the difference 
between the SER and the nominal exchange rate is the distortion, which in this 
case is an implicit tax of exporters. For this dissertation, following the approach 
presented so far, this difference is actually only the size of the policy 
intervention. As already shown, if the policy effect is considered a distortion 
per se, then there is no reason to do a counterfactual experiment to test the 
outcome of this policy, as any exchange control would create distortions a 
priori. The approach adopted here is to calculate the distortion as the effect of 
the difference between the nominal exchange rate and the SER on the real 
economy, measured by the divergence in the sectoral industrial production. If 
the policy intervention does not result in changes to the overall performance of 
the real economy, it means it did not create distortions.  
Brandão and Carvalho (1991), in a World Bank study, provide a formula to 
calculate the SER, following a similar approach to Bertrand (1974) and 
reflecting the general concept that is found in most of the SER literature. The 
shadow exchange rate is defined as: 
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where  is the demand for foreign exchange,  is the supply of foreign 
exchange,  is the official nominal exchange rate,  is  at the official 
exchange rate ,   is the SER,   is the price elasticity of foreign exchange 
demand,  is the price elasticity of foreign exchange supply,  is the true 
import tariff, and  the true export tariff (or subsidy). The formula defines the 
SER as the nominal exchange rate adjusted by the real flows of foreign 
exchange to the economy, essentially representing the fundamentals of imports 
and exports of the current account balance, stripped of the effects of tariffs or 
subsidies on imports and exports. The SER is the underlying exchange rate of 
the economy considering the fundamental flows but cleaned of the effects of 
policy interventions. 
While authors have estimated the SER in different ways, the literature agrees 
that the SER is the exchange rate most closely related to the true economic 
fundamentals, so it can be used to support a counterfactual experiment to test 
what would have happened if no interventions or controls had been imposed. 
Bearing this in mind, the Brazilian case again provides an excellent case study 
to perform the counterfactual exercise. And interestingly, while most authors 
had to estimate the SER based on data from economic fundamentals, the free 
market exchange rate in Brazil can be seen as a ready made proxy for the SER 
that Oliveria (1986) missed.  
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the free market rate was fully separated from 
policy interventions and did not suffer the effects of the MER or tariff 
restrictions during the whole decade, with services and FDI flows essentially 
free in that market. By being free of policy interventions, the free market 
exchange rate is already the underlying exchange rate based on the economic 
 
 
249 
 
fundamentals, fluctuating according to the evolution of macroeconomic trends 
of foreign exchange flows, and without the effect of import and export tariffs 
and subsidies. 
It is not a surprise, then, that the free market exchange rate predicted the 
depreciation of the MER, as shown in Chapter 6. Figure 6.5 showed how the 
free market exchange rate was not very different from the average weighted 
auction rates, and both cointegrated in the long term, suggesting that the free 
market was indeed performing according to underlying macroeconomic 
fundamentals. This guided authorities on the distribution of foreign exchange 
and on setting the minimum prices in the auctions, so that the weighted 
average MER followed a similar pattern to the free market rate. This means that 
the free market exchange rate provides a sort of natural experiment, in which 
the difference between the nominal exchange rate and the proxy SER can be 
used to estimate the effect of the policy intervention on the performance of the 
different industrial sectors.  
However, while this theoretical discussion justifies the use of the free market 
exchange rate as a proxy for the SER in this counterfactual experiment, to make 
sure the free market exchange rate can indeed be considered a proxy of the SER 
and used to perform the counterfactual exercise, Appendix 1 follows the 
formula proposed by Brandão and Carvalho (1991) to estimate a bottom up 
SER and check whether this estimate is similar to the free market exchange rate. 
Using the dataset collected for this research, Appendix 1 estimates the SER by 
correcting the nominal exchange rate by the flows of exports and imports and 
the import and export subsidies and tariffs imposed during that period. The 
result is a new estimate of the SER based on fundamental data and cleaned of 
the effects of policy interventions. Figure 6.1 presents this new SER estimate in 
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comparison with the free market exchange rate. Appendix 1 concludes that not 
only are the two series highly correlated (65%) but they also cointegrate, with 
the free market exchange rate and the estimated SER following a long-term 
relationship. This leads to the conclusion that the free market exchange rate is 
indeed a good proxy of the SER that also reflects the fundamentals and can be 
used to performing the counterfactual experiment in this chapter. The detailed 
methodology to estimate the SER and test it against the free market is 
presented in Appendix 1. 
Figure 7.1 – Proxy SER and Free Market Exchange Rate (Cr$ per USD) 
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Sources: Free market exchange rate data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of 
Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books,(1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Methodology for the SER series 
can be found in Appendix 1.  
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7.3 Econometric Methodology  
A general equilibrium model would be the ideal method to perform this 
counterfactual experiment. Since industrial sectors interact in dynamic ways 
with each other, with links through the supply chain, a test on the overall 
impact of the different exchange rates would provide a full understanding of 
the impact of the MER on the economy. Microeconomically, the distortion in 
the performance of each sector would be expected to have a second order effect 
on other industrial sectors, given the possibility of substitution of goods 
between them. This basically means that a sector that is gaining from a weaker 
exchange rate, for example, and growing faster over time, could be causing a 
negative distortion for another sector if they have a substitution effect. This was 
probably the case for sectors that produced goods that could be replaced by 
other similar sectors’ substitution goods but were allocated in different 
categories of the MER system. Any econometric method that attempts to 
estimate the distortion from the MER must therefore take into account these 
inter-sectoral effects. Unfortunately, however, data limitations do not allow the 
use of a general equilibrium model. The first complete inter-sectorial input-
output data published in Brazil is for the year 2000,18 and before that there are 
only final industrial production series, rather than inter-sectoral sales and 
consumption.19 
                                                 
18 They are published by IBGE 
(http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/matrizinsumo_produto/).   
19 Barros and Guilhoto (2014) produced an interesting inter-regional input-output table 
for 1959, but it only includes linkages between sectors of different states and regions, 
rather than the matrix of all intersectoral relations. 
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In this case, the second-best alternative is a partial equilibrium framework, but 
with controls to account for macroeconomic trends such as economic activity, 
as well as monetary and fiscal policy, in order to account for all the underlying 
trends in the economy. In the partial equilibrium framework, individual time 
series regressions are estimated for each industrial sector with real industrial 
production as the dependent variable. The effective rate of protection (ERP) for 
each sector is used as the main explanatory variable. The ERP estimation 
follows Morley’s (1969) approach and consists of the nominal MER for each 
sector adjusted for the protection given by import tariffs and the difference 
between domestic and international prices, which corrects for export subsidies 
or other domestic price distortions. The reason for using the ERP as the main 
explanatory variable, rather than the nominal MER for each sector, is to capture 
the full effect of the ISI policy interventions provided to each industrial sector 
via exchange rates, tariffs or other subsidies that could alter prices levels. This 
follows the theoretical discussion of Chapter 3, which showed that the ERP is 
the best way to capture the full level of protection provided by any ISI 
program. It is important to stress that, although the ERP captures the effect of 
the protectionism given to each sector during the 1950s, since tariffs were not 
present for most of the period and there were no export subsidies, most of the 
variation of the ERP for each sector is explained only by the variation of the 
MER import rate for each sector. This is why using the ERP as the main 
explanatory variable makes sure the regressions account for all possible 
protectionist measures, on both imports and exports, but acknowledging that 
most of the variation comes from the very large differences of the MERs. 
The coefficient of the ERP in the regression captures the elasticity from the 
MER on the industrial production of each sector, which means individual 
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regressions rather than panel data are the more appropriate method. Panel data 
would give the average effect of the MER system on overall industrial 
production, which would not help to explain the industrial distortions in each 
sector. At the same time, the much larger quantity of information on the time 
horizon with 86 observations versus only 10 industrial sectors – data that is 
presented in the next sub-section – means that there is not enough variation 
under the cross-section space to perform a panel. For a robustness check, the 
results of a panel data exercise are also presented in Appendix 1, together with 
other alternative specifications for the regressions.  
Another important aspect to mention on the design of the regressions is the 
choice for the real industrial production index as the dependent variable. An 
alternative would be to use each sector’s productivity as the dependent 
variable, following the methodology used by O´Mahony and van Ark (2003), 
who have estimated industry level labor productivity for the European Union. 
Unfortunately, there is no available data on labor composition per sector for 
1950s Brazil to produce similar productivity data. There are two labor censuses 
in Brazil in that period, in 1949 and 1959, but no high frequency data between 
them.  
But while this could have been an interesting option for another robustness 
exercise of the regressions, using the industrial production indexes as 
dependent variables should endogenously capture the effect from the 
protectionist instruments also on each sector’s productivity performance. As 
discussed in Section 7.1, protection could have improved each sector’s 
performance via different channels, such as reducing foreign competition, 
increasing prices of imported goods, higher profit margin for the local 
manufacturer, or even increasing its productivity. Using the final industrial 
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production of each sector should also cover the productivity channel. 
Therefore, the proposed regression is: 
Real Industrial Production t = c + β1 ERP t + Controls + ARMA terms + e 
This regression directly estimates the effect of the ERP on each individual 
sector. Based on the results of the, the β1 coefficients are used to perform the 
counterfactual exercise. As previously discussed, the free market exchange rate 
is a good proxy of the SER of the MER regime. Using this proxy of the SER and 
the estimated regression coefficients β1, the ERP is substituted by the proxy SER 
to perform an in-sample simulation. The difference between the two series, the 
original industrial production for each sector and the in-sample forecast with 
the proxy SER, is the distortion, that is, the deviation from what the industrial 
production of that sector would have been if it had the proxy SER. The larger 
the difference between the two series, the larger the under or over performance 
of industrial production caused by the ERP.  
There are two ways of analyzing the size of this distortion. The first is to 
examine the average monthly difference between the two series, which give a 
monthly average distortion. The second is to calculate only the final difference 
between the two series and check how different industrial production would 
have been by the end of 1950s. The first of these metrics, the average monthly 
distortion, can be used to build an index of weighted distortions of the overall 
industrial sector by applying the shares of each industrial sector. This index 
indicates whether the industrial sector as a whole was performing differently 
with the ERP rather than the SER for all sectors. The sample of industrial 
production data to be presented in the next sub-section represents between 65-
75% of overall industrial production, so this index has to be adjusted to the 
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whole of industry. Three indexes are built using different assumptions for the 
distortion of the remaining share of industrial production that were not part of 
the econometric sample. The first index assumes the average distortion for the 
out of sample data; the second assumes no distortion; and the third assumes 
double the average distortion. This produces a range of indexes to assess how 
great the distortion may have been for the whole industrial sector. 
A large set of controls is included in the regressions. First, to account for 
common macroeconomic trends and other general policies across industries, 
controls were added to account for economic activity (a GDP index), 
population growth, fiscal (the budget balance) and monetary policies (the 
monetary base). To account for the regime change of 1956, as in the exercises of 
Chapter 6, a dummy was included for before and after 1956. A seasonality 
dummy was also included to account for monthly effects. Finally data on 
Instruction 113 FDI flows were also included as control variables, since, as 
previously discussed, Instruction 113 allowed sectors to import capital goods 
and classify them as FDI after 1955. The regressions are performed in log and 
first difference, and ARMA terms are included to control for serial correlation 
problems.  
To ensure the results are not spurious, Appendix 1 shows unit roots, 
cointegration tests, and VEC estimates for all the ERPs and industrial 
productions series used in the regressions. All series are stationary in 
difference; the cointegration tests show industrial production and ERP 
cointegrate in level, which suggests that they have a positive long-term 
relationship; and more importantly the VEC estimates suggest that in the short 
term the ERPs predict industrial production in the subsequent period. There is 
no evidence of inverse causality with industrial production predicting the 
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ERPs, which guarantees the non-existence of endogeneity problems in the 
regressions. These robustness exercises indicate that the counterfactual 
experiments are causation effects and allow robust estimates of the distortion in 
each sector.   
In fact, the whole methodology of using the proxy SER to simulate industrial 
production is a way to protect against a possible endogeneity problem. In 
theory, an endogeneity problem could appear in these regressions if industrial 
production also had an inverse effect on the ERP. Since each ERP was the result 
of a separate market for each sector, conceptually they do not reflect the long-
term fundamentals of the economy. The proxy SER, on the other hand, was free 
to fluctuate in the market, so it was the only exchange rate capturing the 
fundamentals. This makes the OLS estimations with the ERP, then the 
simulation with the proxy SER following the regressions, a way to guarantee 
that the inverse causality is not incorporated in the regressions. The tests of 
Appendix 1 and alternative regressions are also robustness exercises to 
guarantee that the results are free from endogeneity problems. 
7.4 Dataset 
The dataset used to perform the regression for the dependent variable 
comprises 10 industrial sectors that represented 65-75% of industrial 
production during the 86 months between 1953 and 1960. The data source is the 
FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica, which reported indexes of real monthly 
industrial production during that decade. The IBGE’s Industrial Censuses of 
1949 and 1959 are the two benchmarks that show the monthly data covered 
between 65-75% of industrial production and are also used to produce the 
weighted indexes based on the results from the estimates. 
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Figure 7.2 – Real Industrial Growth in Brazil, 1952-1960 (1948=100) 
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Source: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica (1947-1958).  
Figure 7.2 presents the output of the 10 sectors included in the dataset. It 
illustrates the process presented in Chapter 2, not only with a fast rise in 
industrial output during the 1950s but also the change in its composition. 
Traditional industries such as food, textiles, and leather saw their share of 
output reduced, having experienced much slower growth rates during the 
decade. The more advanced industries, such as steel and extractive industries, 
which included mining and oil, had much faster growth, becoming 
increasingly important in overall industrial structure. The sample does not 
include a few important modern industries, such as machinery and electrical 
equipment, which were important during the 1950s, as previously discussed. 
But given that the sample includes almost 75% of the industrial sector of Brazil, 
including a large variety of traditional and modern industries, the results 
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should be comprehensive enough to analyse the effects of protectionism on 
industrial development. 
Figure 7.3 – Average Annual Real Industrial Growth by Sector, 1950-1960 
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Source: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica (1950-1960). Averages were calculated based on annual real 
growth rates. 
Figure 7.3 shows the average growth rates of the sectors in the 1950s, further 
confirming the substantially higher growth rates of sectors like steel, cement, 
and paper, which were all above 10% per year on average, in comparison to 
much lower average growth rates in traditional sectors, such as textiles or food, 
at around 5-6% per year. As shown in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, the import 
substitution of the traditional sectors was mostly completed by the end of the 
1940s. Consequently, the share of consumption goods in overall imports was 
only around 15% by the beginning of the 1950s, with capital goods, raw 
materials, and fuels representing almost the entire imports of the country 
(Gudin, 1969, p. 4).  
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Figure 7.4 – Industrial Composition in Brazil, 1949 (% of output) 
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Source: Data from IBGE’s (1949) Censo Industrial do Brasil. Shares were calculated as percentages of industrial 
production output in nominal prices.  
Figure 7.5 – Industrial Composition in Brazil, 1959 (% of output) 
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Source: Data from IBGE’s (1959) Censo Industrial do Brasil. Shares were calculated as percentages of industrial 
production output in nominal prices.  
The result can be seen in Figures 7.4 and 7.5, which present the composition of 
the industrial sector in 1949 and 1959. The two figures show the change in the 
composition of the industrial sector before the start of the decade and by the 
end of the 1950s. The average GDP growth of the 1950s was 7.4% per year 
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(IBGE, 1950-1960), while industrial growth averaged about 10% per year (FGV, 
1950-1960). This resulted in a significant increase of the share of the industrial 
sector in GDP, from 17% in 1949 to 30% in 1959 (IBGE, 1949-1959). It was in this 
context that advanced industries increased their share in industry and in GDP.  
Textiles and food were the two sectors with the largest decline in their share of 
industrial production. Food lost 7 percentage points, from 32% to 25%, while 
textiles lost 5 percentage points, from 18% to 13%. The main increase was in the 
advanced sectors, such as chemicals and plastic products, machinery, and the 
motor vehicles industry, which together increased their share from 23% to 35% 
of industry.   
Based on the above information, it is possible to conclude that by the end of 
1950s industrial production was more diversified, including most sectors, and 
more vertically integrated, with both capital and consumer goods being an 
important part of the structure. As shown in Chapter 3, the conventional 
interpretation of this shift in the composition of industrial development is 
based on the consensus view of ISI, with protectionist instruments used to 
stimulate the import substitution of advanced sectors. Although the 
compositional change of the industrial sector is an historical fact, as discussed 
above, the interpretation of the results from the econometric exercise in this 
chapter is a test to see whether the MER and tariffs were indeed behind this 
process.  
For the explanatory variables, the dataset uses the same MER exchange rates 
presented in Chapter 6, adjusted by tariffs and price differences to estimate the 
ERPs of each sector following the methodology proposed by Morley (1969). 
Figure 6.6 shows the MERs and the SER, while Figure 7.7 shows the ERPs used 
in the regressions. 
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Figure 7.6 – Multiple Exchange Rates and the Shadow Exchange Rate (Cr$ 
per US$)  
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
Figure 7.6 shows the different paths of the MERs and the SER, which is 
represented by the line with black diamonds. Until 1957, during the first phase 
of the system, there were five categories but then they were merged into two. It 
is worth noting that the SER runs close to Categories 1 and 2 during the first 
phase, and around the general exchange rate in the second phase of the system. 
This is not a surprise because, as shown in Chapter 5, most of the foreign 
exchange was distributed to Categories 1-3 and then later to the general 
exchange rate: they received about 80% of the available foreign exchange. 
Moreover, as the last econometric exercise of Chapter 5 showed, the SER 
anticipated the movement of the average weighted MER, which helped to 
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explain how officials managed to keep the system macroeconomically 
balanced. This means that if a distortion did indeed make a sector over-
perform, it would likely be a sector producing goods placed in Categories 4 
and 5, which received less foreign exchange and consequentially were 
theoretically protected due to the weaker exchange rate. At the same time, 
underperformance would likely appear in sectors placed in the lower 
categories, which had, by contrast, stronger exchange rates than the SER. 
Figure 7.7 – Effective Rates of Protection (Cr$ per US$) 
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Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Tariffs from Morley (1969, p. 
307).  Import and Export Prices from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica (1953-1961).  
Figure 7.7 shows the ERPs for the 10 sectors, after the MERs of Figure 7.6 are 
adjusted by tariffs, and the internal and external prices of each industrial sector. 
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From the ten sectors of the sample of industrial production used for the 
econometric exercise, there is a good distribution among the five categories of 
the system. Food and extractive industries were part of Category 1; rubber in 
Category 2; paper, tobacco, leather, and textiles in Category 3; steel in Category 
4; and cement and beverages in Category 5. To produce the ERP series for each 
individual sector for the full period, the exchange rate of the category the sector 
was placed in during the first phase was chained to the larger exchange rate 
category the sector was part of in the second phase. This produced exchange 
rate series fully individualized for each sector for the whole period of the 
experiment. These series were then adjusted by the size of the tariff protection 
after 1957 and the difference between the domestic and external prices of each 
sector.  
Given the differences in prices and tariffs after 1957, there is a wide variation 
between the ERPs of the different sectors. Before 1957, the variation is 
essentially explained by the different MERs and the difference between the 
domestic and external prices of each sector. After 1957, when inflation 
accelerated and tariffs were imposed, this variation further increase, despite the 
reduction of the MER system from five to two exchange rates. The shift in the 
form of protection after 1957, as already discussed, had a clear impact on 
producing further differentiation between the sectors’ ERPs. Overall, this data 
shows that, although there were five MERs during most of the period, 
industrial sectors in fact had very different ERPs, which could have affected 
their performance during the decade. The regressions will use these ERPs as 
the main explanatory variables, later replaced by the SER proxy (the free 
exchange rate market) to run the simulation and estimate the size of the 
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distortions. The results of the econometric estimates including the regressions, 
the in-sample forecasts, and the indices are presented in the next section. 
7.5 Econometric Results 
Table 7.1 presents the results of the individual regressions.  
Table 7.1 – Regression Results, 1953-1961 
Food Beverages Rubber Leather Cement Extractive Tobacco Paper Steel Textile
Equation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
-22.218 5.405 33.221 -17.123 -6.420 26.863 -0.216 15.948 -1.154 7.790
(18.951) (22.389) (60.381) (23.354) (24.985) (27.855) (11.047) (18.251) (29.143) (12.929)
-0.034 0.035 -0.119 0.032 0.018 0.111 0.001 0.041 0.123 -0.015
(0.015) (0.016) (0.069) (0.010) (0.049) (0.046) (0.005) (0.023) (0.068) (0.022)
Controls
-0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.002 0.036 -0.005 0.002 -0.012 0.008
(0.027) (0.016) (0.044) (0.030) (0.033) (0.010) (0.032) (0.013) (0.012)
-0.023 0.016 0.056 -0.027 0.001 0.060 0.011 0.020 -0.011 0.040
(0.038) (0.037) (0.077) (0.043) (0.035) (0.044) (0.020) (0.032) (0.054) (0.023)
-0.001 0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.022 0.000 0.005 -0.010 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
-1.166 0.117 2.529 -0.580 -0.319 0.914 -0.294 0.501 -0.367 0.121
(0.848) (1.007) (3.087) (1.118) (1.197) (1.274) (0.530) (0.841) (1.312) (0.625)
1.728 -0.353 -2.906 1.201 0.493 -1.892 0.135 -1.103 0.219 -0.486
(1.401) (1.665) (4.629) (1.749) (1.886) (2.078) (0.835) (1.362) (2.169) (0.978)
0.013 0.001 -0.057 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.009 0.003 0.019 -0.001
(0.015) (0.012) (0.043) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.012)
0.890 -0.197 -1.726 0.969 0.434 -2.053 0.226 -0.676 -0.051 -0.085
(0.834) (0.984) (2.606) (1.091) (1.141) (1.320) (0.487) (0.802) (1.253) (0.582)
ARMA Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
R-Squared 0.54 0.50 0.46 0.66 0.28 0.54 0.63 0.62 0.53 0.43
Adjusted R-Squared 0.45 0.40 0.36 0.58 0.16 0.42 0.55 0.51 0.46 0.35
Statistical Significance 1% 5% 10%
Monetary Policy
Fiscal Policy
Dependent Variable - Real Industrial Production Index (Log and 1st Difference)
Effective Rate of Protection (Log and 
1st Difference)
Intercept
Seasonality 
Economic Activity (Log)
Population (Log)
113 FDI  (Log & 1st Difference)
Exchange Rate Regime (Dummy)
 
Sources: MER data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly 
Statistical Books,(1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. ERPs build using tariffs from Morley (1969, p. 307). 
Sectoral industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica (1953-1961). Instruction 113 FDI from 
Caputo (2007, p. 54) Population, monetary and fiscal policies from IBGE (2017). Methodology for the MER data can be 
found in Appendix 4.  
A few points are worth highlighting from Table 7.1. The elasticities of the ERPs 
to industrial production, the main explanatory variables, are small and 
statistically significant for most industrial sectors. The higher coefficients are 
for rubber, steel, and extractive industries, which are above 0.1. All other 
sectors have very small elasticities, normally close to 0. The interpretation of 
this coefficient follows the standard log-difference approach: in the case of 
rubber, for example, a 1% increase in the difference of the exchange between 
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two months leads to a 0.11% increase in the annual growth rate of industrial 
production in the consecutive month. Since these coefficients represent the 
impact on the acceleration or deceleration of industrial growth, and not direct 
elasticities, they suggest a very small impact of the ERPs on industrial 
performance. The interpretation of these low and statistically significant 
coefficients is that the overall protection, coming mostly from the MER system, 
were not an important source of stimulus for the growth of most industrial 
sectors in the 1950s. It means, in other words, that they were not causing 
distortions, as the standard interpretation claims, as they did not change the 
performance of the sectors. It also means they were not an instrument behind 
the rise of the advanced industrial sectors, which challenges the emphasis of 
the ISI consensus on these instruments. The distortions indexes below will 
further explore this interpretation. Moreover, controls improve the 
performance of the regressions. In most cases, the macroeconomic controls 
increase adjusted R2. The same is true for population and FDI data. The 
inclusion of the ARMA terms also helps to guarantee that regressions do not 
have serial correlation and improves the forecasting performance.   
Based on these regressions, and following the methodology proposed in the 
previous section, it is possible to perform the counterfactual exercise for each 
individual industrial production series by substituting the ERP with the proxy 
SER. As discussed, Appendix 1 shows that the proxy SER, the free market 
exchange rate, is similar to an estimated SER, which means it is a good proxy to 
perform a counterfactual exercise. The in-sample forecasts follow a dynamic 
process, in which each new data point is forecasted with the information of the 
new free market exchange rate and the outcome from the forecast in the 
previous period. This guarantees that the in-sample experiment reflects exactly 
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how industrial production would have looked like if just one variable, the ERP, 
had been changed for the SER. Figure 6.7 shows 10 graphs that compare the 
original industrial production series and the new in-sample forecast based on 
the SER. 
Figure 7.7 – In-Sample Forecasts 
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Source: Data from FGV, Revista Conjuntura Economica (1947-1958). In-sample forecasts based on the regressions of Table 
6.1.  
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The graphs reflect the coefficients of the regressions. Since most the exchange 
rate coefficients are small, the in-sample forecasted series are generally similar 
to the original industrial production series. This is particularly the case for the 
sectors with larger shares of industrial production, such as textiles, food, and 
leather. The similarity of the forecasted series and the original series also 
suggest that the regression analysis is robust and has a good forecasting 
precision. The distortions, that is, the gap between the original series and the 
forecasts, only appears in a few series in which the elasticities are larger than 
0.1 in the regressions. This is the case for steel, in which the original series run 
above the forecasts for most of the series. 
These results are consistent with the history of Brazilian industrial production 
in this period. The generally low impact of exchange rates is notable, 
particularly for the traditional industrial sectors in which protection usually 
plays an important role, like textiles. Only for more advanced sectors, which 
are capital intensive and take longer to develop, such as steel, do exchange 
rates appear to have had somewhat more impact. The opposite result would 
initially be expected, with traditional industries more linked to exchange rate 
protection. As part of the earlier phase of import substitution, they would have 
greater distortions than capital-intensive industries that depend less on the 
exchange rate. This is, however, explained by the shift of industrial production 
in the 1950s. As previously discussed, the import substitution of traditional 
industries was completed in the 1940s, which explains why the exchange rate 
did not play a role in supporting their growth during the 1950s. At the same 
time, the government targeted the development of advanced sectors, such as 
steel, and the estimates suggest the auction system played a minor role in 
helping to stimulate them. This suggests that the faster industrial growth of the 
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advanced sectors was the result of a different source, as the channels through 
which protectionism could have supported them, such as higher profit margins 
or reduced foreign competition, did not seem to have played an important role 
in the Brazilian case. Chapter 8 will show that the channels for the stronger 
performance of advanced industries were mainly the subsidies to import 
capital goods and the government’s direct participation in these advanced 
industries. Overall, the results show that the performance of most sectors was 
not influenced by the MER system. The indices constructed below will 
reinforce the impression that, on average, the impact from the MER system on 
the overall performance of industry was almost non-existent.  
The case of steel it is apparently the only case in which the MER system played 
a small role in stimulating the sector. Its development, which will receive 
further attention in Chapter 8, is the best example of the government effort to 
participate in the industrial take off in the later part of the 1950s. During the 
1940s and early 1950s, Brazil opened the first few small steel plants, such as 
CSN in 1941, ACESITA in 1951, and USIMINAS in 1956. But during the 1956-
1961 Target Plan the sector really took off, with the government setting an 
ambitious target to increase steel production to 2.4 million tons per year, 
doubling the 1955 level (Andrade & Cunha, 2002, p. 2). This was why the steel 
sector was included in Category 4, receiving less foreign exchange and strong 
protection despite being an important input for domestic production, which 
was usually included in Categories 2 and 3. The econometric results show that 
this choice did help to provide some protection and faster industrial growth 
than would have otherwise happened with the free market exchange rate. 
For all the other sectors, as the exchange rate was kept overvalued for a long 
period of time, the depreciations in the MERs and the adjusted ERPs did not 
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result in under or over performance, so it did not produce distortions. With 
these in-sample forecasts it is possible to estimate the exact size of the 
distortions for each sector, which are shown below at Table 7.2. As discussed in 
Section 7.2, the table presents the average monthly distortion, which is the 
monthly difference between the two series, and the final distortion, which is 
the difference by the end of the two series. The table shows both metrics for 
each industrial sector.  
Table 7.2 – Industrial Distortion by Sector, 1953-1960 
Industry
Original 
Category Coeficient
Average 
Monthly 
Distortion
Final 
Distortion
Rubber 2 0.164 -10% -6.5%
Steel 4 0.139 -10% -3.3%
Food 1 0.097 -4% -0.7%
Paper 3 -0.049 3% 2.2%
Extractive 1 -0.159 -4% -3.5%
Beverages 5 0.037 -4% -2.6%
Tobacco 3 0.037 2% 0.5%
Cement 5 -0.032 -9% -4.0%
Textiles 3 0.02 6% 3.9%
Leather 3 0.029 1% -2.9%
Industrial Distortions by Sector
 
Source: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica (1947-1958). In-sample forecasts based on regressions of Table 
6.2. Final distortions were calculated by comparing the average six months production with the MER versus the SER, to 
control for seasonality in production. 
 
For rubber and steel, the estimates show that both the average and final 
distortion were between -3% and -7%, which means that both sectors have over 
performed by these amounts on average at the end of the period. On the other 
hand, the underperformance of traditional sectors is very small, at around 0 to -
4%, following the very low regression coefficients. This reinforces the 
impression that these traditional sectors did not benefit from the MER system 
because their import substitution was mostly completed earlier in the decade. 
Overall, the results show very small levels of under or over performance in 
comparison to the pace of industrial production growth in that period. On 
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average, industrial production grew at 5-12% per year, which means an 
accumulated industrial rise of around 82% over the decade. Compared to this, 
a 0 to -6% final distortion did little to change the overall rate of industrial 
growth. 
Finally, based on the monthly average distortion, indices of the weighted 
average distortions for the whole industrial sector were constructed, and are 
presented below in Figure 6.8. The figure presents three variations of the index, 
assuming the out of sample industrial production to have the average weighted 
distortion of all other sectors, no distortions, or double the average distortion. 
Figure 7.8 – Index of Weighted Industrial Distortions, 1954-1959 
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Sources: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica (1947-1958). In-sample forecasts based on regressions of Table 
6.2. Indexes were calculated by weighting the monthly distortions of the 10 industrial sectors. 
The graph shows very small variations between the three indexes, reflecting the 
overall low level of average distortions throughout the period for the whole 
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industrial sector, and do not suggest an overall under or over performance of 
the industrial sector as a whole. This suggests that for distortions to have 
remained high for the whole decade, making them important for most of the 
industrial sectors on average, the ERP depreciations would have needed to 
have been much faster and have reached weaker levels. This confirms the 
findings of Chapter 6, which suggests that the MER system was replicating a 
market clearing process rather than forcing distortions in exchange rate 
markets. It also reflects the adjustment seen in the real exchange rate during the 
first phase of the MER system between 1953 and 1957, as was shown in Figure 
4.1.  
Finally, based on the indexes, it is possible to calculate the final distortion for 
each index for the whole period. This follows the same metric used in Table 7.2 
for the end of the period but now using the final weighted average for all 
sectors. Table 7.3 confirms the conclusions above, showing the average 
distortions at around 3%. It confirms industrial production would have only 
been 3% higher on average had the auction system been replaced by the SER. 
This is extremely low compared to an accumulated industrial production of 
about 82% in real terms during the decade. 
Table 7.3 – Final Sectoral Weighted Distortions 
Average Weight 0 Weight Double Weight
5.11% 3.24% 5.66%
Final Sectorial Weighted Distortion
 
Sources: Data from FGV’s Revista Conjuntura Economica (1947-1958). In-sample forecasts based on regressions of Table 
6.2. 
 7.6 Chapter Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated whether the MER system had negative 
externalities for industrial production in Brazil in the 1950s. By performing a 
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counterfactual exercise of substituting the ERP for the free market exchange 
rate in 10 different industrial sectors, plus a few alternative estimations and 
robustness checks in Appendix 1, the results refute the view that the MER 
system could have caused important distortions for industrial production. On 
average, the weighted average growth difference between industrial 
production with the MER and the free market exchange rate was only 3%, 
against a strong industrial production growth on average above 9% per year in 
real terms and an accumulated growth rate of about 82% during the decade. In 
most industrial sectors, particularly the larger ones, such as textiles, leather and 
food, which represented the bulk of Brazilian industrial production at the time, 
there were minimal distortions from the MERs, which suggests their growth 
pattern was not related to the MER system.  
These results are explained, for the traditional industries, by the fact that their 
substitution of imports was already completed before the 1950s, which means 
the protection given by the MER system did not stimulate a faster production 
of these industries. These results provide two important contributions to the 
literature. First, the lack of distortions suggests that the MER system was not 
only a ‘successful’ experiment in its first phase because it supported balance of 
payments stability; it also did not cause sectoral distortions. The second 
contribution is a challenge to the consensus view of ISI, which sees the 
industrial shift of the 1950s as the result of protectionist instruments, such as 
the MER system and tariffs. By not changing the growth pattern of the 
industrial sectors, the MER system was an ineffective instrument to stimulate 
important substitution for both traditional and advanced sectors. The MER 
system in the 1950s neither produced distortions, as per the consensus view on 
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controls, nor formed an effective policy intervention to stimulate industrial 
growth, as predicted by the standard ISI model. 
This leads to the next question of how this industrial performance was 
achieved if it was not through the use of the MER system and tariffs as 
protectionist instruments. Chapter 8, the last of the dissertation, explores how 
industrial growth was achieved and the political economy of the 1957 changes 
to the MER system. A government-led industrial deepening using the second 
MER system to subsidize private sector imports and increase its own 
participation in the economy were the main channels to stimulate the advanced 
industrial sectors. 
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8. The Multiple Uses of Multiple Exchange Rates: The Rise of ‘Industrial 
Deepening’ in Brazil 
The last two chapters have analyzed the reasons behind the effectiveness of the 
first MER system in Brazil and the causes for its decay after 1957. Chapters 5 
and 6 showed that the MER system was effective during its first phase (1953-
1957), essentially due to the combination of the auction system and officials’ 
response to changes in market demand, and was slowly dismantled in the 
second phase (1957-1961) with the rise in imports outside of the auctions. The 
system also did not generate ‘distortions’ to overall industrial growth, as 
shown in Chapter 7. It was not, therefore, an instrument for import substitution 
and does not explain the shift from traditional to advanced industrial sectors.  
These findings suggest a macroeconomically effective policy system, but leave 
an important question open: why did the Kubitschek administration not keep 
the original MER system if, as shown, it was an effective way to maintain 
macroeconomic stability? Chapter 5 has shown that there were no substantial 
changes in macroeconomic conditions that could have triggered such a massive 
policy shift, which raises the question of what were the true objectives of the 
1957 reforms. Even though from a macroeconomic approach the first MER 
phase was effective and did not produce distortions, from a welfare perspective 
both MER systems could have significantly altered the distribution of income 
in Brazilian society. The large literature on the political economy of controls 
discussed in Chapter 2 argues that in many cases the stated objectives of 
controls are in reality only excuses that hide policymakers’ true political goals 
(Alesina & Tabelini, 1989; Alesina et al, 1993; Grilli & Milesi-Ferretti, 1995). This 
can vary from protecting certain sectors, increasing taxation, or passing the cost 
of a macroeconomic adjustment to specific social groups. 
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The official objectives of the 1957 shift to the second MER system was to create 
further differentiation between industrial sectors and stimulate the import 
substitution of advanced sectors (Sochaczewski, 1980, p. 92), which was 
supposed to be further promoted by increasing the openness to foreign 
investments via Instruction 113, which removed capital goods imports from the 
MER auctions (Malan, 1974, p. 5). As already shown in the last two chapters, 
however, the second system did not replace the protection of the MER with 
tariffs and did not stimulate the shift to advanced industries. The second MER 
system was principally just a way to dismantle the import restrictions of the 
original system, allowing a significant increase in imports outside the auctions. 
If the policy shift was not a response to macroeconomic variables and in 
practice dismantled the original system, it is worth asking whether this process 
was politically motivated to produce a certain redistribution of welfare in 
Brazilian society. Understanding who were the winners and losers of the 1957 
policy shift is the remaining aspect needed to comprehend the whole MER 
experience. This would not only add to the literature on the period, but if the 
reasons for the shift were indeed political, it would reinforce the results 
obtained in Chapters 6 and 7, which have shown that there was little wrong 
with the first MER framework. 
Understanding the reasons behind the policy shift does more than just explain 
the political economy incentives for the use of exchange controls in Brazil. It 
also helps provide a new analysis of the origins of the industrial shift of the 
1950s. If it was not through the protection of exchange rates and tariffs, how 
did policymakers promote the growth of advanced industrial sectors? 
Following the literature discussed in Chapter 3, one could ask if policymakers 
were using the MER system after 1957 to ‘set the prices wrong’ (Amsten, 1992) 
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and produce ‘winners’ in the industrial sector via channels other than 
protectionism. These channels may have been part of an ‘industrial deepening’ 
process similar to East Asia (Kuroiwa, 2015; Toshiyuki, 2005), and which Serra 
(1979, p. 117) claimed was already taking place in Brazil in the 1950s, 
confronting the traditional interpretation of the ISI model for the period 
(Tavares, 1975; Weisskoff, 1980; Versani & Barros, 1977; Baer, 1972). 
Understanding how policymakers changed the distribution of welfare between 
the two systems should also identify how they created the channels to 
stimulate industrial growth. 
The existing literature on ISI in Brazil (Tavares, 1975; Weisskoff, 1980; Versani 
& Barros, 1977; Baer, 1972; Abreu et al, 1997; Colistete, 2006), as well as 
specifically on the MER system (Baer, 2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; 
Vianna, 1987; Bergsman, 1980; Abreu, 1990; Caputo, 2007), does not identify the 
winners and loser of the two systems and how policymakers changed 
incentives for industrialization. This is the case even for authors who have a 
very critical view, arguing that the ISI model hurt consumers and only 
benefited industrialists, although without giving details for the Brazilian case 
(Taylor, 1998; Haber, 2006; Coatsworth & Williamson, 2004). Sochaczewski 
(1980, pp. 103-104) is one of the few authors who directly discuss the 
redistributive effects of the MER system in Brazil, with a partial identification 
of the winners and losers. He claims that importers were the main losers during 
both MER systems because their business was constrained and made more 
expensive by the auctions, and also because they were paying for the exporters’ 
subsidy – the bonificações – while also providing revenues for the government 
with the auctions' tax. For him, the local industrialists were appropriating the 
benefits of the protection given by the system and the government was a 
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secondary beneficiary by appropriating part of the revenues from the auctions, 
although it distributed part of the funds to exporters. His view fits well with 
the consensus on the political economy of ISI, which places the cost of the 
industrial development on importers and consequentially local consumers, 
with industrialists as the main winners and the government as the secondary 
beneficiary.  
Lyne (2015, pp. 77-78) provides an alternative model to the ISI consensus to 
interpret the political economy of the period. She provides a ‘clientelistic’ 
model in which the different interest groups’ influence over politicians was not 
through direct popular voting but rather based on clientelism. Politicians 
directly exchanged support for policies that could benefit various important 
social groups, adjusting general policies to include exemptions and loopholes 
that would allow the most important political groups to always benefit from 
the government. Lyne (2015, p. 86) calls this a system of ‘direct exchange 
linkages’, in which politicians are not only providing benefits to a specific 
group in exchange for future votes (an ‘indirect linkage’), but were rather 
providing direct benefits to various groups at the same time.  
Still, although conceptually her model is interesting to interpret the political 
economy of 1950s, some of her conclusions follow Sochaczewski’s (1980) 
interpretation. She claims that this system of ‘direct exchanges’ helped to 
partially protect exporters in the MER system because they received the bonus 
on top of the official exchange rates, while also receiving an important share of 
the subsidized credit from state-owned banks, such as Banco do Brasil, to fund 
their production. At the same time, industrialists were the main beneficiaries of 
the system with the protection from tariffs and the MER system, although the 
exemptions and subsidies to import outside the auction system granted at the 
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firm level were an important instrument to benefit different groups within the 
industrial sectors. This distinguishes her analysis from Sochaczewski (1980). 
Overall, her main argument is that the MER system during the 1950s was in 
fact more balanced in the distribution of welfare between the traditional 
agricultural producers and the rising industrialists than the literature on ISI has 
argued. 
This chapter will present a different political economy interpretation, showing 
that Sochaczewski (1980) and the consensus analysis of ISI are inadequate for 
the Brazilian case, and although Lyne (2015) brings an interesting alternative 
model to interpret the period, some of her conclusions are not validated by the 
evidence. Industrialists were indeed one of groups who benefited from the new 
system, although not via protectionism but though the subsidies to imports of 
capital goods provided though the exemptions from the auctions created after 
1957. Lyne (2015) correctly identified this channel, although she still 
emphasizes the protectionist effect. The much slower depreciation of the 
exporters’ exchange rate versus the auction exchange rate makes exporters and 
not importers, despite the existence of the bonus to the former, the main group 
subsidizing the rest of the system. The system, which theoretically protected 
the exporters, and led Lyne (2015) to claim it balanced the distribution of 
welfare between agricultural producers and industrialists, was in practice 
highly punitive for agricultural exporters. Moreover, while Sochaczewski 
(1980) sees the government as only a secondary beneficiary of the new system 
and Lyne (2015) does not identify the government as a recipient of welfare, the 
government was in fact the main beneficiary of the second MER phase, 
financing its own participation in the industrial take off while also subsidizing 
the local industrial sector. The evidence suggests that the government was 
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financing and participating in an ‘industrial deepening’ process in Brazil at the 
expense of exporters while also ‘stealing’ the import market from the 
importers. These welfare redistributions were also the channels that generated 
the incentives behind the rise of advanced industries in the second half of the 
decade. 
This chapter builds on a combination of quantitative and qualitative sources to 
reach these conclusions. First, quantitative analysis of the distribution of the 
costs and benefits of the two MER systems identifies which groups in society 
were being subsidized or were subsidizing others.20 This uses the quantities 
and prices of the exchange rates already used in the previous chapters, as well 
as the agios and bonificações data, the subsidies and revenues for exporters, and 
the government’s revenues. The second part of the chapter focuses on 
qualitative sources to link the quantitative evidence to the political economy of 
that time, identifying the implicit objectives of policymakers. Sources used 
include the minutes of the Sumoc meetings, the personal archives of Vargas 
and Kubitschek, and newspapers of the time.  
8.1 The End of Import Substitution 
This section demonstrates that import substitution was not taking place in 
Brazil’s advanced industries in the second half of the 1950s. Chapter 6 has 
shown that the MER system and tariffs did not cause the growth of advanced 
                                                 
20 It is important to highlight that this exercise does not have the purpose of comparing 
the welfare results of the MER to a theoretical benchmark of an environment without 
controls, but to find the welfare changes between the two systems. Microeconomically, 
both MER systems caused a general loss of welfare for society, but there is little to be 
gained for this research in calculating the theoretical loss of welfare for society as a 
whole. 
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sectors, challenging the common view of the traditional instruments of the ISI 
consensus. Nonetheless, it could still be argued that substitution in advanced 
sectors was an important aspect of industrialization in the second part of the 
1950s, thus supporting the official explanation of the 1957 policy shift 
(Sochaczewski, 1980, p. 92). Indeed, the growth of the advanced industrial 
sectors was an undeniable fact, as was shown in Chapters 3 and 6. Yet this 
growth did not happen through the substitution of imports. The rise of imports 
in the second half of the 1950s happened in parallel to the growth of the 
advanced industries in Brazil. This is shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, which 
present the changes in import composition and the ratio of imports to domestic 
production during different moments of the 1950s.21 
Table 8.1 – Import Composition and Import Ratios, 1949-1961 (%) 
% Imports Import Ratio % Imports Import Ratio % Imports Import Ratio
Steel 13.5% 29% 12.6% 13% 16.3% 13%
Machinery 17.5% 176% 15.4% 71% 19.4% 86%
Electrical Material 7.0% 81% 5.9% 15% 7.9% 20%
Transportation Material 18.6% 130% 25.3% 44% 17.2% 23%
Pharmaceutical 22.0% 41% 28.8% 25% 25.3% 21%
Minerals (Non-metals) 3.1% 11% 2.2% 5% 1.9% 5%
Paper 1.3% 11% 1.4% 6% 2.2% 8%
Rubber 0.1% 1% 1.2% 7% 3.2% 17%
Wood 0.2% 1% 0.2% 1% 0.2% 1%
Textiles 7.6% 7% 0.7% 1% 0.8% 1%
Food 7.8% 4% 4.9% 3% 4.3% 2%
Beverages 0.5% 2% 0.6% 3% 0.6% 3%
Editorial 0.4% 2% 0.6% 3% 0.6% 1%
Leather 0.3% 3% 0.1% 1% 0.0% -
1949 1957 1961
 
Source: Calculated from Tavares (1975, pp. 92-93). Original data from IBGE’s industrial censuses of 1949 and 1959, and 
Anuário de Produção Industrial (1957). Import ratios are the ratio of imports to domestic production and calculated based 
on production values.  
                                                 
21 Tavares (1975) uses this data to argue that there was an impressive import 
substitution during the 1950s. The new reading of this data in this chapter provides a 
different interpretation, which shows how the process was not in fact import 
substitution.  
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Table 8.2 – Changes in Import Composition and Import Ratios, 1949-1961  
(percentage points) 
1949-1957 1958-1961 1949-1957 1958-1961
Steel -0.9 3.7 -15.4 -0.1
Machinery -2.1 4 -105.4 15.1
Electrical Material -1.1 2 -65.8 5.0
Transportation Material 6.7 -8.1 -86.5 -21.2
Pharmaceutical 6.8 -3.5 -16.5 -3.9
Minerals (Non-metals) -0.9 -0.3 -5.8 -0.8
Paper 0.1 0.8 -5.0 2.2
Rubber 1.1 2 5.7 10.2
Wood 0 0 0.0 -0.3
Textiles -6.9 0.1 -6.0 0.0
Food -2.9 -0.6 -1.5 -0.3
Beverages 0.1 0 0.2 0.0
Editorial 0.2 0 0.8 -2.1
Leather -0.2 -10.0% -2.3 -
Changes in Import Share (p.p) Changes in Import Ratio (p.p)
 
Source: Own construction based on Table 7.1. Import ratios are the ratio of imports to domestic production and 
calculated based on production values.  
 
The tables allow a new reading of Brazil’s industrialization in the 1950s. First, 
both tables show that by 1949 most of the consumer manufacturing sectors, 
durable and non-durable, had already completed their import substitution 
process, before both the Vargas and Kubitschek governments. Sectors such as 
textiles, leather, and food already had very low participation in the 
composition of imports and very low import ratios in 1949. Not surprisingly, 
the MER system did not help these sectors to further industrialize, as shown in 
Chapter 7.  
But the second and most important finding from the data is that most of the 
advanced sectors had already been through the process of substitution before 
the reform of the MER system in 1957. The reduction in import ratios in sectors 
like steel, machinery, and electrical and transportation materials was also 
completed before the impact of the reform and the use of the discretionary 
 
 
283 
 
MER system with tariffs, which was theoretically targeted to promote import 
substitution in these advanced sectors (Sochczewski, 1980, p. 92). Between 1957 
and 1961, despite the strong growth of advanced industries, there was 
surprisingly little change in the composition of imports and mostly no further 
declines in import ratios. In fact, import ratios actually increased in a few of 
these advanced sectors during the late 1950s, such as for machinery and 
electrical material. This suggests that the second MER system after 1957 was a 
period without import substitution, with the import ratios of advanced sectors 
remaining stable or rising until the end of the decade. They were, moreover, 
relatively high compared to traditional industries. 
In her discussion of import substitution during this period, Tavares (1975, p. 
94) argues that some advanced industries, such as steel, machinery, and 
electrical material, lost their dynamism during the later part of the 1950s, 
although she does not explain what happened. She essentially claims that there 
was a major import substitution effort during the whole decade and does not 
separate between the two periods. Other more recent works on import 
substitution also do not discuss these changes in the later part of 1950s (Abreu 
et al, 1997; Colistete, 2006; Villela, 2011), generally claiming that the whole 
industrialization process was based on the import substitution of advanced 
industries, which was not really the case for the end of the 1950s. 
This raises the question of how it was possible to produce extremely fast 
industrial growth without substituting imports. Table 8.3 and Figure 8.1 start 
clarifying this process by highlight the ‘industrial deepening’ that took place. 
By analyzing imports as a percentage of total supply (imports plus local 
production), there is evidence of the falling reliance on imports for most capital 
and also some intermediate goods.  
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Table 8.3 – Imports to Total Supply Ratios (Percentage) 
Consumer Intermediate Capital
1949 9 25.9 63.7
1955 2.9 17.9 43.2
1959 1.9 11.7 32.9
1964 1.3 6.6 9.8
Imports as Percentage of Total Supply
 
Source: Compiled by Bergsman and Candal (1969, pp. 44-45). Original data from the IBGE’s Industrial Censuses of 
1949 and 1959, and the Industrial Register for 1955 and 1964,.  Imports to total supply ratio are the share of imports to 
domestic production plus imports and are calculate based on trade statistics and production values.  
Figure 8.1 – Import to Total Supply Ratios, 1949-1964 (%) 
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Source: As in Table 7.3. 
The key aspect is that if import ratios for industrial sectors were not falling in 
the later part of the 1950s, as seen in Table 8.1, but import ratios to total supply 
were in decline, as in Table 8.3, this was happening only because there was a 
significant increase in local production, not because of a process of substituting 
imports. Imports to total supply ratio only declined because the denominator 
(local production plus imports) was expanding rapidly. Domestic industrial 
production grew at an annual average of 9.1% per year in real terms during the 
second part of the decade, about 2 percentage points above the 1953-1957 
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average (IBGE, 1953-1957). Both imports and production were growing at 
similar rates, so that the import ratios remained stable. Sectors such as electrical 
material and machinery illustrate this process well. They had declines in 
import ratios of 65 and 105 points respectively during the first phase of the 
MER system (Table 8.1), but in the second, when most of the industrial growth 
was concentrated in such advanced sectors, import ratios increased by 5 and 15 
points (Table 8.1). Imports were rising faster than local production, which 
shows that the second phase of the MER resulted in a very different form of 
industrial development. Clearly, as will be shown below, the rise in imports of 
capital goods and inputs for these advanced sectors was the main channel to 
deepen the industrialization of these industries and support their growth. 
It is important to stress, based on the discussion of the ISI literature in Chapter 
3, that some authors who adopt a broader definition of ISI, such as Bruton 
(1998) or Tavares (1975), would claim this rise in imports of advanced 
industries supported by government policies was still part of the general 
framework of ISI. For them, policies that were targeted to stimulate industries 
that were still not present in the country, including those leading to the 
increase of capital goods imports, was part of the ISI objectives. But as 
discussed in Chapter 3, most of the literature places a much stronger emphasis 
on the protectionist instruments and the more strict import substitution process 
of replacing foreign imports by local production. The evidence presented here 
goes against this more narrow form of the ISI model. If the process of 
industrialization was not the result of substituting imports, but resulted from a 
rise in imports based on government support, this should be classified as 
industrial deepening. 
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This rise of imports in the second half of the 1950s was discussed before in 
Chapter 5, where it was used to explain the decay of the MER system. Imports 
had declined significantly from an average of US$1.4 billion during the pre-
MER period of 1950-1952, when the balance of payments was on the verge of 
collapse, to US$1.1 billion during 1953-1956, the years of the first MER system 
(IBGE, 1950-1957). From 1957 onwards, average imports picked back up again 
to almost US$1.3 billion, and about US$75 million more came in the form of 
capital goods under Instruction 113 (IBGE, 1957-1961; Caputo, 2007, p. 40). As 
shown in Chapter 5, there were almost no restrictions on imports during the 
second part of the 1950s, which explains how their level returned to near the 
pre-MER period.  
This section has shown that not only were the instruments behind the 
industrialization of advanced sectors not tariffs and the MER system, but also 
that there was no substitution of advanced sector imports in the second of half 
of the decade. After 1957, in fact, imports were rising side-by-side with 
domestic industrial output. The sub-sections below will show how this process 
supported industrialization. 
8.2 Losing the Market 
This section looks at the welfare position of the first group who actively 
participated in the MER system: the importers. The main question is whether 
the importers were really suffering the costs of the import restrictions, as 
claimed by Sochaczwesky (1980), or whether they could have benefited from 
the rise in imports observed after 1957. 
First, it is important to understand exactly who the importers were. One 
relevant issue is whether importers were actually part of the local industrial 
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sector in a vertically integrated system in which they only functioned as an arm 
to import inputs for local production, or whether they were really an 
independent group with specific interests. If it is the former, then one should 
consider them as essentially local industrialists. This was not the case, however, 
because the importers were quite a distinct group in the framework of the MER 
system. Indeed, the MER regime was designed exactly to differentiate between 
importers and industrialists. Only registered import companies were allowed 
to participate in the auctions, and some institutional restrictions forced them to 
build a very different business compared to industrialists, in two ways. First, 
scale was needed to participate in the import business, given the high values of 
import licenses, which were set at a minimum of US$1,000, forcing very small 
import companies out of the system if they could not bid on importing the 
minimum requirement. Moreover, importers were allowed to bid in any of the 
auction houses across the country, but only if they had formally opened 
branches in each location where they operated. As foreign currency was 
distributed across the country, only importers with a decent size business could 
join the auctions in more than one place (Kafka, 1956). 
Second, and most important, importers were forced to pay for the licenses and 
the transfer tax – the tax on the amount of foreign exchange purchased for 
foreign currency – up front, while having up to 120 days to confirm the imports 
with Banco do Brasil and only then sell the goods locally, so they needed a 
large cash flow, which was provided in the form of credit by Banco do Brasil 
and could only be obtained by registered import companies. This was an 
official policy of the government and had the objective of helping importers to 
participate in the MER system, while excluding industrialists from the system 
(Kafka, 1956). These conditions were designed to create a full separation 
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between importers and the industrial sector. Importers were forced to build a 
complex business, with high levels of cash flow and presence in various parts 
of the country.  
These conditions fit well with the usual description of importers as a separate 
social group in Brazil during this period. Skidmore (1982, p. 111) characterizes 
importers as a different group from local industrialists, as they were 
traditionally linked to the ‘old’ primary export model and the traditional elites, 
and were losing influence to a growing urban and industrial class. With most 
consumer sectors already supplied by domestic production by the end of the 
1940s, they became mostly importers of fuels or raw materials, and to a smaller 
extent capital goods, as shown in Figure 8.2. These were sectors that had a 
small share of local production in total supply. 
Figure 8.2 – Import Composition (%) – 1949-1964 
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Source: Data from Gudin (1969. pp. 4). Original data from CEPAL’s Economic Bulletin for Latin America.  
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During the whole period from 1949 to 1961, durable and non-durable consumer 
goods, which were the larger sub-sectors of the domestic industrial business, 
represented a small part of overall imports. Most of the imports during both 
phases of the MER system were concentrated on fuels, raw materials, and 
capital goods, which were also the sectors receiving most of the foreign 
exchange in the auctions (Vianna, 1987, p. 54). Local supplies of fuels and raw 
materials, such as metals, were insufficient to meet the large demand from the 
booming industrial sector, and became the importers’ main business during 
that period (Skidmore, 1982, p. 112). Capital goods were the other sub-sector in 
which importers were also present, particularly during the period 1953 to 1957, 
when they were still part of the auctions. After 1957 most capital goods were 
brought to the country via Instruction 113, which allowed industrialists to 
classify them as FDI outside of the MER system.  
This evidence, both from the structure of the system, as well as from the 
composition of imports, suggests importers should be considered an 
independent group in the MER system, with their own incentives. But the most 
interesting aspect of this analysis is that importers were not subsidizing 
industrialists with the reduction of the MER constraint on their business, as 
Sochaczwesky (1980) claimed, because imports of consumer goods were quite 
small compared to imports of fuels and raw materials, which meant importers 
were complementarily to local industrialists. In practical terms, importers and 
industrialists were not competing for the same business, as both had incentives 
to increase imports, with industrialists benefiting from more inputs to the local 
manufacturing sector. Thus, when theoretically imports were constrained 
during 1953-1957, both groups were affected, and when they were liberalized, 
both could have benefited from it. This is a very distinct feature of the import 
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business in Brazil in the 1950s, which resulted from import substitution being 
largely completed for most consumer goods by the end of the 1940s.  
Yet, while theoretically they would both benefit from the relaxation of import 
controls after 1957, the data actually tell a different story: even as imports rose 
during the second MER system, import companies lost their share of the import 
market to the government and industrialists. After 1957, the rise of imports via 
Instruction 113 and the exemptions given to the private sector, as well as direct 
imports by the government, was a major feature of the second phase of the 
system. So while importers’ relative position could have improved after 1957 if 
they had kept their share of the import business, it was actually being reduced. 
Table 8.4 shows these changes in the importers’ relative welfare position. 
Table 8.4 – Importers’ Costs and Benefits, 1950-1960 
Total 
Imports 
(US$ 
million)
% of Imports from 
Government and 
Industrialists
Average 
Imports by 
Importers 
(US$ million)
Imports % 
Change
Importers 
Average 
Exchange Rate 
(Cr$ per US$)
Cost/Benefit 
(Cr$)
"Agios" + Tariffs 
Revenues (Cr$)
Ratio Cost/Benefit 
to Government 
Revenues
1950-1952 1446.33 40.0% 867.8
1953-1956 1167.75 44.5% 648.1 -25.3% 80.44 -13,198,604 29,065,179 45%
1957-1960 1241.75 63.6% 452.0 -30.3% 165.53 -22,639,008 83,000,335 27%  
Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Trade data from IBGE’s 
Anuários Estatísticos (1950-1960). See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
 
This table was calculated using the following process: in the first three columns 
the imports made directly by industrialists and the government are subtracted 
from total imports to calculate the share of overall imports that was in the hand 
of the traditional importers. After 1957, a large part of imports took place 
outside the auctions, which reduced significantly the imports performed by the 
import companies. The first decline in the importers’ income from the pre-MER 
period to 1953-1957 resulted essentially from the overall decline in imports, 
given the restrictions imposed by the first auction system, which was by 
design. The second decline after 1957, by contrast, was in a context of 
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increasing imports, with the import companies losing their share. The 
remaining part of the table calculates the financial cost of this decline and its 
size compared to government revenues from the MER system. 
The table shows that import companies did suffer a significant decline in their 
business during the whole period, even though they had a complementary 
business to local industrialists and could have benefited from the rise in 
imports after 1957. When the first phase of the MER system is compared to the 
pre-MER period, the value of the import companies’ imports fell by 25.3%. 
Considering that the average import exchange rate for the period and the 
overall level of agios, the revenues from the MER system collected by the 
government, importers lost what represented about 45% of the amount of 
government revenues from the MER system at the time. After 1957 this decline 
continued because their market was being taken away by the government and 
the private sector. The fast depreciation of the importers’ average exchange rate 
in the auctions helped to compensate for part of the losses in local currency, but 
it was not enough.  Imports in foreign currency by importers declined another 
30.3% during the second phase of the system, against the increased share of 
government and private sector imports. Capital goods were the sub-sector in 
which the importers’ business was most affected, given the formal process to 
import outside the auctions via Instruction 113. So while the composition of 
imports during the whole period remained relatively stable, as seen in Figure 
8.2, the share of the different participants in the importing business did not. 
The importers’ loss of share during the second phase of the MER system is 
impressive, given that the overall level of imports rose by 6%, even as imports 
by importers declined. This decline represented 27% of the government 
revenues from the system in the second phase of the MER.  
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This reveals a very different position of importers during the two MER phases. 
Importers did suffer from the MER system as their business declined during 
the whole MER period, but the most important difference was the cause of this 
decline. During the first phase, they had a reduction of business due to the 
balance of payments adjustment. During the second phase, their loss came 
from a change in relative position. Imports were rising overall for the economy 
but their business was in decline. The government and the private sector were 
‘stealing’ their business. The following sections will analyze how the market for 
imports was transferred to industrialists and the government.  
8.3 Growing Export Appropriation 
The situation for exporters was to a certain extent exactly the opposite. While 
importers were bearing the burden of balance of payments adjustments during 
the first phase, then had their market ‘stolen’ by the government and 
industrialists during the second, exporters benefited from a specific policy 
designed to share with them the benefits from the MER system. That was, 
however, not enough, as they were in fact the group providing most of the 
subsidies to the government and industrialists.  
Sumoc's policies targeted at exporters were the bonuses (‘bonificações’) and the 
fixed exchange rate for exports, which was intended to compensate for the 
depreciation of the import MERs. Exporters, particularly coffee producers, 
were the main source of foreign exchange and still had a relatively important 
position in Brazilian society in the early 1950s (Skidmore, 1982, p. 114). There 
was a clear concern on the part of policymakers in the Vargas period to 
compensate coffee exporters, which was reflected in the design of the first MER 
system. Qualitative sources in Section 8.7 will show the explicit objective of 
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Vargas to support coffee exporters with this bonus. But as discussed in Chapter 
5, this was not only the case for coffee producers. By the early 1950s, 
policymakers also knew coffee production was facing an important structural 
decline, and were concerned to stimulate manufactured exports. Coffee 
represented about 60% of overall exports, while manufacturing goods only 
accounted for 3% in 1953 (Bergsman, 1970 p. 100). Sumoc minutes from the end 
of 1953 show that this was the reason why manufactured exports initially 
received a bonus that was twice that of coffee exports (Cr$10.0 per dollar 
versus Cr$5.0 per dollar for coffee exports), which was a clear attempt to 
stimulate manufactured exports (Sumoc Minutes 408, 9/10/1953). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the bonus for the exporters differs from Leff’s 
(1967) claim that exporters never had any stimulus to their business during this 
period. He argued that exports were seen only as a form of ‘leftover’ from 
production that was not internally consumed, and policymakers were only 
concerned with import substitution. But it fits with Lyne’s (2015) interpretation 
that this was a policy tweak of a ‘clientelist’ model intended to support the 
exporters, a still relevant interest group in the Brazilian society. The bonuses, 
for example, were given to all exporters, but coffee represented on average 61% 
of overall exports and coffee producers were the driving force behind the 
policy (Bergsman, 1970, p. 100).  
The problem was that the two policies were not enough to compensate for the 
appropriation of their income, and exporters were actually the major source of 
subsidy for all other groups in the MER system, which means Leff was actually 
correct in identifying the prejudice against exporters and Lyne did not see that 
in practice the policy system did not protect the exporters. This structure also 
fits with Tyler (1983, p. 9), who claims policymakers in Brazil had a strong 
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‘anti-export’ bias embedded in the import substitution policies of that period. 
The bonus was far from enough to compensate for the widening of the gap 
between the importers’ and exporters’ average exchange rates, which meant 
that the implicit subsidy exporters were providing to the whole system was 
only growing over time (Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5). The policy of increasing the 
bonus to exporters happened during the whole period and accelerated after 
1957. However, the strong depreciation of the average import exchange rate, 
particularly after 1957, only made this gap wider, with this bonus never 
sufficient to close it. The lack of control over imports during the second phase, 
combined with the increased money supply and government spending after 
1957, produced strong inflationary pressures, which consequentially pressured 
the import MERs to depreciate.  
Table 8.5 – Exporters’ Costs and Benefits, 1953-1960 
Importers 
Average 
Exchange Rate
Exporters 
Average 
Exchange Rate
Exchange Rate 
Ratio 
Importers/Exporters
Implicit Subsidy 
(appropriation)
Nominal 
Appropriation
1953 32.6 27.0 1.208 16.8% $8,428,297
1954 54.0 31.6 1.706 37.1% $31,181,236
1955 113.2 37.1 3.052 66.9% $107,430,544
1956 121.9 40.3 3.025 65.1% $117,708,392
1957 81.7 46.7 1.750 42.2% $47,947,078
1958 149.9 57.1 2.623 61.1% $113,879,515
1959 199.7 79.1 2.523 59.2% $151,581,780
1960 230.9 78.7 2.932 65.8% $192,913,197  
Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Trade data from IBGE’s 
Anuários Estatísticos (1950-1960). See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
 
 
The result of this wider gap is assessed in Table 8.5, where the cost for the 
exporters is calculated. The third column of the table shows the increase in the 
ratio between the importers’ average exchange rate and the exporters’ 
exchange rate, which rose from 1.2 at the beginning of the system to 2.9 at its 
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end. This means the import exchange rate was 2.9 times the export rate by the 
end of the system. From this the appropriation, the exporters’ loss of income is 
calculated in the fourth column. During the second phase, more than 60% of 
the revenues that would have gone to them had they had the same exchange 
rate as importers was appropriated. This calculation already includes the bonus 
to the exporters in their average exchange rate.  
These results suggest a much larger appropriation than the ones estimated by 
Oliveira (1986), who, as discussed in Chapter 7, is the only author to have 
previously estimated this appropriation. Oliveira estimated the tax imposed on 
exporters by looking at the difference between the nominal exchange rate and 
the SER. He claims the difference resulted in an implicit taxation of about 25-
30% on exports during the 1950s. It is not clear, however, which nominal 
exchange rate he used for the comparison, and there is no differentiation 
between the import and the export exchange rates. The calculations above 
suggest a much larger appropriation of around 60% on average during the 
period.  
One of the questions these numbers raise is why the exporters, particularly 
coffee producers, who in the past had been one of the most well organized and 
influential groups in Brazilian society (Skidmore, 1982, p. 114; Suzigan, 2000, p. 
30), did not manage to block or reduce this growing appropriation. Why did 
they keep selling their foreign exchange to the MER system and not try to keep 
foreign exchange abroad? This is a particularly important question because 
coffee exporters remained the most important source of foreign exchange for 
the whole period, as Table 8.6 shows.  
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Table 8.6 – Export Composition, 1949-1961 
Coffee Other Food Raw Materials Manufacturers Total
1949 58% 10% 29% 3% 100%
1950 64% 11% 24% 1% 100%
1951 60% 9% 30% 1% 100%
1952 74% 8% 18% 1% 100%
1953 71% 10% 19% 1% 100%
1954 61% 13% 25% 1% 100%
1955 59% 15% 24% 2% 100%
1956 69% 10% 19% 2% 100%
1957 61% 14% 23% 2% 100%
1958 55% 21% 22% 2% 100%
1959 57% 18% 16% 8% 100%
1960 56% 18% 23% 3% 100%
1961 51% 16% 30% 4% 100%  
Source: Bergsman (1970 p. 100). Original data from CEPAL’s Economic Bulletin for Latin America. 
Coffee exporters were during the 1950s gradually losing their relative 
importance in Brazilian society. The transition from Vargas to Kubitschek, as 
shown in Chapter 3, marked a significance loss of influence of coffee producers 
and the traditional agricultural elite in general. The group had still managed to 
influence Vargas’ government, as exemplified by the creation of the bonuses as 
a way of rebating part of the appropriation. When designing the system, 
Ministry of Finance officials explicitly reported to Vargas that this mechanism 
was a solution to respond to the demand of coffee producers for less 
appropriation (Dossier for President Getulio Vargas, Ministry of Finance, 
CPDOC-FGV, 1953, pp. 4-5). The Vargas government was clearly divided 
between the influence of the ‘old’ elite and the growing presence of the 
industrial sector (Leopoldi, 2000). During the second half of the 1950s, the 
Kubitschek government, by contrast, had a much stronger policy stance of 
national and industrial development (Bielschowsky, 1996), with the coffee 
sector further losing their political influence.  
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Hirschman (1968) claimed that the use of the exchange rate system to 
appropriate the revenues from agricultural exporters was just an ‘opaque’ way 
to tax the exporters, which given their historical political influence have always 
managed to block any attempts for direct taxation of their production or land. 
So the appropriation was, then, a new indirect channel to fund the rest of the 
system from the coffee exporters but without having to directly tax the 
exporters.  Given the size of the appropriation and with coffee exports still 
representing 60% of foreign exchange inflows, this explanation does not seem 
sufficient. Clearly, Hirschman (1968) was right that the instrument was a way 
to tax the coffee exporters and fund the rest of the system, as shown above. But 
as Lyne (2015, p. 85) suggested, it is difficult to argue that the appropriation 
would have been unnoticed by exporters. In fact, qualitative evidence in 
Section 7.7 below shows that the exporters were publically complaining of the 
government’s proposal for the second MER system in newspapers in 1957, as 
they knew the incoming MER system would increase the appropriation of their 
foreign exchange. Lyne’s (2015, p. 92) alternative explanation is that 
appropriation was not unnoticed, but compensated for by the bonuses from the 
MER system and the loans that Banco do Brasil provided to the sector.  
The evidence presented above showed that the bonus was not enough to 
compensate the sector, and although there was some state-backed credit was 
provided, this was also too small to compensate for the appropriation. Between 
1956 and 1960, Banco do Brasil’s loans to agricultural producers represented 
10% of the gross agricultural product of the country, with coffee representing 
about 30% of this total (Smith, 1969, p. 240). This was about Cr$ 9.5 billion on 
average between 1956 and 1960 (calculated based on Banco do Brasil credit data 
from IBGE, 2017), 7.5% of the average annual appropriation from the exporters 
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through the MER system. These loans did receive highly subsidized interest 
rates of about half of the level of inflation during the second half of the 1950s 
(Smith, 1969, p. 240). So Lyne (2015) was right that they were also a subsidy to 
compensate exporters, but as in the case of the bonus from the MER system, 
this credit was also too small to compensate for the large size of the 
appropriation. 
The reason for the inability to reduce the appropriation results from the 
structural changes in the global coffee sector and the producers’ dependence on 
the government in that context. During the second half of the 1950s there was a 
rising overproduction of coffee in the world, which resulted in a decline of 
coffee prices of 29% between 1957 and 1959 (Abreu, 1990, p. 405). Brazil was an 
important part of this overproduction, with local production at 44 million bags 
by 1959, enough to supply the full 42 million bags of global demand on its own. 
Global production was at 79 million bags (Klein & Luna, 2014, p. 174). With 
Brazil’s contribution to global production falling to about 50%, and the rest of 
global production being almost enough to fulfill the global demand, Brazil’s 
share of the world market was reaching the price elasticity of demand (Krasner, 
1994, p. 93). The capacity to influence external coffee prices, which played an 
important role in Brazilian policymaking in the first half of the century, was 
almost inexistence in the 1950s, as cuts in supply did not affect external prices 
(Krasner, 1994, p. 94).  
Still, the Kubitschek administration tried to influence markets and contain the 
fall of prices by organizing a stockpiling system of coffee in warehouses across 
the country to prevent coffee from reaching the market. The government did 
not buy the coffee, as previous administrations had done in the first half of the 
century, but organized a system in agreement with coffee producers to keep 
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part of their production from reaching the market (Netto & Pinto, 1973). By 
1959 69 million bags of coffee were stored across the country (Luna & Klein, 
2014, pp. 174-175). But this was not enough to contain the decline in coffee 
prices, given that global markets remained in overproduction even with less 
coffee from Brazil reaching international markets (Krasner, 1994, p. 93). 
The coffee business was in an irreversible structural decline and the capacity to 
influence external prices, and consequentially internal policies, were also 
waning. Nonetheless, the stockpiling process was producers’ only hope to save 
their sector, which meant they were highly dependent on government support 
during this period. The administration was, in practice, influencing the amount 
of coffee that reached the markets and which producers were kept from selling 
their production. In the context of the structural decline and dependence on 
government support, coffee exporters did not have an alternative other than 
selling their foreign exchange to the government and accept the rising 
appropriation.  
Thus, while Sumoc increased the bonus during the MER experience and the 
government provided some subsidized credit for the sector, these two 
mechanisms were not enough to compensate exporters. The structural decline 
of the sector’s global importance and the remaining dependence on the 
government support to try to prevent the decline in prices gave producers 
almost no bargaining power to fight against the rising appropriation.  
8.4 Subsiding Private Sector Imports 
The policy shift of 1957 increased the appropriation of foreign exchange from 
exporters, while at the same time decreasing the share of imports by import 
companies. These two groups were the main losers of the shift to the second 
 
 
300 
 
MER system. The next step is to see how this appropriation was transferred to 
the government and the industrial sector, improving their relative positions. 
One of these channels was removing the restrictions on imports, particularly 
capital goods, and subsidizing them with the export appropriation to reduce 
the cost of imports.  
One of the problems to precisely identify this channel is that there is no 
available data on the composition of imports outside of the auction system. 
Chapter 5 showed how both the imports via Instruction 113, as well as the 
increase in exemptions given by Sumoc, were central to the reduced availability 
of foreign exchange to the MER system after 1957 and its eventual collapse. The 
previous section showed how importers lost their share of the business in this 
process. The ideal would be to show the exact destination of those imports, 
separating the shares of government and industrialists. 
While this is not possible, there are alternative ways to proxy the share of each 
of these groups and calculate the size of the subsidy transferred from exporters. 
Between 1956 and 1961, the Kubitschek administration put forward Brazil's 
most well-known investment plan, the Target Plan. There is a long literature 
about the Target Plan (Skidmore, 1982; Baer, 1995; Abreu et al, 1997; Villela, 
2011; Serra, 1982; Shapiro, 2004), with its ambitious slogan of producing fifty 
years of economic development in five. The plan started immediately after the 
new president took office, and was successfully delivered during his five years 
in office, as it was used to channel the appropriation from the MER system. The 
plan had five priority areas, but in practice just two. The five areas were power 
supply, transportation, food supply, basic industries, and education. They can 
be divided into only two because most of the investments from the plan were 
allocated to infrastructure and power supply (71.3%) and basic industries 
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(22.3%). Food supply and education received little of the funding 
(Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 106). The plan was not only a government investment 
effort, but included a high level of private sector participation. According to the 
original plan, 35% of the funding would come from the private sector, both 
domestic and foreign, 15% from government financing agencies, and 50% from 
direct government investments (Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 107). The plan made 
government responsible for investments in infrastructure, transportation, and 
power supply; the stated-owned companies responsible for basic industries, 
such as steel and oil; and the private sector responsible for advanced industries, 
such as motor vehicles, machinery, chemicals, and electrics.  
Table 8.7 – The Target Plan 
 Sector Unit Forecast Effective %
Electric Power KW 2,000,000 1,650,000 82.5%
Coal Ton 1,000,000 230,000 23.0%
Oil-Producing Barrells/day 96,000 75,000 78.1%
Oil-Refining Barrells/day 200,000 52,000 26.0%
Railroads KM 3,100 1,000 32.3%
Roads-Construction KM 13,000 17,000 130.8%
Steel Ton 1,100,000 650,000 59.1%
Cement TON 1,400,000 870,000 62.1%
Cars and Trucks One 170,000 133,000 78.2%
Nationalization (cars) % 90 75 83.3%
Nationalization (trucks) % 95 74 77.9%
 
Source: Sochaczwesky (1980, p. 106). Original data from Conselho de Desenvolvimento (1959). 
Table 8.7 shows the impressive results of the Target Plan between 1956 and 
1961. Government-owned companies delivered growth in the production of oil, 
steel, coal, and cement, while the government invested in electric power 
production, roads, and railroads. The private sector was mostly concentrated in 
the production of motor vehicles, which was seen by the Kubitschek 
administration as the quickest and most effective way to bring the private 
sector on board with the plan (Shapiro, 2004). But the key aspect is how these 
 
 
302 
 
investments were financed through the subsidies from the MER system, which 
is calculated in Table 8.8 and Figure 8.3. 
Table 8.8 – ‘Outside of Auctions’ Import Subsidy, 1954-1960 
Year
Instruction 
113 Imports 
(USD 
Million)
Imports  
(USD 
Million)
Effective 
Total 
Imports  
(USD 
Million)
Imports via 
Official 
Rate (USD 
Million)
Imports via 
MER Rate 
(USD 
Million)
Imports via 
Official 
Rate (%)
Official 
Rate (Cr$)
Average 
MER Rate 
(Cr$)
Ratio 
MER/Official 
Rate
1954 0 1410 1410 574.9 835.1 41% 18.8 54.0 2.9
1955 29 1099 1128 538.1 589.9 48% 18.8 113.2 6.0
1956 41.8 1046 1087.8 416.5 671.3 38% 18.8 121.9 6.5
1957 107.7 1285 1392.7 816.5 576.3 59% 18.8 81.7 4.4
1958 82.5 1179 1261.5 789.2 472.3 63% 18.8 149.9 8.0
1959 65.8 1210 1275.8 918.0 357.8 72% 18.8 199.7 10.6
1960 107.2 1293 1400.2 890.1 510.1 64% 18.8 230.9 12.3  
Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Trade data from IBGE’s 
Anuários Estatísticos (1950-1960). Instruction 113 imports from Caputo (2007, p. 64). See Appendix 4 for the 
methodology. 
  
Figure 8.3 – Exchange Rate Subsidy Ratio, 1954-1960 
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Source: Table 7.8. 
Table 8.8 first sums up the overall level of imports outside the auction system 
together with Instruction 113, to reach the effective level of imports outside the 
auction system. This was the share of the market lost by the import companies. 
This share represents exactly the amount of imports in the official overvalued 
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exchange rate, since the government, private exemptions, and Instruction 113 
imports did not need to go through the auction system and could all use the 
fixed exchange rate. Column 6 shows this share, and how much it grew during 
the second phase of the system. In 1954, 41% of all inflows were out of the 
system, while by 1959, 72% were using the official exchange rate. From this, the 
last three columns calculate the size of the subsidy based on the ratio between 
the official rate and the average MER. This ratio averaged 4.9 (which means the 
MER average rate was 4.9 times the official rate) until 1957, but grew rapidly to 
12.3 by 1960. The average ratio between 1958 and 1960 was an impressive 10.3. 
This means that imports outside the auctions were 10% of the average price of 
all other imports of the MER system. An average of 64% of all imports were 
being subsidized in this way, while the rest of the economy was paying a much 
higher price for imported goods via the auctions. 
The subsidy was being paid by appropriations from exporters, since they were 
selling foreign exchange at a much lower price than the importers were paying 
for it. Foreign exchange was essentially bought at cheap levels from exporters, 
then skipped the import companies as intermediaries, in order to allow the 
private sector and government to import subsidized goods at very low prices. 
It should not be a surprise, then, how much interest Instruction 113 created for 
foreign investors, who were investing in the country with this massive subsidy. 
Tables 8.9 looks at the composition of this process, showing the sectoral 
destinations of these large subsidies to the private sector under Instruction 113.  
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Table 8.9 – Foreign Direct Investment via Instruction 113, 1955-1961 (%) 
 
Sector 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Vehicles 21.2 7.3 33.5 65.6 48.4 49.7 0.0
Chemical Products 11.6 35.1 23.1 2.9 4.8 4.6 4.6
Machinery 5.8 7.0 6.1 2.3 12.9 16.8 22.9
Rubber and Plastic 4.6 3.0 5.0 6.4 14.2 2.8 10.2
Electrical Material 8.6 3.8 5.8 0.6 1.3 6.0 10.2
Textile Equipment 6.2 10.9 10.2 0.4 0.6 2.4 2.2
Metallurgical Products 2.8 7.0 4.7 1.0 6.7 1.0 12.3
Food 9.9 5.7 3.1 3.2 1.2 2.7 5.0
Paper 0.3 2.1 0.1 10.0 1.4 0.5 16.4
Transportation Equipment 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 5.0 6.0 4.8
Electronic Equipment 4.7 2.4 1.0 1.7 0.7 1.9 3.3
Metallic Minerals - Extraction 3.4 3.8 1.2 0.1 0.6 3.7 2.1
Metallic Products 6.5 2.4 2.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.6
Non-Metallic Products 0.9 4.2 0.9 3.8 0.5 0.4 2.3
Other Sectors 13.5 5.3 2.0 1.2 1.0 0.6 2.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
Source: Reproduced from Caputo (2007, p. 64). Original data constructed from Sumoc’s Instructions. 
Table 8.9 shows the composition of flows under Instruction 113. Since these 
were authorized by Sumoc and registered in the minutes, it is possible to know 
exactly the amount of FDI in the form of imports going through this channel. 
This table highlights how the Target Plan concentrated private sector 
investments in advanced industries. Instruction 113 investments were 
concentrated in vehicles, machinery, different types of equipment, rubber, and 
plastics. The best example of an industry that benefited from this import 
subsidy during the second phase was the automotive sector: 38% of the total 
FDI during the years 1955-63 (US$190 million) was for the automotive sector. 
Under the Target Plan, the government created the Grupo Executivo da 
Industria Automobilística (GEIA), composed of government officials and 
private sector executives, to plan, study, and approve projects for the sector. In 
1956 and 1957, this group approved 18 projects to be developed until the end of 
the decade (Shapiro, 2006, pp. 235-236). All projects had some participation of 
foreign companies and could utilize the subsidy from Instruction 113. The 
sector accounted for 32% of the FDI under the instrument (Caputo, 2007, p. 76). 
The Target Plan also established a percentage of the supply that should be 
 
 
305 
 
domestically produced of 90%, and accomplished 75% of the production by the 
end of 1961 (Kertenetzky, 2016, p. 5).  
8.5 Funding the Government  
But the subsidy was not only channeled to private sector imports. The 
government itself was also responsible for a very large share of investments 
under the Target Plan: about 25% of total investments during 1956-1960 (IBGE, 
2017), concentrated in infrastructure and power supply. A large part of the 
appropriation from the MER system was used to finance this increasing role in 
the economy. While the data also do not show the exact composition of imports 
divided between the government and the private sector, the composition of 
investments is a useful proxy to analyze the government role in the process. 
Table 8.10 – Composition of Investments, 1955-1961 (% of GDP)  
Total Investment
Government 
Investment 
State-Owned 
Companies 
Investments Private Investment
1955 18.4 2.8 0.6 15
1956 20.2 2.7 0.4 17.1
1957 21.9 3.9 0.9 17.1
1958 23.3 4.7 1.2 17.4
1959 23.3 4.1 1.8 17.9
1960 22.8 4.7 2.4 15.7
1961 22.4 4.3 2.5 15.6  
Source: IBGE (2017). Original data from Sumoc . 
Table 8.10 provides a good picture of the composition of investments during 
the years of the Target Plan. During the whole period, average investments 
were almost 22% of GDP, of which 5.3% of GDP were, on average, from the 
government or state-owned companies, making 25% of the total (IBGE, 2017). 
The private sector had an average investment of 16.5% of GDP. The 
government used to retain about 30% of all foreign exchange for its own 
imports during the first phase of the MER system, which was why the average 
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percentage of imports via the auction system was around 60-70%. In the second 
system, post-1957, the level of imports through the auctions declined to around 
30% on average, with 70% of foreign exchange being offered outside the system 
(see Figure 5.2). The government share of investments increased from 18.5% in 
1955 to an average of 25% during the period 1956-1961, including the state-
owned companies (IBGE, 2017). Although there is no data on exactly the share 
of government imports in the second phase of the system, proportionally, this 
increase in investments would represent in the second system about 40% of the 
overall imports, an increase of 10 percentage points from the 30% level of the 
government in the first system. In this simulation, then, out of the 70% of 
imports outside the auctions in the second system, about 40 percentage points 
were likely going to the government and state-owned companies, while 30 
percentage points went to industrialists. Both enjoyed an implicit subsidy that 
was on average five times the official exchange rate (the 4.9 average ratio 
calculated from Table 7.8).  
The Target Plan was effective. During the previous period, between 1947 and 
1955, average investment was only 14% of GDP, whereas it rose to an average 
of 22% during the Target Plan years. During the 1960s, average investments 
then declined to 17% of GDP, significantly below the Kubitschek years. This 
shows how the effort to produce investments through the plan and using the 
MER system to appropriate exporters and subsidize imports for both the 
government and industrialists was effective.  
On the government side, it is possible to calculate exactly its share of the 
appropriation in the form of revenues. One of the most interesting findings of 
the analysis of primary data of the agios is the way the government 
compensated for the revenues lost from the first to the second phase of the 
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MER system. During the first phase, the government was financing itself only 
with the tax imposed on the auctions, the agios. As most imports were taking 
place though the auctions, the government obtained large sums of revenues 
from taxing them. During the second phase, however, the reduction of imports 
through the system meant a significant decline in revenues from the auctions, 
as the appropriation from exporters was mostly being transferred in the form 
of subsidies to imports outside the auctions.   
The introduction of ad valorem tariffs in 1957, however, compensated for a 
good part of these losses, as the tariffs were applied to all imports, 
independently of the exchange rate regime and whether they went through the 
auctions or not. In fact, the imports that remained under the auctions regime 
were doubly taxed, as they still had to pay the agio on top of the new tariffs. 
Not surprisingly, this resulted in a very effective channel to recover revenues 
that were being lost to the increase of imports outside the auctions. Table 8.11 
shows this calculation. 
Table 8.11 – Government Revenues from the MER System and Tariffs, 1953-
1960 
Year Agios (Cr$) Bonificações (Cr$) Revenues (Cr$)
Net Agios (% 
Revenues)
Tariffs (ad 
valorem %) Tariffs (Cr$)
Tariffs (% 
Revenues)
Net Agios + 
Tariffs (% 
Revenues)
1953 $5,111,965 $4,261,950 $91,500,000 1% 0.9%
1954 $45,058,895 $20,148,510 $124,500,000 20% 20.0%
1955 $66,796,525 $26,108,713 $144,200,000 28% 28.2%
1956 $81,860,755 $32,048,248 $192,900,000 26% 25.8%
1957 $76,320,652 $38,931,920 $238,900,000 16% 13.5 $14,186,638 5.9% 21.6%
1958 $70,780,550 $47,810,548 $331,400,000 7% 14.7 $25,922,262 7.8% 14.8%
1959 $96,652,195 $77,480,875 $450,400,000 4% 29.1 $70,372,640 15.6% 19.9%
1960 $117,755,732 $76,261,913 $640,600,000 6% 33.7 $100,495,929 15.7% 22.2%
1st Phase
2nd Phase
 
Source: Own construction. MER data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and Ministry of Finance’s 
Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Tariffs come from Morley (1969, p. 307). 
Fiscal data compiled by Sochaczwesky (1980, p. 127). See Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
 
The table presents the levels of government revenues collected from the two 
systems. Until 1956, only revenues from the agios were collected from the MER 
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system. In net terms, with the bonus to exporters subtracted, they represented 
25% of all government revenues between 1954 and 1956. From 1957 onwards, 
the contribution of agios to revenues declined, falling to an average of 8% of all 
government revenues. This was the result of the growth of imports outside the 
auctions, which reduced the overall level of foreign exchange available to the 
MER system, leading to reduced tax revenues. It was, however, compensated 
for by the addition of ad valorem tariffs after 1957, which on average grew 
from 13.5% to 33.7% in 1960 (Morley, 1969, p. 307), representing an additional 
source of income that accounted for more than 11% of government revenues 
between 1957 and 1960. By the end of the period, the system as a whole, 
including auctions and tariffs, was providing 22% of all government revenues, 
compared to 26% at the end of 1956. Thus, although the government lost 
revenues due to the enormous subsidy being provided via imports outside the 
auctions, it found a way to compensate for a good share of those losses through 
tariffs. This evidence shows that, although Chapter 7 and the first sections of 
this chapter demonstrated that tariffs were not important for the 
industrialization process during the second half of the 1950s, their re-
introduction was important for the government because they were a new 
source of financing for the second MER system. 
Primary evidence from newspapers of the time, presented below in Section 7.7, 
suggests that the second MER system was indeed designed to increase fiscal 
revenues with the imposition of ad valorem tariffs, even though officials never 
made that public. These revenues were used to finance the government’s 
growing participation in the economy, as seen by the increase of public 
investments from 3.2% to 5.3% of GDP (IBGE, 2017), both in infrastructure but 
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also in inputs such as oil, steel, and cement. Table 7.12 shows the increase in 
government spending and investments during the period. 
Table 8.12 – Government Expenditure, 1952-1961 
Cr$ Million Consumption Investment Total Total/GDP% Investment/GDP%
1952 45.1 12.7 57.8 15% 3.2%
1953 65 15.1 80.1 17% 3.2%
1954 75.3 20.9 96.2 15% 3.3%
1955 94 22.3 116.3 15% 2.9%
1956 130.4 26.7 157.1 16% 2.7%
1957 152.7 45.7 200.2 16% 3.7%
1958 180.5 68.5 249 17% 4.7%
1959 249 85.5 334.5 17% 4.3%
1960 366.7 130.6 497.3 18% 4.8%
1961 537.9 173 710.9 18% 4.3%
Source: Compiled by IBGE (2017). Original data from Sumoc. 
The table shows how total government expenditure grew by three percentage 
points of GDP between 1952 and 1961, including 1.7 percentage points in 
investments. From 1958 to 1960, investments averaged 4.6% of GDP, compared 
to 3% of GDP during the Vargas period. As Table 8.8 showed, government 
investments though the Target Plan were delivered via the ownership of 
companies producing oil, steel, coal, and cement, and also direct investments in 
electric power production, roads, and railroads.  
But this financing channel through the revenues from the MER system was not 
sufficient to cover the fast pace of increase in government expenditures. Figure 
4.8 showed that the budget deficit increased from an average of -1.6% of GDP 
between 1952 and 1955, to -5.9% between 1956 an 1960, an increase of 4.3 
percentage points. The new revenues from tariffs compensated for most of the 
decline in revenues from the MER, but did not increase to cover this rising 
expenditures. As shown in Chapter 5, this was compensated for by printing 
money. The annual growth of money supply increased from about 15% in 1955 
to almost 40% by 1960, and covered the gap in the government budget. 
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But this scheme was also used to further finance the government outside of its 
own public accounts. Printing money by Banco do Brasil was also used to 
increase credit loans from the bank, which were not registered in the public 
accounts. As discussed in Chapter 5, Banco do Brasil was during that time both 
a monetary authority and a commercial bank. It printed money to finance the 
government deficits and also to fund its own rise in credit supply for the 
economy. Interestingly, however, most of this rise in credit was channeled to 
also finance the government itself, both to its investment projects under the 
Target Plan and the state-owned companies’ large investments in basic 
supplies. Table 8.13 shows this scheme. 
Table 8.13 – Banco do Brasil Loans, 1952-1961 
Outsanding 
Loans
% to Public 
Sector
% to Private 
Sector % GDP
Annual 
Growth (%)
1952 55,189,000 40% 60% 13.9%
1953 74,846,000 42% 58% 15.9% 36%
1954 106,773,000 46% 54% 17.0% 43%
1955 124,549,000 48% 52% 15.9% 17%
1956 160,628,000 53% 47% 16.1% 29%
1957 215,885,000 57% 43% 17.7% 34%
1958 260,044,000 55% 45% 17.8% 20%
1959 322,566,000 58% 42% 16.2% 24%
1960 468,596,000 61% 39% 17.0% 45%
1961 806,923,000 65% 35% 19.8% 72%  
Source: Banco do Brasil data from IBGE (2017) 
Table 8.13 shows the increase in Banco do Brasil loans between the public 
sectors (government and state-owned companies) and the private sector 
between 1952 and 1961. Between 1952 and 1961, the share of the public sector 
increased from 40% to 65%, accounting for almost all of the growth of loans 
from the bank. The increase in this credit represented, on average, 2% of GDP 
between 1957 and 1961. In the Target Plan, this represents exactly the 15% of 
the financing that was intended to be offered by government financing agencies 
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(Sochaczwesky, 1980, p. 107). This means the channel of money printing 
turning into credit for the government represented about half of the increase in 
the budget deficit of 4.3% in the period, showing the size of the role of the 
government in the industrial effort. The government used both the revenues 
from the MER and tariffs, as well as money printing, to finance both the direct 
increase in state spending and also the rise in credit from Banco do Brasil 
outside of the official public accounts. These conclusions also show the Banco 
do Brasil’s numerous credit lines to the private sector, such as financing cash 
flow to the importers participating in the MER system, and loans to agricultural 
exporters and local industrialists, fell as a share of the bank’s funds after 1957. 
It reinforces the conclusions made above that the credit to agricultural 
exporters was not a large share of the bank’s business, and also that the main 
channel to subsidize local industrialists were the subsidies to imports outside 
of the auctions. 
The case of the steel industry is probably the best example of the government 
effort to participate in the industrial take off. During the 1940s and early 1950s, 
the first few steel plants were opened, such as CSN (1941), ACESITA (1951) and 
USIMINAS (1956). Most of these companies were government owned or joint-
ventures with foreign capital, but with a significant participation by the state 
(Andrade & Cunha, 2002, p. 2). During 1956-1961 the sector took off, with the 
government setting an ambitious target to increase steel production to 2.4 
million tons per year as part of the Target Plan, doubling the 1955 level. 
Although this ambitious target was not achieved, production reached slightly 
more than 2 million tons in 1961, an average annual growth of 12.1%. This 
resulted from the direct investment by the government-owned companies, 
especially CSN (Andrade & Cunha, 2002, p. 4). 
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The evidence presented in this section shows that the government used a large 
share of the appropriation from the exporters to subsidize its increased role in 
the economy as part of the Target Plan, while also using money printing to 
finance the rising budget deficit and increase credit from Banco do Brasil to 
itself and state-owned companies.  The rest of the appropriation was used to 
subsidize imports outside the auctions by industrialists. From a welfare 
perspective, the government was thus one of the main beneficiaries of the shift 
in systems in 1957, as it found a way to both increase the subsidy to the private 
sector but also compensate for its loss of revenues. 
8.6 The Rise of Industry 
This leads to the other main beneficiary of the new system: the industrial 
sector. While the last few sections have showed the channels through which the 
industrial expansion was stimulated, and calculated the size of the welfare 
improvement of the government and declines for importers and exporters, this 
section calculates how much the subsidy represented for the local industrialists, 
as shown in Table 8.14. 
Table 8.14 - Industrial Benefits, 1953-1960 
Year
Industrial Production 
(Nominal % Growth)
Industrial Production 
(Cr$)
Industrial 
Production (Real 
% Growth) Inflation (%)
Net Agios + 
Tariffs (Cr$)
Financial Benefit of 
2 p.p (% of Agios + 
Tariffs) - (Cr$)
1953 221,896,408 8.3% 17% 850,015
1954 29% 285,834,147 6.5% 14% 24,910,384
1955 27% 363,218,017 8.9% 23% 40,687,812
1956 35% 489,313,162 4.3% 23% 49,812,507
1957 37% 668,926,627 5.3% 21% 51,575,370 65%
1958 40% 933,229,779 10.2% 16% 48,892,264 95%
1959 28% 1,194,784,551 7.4% 15% 89,543,960 67%
1960 58% 1,887,600,395 13.5% 39% 141,989,749 66%  
Source: Own construction from primary data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry 
of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Sectoral industrial production 
from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica. Tariffs from Morley (1969, p. 307). Inflation from IBGE (2017). See 
Appendix 4 for the methodology. 
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Table 8.14 calculates how much the industrial sector benefited from the second 
MER system. First, it shows the change in the real growth of industrial 
production after 1957, with an average of 9.1% versus 7.0% in the period 1953-
1956. Second, it shows how much industrialists gained financially from this 2 
percentage points of additional growth during the second MER system. In 
nominal terms, it represented an average of 73% of the amount of government 
revenues in the form of both net agios and tariffs between 1957 and 1960. This is 
calculated in the last column of Table 8.14. Thus, by representing a large share 
of imports outside of the auctions, while simultaneously having those 
subsidized by the foreign exchange appropriated from the exporters, the 
welfare gains from industrialists were equivalent to almost three quarters of 
the government revenues from the system in the same period.  
One important question that can be raised about these benefits to the industrial 
sector is whether they were obtained by local industrialists or foreign 
companies, given that part of the subsidy was given through Instruction 113. If 
the marginal increase in industrial growth was only concentrated in the hands 
of foreigners, then the implicit subsidy was not actually reaching the local 
industrialists. 
This was not, however, the case because local industrialists benefited 
significantly from the industrial growth. Instruction 113 investments could 
officially only be made by foreign companies, but most of these companies 
operated by creating new local subsidiaries, investing in existing local 
companies, or creating joint ventures with local industrialists (Andrade & 
Cunha, 2002, p. 3). The motor vehicles sector, which received most of the 
investments via Instruction 113 (32% on average during 1956-1961), opened 
new branches that accounted for about 50% of the investments in the sector 
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(Caputo, 2007, p. 76). The remaining FDI in the sector was fragmented across a 
variety of supply companies for the sector. Out of the original 11 car makers of 
the sector that launched investments in 1956, only in 5 were foreigners the 
majority shareholder, 4 had Brazilian capital as the majority shareholder, and 3 
had at least 50% local ownership. None of them had only foreign ownership 
(Shapiro, 2006, p. 237). Clearly, local industrialists were utilizing foreign capital 
as a complement to develop their business, which allowed them to share the 
benefits from Instruction 113.  A similar situation was observed in the 
chemicals industry, which was the second largest recipient of investments 
under Instruction 113, with 12.5% on average between 1956 and 1961. Large 
foreign producers, such as Bayer, Pfizer, and White Martins, did not make 
more than 25% of the investments in the sector and all had some participation 
of local capital. The rest also fragmented to smaller companies mostly owned 
by local industrialists or joint ventures (Caputo, 2007, p. 77). 
It is not possible to know the exact share of foreign ownership that resulted 
from the Instruction 113 investments, but it is clear that there was significant 
complementarily with local industrialists, who used the channel as an 
opportunity for expanding and forming joint ventures, receiving foreign capital 
and expanding to supply a growing vertically integrated industrial sector. This 
explains why there were no signs of complaints from local industrialists to 
Instruction 113. In fact, there is evidence of the sector publically defending the 
1957 reform in local newspapers, which will be shown below in Section 7.7.  
Finally, it is also interesting to analyze the impact of the new MER system on 
employment in the industrial sector. Advanced industries’ share of 
employment grew significantly in comparison with traditional industries, 
following exactly the same process observed in the overall composition of the 
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industrial sector. Table 8.15 elaborates on this by showing the overall levels and 
shares of employment in industry before and after the 1950s. 
Table 8.15 – Employment Levels and Shares, 1949-1959 
1949 1959 1949 1959 1949-1959
Contribution to Employment 
Growth (in p.p)
Extractive Industries 36,809 45,714 2.7% 2.5% 2.0
Nonmetall ic minerals 128,928 163,680 9.6% 9.1% 7.7
Iron, steel and metal  products 102,826 174,279 7.6% 9.7% 15.8
Machinery 26,600 62,148 2.0% 3.5% 7.8
Eletrical Machinery 15,774 57,904 1.2% 3.2% 9.3
Transport Equipment 20,182 81,876 1.5% 4.6% 13.6
Wood products 68,486 87,822 5.1% 4.9% 4.3
Furniture 38,802 63,471 2.9% 3.5% 5.4
Paper 24,959 40,925 1.9% 2.3% 3.5
Rubber 10,861 20,878 0.8% 1.2% 2.2
Leather 21,196 24,715 1.6% 1.4% 0.8
Chemicals 44,656 76,518 3.3% 4.3% 7.0
Pharmaceutical 17,533 27,066 1.3% 1.5% 2.1
Perfumery 11,283 14,714 0.8% 0.8% 0.8
Plastic products 3,057 9,683 0.2% 0.5% 1.5
Textiles 338,035 328,297 25.1% 18.2% -2.1
Shoes 76,464 97,999 5.7% 5.4% 4.8
Food 234,311 266,103 17.4% 14.8% 7.0
Beverages 39,253 43,880 2.9% 2.4% 1.0
Tobacco 13,008 13,169 1.0% 0.7% 0.0
Printing and publ ishing 49,367 60,625 3.7% 3.4% 2.5
Others 24,033 37,910 1.8% 2.1% 3.1
Total 1,346,423 1,799,376 100.0% 100.0%
Employment % of Total Employment
 
Source: Own construction from IBGE’s industrial censuses of 1949 and 1959. 
Table 8.15 shows some very interesting aspects of employment in the 
manufacturing sector before and after the two MER systems. First, the overall 
level of employment increased by 33.6% during the decade, which is an 
impressive average of more than 3% per year, although it is the same as Brazil’s 
population growth during the period (IBGE, 2017). Second, this increase was 
strongly concentrated in advanced industries, such as steel, machinery, 
transportation, chemicals, etc. Most of the traditional industries saw their 
employment levels growing very slowly or in some cases, such as textiles, 
stagnating during the decade. Third, the final column of the table calculates the 
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contribution to employment growth from each of the sectors in percentage 
points. Some sectors, such as steel and transport equipment (including motor 
vehicles) accounted for more than ten percentage points, and a large number of 
other advanced industries accounted for between five and ten percentage 
points.   
These numbers show how the industrial growth of the 1950s, which was mostly 
the industrial deepening of advanced industries after 1957, also resulted in an 
increase of labor being incorporated into the industrial sector. This fits perfectly 
with the policy objectives of Kubitschek to further stimulate industrial growth 
and benefit an emerging urban labor force, as discussed in Chapter 3. More 
importantly, it shows that given the early completion of import substitution in 
traditional industries, there would probably have been an excess of labor 
without the new phase of industrial growth. The Kubitschek government was 
therefore trying to subsidize industrialists and finance its own role in the 
economy not only to benefit these groups, but also to maintain employment 
growth.  
8.7 The Political Economy of Multiple Exchange Rates 
The quantitative evidence presented so far has analyzed welfare redistribution 
during the two phases of the MER system in Brazil. During the first phase 
importers lost income from the restrictions imposed by the balance of 
payments, as the level of imports fell; exporters’ incomes were partially 
appropriated, but Sumoc gave them the bonuses to compensate for part of their 
loses; industrialists benefited from industrial growth; and the government 
collected taxes from the MER system. During the second phase the 
appropriation of exporters surged with the widening of the gap between the 
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import and export exchange rates; importers had their business taken away, as 
industrialists and the government increasingly imported directly; industrial 
production accelerated based on the subsidy to importing capital goods and the 
government’s increasing role in industrial production; and the government 
funded this new system by collecting revenues from tariffs rather than only 
from the MER auctions. This shift represented, then, a strong government-led 
industrial deepening process. 
The question that remains is whether this shift was intended by policymakers 
or whether it was mostly an unintended consequence of the second MER 
system, which was in fact targeted at the official purpose of complementing the 
first MER system and stimulating the import substitution of advanced sectors. 
The evidence presented so far suggests that the government indeed intended to 
change the source of economic growth from protectionism to having a direct 
presence in the economy and creating channels to subsidize the private 
industrial sector.  
Yet, while the quantitative data suggest this interpretation, the data only 
provide evidence of the outcomes of the policies but not policymakers’ 
intended objectives. Methodologically, this was the same problem observed in 
Chapter 5, where the distribution of foreign exchange was revealed by the data 
rather than by direct evidence from policymakers. Fortunately, qualitative 
evidence supports the above interpretation. 
This section presents new qualitative evidence collected from the archives of 
the Brazilian Central Bank, which contains the Sumoc minutes; the Centro de 
Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil (CPDOC)-FGV 
archive, containing the personal documents of both Vargas and Kubitschek; 
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and contemporary information from the archive of Estado de Sao Paulo, one of 
Brazil's most important newspapers at that time.  
Economic policymaking oscillated significantly during the 1950s, reflecting the 
political transition from Vargas to Kubitschek. The history of Sumoc was full of 
changes due to the fluctuating the influence of the original Sumoquean group, 
the orthodox liberal policymakers, versus the developmentalists, to use Lago’s 
(1982, p. 5) terms. Chapter 4 has shown how during the Vargas years the 
developmentalists were growing in influence within Sumoc, although its 
policies remained balanced, focused strongly on balance of payments stability. 
In the Kubitschek years, by contrast, the developmentalists’ influence was 
much larger, which resulted in deteriorating macroeconomic policies, a larger 
role for industrialization, and the shift of policies in 1957 (Kuperman, 2012; 
Bielshowsky, 1996).  
Primary evidence supports this interpretation, which explains the welfare shift 
observed in the data above. In the Vargas years, discussions of macroeconomic 
stability and balance of payments deficits were central in Sumoc. In 1951, the 
minutes of Meeting 266 from 10th July report one of the first discussions about 
the creation of the free market exchange rate, which was later approved in 
1952. The minutes of the meeting, which was chaired by Finance Minister 
Horacio Lafer, describe a board trying to find a way to correct the balance of 
payments deficit but without finding solutions. In 1952, when the balance of 
payments deficit worsened and before the creation of the free market for the 
exchange rate, the minutes of Meeting 366 of 27th May show Sumoc sending 
guidance to the Banco do Brasil exchange rate director to strictly follow the 
foreign exchange budget authorized by Sumoc earlier in the year. The Finance 
Minister wrote to Banco do Brasil’s exchange rate director:  
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It becomes necessary, with the objective of establishing control over 
the licensing system, and by recording the authorized imports, that 
the department complies with the approved exchange budget. 
(Sumoc Minutes 366, 27/05/1952) 
Sumoc was, at that time, not ready for devaluation or even a gradual 
depreciation of the exchange rate, but the episode shows how the leadership of 
Sumoc was trying to enforce its monetary authority over Banco do Brazil, in 
order to alleviate the shortage of foreign exchange. 
In early 1953, when the balance of payments was in severe deficit and the board 
was looking for solutions to the problem, the minutes of Meeting 360 on 10th 
February show the Sumoc board discussing how the free market exchange rate 
depreciation had not been enough to correct the balance of payments deficits, 
leading to the conclusion that a depreciation of the official rate was needed.  
Essentially, during the whole Vargas period, there are no policy discussions 
inside Sumoc about industrialization. Sumoc seems to have been functioning 
during this period as a true monetary authority, concerned with enforcing 
monetary policy and correcting the balance of payments problems. 
In late 1953, already under Finance Minister Oswaldo Aranha, the minutes 
from Meeting 408 of 9th October present the proposal of Instruction 70 and the 
MER system to the Sumoc board. Instead of a discussion about the various 
rates and how to protect different industrial sectors, his presentation essentially 
argued that the new system would bring equilibrium back to the economy, 
reducing the balance of payments deficits and inflation:  
[…] the virtues of the new plan are, he noted among other things, the 
normalization of the trade balance and the country's balance of payments, 
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the end of commercial delays, and the liquidation of all foreign exchange 
liabilities from the Government; moreover, he stressed the need to 
achieve equilibrium between inflation and deflation. (Sumoc Minutes 408, 
9/10/1953) 
The discussion that followed Aranha’s presentation concentrated on 
macroeconomic stability. It covered how importers could participate in the 
auctions and how much the system would adjust the balance of payments. The 
minutes do not show any evidence that the system was targeting 
industrialization, or how the five categories of the MER system were selected.  
These minutes do not explicitly state policymakers’ objectives, although they 
provide evidence of the topics and concerns of their discussions. Nonetheless, 
there is evidence that directly identifies the objectives of the MER system under 
Vargas. On the 10th October 1953, Vargas received a 30-page dossier prepared 
by Sumoc and the Finance Minister with information about the new system 
and its design. The document was found in the CPDOC-FGV archive, 
belonging to Vargas’ personal files. Most of the document contains an 
explanation of how the MER system would work and what was included in the 
categories. It was clearly targeted at persuading the president of the importance 
of the new system. The most interesting part of the document is a page called 
‘The 12 Advantages of Sumoc's New Instruction’, which has a simple list of 
objectives of the first MER regime: 
1 – Institutionalizes the distribution of foreign exchange, solving the problem 
of CEXIM [Banco do Brasil’ department responsible for distributing foreign 
exchange during the import licensing system]; 
2 – Solves the problem of expensive exports; 
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3 – Meets the demand of coffee producers;  
4 – Eliminates the foreign exchange appropriation [of coffee exports]; 
5 – Favors production and exports; discourages imports that have been 
subsidized; 
6 – Concentrates high sums of funding in Banco do Brasil, which will be used 
for productive development; 
7 – Guarantees the payment of all imports, avoiding new trade payment 
delays; 
8 – Guarantees enough funding for the foreign exchange obligations of Banco 
do Brasil; 
9 – Exempts Banco do Brasil from having to intervene in the exchange 
market; 
10 – Prevents, or restricts to the minimum, superfluous imports, establishing 
a true progressive taxation on imported goods; 
11 – Guarantees trade balance equilibrium; 
12 – Guarantees balance of payments equilibrium […]  
(Dossier for President Getulio Vargas, Ministry of Finance, CPDOC-FGV, 1953, 
pp. 4-5) 
As part of a private internal document, prepared just for the President, the list 
is quite impressive as it highlights the ‘true’ objectives of the system in a way 
no other official document or secondary study has done before. There are 
several interesting points to be made. First, the main emphasis on trade and 
balance of payments stability, which confirms that this was the primary 
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objective of the first MER system. Second, the concern with exporters and 
coffee producers (points 2, 3, and 4). As the quantitative evidence highlighted 
above, the first MER system reflects clearly officials’ and Vargas’ concern for 
coffee exporters and interest in promoting manufactured exports, although 
exporters as a whole were ultimately expropriated in the system. Third, the 
emphasis on development through import substitution (points 5, 6, 8, and 10). 
This was not seen in any of the minutes and other official documents, but it 
makes clear that the first MER system had as a secondary objective the 
reduction of unnecessary imports and a more progressive taxation system that 
was targeted at stimulating import substitution in advanced sectors. For this 
reason, the dossier went on to provide the president with a detailed list of all 
goods included in each of the five categories of the system. 
Overall, the document seems to be a definitive confirmation of the political 
objectives of the first MER system, reflecting perfectly the outcomes seen in the 
quantitative data. The political objectives of the first MER system were 
essentially to adjust the balance of payments, but they were also concerned 
with exporters and secondarily designed to support industrialization. Finally, it 
is important to highlight that the document does not give any indication that 
the first system was targeted at increasing government revenues. This would 
change with the second system after 1957. 
In 1954 and 1955, during the transitional presidency of João Café Filho, Sumoc 
shifted towards very conservative policymakers and was ruled by the original 
group of founders. This was the time of Instruction 113, which was originally 
planned by policymakers as a way to attract foreign capital and gradually start 
reopening the economy. During the discussion around the creation of this 
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instrument, Finance Minister Gudin gave a detailed account of how he 
understood Instruction 113: 
In relation to foreign investments, carried out in the country through 
imported equipment without exchange coverage [though Instruction 
113], I believe that one should not impose restrictions other than those 
concerning the verification of the legitimacy of the investment itself. 
There are people who judge foreign investment as having drawbacks in 
encouraging production that is not essential to the economy. They 
condemn, for example, capital inputs to produce perfumes, soft drinks, 
and other items considered superfluous. We have to agree, however, that 
these represent production aimed at meeting market demand. If we 
forbid the entry of equipment for this purpose, in reality it will do 
nothing more than encourage the monopolistic position of those who 
already operate this business in the country.  […] If the investment is 
legitimate, that is, if it is established that the entry of equipment is not 
made at the expense of our scarce foreign exchange, it is hard to condemn 
it. (Sumoc Minutes 507, 17/01/1954) 
Clearly, his words show that the original objective of Instruction 113 was to 
open the economy to foreign investments as a way to gradually liberalize trade 
and exchange rate markets. This was, however, the last period when Sumoc 
actively participated in policymaking. Sumoc lost influence under Kubitschek 
and the Ministry of Finance was the only central authority for policy decisions. 
According to Malan (1974, p. 3), Sumoc lost all its influence during the new 
government and only returned to center stage in 1961, when Jânio Quadros 
became President and brought Bulhões back to end the MER system. This shift 
was a reflection of the lack of attention paid by the new administration to 
macroeconomic stability, inflation, and the balance of payments.  
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The lack of consideration given to these key problems is clear from the minutes 
of Sumoc’s meetings during this second period. In many important moments, 
particularly during the shift of the system in 1957 following the new tariffs law, 
there is nothing reported from the Sumoc board on how the exchange rate 
system would work under the new legislation. In fact, there is no reported 
discussion at all during the whole period about exchange rate policies. Sumoc 
was governed by seven different executive directors – a huge number 
compared to just three under Vargas – who were mostly just managing 
exchange rate operations, rather than producing policies. 
This can be observed in the massive amount of authorizations under 
Instruction 113 for capital goods in the form of foreign direct investments for 
different firms found in the minutes. The minutes describe the company, the 
size of the investment, the imported goods, and the final decision from Sumoc. 
There is no reporting of internal discussions about whether each investment 
was important or not, and everything seems to have been authorized. In fact, 
exactly because the minutes present company names and the size of their 
financial transactions under Instruction 113, the Brazilian Central Bank resisted 
making these documents public. According to the Central Bank, this would 
have broken the financial confidentiality of those firms. The Central Bank only 
authorized the citation of policy discussion and not the data gathered on the 
companies and their financial flows. 
In relation to the 1957 shift to the new MER regime, Sumoc did not have a 
single reported discussion about the reduction of the number of categories or 
how much foreign exchange would be allocated to the new MER system. 
According to the minutes from Meeting 661 on 9th August 1957, following the 
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congressional approval of the new tariffs law Number 3244, the board of 
Sumoc took the following decision: 
The Council notes the terms of the report forwarded on 30/07/57 to the 
Honorable Minister of Finance, regarding the actions with the IMF in 
order to obtain the approval of that body for the simplifications in the 
exchange rate mechanism for imports as a result the new tariff law. 
(Sumoc Minutes 661, 9/8/1957) 
Sumoc simplified the system and seems to have allowed imports outside the 
auctions imports via exemptions and Instruction 113 to rise without really 
discussing it. However, while in the Sumoc documents there is only omission, 
there is primary evidence elsewhere to identify more clearly the political 
objectives of the second system. In relation to the evidence that the objective of 
the second system was in practice to increase imports outside the auctions 
rather than stimulating further import substitution, when assuming the 
Ministry in 1958, Finance Minister Lucas Lopes stated that ‘[t]he very process 
of economic development, during the initial phase of rapid structural change, 
rapidly intensifies the demand for imports’ (Bulhões, 1959, p. 57). 
This is supported by the fact that most of the meetings’ minutes were basically 
spent authorizing imports via Instruction 113. Even at the peak of inflation and 
balance of payments disequilibrium in 1959 and 1960, Sumoc seems unworried 
about these issues and the policy system continued, supported by the Finance 
Minister. There is further evidence to support this interpretation. In an editorial 
in May of 1957 Estado de São Paulo, one of Brazil's largest newspapers, with a 
right-wing conservative approach, discussed the proposed tariffs and exchange 
rate reform. The newspaper was the reflection of the UDN and the conservative 
elite’s stance on economic policy at that time. The editorial makes two 
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important points about the proposed reform. First, it criticizes the overlap 
between the tariffs and the exchange rate auctions. It argues that the 
government should choose between the two, and that maintaining both 
together would open space for discretionary choices, returning the import 
system to its previous condition prior to 1953. The newspaper is clearly 
adopting a stance against the project, claiming it was a return to a more 
discretionary policy system rather than a more market oriented one. Second, 
and interestingly, it claims the new system has the benefit of increasing 
government revenues with the substitution of the agios for tariffs revenues. It 
states that ‘[i]t should be recognized that the transfer of most of the funds from 
the agios, now in the form of customs revenues, to the government budget will 
be an advantage compared to the current system’ (Estado de São Paulo, 9/5/1957, 
p. 19). 
As a conservative newspaper, the Estado de São Paulo clearly had a negative 
view of the overall reform, as it saw the system returning to discretion, which 
would impact the balance of payments. Nonetheless, it saw the increased 
revenues as a positive aspect of the government plan. It implicitly suggested 
that the objective of substituting government revenues from the MER system 
with tariffs was an important aspect of the second system, even though officials 
never stated that publically or in Sumoc’s minutes. It is interesting to find this 
evidence exactly in a source that was against the new system. As the data 
above has shown, the new MER system indeed substituted the source of 
revenues, becoming an essential means to finance the government’s increasing 
role in the economy. 
Again, the omissions from Sumoc’s minutes reinforce this interpretation. The 
minutes always reported the overall level of agios, but never discussed that 
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these agios were falling rapidly during the second MER system. They were 
being replaced by tariff revenues, but since the agios were the source of funding 
for Sumoc to pay the bonus to exporters, Sumoc had every reason to be worried 
about their reduction. The omission suggests that officials were not worried 
about the increase in the gap between the two exchange rates, and the growing 
subsidy this appropriation provided to imports outside the auctions. During 
the Vargas period, the bonus is described as shown above as an important 
instrument to compensate exporters, whereas in the second phase this clearly 
did not matter. 
Another interesting piece of qualitative evidence about the 1957 reform comes 
from another article in Estado de São Paulo, two months later on 6th June 1957, 
when the newspaper discussed the impact of the upcoming tariffs reform and 
presented a debate between industrialists and exporters. It reports that the 
agricultural producers were accusing the reform of only benefiting 
industrialists and recreating the exchange rate appropriation of the sector, 
which clearly happened, as seen in the data above. The newspaper reports the 
response from industrialists, who claimed this was not the case and that the 
reform only had the objective of substituting the protection of the MERs for 
tariffs, which was exactly the official line. This is evidence that coffee exporters 
knew they would lose welfare with the new system, and the conservative 
newspaper provided them the space to present their stance. Industrialists, who 
were about to gain significantly from the new system, responded with the 
official explanation.  
Overall, the qualitative documents and public debates discussed in this section 
provide consistent evidence of the implicit objectives of the two policy systems, 
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supporting the outcomes observed in the data seen in the first part of the 
chapter.  
8.8 Chapter Conclusions  
Based on quantitative and qualitative material, this chapter has provided a new 
interpretation to explain the welfare redistribution of the two phases of the 
MER regime. It showed Sumoc was at first an institution designing policy for 
macroeconomic stability, while also focusing secondarily on industrialists and 
exporters. During this period, importers suffered restrictions on their business 
because of the necessary adjustment of the balance of payments, exporters 
suffered some appropriation of their income but still had the bonus to 
compensate for part of their losses, and the industrial sector gained from 
protection.  
During the second phase the objectives changed under the new administration. 
The second system was designed to produce a national development strategy 
of industrial deepening. It resulted in a growing appropriation of the exporters’ 
incomes, the transfer of the import business from importers directly to 
industrialists and government, and a shift in government revenues from the 
MER auctions to tariffs, in order to fund the state’s increasing role in the 
industrial take off.  
Returning to the initial question of why the Kubitschek administration did not 
keep the original system in place, given that it had effective macroeconomic 
results, the interpretation presented in this chapter shows that by responding to 
much more pro-industrial and urban constituencies, the second system was 
used to produce a different model for industrial growth, given the exhaustion 
of the traditional substitution scheme. This resulted in industrial deepening at 
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the expense of inflation and balance of payments stability, with the cost passed 
to exporters and importers.  
This interpretation provides contributions to different bodies of literature 
related to this topic. For the Brazilian literature on the MER experience (Baer, 
2009; Figueiredo Filho, 2005; Lago, 1982; Vianna, 1987; Sochaczewski, 1981), it 
completes the interpretation of the peak and decline of the MER system, 
providing a new interpretation of the shift to the second system. It strongly 
challenges the idea that the system’s two periods were complementary to each 
other, and shows they were designed to support the different political interests 
of the two governments. More specifically, the chapter has quantified the 
impact of the shift on the welfare of the different groups. Finally, it reinforces 
the finding that the first MER system had an effective design that declined 
because of the changes in the second phase. 
For the literature on import substitution in Brazil, both from the 1970s and 
1980s (Baer, 1972; Tavares, 1975; Bergman, 1970; Weisskoff, 1980; Versiani & 
Barros, 1977), as well as the more recent revisions (Abreu et al, 1997; Colistete, 
2006; Villela, 2011; Aldrigui & Colistete, 2013), it further challenges the 
consensus on the period. The evidence shows that there was no import 
substitution of advanced sectors in the last part of the 1950s, and that 
industrialization was reached through the channels of subsidizing capital 
goods imports and direct government participation in the economy. Finally, for 
the broader literature on ISI in Latin America, it qualifies the Brazilian 
experience in comparison to the rest of the region. Brazil in the 1950s differs 
from the ISI model (Taylor, 1998; Haber, 2006; Hirschman, 1966; Teitel & 
Thoumi, 1986; Coatsworth & Williamson, 2004; Leff, 1967), which has focused 
on tariffs and exchange controls as the traditional instruments of protection to 
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stimulate industrialization in the region. Brazil's history fits better with authors 
who have focused on the state’s role in industrialization (Kaufman, 1990; 
Lewis, 2005; Fishlow, 1972; Baer; 1972; Bergman, 1970), and has strong 
similarities to the model of industrial deepening that is commonly used to used 
to interpret Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s (O’Donnell, 1973; Serra, 1978; 
Bielshovwsky & Stumpo, 1995).   
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9. Conclusions  
This dissertation began by arguing that the experience with MERs during the 
1950s provided a unique case study to understand the economic history of 
Brazil, while also contributing to larger bodies of literature on industrialization 
in Latin America and exchange controls under the Bretton Woods system. 
These historiographical debates were presented in Chapters 2 and 3, which 
were then followed by new evidence that challenged many aspects of the 
existing literature on these topics. This evidence was mostly based on a new 
MER dataset, gathered from primary sources from the period, and which 
includes the quantities, prices, revenues, and subsidies of the system and 
differs substantially from the existing statistical sources. It is per se a new data 
source for the period and should be a lasting contribution of this research. 
This data has been used in a sequential methodological approach of first 
presenting and testing the MER regime’s empirical results, followed by a 
counterfactual exercise to test the effects of the MERs on sectoral industrial 
growth, and then exploring the political economy aspects of the system. In this 
way, it has led to a new interpretation of the MER experience in Brazil in 
Chapters 4 to 8. This concluding chapter revisits the conclusions and highlights 
the contributions this dissertation provides to the literature on Brazil's MER, 
industrialization in Latin America and exchange controls under the Bretton 
Woods system. The chapter starts by revising the conclusions of the chapters, 
then connects them to the broader literature, and finally concludes by arguing 
that the MER regime in Brazil was a ‘successful’ case of exchange controls 
under the Bretton Woods arrangement. 
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Chapter 2 reviewed the international context of the Bretton Woods period and 
the theoretical debates about exchange and capital controls. The chapter has 
demonstrated the need for more empirical case studies on controls that can 
tackle both the effectiveness of the systems, including counterfactual exercises, 
and also their political economy, which has been a central reason for the 
adoption of these instruments in history. It has shown the limited literature on 
exchange controls specifically in the Bretton Woods period, especially 
regarding how they related to the instability of the system in its early years.  
Chapter 3 presented the historical and historiographical context of 1950s Brazil, 
placing the Brazilian case within the general Latin American context of 
industrialization. The chapter showed the impressive industrial growth and the 
shift from traditional to advanced industries in the 1950s, but also that the 
explanation of this process is not fully established. The typical ISI model with 
its strong focuse on protectionist instruments is too narrow to explain it, as the 
government played a larger role than is normally supposed, particularly given 
the lack of tariffs in post-war Brazil.  
Chapters 5 revisited the peak and decline of the Brazilian MER system between 
1953 and 1961. The evidence showed that the first MER system of 1953-1957 
successfully adjusted the balance of payments, while at the same time 
supporting macroeconomic conditions. The system’s auction mechanism 
allowed the exchange rate to endogenously depreciate, correcting for a long 
period of overvaluation. The decay and eventual collapse followed many 
changes introduced in 1957, particularly the exemptions to the system, which 
allowed foreign exchange to be distributed outside of the auctions. Combined 
with rising pressures from expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, this 
undermined the balance of payments toward the end of the decade, resulting in 
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the collapse of the MER system, which forced a one-off devaluation of the 
official exchange rate and recourse to the IMF. The system did not collapse 
because of its original design or the fall of export receipts from coffee 
producers, like it has been assumed by the literature, but because of its gradual 
disuse. Import levels rose rapidly and the balance of payments eventually 
collapsed in the early 1960s. This new interpretation of the peak and decline of 
the system shows that the two phases of the MER regime were in fact different 
systems, resulting in distinct macroeconomic outcomes 
Chapter 6 has showed, based on the new dataset of the MER auction system, 
that the effective results obtained in the first phase were not only the result of 
the centralization of foreign exchange in the system but mostly due to officials 
using the auctions to both force buyers out of the auctions and depreciate 
exchange rates, while also adopting a responsive approach to changes in 
market demand so that the gap between supplied and auctioned foreign 
exchange did not increase too much. This was done both by controlling the 
supply of foreign exchange to the auctions and also by setting minimum prices 
for each category at each moment in time. The econometric exercises suggest 
officials were not committing systematic mistakes with the supply of foreign 
exchange and were looking at the free market exchange rate to determine how 
much to provide to each category and to set minimum prices in the following 
month. This mechanism worked as an intermediary system that helped to 
gradually depreciate the exchange rate after a long period of overvaluation, 
with Sumoc ‘guiding the invisible hand’ of the market for an effective outcome 
between 1953 and 1957.  
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Chapter 7 performed a counterfactual exercise to assess whether sectoral 
industrial production would have been different if every industrial sector had 
received the same market exchange rate. By replacing the auction exchange rate 
with the free market exchange rate for a pool of industrial sectors, the test 
assessed whether the effective macroeconomic results observed during the first 
phase of the MER were also not generating important ‘distortions’ for the rest 
of the economy. Chapter 7 also performed a test on the effectiveness of the 
MER system as an instrument of import substitution industrialization for 
advanced sectors, since the existence of ‘distortions’ on sectoral industrial 
growth – better or worse performance of a sector with the MER system – would 
suggest that it was an effective policy tool to stimulate industrialization and 
affect the performance of different sectors. The results reveal that during the 
whole period of the auctions, the overall level of ‘distortions’ was minimal, 
both for individual sectors as well as for the industrial sector as a whole. The 
counterfactual exercise also reinforced the conclusions from Chapters 5 and 6 
which suggested a system effective at balancing macroeconomic conditions 
during its first phase.   
Chapter 8 assessed why the original system was not kept in place after 1957 if it 
produced effective macroeconomic results in its original design and did not 
cause ‘distortions’. Based on quantitative and qualitative evidence, the chapter 
presented evidence of welfare redistribution during the two phases of the MER 
regime in Brazil to unveil the different utility functions of policymakers. The 
chapter concluded that Sumoc was, during its first phase in the Vargas years, 
an institution designed primarily for macroeconomic stability, while also 
balancing the interests of industrialists and traditional coffee exporters. During 
the first phase, from a welfare perspective, importers suffered restrictions on 
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their business because of the necessary adjustment of the external accounts; 
exporters suffered some appropriation of their income but still had the MER 
bonus to compensate for part of their losses; and the industrial sector benefited 
from industrial growth.  
During the second phase after 1957, the MER system was part of a national 
development strategy with industrial deepening as its main channel to 
generate the accelerated industrial growth of advanced sectors. It resulted in a 
larger appropriation of exporters’ income; the transfer of the import business 
directly to industrialists and the government; and shifted the government’s 
main source of revenues from the MER system to tariffs to fund it increasing 
participation in industrialization. This redistribution created the incentives and 
channels for an industrial deepening process in Brazil, which was the main 
objective of the Kubitschek government, but left macroeconomic balance aside. 
The quantification of these welfare changes and channels to support 
industrialization were an important finding of Chapter 8. 
These conclusions can be placed in a larger context. In Brazil’s economic 
historiography, the 1950s are seen as an important period of industrialization, 
modernization, and successful economic growth. For scholars and the public, 
Vargas and particularly Kubitschek are remembered with nostalgia as leaders 
who achieved rapid economic development. The ISI model, as shown, plays a 
central role in this interpretation, with protectionist instruments seen as the 
force that broke with the dependency on agricultural commodity exports and 
allowed the country to industrialize. This broader interpretation of the period 
is the reason why the literature on the Brazilian MER regime, as shown 
throughout this dissertation, has adopted the ISI model framed by American 
scholars as its interpretative framework. This literature interpreted the changes 
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in 1957 to the second MER system as a mean to create further differentiation 
between sectors, ascribing the decay of the system to external shocks, rather 
than as the result of the policy shift. They have also assumed the MER system 
was effective in its first period, but never explained why and how 
policymakers made it work. 
This dissertation has revised this interpretation of the economic history of 
Brazil in the 1950s. It presents the reasons for how and why the system initially 
worked but then stopped working. The dissertation demonstrates that during 
the first stage macroeconomic stability was intended, the system had a complex 
and effective design for reducing import levels, and authorities responded to 
market fluctuations to achieve those results. The MER system between 1953 
and 1957 was not just a 'mirage', but indeed a 'miracle' combination of 
macroeconomic stability, industrialization and economic development 
resulting from an effective design and a responsive approach from 
policymakers. At the same time, the dissertation identifies the shift in the 
system and how this led to its collapse in the later part of the 1950s. Thus, it 
breaks the existing view that links Instructions 70 and 113 and the two phases 
as complementary steps of import substitution. The 1957 reform and 
Instruction 113 dismantled the original system, rather than complemented the 
original Instruction 70. 
For the literature on Brazil’s industrialization, Chapters 7 and 8 also contribute 
to the interpretation of the industrial shift in the 1950s. The findings do not 
challenge the facts, which were (1) a major increase in industrial production 
during the decade, and (2) an important shift in its composition to advanced 
industries in the last part of the decade. But the new evidence does show the 
substitution of imports was mostly completed before the start of the decade 
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and the process seen afterwards was not produced by tariffs or MER 
protectionism, as is commonly believed, but by an industrial deepening that 
used different forms of subsidies to the private sector to import cheap capital 
goods, and also saw an increased government participation in the economy. In 
fact, the challenge to the ISI consensus can be taken a step further. Although 
scholars from the ISI consensus have been searching for the earlier presence of 
tariffs as the instrument behind industrialization in the first half of the 
twentieth century, as presented in Chapter 3, the existing research by Brazilian 
scholars shows that the early stages of industrialization in Brazil were mostly 
the result of external shocks or unintended policies during the first half of the 
twentieth century. This dissertation then further challenges the relevance of the 
ISI model and its instruments to the post-war period, raising the questions of 
whether the ISI model, as it is mainly understood in the literature, has ever 
been a reality in Brazil? The conclusions of this research challenge the adequacy 
of the ISI model for Brazilian economic history as a whole. Industrialization 
was first the result of shocks or the unintended consequences of other policies, 
resulting in import substitution in traditional sectors in the first half of the 
century, and then the result of a major government-led effort in the post-war 
period to expand the industrial sector to advanced industries. These 
conclusions suggest Brazilian industrialization in the 1950s should be 
interpreted as a broader government-led effort using subsidies and direct state 
participation with the goal of 'industrial deepening', rather than based on the 
ISI model and its protectionist instruments.   
Finally, this dissertation also casts a shadow of doubt over some strong 
perceptions scholars and the public have about the Vargas and Kubitschek 
presidencies. Vargas policies resulted in a system that balanced macroeconomic 
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stability with industrial growth, while Kubitschek orchestrated even faster 
industrialization but with major macroeconomic costs. His government 
challenged the decline in the pace of growth that followed the completion of 
import substitution in the traditional sectors, but at the expense of the public 
finances, the balance of payments, and inflation. The crisis that resulted from 
these policies in 1961 brought three years of recession, which ultimately 
contributed to the rise of the military dictatorship in 1964. Although historical 
counterfactuals do not exist, an important question raised by the findings of 
this thesis is whether the macroeconomic costs of industrialization between 
1957 and 1961 were worth it. 
The dissertation has also contributed to the broader historiography of Latin 
America’s industrialization. By reinterpreting the case of Brazil in the 1950s, 
showing that tariffs and the MER system were not instruments of import 
substitution, this research also challenges a large set of assumptions of the 
broader ISI model which has been applied to the region as a whole. Rather than 
looking for the earlier use of tariffs in the region as the source for 
industrialization and questioning whether Latin America has always been 
protectionist, the scholarship should shift its focus to test the causal 
relationships between policy instruments and the economic outcomes. Brazil 
clearly does not fit the ISI model, and this raises the question of whether 
industrialization in other cases of the region has also resulted from alternative 
channels of policymaking.  
Finally, the dissertation has also contributed to the broader debate on exchange 
controls and the assumed instability of the Bretton Woods system. Brazil’s use 
of MERs was a response to adverse conditions that made the MER system 
necessary to remain within the structure of the Bretton Woods arrangement. 
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Brazil did not follow the IMF policy guidebook and used the MER system with 
effective macroeconomic results. Its unique design, with centralization and the 
auctions mechanism, was a more inventive and effective approach than the 
other cases in the region. The IMF was therefore wrong to assume that 
exchange controls were a source of instability in the Bretton Woods system, as 
is most of the literature in assuming that the Bretton Woods system was a 
stable monetary arragement. This case study shows that controls, if well 
implemented, were in fact part of the solution to the instability of the Bretton 
Woods regime.  
In fact, by identifying the reasons for the effective results of a case of controls in 
history, this research also contributes to the current policy debate around 
controls, which still has the IMF not entirely sure of where and when these 
instruments should be adopted. In one of its most recent staff discussion notes, 
the IMF conclusion was that ‘[f]or reasons that are not yet fully understood, 
capital controls and related prudential measures achieve their stated objectives 
in some cases but not in others, and it is not possible to draw definitive 
conclusions’ (Habermeier et al, 2011, p. 4). This dissertation reinforces that 
there is nothing a priori wrong with these instruments. This case study does not 
prove exchange controls can be used at any moment or in any circumstance, 
but it suggests that when there is a foreign exchange shortage, such as the early 
years of the Bretton Woods arrangement, they can be a quite effective system 
and could perhaps be replicated elsewhere in similar circumstances. 
Brazil's MER experience was thus a ‘successful’ case of exchange controls. The 
main thesis of this dissertation was a new novel explanation for the peak and 
decline of this ‘successful’ experience. The effectiveness during its first phase 
between 1953 and 1957 is explained by a responsive approach from authorities 
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to changes in market demand. This resulted in a controlled depreciation of the 
exchange rates, which did not produce ‘distortions’ for the economy and 
stabilized the balance of payments and other macroeconomic conditions. The 
decay and collapse of the MER system are explained by the rise in imports 
outside the auction system between 1957 and 1961. They were used to 
subsidize the private sector and finance the increased government role in the 
economy. The system after 1957 produced industrialization of advanced 
sectors, but at the expense of macroeconomic stability. There are no historical 
counterfactuals to show what would have happened if the original system had 
been kept in place after 1957 and how long it would have lasted. But this 
dissertation has showed that Brazil's MER was not just a 'mirage', but a 
'miracle' experience which still today has a lot to teach economic historians. 
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11. Appendix 1 – Econometrics for Chapter 7 
This appendix presents complementary econometric tests for robustness for 
Chapter 7.  
The appendix is divided into three parts. Subsection 11.1 presents the estimate 
for the SER and the cointegration test between the SER and the free market 
exchange rate. 
Subsection 11.2 presents unit root tests, cointegration, and VEC results as 
robustness exercises for the regressions of Section 7.5. The unit root tests for the 
industrial sectors and ERPs both in levels and first differences show that all 
variables are not stationary in levels, but are in difference, permitting time 
series regressions to be performed. Additional explanation is provided below 
about the cointegration and VEC estimates 
Sub-section 11.3 presents two alternative groups of regressions as robustness 
exercises for Section 7.5. Additional explanation is also provided below. 
11.1 Estimating the SER  
The estimation of the SER follows the methodology proposed by Brandão and 
Carvalho (1991) in a World Bank study, which as discussed in Chapter 6 
provides a formula that well reflects the concept of the SER. The authors 
propose the following formula to estimate the SER: 
 
where,  is the demand for foreign exchange,  is the supply of foreign 
exchange,  is the official nominal exchange rate,  is  at the official 
 
 
375 
 
exchange rate ,   is the SER,   is the price elasticity of foreign exchange 
demand,  is the price elasticity of foreign exchange supply,  is the true 
import tariff and  the true export tariff (or subsidy).  
To estimate the SER, the true import and export tariffs were obtained from 
Morley (1969), who estimated the tariffs and export subsidies per sector for the 
period of the MER system, including the effect of the different exchange rates 
for each sector. For the price elasticities, the same values applied by Brandão 
and Carvalho (1991) were also adopted.  In the absence of reliable estimates for 
the price elasticities, they adopt the hypothetical values of  and  and 
argue that these values are close to those presented in other studies that used 
the elasticity approach for the Brazilian case. Supply and demand for foreign 
exchange were obtained from the import and export data from IBGE, using the 
same procedure from Brandão and Carvalho (1991). With this data it was 
possible to construct a proxy of the SER for the whole period of the MER 
system. Figure 11.1 shows the SER estimate in comparison with the free market 
exchange and also the weighted average MER. 
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Figure 11.1 – Proxy SER Estimate 
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Figure 11.1 shows some interesting aspects of the SER estimate. First, after 
correcting for supply and demand for foreign exchange and the true import 
and export tariffs (which include the MER subsidies) on the official exchange 
rate, the resulting series is similar to the free market exchange rate and the 
MER weighted exchange rate. This is not a surprise since the construction of 
the SER was essentially to apply the different protection instruments and the 
gap between supply and demand for foreign exchange to the official exchange 
rate. The result is a series that is close to the weighted MER and the free market 
exchange rate. It is also worth noting that this SER estimate seems to have 
fluctuated following a similar pattern as the other two series.  The correlation 
between the SER and the free market exchange rate is of 65%. 
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To make sure that the free market rate can be used as a proxy for the SER in the 
regressions, a cointegration test between the SER and the free market rate was 
performed. Table 11.2 shows the unit root tests and Table 11.3 the cointegration 
test. The tests follow the same procedure adopted in Chapter 5. 
Table 11.2 – Unit Root Tests 
ADF T-Statistic P-value Outcome
Level
Free Market -1.366 0.8615 I (1)
SER -2.75 0.22 I (1)
1st Difference
Free Market -6.45 0*** I (0)
SER -10.16 0*** I (0)
KPPS LM-Stat Outcome
Level
Free Market 0.15 I (1)
SER 0.17 I (1)
1st Difference
Free Market 0.11 I (0)
SER 0.06 I (0)  
Table 11.3 – Cointegration Tests 
Trace Max-Eigen
None 0.37 0.37
At Most 1 0.015** 0.016**
N=62
Free Market and SER
Johansen Cointegration Test
 
Table 11.2 shows that the two variables are I(1), which means they are non-
stationary and a cointegration test between them can be performed.  Table 11.3 
shows that the two series cointegrate according to both the trace and Max-
Eigen approaches of the Johansen test. This confirms that the two series have a 
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long-term relationship, and validates that the free market exchange can be used 
a good proxy for the SER in the regressions of Chapter 6. 
11.2 Unit Roots, Cointegration and VECS 
Tables 11.4 present the unit root tests.  
Table 11.4 – Unit Root Tests 
Level T-Statistic P-value Rejects Unit Root
Food -0.95 0.76 No
Beverages -2.33 0.16 No
Rubber -1.06 0.72 No
Leather -2.14 0.22 No
Cement -1.34 0.6 No
Extractive -0.55 0.87 No
Tobacco -2.14 0.22 No
Steel -0.38 0.96 No
Textiles -1.36 0.59 No
Paper -0.79 0.81 No
1st Difference T-Statistic P-value Rejects Unit Root
Food -10.2 0 Yes
Beverages -7.35 0 Yes
Rubber -15.15 0 Yes
Leather -4.57 0 Yes
Cement -11.96 0 Yes
Extractive -8.9 0 Yes
Tobacco -4.57 0 Yes
Steel -11.68 0 Yes
Textiles -4.54 0 Yes
Paper -6.75 0 Yes
Level T-Statistic P-value Rejects Unit Root
ERP Food -1.748622 0.4034 No
ERP Beverages -1.875567 0.3423 No
ERP Rubber -1.778382 0.3888 No
ERP Leather -1.866514 0.3465 No
ERP Cement -1.987651 0.2917 No
ERP Extractive -1.648037 0.4539 No
ERP Tobacco -1.254114 0.6475 No
ERP Steel -2.031004 0.2733 No
ERP Textiles -1.545538 0.5059 No
ERP Paper -1.504704 0.5266 No
1st Difference T-Statistic P-value Rejects Unit Root
ERP Food -11.44182 0.0001 Yes
ERP Beverages -8.782918 0 Yes
ERP Rubber -11.16492 0.0001 Yes
ERP Leather -10.43288 0 Yes
ERP Cement -7.431316 0 Yes
ERP Extractive -8.066708 0 Yes
ERP Tobacco -10.06469 0 Yes
ERP Steel -9.562907 0 Yes
ERP Textiles -9.342295 0 Yes
ERP Paper -8.928508 0 Yes  
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Sources: Own construction. MER data comes from the new dataset collected from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports 
(1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. 
Sectoral industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica. 
 
Table 11.5 presents the cointegration tests between all industrial sectors and the 
ERP of that sector. The results show the existence of long-term relationships 
between the industrial production of each sector and the ERP of that sector, 
which guarantees that the regressions of Section 7.5 are not spurious. 
Table 11.5 – Cointegration Tests 
Test Type Data Trend None None Linear Linear Quad
Intercept No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Trend No No No Trend Trend
Trace 0 1 1 1 2
Max-Eig 0 1 1 1 2
Trace 0 1 1 1 2
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 2
Trace 0 1 2 0 2
Max-Eig 0 1 2 0 2
Trace 0 1 0 0 2
Max-Eig 0 0 0 0 0
Trace 1 0 0 0 2
Max-Eig 0 0 0 0 0
Trace 1 0 0 0 2
Max-Eig 1 0 0 1 2
Trace 0 1 1 1 2
Max-Eig 0 1 1 1 2
Trace 2 1 0 0 0
Max-Eig 2 0 0 0 0
Trace 0 1 1 1 2
Max-Eig 0 1 1 1 2
Trace 0 0 0 1 2
Max-Eig 0 0 0 1 2
Cement
Extractive
Tobacco
Steel
Textiles
Paper
ERP
Food
Beverages
Rubber
Leather
 
Sources: Own construction. MER data comes from the new dataset collected from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports 
(1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. 
Sectoral industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica. 
 
Table 11.6 presents the results of the VEC estimates between each industrial 
sector and its corresponding ERP. The VECs could only be performed given the 
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existence of cointegration equations between all the sectors and their 
corresponding ERPs shown in Table 11.5 above. 
The VEC exercises are an additional robustness check to support the results 
obtained in Section 7.5. A few points are worth highlighting from the VEC 
results. First, they show that the short-term correction happens with the ERPs 
preceding the industrial sector series. The coefficients are also very small, 
similar to the regressions, which suggests that this impact is very limited. This 
shows that there is no inverse causality for any of the 10 sectors used in the 
regressions. The VEC does not indicate a short-term correction with the 
industrial sectors explaining future variations in the ERPs, which would 
suggest endogeneity.  
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Table 11.6 – VEC Estimates 
Food ERP Extractive ERP
Food - -0.980 Coef Extractive - -0.075 Coef
(-1) - 0.370 P-value (-1) - 0.270 P-value
ERP -0.045 - Coef ERP -0.095 - Coef
(-1) 0.047** - P-value (-1) 0.013 - P-value
Beverages ERP Tobacco ERP
Beverages - -0.200 Coef Beverages - -0.200 Coef
(-1) - 0.210 P-value (-1) - 0.340 P-value
ERP 0.038 - Coef ERP 0.015 - Coef
(-1) 0.045** - P-value (-1) 0.290 - P-value
Rubber ERP Steel ERP
Rubber - 0.100 Coef Steel - -0.440 Coef
(-1) - 0.200 P-value (-1) - 0.140 P-value
ERP 0.079 - Coef ERP -0.050 - Coef
(-1) 0.200 - P-value (-1) 0.035*** - P-value
Leather ERP Textiles ERP
Leather - 0.220 Coef Textile - 0.570 Coef
(-1) - 0.200 P-value (-1) - 0.320 P-value
ERP -0.055 - Coef ERP -0.060 - Coef
(-1) 0.057* - P-value (-1) 0.041** - P-value
Cement ERP Paper ERP
Cement - 0.200 Coef Paper - 0.025 Coef
(-1) - 0.180 P-value (-1) - 0.460 P-value
ERP -0.069 - Coef ERP 0.035 - Coef
(-1) 0.089* - P-value (-1) 0.180 - P-value
N=85
Vector Error Correction Model
 
Sources: Own construction. MER data comes from the new dataset collected from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports 
(1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. 
Sectoral industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica. 
 
11.3 Additional Regressions  
This third sub-section presents two additional sets of regressions that are also a 
robustness exercise for the regressions from Section 7.5. The first exercise runs a 
panel data rather than OLS estimates, while the second changes the 
explanatory variables to the difference between the MERs and the SER.  
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The first exercise is to perform the same regressions as Section 7.5, but rather 
than using individual OLS regressions it shows a panel data set of all sectors 
combined. As discussed in Chapter 7, a panel is not expected to perform well 
with the current data set, given that the time horizon is larger and there is little 
variation in the cross section space. But the panel can provide an interesting 
counterfactual exercise. Since the results of the original regressions indicate 
small coefficients between the exchange rates and industrial production, it 
would be expected that a panel, which provides the average impact of all MER 
on industrial production, would also show minimal or not statistically 
significant coefficients. This is the main difference in the panel specification 
compared to the original regressions. Since all sectors are tested together, and 
all of the non-explained cross-section variation goes to the fixed effects, the 
original coefficient of the exchange rate to industrial production is not sectoral 
but a combined coefficient for the whole economy.  
The panel was performed with specifications both on level and first difference, 
as well as with a variety of estimating methods. The various estimating 
methods were used to guarantee that the results were robustly tested, with two 
stages least square (2SLS) and general method of moments (GMM) estimators 
being used to correct for serial correlation. The results of the panel estimates 
are presented at Table 11.7. 
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Table 11.7 – Panel Data Estimations  
Estimation OLS Pooled OLS FE OLS FE 2SLE FE GMM
OLS 
Pooled OLS FE 2SLE FE GMM
Equation i ii ii iii v vi vii ix x
Intercept
0.13**    
(0.058)
4.53***    
(0.09)
0.36***    
(0.11)
0.196**    
(0.12)
0.196**    
(0.12)
0.006*** 
(0.001)
0.006*** 
(0.001)
0.019 
(0.02)
0.019 
(0.02)
Effective Rate of Protection (Log and 1st 
Difference)
.-0.00016 
(0.0053)
0.02 
(0.008)
0.03 
(0.008)
0.04 
(0.01)
0.04 
(0.01)
0.02 
(0.03)
0.019 
(0.03)
.-0.2  
(0.59)
.-0.1 
(0.59)
Controls X X X X X X X X X
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 860 860 860 860 860 860 860 860 860
R-Squared 0.95 0.73 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.1 0.1 -0.08 -0.08
Adjusted R-Squared 0.95 0.7 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.09 0.09 -0.22 -0.22
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.43 0.18 2.38 2.47 2.47 2.46 2.49 2.37 2.37
Dependent Variable - Real Industrial Production Index (Log)
Level First Difference
 
Sources: Own construction. MER data comes from the new dataset collected from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports 
(1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. 
Tariffs come from Morley (1969). Sectoral industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica. Instruction 
113 FDI from Caputo (2007). Population from IBGE (2017).  
The panel data results confirm the above expectations. The coefficients of the 
exchange rate are generally very small and in all cases not statistically 
significant. As in the original results, the coefficients of tariffs are also very 
small and not statistically significant. This confirms that there does not seem to 
be any important average impact of the exchange rate on industrial production 
– the same result obtained above from the indexes and the regressions from 
Section 7.5. It is also worth highlighting that the panel data regressions are not 
very robust. Even in the cases when serial correlation is corrected by GMM or 
2SLS, the explanatory power of the first difference regression is very small, 
confirming that this model is not the best option for the exercise.  
The second exercise provides a different econometric methodology to the 
regressions of Section 7.5. As discussed in Chapter 7 and validated by the tests 
of Appendix 1, the regressions of Section 7.5 seem robust enough to suggest the 
MER system’s distortions to industrial growth were minimal and did not cause 
major changes to the overall performance of the industrial sector in Brazil. 
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There is, however, one possible weakness of the adopted methodology: the 
policy intervention, which is measured by the gap between the ERP and the 
SER, is only being captured by the in-sample simulation after the regressions 
are performed. The regressions only capture the direct effect of the ERP in each 
sector’s industrial production growth, which from an econometric standpoint 
means that they are not being directly controlled for the SER in the regressions. 
One could argue that this process does not prevent an endogeneity problem. 
As was already discussed, since each MER was a separate market, this is not a 
problem, at least in theory. The existence of cointegration equations between 
the nominal exchange rates and industrial production for all the sectors and the 
VEC estimates (both in Appendix 1) support the correct direction of causality, 
while also acting as robustness exercises to guarantee that the short-term effects 
estimated above are not spurious. Nonetheless, it could be argued that there 
may still be an inverse causality between industrial production and the ERP, 
invalidating the results. 
An alternative econometric approach deals with this problem and is another 
robustness check for the exercise done above. Instead of regressing the ERP on 
the production of each industrial sector, a different specification can directly 
estimate the effect of the gap between the ERPs and the SER. By doing this, the 
new regressions estimate the direct elasticity of the policy intervention, the size 
of the gap between both exchange rates, and with this control for the long-term 
underlying economic fundamentals with the inclusion of the SER in the 
regressions.  
This alternative approach has, however, a different problem. If the results from 
the above section are correct, they mean the effects of the distortions were very 
small or inexistent for most sectors, so the elasticity of the policy intervention in 
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these new regressions would need to be close to zero or not statistically 
significant to be consistent with the previous results. If this exercise captures a 
strong effect from the policy interventions on industrial production, it would 
suggest a large distortion effect, contradicting the above results. Usually 
regressions searching for small effects or statistically insignificant parameters 
do not tell interesting stories, but in this case they would be confirming the 
above results. The alternative estimation specification is: 
Real industrial production t = c + β (gap between ERP of the sector and the SER) 
t + controls t + ARMA terms + e 
Table 11.8 presents the new regression results. 
Table 11.8 – Alternative Regression Results, 1953-1961 
Food Beverages Rubber Leather Cement Extractive Tobacco Steel Textile Paper
Equation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Intercept 0.0034 0 0.001 0 0.009 0.028 -0.001 0.02 0.001 0.01
0.55 0.84 0.92 0 0.08 0 0.1 0 0.67 0.03
0.2** 0.034 0.43 0.02 -0.09 -0.25 0.09*** -0.016 0.002 -0.06
0.02 0.37 0.19 0.53 0.21 0.002 0.42 0.96 0.42
Controls X X X X X X X X X X
ARMA Terms YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 62 64 63 62 62 58 62 62 61 61
R-Squared 0.35 0.55 0.28 0.7 0.098 0.46 0.5 0.28 0.4 0.46
Adjusted R-Squared 0.28 0.48 0.2 0.68 0.05 0.37 0.43 0.23 0.33 0.39
Dependent Variable - Real Industrial Production Index (Log and 1st Difference)
Gap between category 
and market exchange 
rate (Log and 1st 
Difference)
 
Sources: MER data from Sumoc’s Annual Bulletins and Reports (1953-1961) and the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly 
Statistical Books (1951-1957), containing data from Banco do Brasil. Tariffs are from Morley (1969, p. 307). Sectoral 
industrial production from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura Econômica (1953-1961). Instruction 113 FDI from Caputo (2007, 
p. 54). Population from IBGE (2017). Methodology for the MER data can be found in Appendix 4. Statistical 
significance: *** for 1% level; ** for 5% level; * for 10% level. 
A few results from the new estimations are worth highlighting. First, there are 
a significantly smaller number of parameters that are statistically significant. 
Only in two sectors, food and tobacco, is β statistically significant. For all other 
sectors, the results show the gap having no statistically significant effect on 
industrial production. Second, for the two sectors that have statistically 
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significant results and all the others that do not, the coefficients are extremely 
small and suggest no effect from the policy intervention on the industrial 
production of each sector.  
These results confirm the regressions of Chapter 6. The inexistence of the policy 
effect on industrial production suggests that distortions were minimal 
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12. Appendix 2 – Original Instructions 70 and 113 of Sumoc 
12.1 Instruction 70 
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12.2 Instruction 113 
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13. Appendix 3 – Multiple Exchange Rates Database 
Table 13.1 – Multiple Exchange Rates, 1953-1960 (CR$ per US$)  
Official 
(CR$)
Catergory 
1
Catergory 
2
Catergory 
3
Catergory 
4
Catergory 
5 Special General
MER 
Average
Free 
Market
Oct-53 18.7 15.2 25.3 38.2 40.5 86.4 31.4 46.3
Nov-53 18.7 12.3 31.8 42.1 51.8 118.9 35.8 53.3
Dec-53 18.7 16.3 22.5 40.0 44.8 114.9 30.6 55.3
Jan-54 18.7 22.0 25.8 47.8 58.4 110.9 36.2 55.4
Feb-54 18.7 24.1 39.5 58.2 77.3 131.3 46.8 59.9
Mar-54 18.7 25.7 38.0 52.5 78.1 120.6 45.2 58.4
Apr-54 18.7 23.7 25.1 49.0 76.5 115.3 38.6 50.9
May-54 18.7 18.8 23.0 51.8 74.4 122.5 38.4 50.7
Jun-54 18.7 17.2 22.7 55.2 78.8 129.4 39.8 58.1
Jul-54 18.7 26.0 35.2 70.0 85.9 146.2 50.6 62.3
Aug-54 18.7 32.4 40.5 72.8 96.1 151.1 56.1 62.2
Sep-54 18.7 29.3 41.8 79.3 92.3 153.7 55.7 63.4
Oct-54 18.7 38.3 42.8 91.6 99.0 163.0 62.5 66.4
Nov-54 18.7 55.7 58.3 127.0 132.0 196.8 88.5 73.9
Dec-54 18.7 47.2 59.7 129.3 162.9 185.5 89.0 76.7
Jan-55 18.7 40.6 55.5 119.6 167.7 199.4 87.9 75.2
Feb-55 18.7 45.6 61.7 142.9 196.1 237.3 101.3 77.8
Mar-55 18.7 57.4 85.4 161.3 222.5 339.2 116.9 82.8
Apr-55 18.7 66.3 92.8 177.5 163.6 301.8 119.1 80.6
May-55 18.7 66.3 84.7 166.6 231.0 272.8 127.1 81.1
Jun-55 18.7 66.6 94.4 178.4 271.4 283.9 132.4 76.8
Jul-55 18.7 71.7 102.4 181.5 281.7 266.9 126.2 72.9
Aug-55 18.7 73.0 108.9 171.5 205.8 284.9 122.3 71.1
Sep-55 18.7 72.5 94.0 154.0 203.3 282.1 115.0 67.8
Oct-55 18.7 72.5 91.1 145.1 182.1 297.8 110.9 67.1
Nov-55 18.7 68.1 85.0 149.4 194.4 298.6 98.3 67.0
Dec-55 18.7 66.9 81.2 141.6 209.9 327.7 101.6 67.4
Jan-56 18.7 70.9 82.0 163.6 221.6 318.6 121.2 72.4
Feb-56 18.7 83.0 112.3 190.6 246.5 314.9 147.2 71.4
Mar-56 18.7 85.1 118.8 177.4 234.0 284.8 143.9 74.1
Apr-56 18.7 90.5 127.3 181.1 251.1 297.8 149.5 79.9
May-56 18.7 98.9 128.5 196.6 212.3 281.5 154.8 84.0
Jun-56 18.7 87.6 123.1 186.7 217.9 289.5 142.8 83.5
Jul-56 18.7 68.0 93.7 164.8 210.9 285.4 134.7 75.6
Aug-56 18.7 63.2 90.6 151.1 195.8 260.4 100.9 74.6
Sep-56 18.7 51.2 81.8 143.7 186.3 277.0 109.4 69.7
Oct-56 18.7 46.3 71.1 121.9 185.9 304.3 85.5 68.5
Nov-56 18.7 40.8 68.8 115.6 173.2 290.4 88.6 67.4
Dec-56 18.7 43.7 67.6 105.4 156.9 295.6 85.0 66.2
Jan-57 18.7 38.9 59.6 90.4 121.4 283.8 78.9 65.6
Feb-57 18.7 38.0 64.3 89.5 125.7 294.3 80.2 66.5
Mar-57 18.7 41.3 66.0 83.1 121.7 317.9 83.5 65.4  
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Official 
(CR$)
Catergory 
1
Catergory 
2
Catergory 
3
Catergory 
4
Catergory 
5 Special General
MER 
Average
Free 
Market
Apr-57 18.7 43.2 66.3 84.1 132.0 311.3 82.9 69.3
May-57 18.7 41.1 63.0 86.4 138.6 311.9 82.9 74.5
Jun-57 18.7 41.7 58.2 87.0 151.1 300.8 74.4 71.7
Jul-57 18.7 47.4 62.8 91.0 150.6 274.8 72.3 74.2
Aug-57 18.7 60.2 89.2 115.9 183.8 281.0 106.3 79.0
Sep-57 18.7 69.2 158.7 76.1 82.1
Oct-57 18.7 66.4 197.0 82.6 88.1
Nov-57 18.7 64.1 210.8 77.4 91.0
Dec-57 18.7 71.6 226.2 82.7 91.7
Jan-58 18.7 80.0 206.4 98.2 98.3
Feb-58 18.7 100.8 236.7 116.3 100.2
Mar-58 18.7 110.7 260.9 128.4 108.4
Apr-58 18.7 134.6 282.1 150.4 122.8
May-58 18.7 120.9 259.4 137.9 125.3
Jun-58 18.7 124.5 263.1 136.7 133.8
Jul-58 18.7 128.9 281.7 138.7 135.1
Aug-58 18.7 137.3 299.0 151.3 164.6
Sep-58 18.7 162.4 336.1 174.3 158.0
Oct-58 18.7 175.7 346.2 207.7 142.8
Nov-58 18.7 169.9 315.8 183.0 140.4
Dec-58 18.7 165.7 290.9 175.8 140.4
Jan-59 18.7 182.0 340.7 192.3 146.5
Feb-59 18.7 228.9 351.2 240.3 141.4
Mar-59 18.7 262.6 355.0 271.4
Apr-59 18.7 199.2 327.6 213.2
May-59 18.7 161.2 317.4 170.1
Jun-59 18.7 153.6 320.7 167.7
Jul-59 18.7 156.7 302.9 168.3
Aug-59 18.7 152.5 311.7 163.7
Sep-59 18.7 157.9 344.8 169.5
Oct-59 18.7 199.6 398.7 230.1
Nov-59 18.7 189.4 395.6 210.4
Dec-59 18.7 184.2 398.4 199.4
Jan-60 18.7 188.3 427.2 207.7
Feb-60 18.7 188.7 472.5 208.7
Mar-60 18.7 217.6 527.7 242.6
Apr-60 18.7 221.1 506.6 239.8
May-60 18.7 218.6 482.0 236.9
Jun-60 18.7 212.3 444.2 237.2
Jul-60 18.7 209.2 454.1 231.2
Aug-60 18.7 208.9 450.6 223.7
Sep-60 18.7 206.7 531.8 231.7
Oct-60 18.7 207.0 573.6 243.4
Nov-60 18.7 209.2 607.2 232.2
Dec-60 18.7 206.8 624.2 235.1  
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Table 13.2 – Offered and Auctioned Foreign Exchange, 1953-1960 (US$ 
million) 
Catergory 1 Catergory 2
Catergory 
3
Catergory 
4
Catergory 
5 Special General
Total 
Auctioned
Total 
Offered
Oct-53 5673 10918 9962 2277 1276 30106 59330
Nov-53 10209 22683 21112 4397 1575 59976 93593
Dec-53 11441 25754 24618 3823 1033 66669 101475
Jan-54 9199 13831 14721 2373 711 40835 58625
Feb-54 10477 18489 19722 2620 775 52083 64233
Mar-54 22430 36720 38733 8679 1689 108251 175171
Apr-54 24471 29720 34689 7473 1626 97979 262112
May-54 26054 27169 39270 7324 1702 101519 323558
Jun-54 24866 24394 38248 6676 1447 95631 214830
Jul-54 20278 18005 26874 4787 921 70865 159163
Aug-54 22617 17966 25636 6795 1251 74265 159230
Sep-54 18496 13088 18548 4130 830 55092 143653
Oct-54 16691 11869 14965 3911 602 48038 160667
Nov-54 11109 11791 13266 3498 518 40182 106930
Dec-54 14401 15126 15005 5201 582 50315 163620
Jan-55 14223 14623 16790 6622 754 53012 148800
Feb-55 12549 10754 12194 5802 489 41788 112460
Mar-55 20087 19980 20228 6897 884 68076 163440
Apr-55 12322 12335 12266 4021 431 41375 134700
May-55 10127 20618 22124 2766 2237 57872 136645
Jun-55 7284 13646 12799 1602 1228 36559 140560
Jul-55 11022 13013 11488 2993 368 38884 135513
Aug-55 13303 19780 12551 1572 1061 48267 143850
Sep-55 12852 20702 14957 1883 1391 51785 149365
Oct-55 13725 22108 15973 2011 1485 55302 154880
Nov-55 13393 23168 12499 777 0 49834 146130
Dec-55 11664 19168 14113 2156 0 47099 141755
Jan-56 8102 17113 16101 2144 905 44365 137380
Feb-56 6785 13903 12725 1530 1295 36238 66180
Mar-56 12446 25505 23343 2806 2376 66476 78740
Apr-56 10153 20066 18647 2558 1311 52735 63299
May-56 10907 21558 20033 2748 1409 56655 67155
Jun-56 11293 20201 16631 2265 846 51236 65195
Jul-56 5801 19788 25995 3322 1058 55964 69854
Aug-56 18141 26564 13455 1430 913 60503 78486
Sep-56 9899 23835 23503 2452 1448 61138 81046
Oct-56 16517 25398 16981 1975 903 61774 83606
Nov-56 14448 23255 19374 2752 1944 61774 83606
Dec-56 14597 23494 19573 2780 1964 62409 86166
Jan-57 7215 22554 28587 3480 1209 63044 88726
Feb-57 8171 16942 17772 2348 1601 46833 77105
Mar-57 5977 13373 16642 2270 1736 39998 61086  
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Catergory 1 Catergory 2
Catergory 
3
Catergory 
4
Catergory 
5 Special General
Total 
Auctioned
Total 
Offered
Apr-57 7405 16081 21699 3260 1637 50082 74898
May-57 8236 17886 24136 3627 1820 55705 81145
Jun-57 11875 19566 17014 2447 1352 52254 76537
Jul-57 15914 23932 17812 2545 451 60654 76721
Aug-57 5795 12637 16812 2364 804 38412 48440
Sep-57 19875 1667 21542 28711
Oct-57 45952 6475 52427 104974
Nov-57 46249 4599 50848 80594
Dec-57 41246 3205 44451 70775
Jan-58 42561 7160 49721 87051
Feb-58 25214 3257 28471 56700
Mar-58 37337 4978 42315 75600
Apr-58 30985 3704 34689 74099
May-58 37419 5254 42673 81791
Jun-58 39504 3803 43307 86508
Jul-58 44113 3007 47120 92609
Aug-58 40346 3812 44158 78661
Sep-58 43195 3175 46370 69096
Oct-58 27269 6309 33578 63753
Nov-58 26878 2654 29532 47820
Dec-58 27883 2440 30323 48015
Jan-59 31453 2194 33647 50651
Feb-59 20943 2146 23089 35984
Mar-59 22210 2325 24535 37970
Apr-59 28657 3511 32168 53737
May-59 30376 1820 32196 50584
Jun-59 27242 2522 29764 47195
Jul-59 24237 2086 26323 44955
Aug-59 24068 1817 25885 44842
Sep-59 36612 2412 39024 57580
Oct-59 22498 4069 26567 55042
Nov-59 25188 2851 28039 48567
Dec-59 33950 2590 36540 49063
Jan-60 28269 2500 30769 38504
Feb-60 33115 2519 35634 43381
Mar-60 30398 2675 33073 41059
Apr-60 29068 2031 31099 37207
May-60 39637 2952 42589 50128
Jun-60 35388 4247 39635 49501
Jul-60 32462 3201 35663 44310
Aug-60 43844 2867 46711 54290
Sep-60 47320 3938 51258 60408
Oct-60 43442 4796 48238 62852
Nov-60 48504 2983 51487 61256
Dec-60 59582 4342 63924 72484  
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14. Appendix 4 – Data Sources and Methodology 
This appendix presents the methodology of the construction of the figures 
presented in the thesis. Most of the methodological explanation is related to the 
transformation of primary data to the format presented in the tables. All the 
figures of the thesis that directly present statistical sources or were reproduced 
from other secondary literature do not require additional methodological 
explanation and are not part of this appendix. All the figures explained in this 
appendix were highlighted in their sources.  
Figure 4.1 – Real Exchange Rate, 1939-1960 (Cr$ per US$, 1939=100) 
Figure 4.1 was constructed using the following procedure. The primary series 
of exchange rates for the five categories of the MER system between 1953 and 
1957, and later for the two categories between 1957-1961, were collected from 
the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly Statistical Books, for the period between 1953 
and 1955, and for 1955 to 1961 from Sumoc’s Monthly Bulletins and Annual 
Reports – the latter aggregated data from the bulletins. Sumoc’s official 
documents only started being published in 1955, but the Ministry of Finance 
data collected information on the exchange rates from Sumoc between 1953 and 
1955, which were published in its own official documents. All three 
publications were consulted in the archives of the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) 
in Brasilia.  
Prior to the MER period, the fixed exchange rate of $18.7 was used between 
1939 and 1953. The exchange rate series were then weighted according to the 
amount of currency auctioned for each category in each of the periods. The 
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data on the quantities of auctioned currency per category were also collected 
from the same three publications described above. This allowed the calculation 
of an average weighted MER for the whole period. Finally, to construct the real 
exchange series an index of the weighted average exchange rates was built with 
1939 = 100, and then the calculation of the real exchange rate was done by 
discounting annualized inflation for every year. Inflation data was collected 
from IBGE (2017). 
Figure 5.1 – Multiple Exchange Rates, 1951-1960 (Cr$ per US$) 
Figure 5.1 was constructed using the exact same methodology described in the 
first part of the explanation of Figure 4.1, but directly presents the MER 
collected from the original sources. 
Table 5.1 – Agios and Bonificações, 1953-1960 (Cr$ Millions) 
Table 5.1 was constructed using the following methodology: Original data for 
the agios and bonificacoes were obtained from the Ministry of Finance’s Monthly 
Statistical Books, for the period between 1953 and 1955, and for the remaining 
period until 1961 from Sumoc’s Monthly Bulletins or Annual Reports, which 
aggregated data from the bulletins. The original data were monthly, and then 
aggregated to an annual basis. The net revenues from the MER system 
correspond to the simple deduction of the bonificacoes from the agios. The net 
revenues were not directly presented in the original documents, and were 
calculated for the table. 
Figure 5.4 - Liquid and ‘Illiquid’ FDI, 1955-1961 (US$ Million) 
Figure 5.4 was constructed using the following methodology. Data on overall 
FDI inflows was obtained from IBGE (2017) on an annual basis. Caputo (2007) 
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calculated, based on Sumoc’s Instructions between 1955 and 1961, the overall 
level of FDI inflows coming under Instruction 113 authorizations. All imports 
via this system had to be authorized by Sumoc. Since these were not inflows, 
but imports, as discussed in the thesis, they are classified as ‘illiquid’ FDI. 
These levels are deduced from the overall level of FDI to calculate the ‘liquid’ 
FDI flows. The two series are plotted together in Figure 5.4 
Figure 5.7 Auctioned Foreign Exchange, 1953-1960 (US$ million) 
Figure 5.7 was constructed using the same methodology described in the 
second part of the explanation of Figure 4.1, which describes the collection of 
the auctioned currency from the MER, and was collected from the same 
sources.  
Figure 5.8 – Imports Outside the Auction System, 1953-1961 
Figure 5.2 was constructed using the following process. Data of the overall 
level of imports in Brazil were obtained from IBGE (1953-1961), on an annual 
basis, while data on the quantities of auctioned foreign exchange were obtained 
following the same methodology presented in the second part of Figure 4.1. 
Since the MER was a closed system, and only exemptions authorized by Sumoc 
or direct imports by the government could be imported outside the system, the 
figures subtract the quantities of currency auctioned from the overall level of 
imports per year. This results in the overall level of imports outside the auction 
system. Finally, the level of imports outside the auctions was calculated as a 
percentage of the overall level of imports. 
Figure 6.2 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange and the Gap (US$ million), 1953-1961 
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Figure 6.2 was constructed using the following methodology. Original data of 
auctioned foreign exchange and offered foreign exchange were constructed 
using the same methodology described in the second part of the explanation of 
Figure 4.1, and collected from the same sources. The same documents from the 
Ministry of Finance and Sumoc report both the level of auctioned and offered 
foreign exchange at the auctions. However, for the quantities of offered foreign 
exchange the documents only report the overall level for the full system, and 
not the data separated by categories. The gap was calculated by deducting the 
quantities of foreign exchange auctioned from what was offered at each month. 
Figure 5.7 plots the gap and the overall amount of auctioned foreign exchange. 
Figure 6.3 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange and Offered Foreign Exchange, 1953-
1961 (US$ million) 
Figure 6.3 was constructed using the same methodology described in Figure 
6.2, but plots the series of auctioned and offered foreign exchange in the MER 
system. 
Figure 6.4 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange Per Category, 1953-1957 (US$ million) 
Figure 6.4 was constructed using the same methodology described in the 
second part of the explanation of Figure 4.1, and collected from the same 
sources.  
Figure 6.5 – Auctioned Foreign Exchange, 1953-1957 (% of Total) 
Figure 5.6 was constructed calculating the percentage share of each category 
from the total of the data presented in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.6 – Free Market Rate and Weighted Auctions Rate, 1953-1957 
(Cr$/US$) 
Figure 6.6 was constructed using the following methodology. The weighted 
average auction exchange rate was constructed using the methodology 
described in Figure 4.1, using the same data sources. The free market exchange 
rate was also obtained from the same data sources, and for same period. Both 
series were plotted at Figure 5.11.Table 7.1 – Regression Results, 1953-1961 
Table 7.1 was constructed using the following methodology. The regressions 
methodology is presented in Chapter 7. Data from the MER were obtained 
using the methodology presented in the first part of Figure 4.1. The sources for 
industrial production, FDI, and tariffs were FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura 
Economica, Caputo (2007), and Morley (1969), and the data were used without 
alterations  
Figure 7.6 – Multiple Exchange Rates and the Shadow Exchange Rate (Cr$ per 
US$) 
Figure 7.6 plots the data presented in Figure 5.1, which presents the series of 
MERs, and Figure 6.6, which presents the free market exchange rate. The SER 
corresponds exactly to the free market exchange rate. 
Table 8.4 – Importers’ Costs and Benefits, 1950-1960 
Table 8.4 was constructed using the following methodology. Column 2, which 
shows the level of imports by importers, was obtained from the data of Figure 
5.2. The percentage of imports outside the MER system is the percentage of 
imports directly by the government and industrialists. This percentage was 
applied to the overall level of imports to calculate the share of imports by 
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importers, and the variations of imports by importers in the two MER periods. 
Then, using the average MER for the two periods, calculated using the 
methodology discussed in Figure 4.1, the exact monetary level in cruzeiros 
gained or lost by importers was obtained for each MER period. Finally, this 
value was compared to the overall level of net revenues by the government 
from the MER system calculated in Table 4.2, and the revenues from tariffs, 
which were obtained by applying the average ad valorem tariffs obtained from 
Morley (1969) to the overall level of imports. The final column compares the 
ratio of the importers’ gains/losses to the overall level of revenues of the 
government in the two systems. 
Figure 8.3 – Import versus Export Average Exchange Rates, 1953-1960 (Cr$ per 
US$) 
Table 8.3 was constructed using the following methodology. The average 
import exchange rate was constructed using the same methodology described 
in the second part of the explanation of Figure 4.1, and collected from the same 
sources. The average export exchange rate was obtained from the same sources 
described for Figure 4.1 and for the same periods. The average export exchange 
rate reproduces the data from the Ministry of Finance and Sumoc documents.  
Table 8.5 – Exporters’ Costs and Benefits, 1953-1960 
Table 8.5 was constructed using the following methodology. The average 
import and export exchange rates, of columns 1 and 2, were obtained using the 
methodology described for Figure 7.4. Column 4 calculates the ratio between 
the two series. Column 5 calculates the percentage of implicit appropriation by 
reversing the ratio between the two series. If the two series were the same, the 
appropriation would be zero. Finally, the last column applies this 
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appropriation to the overall level of exports to calculate the nominal value of 
the appropriation. 
Table 8.8 – ‘Outside of Auctions’ Import Subsidy, 1954-1960 
Table 7.8 was constructed using the following methodology. Column 3 sums 
the level of overall imports with the FDI through Instruction 113, obtained from 
Caputo (2007). Then, by applying the percentage of imports outside the system 
calculated in Figure 5.2 to this sum, it calculates the share of effective imports 
via the official exchange rate. This is used to calculate the exact amount of 
imports via the official and the MER average rate in US$. Finally, the table also 
calculates the ratio between the official rate and the average import exchange 
rate using the data calculated in the first part of the methodology described for 
Figure 4.1. 
Table 8.11 – Government Revenues from the MER System and Tariffs, 1953-
1960 
Table 8.11 was constructed using the following methodology. Using the data of 
agios and bonificacoes from Figure 5.1, and the data of overall government 
revenues obtained from Sochaczwesky (1980), it calculates the share of net agios 
in government revenues. Then, using the average tariff rate from Morley (1969) 
and the government revenues, it calculates the share of tariffs to government 
revenues. Finally, these two series are summed to obtain the overall level of 
revenues from tariffs and the MER system, obtained by the government, and its 
share in overall revenues. 
Table 8.14 - Industrial Benefits, 1953-1960 
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Table 7.14 was constructed using the following methodology. Data of real 
industrial production were obtained from FGV’s Revista de Conjuntura 
Economica. Then, using the data of net revenues from tariffs and the MER from 
Table 8.11, the contribution, in percentage points, of industrial growth in 
nominal terms to the revenues is estimated.  
 
 
 
